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ABSTRACT: 
ENGLISH CASTLE GARRISONS IN THE ANGLO-SCOTTISH 
WARS OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 
The military history of the castle has been dominated by architectural ly based studies 
whilst little attention has been paid to the men who manned them in time of war. The 
aim of this thesis is to redress the balance by undertaking a detailed analysis of 
medieval wartime garrisons by concentrating on those retained by the English Crown 
during the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century. During 1298-1314 and 1335- 
42 major Scottish castles were occupied by English garrisons while 1314-23 saw, 
garrisons installed in the front-line castles of northern England and Roxburgh 
remained garrisoned by English troops from 1346 right through into the fifteenth 
century. Fortified garrison towns such as Berwick, Carlisle and Perth also played key 
roles but as this study concentrates on castle garrisons these only enter the discussion 
where they help illustrate a point or are integral to the aspect being illustrated. 
To determine the role of the castle in warfare it is necessary to analyse the 
operational activities of garrisons yet the latter can only be truly understood by 
appreciating exactly what sort of an entity a castle garrison was. Only by 
comprehending the nature of garrisons can their operational effectiveness be properly 
addressed. This thesis therefore first details the infrastructure that underpinned these 
garrisons before discussing their operational activities. 
In terms of size the fourteenth century garrisons equate to the largest retained 
by the English Crown during the entire medieval period. Their numbers do fluctuate in 
response to the immediate state and pressure of warfare but each major Scottish castle 
regularly had an approximate average of either eighty or 150 troops based within them 
suggesting two approximate tiers of wartime manning were in operation. The overall 
total of troops in garrison service, including those based within garrisoned towns, was 
between 1,100 and 1,600 in the first half of the century. The rapid reduction of 
garrisons upon periods of truce or peace reflects the burdensome cost of retaining such 
large forces. 
A full range of medieval troop types was retained within these garrisons. 
Bannerets and knights accounted for approximately 1% whereas men-at-arms formed 
the mainstay throughout the century regularly accounting for between a third and a half 
of each individual garrison. During the early years of the century foot-soldiers 
represented between a half and two thirds of garrison troops but from 1314 they almost 
completely disappear from wartime garrisons altogether and feature intermittently after 
1335. They were replaced by mounted troops, the first being the hobelar and the 
second the mounted archer,, the latter accounting for 67% of the Roxburgh garrison in 
1400. Clearly the latest troop types were immediately incorporated into garrisons and a 
conscious effort was undertaken to make garrisons totally mobile forces. 
Despite serving within the same castle garrison troops consisted of various 
groups of men who frequently appear separately Within financial accounts with the 
personal retinue of the constable being the most striking individual group. This process 
became more streamlined from mid-century when the Crown routinely recruited and 
retained garrisons by concluding an indenture with each constable, a practice that first 
occurred earlier in the century but only for short periods of time such as the winter 
months. Later in the century indentures contained detailed stipulations which were 
mostly financial in nature and made provision for specific differences in time of peace 
and of war. 
All garrisons were paid by the Crown. Before the 1330s this was calculated on 
an individual basis with troops being paid at the accepted wage rates relevant to their 
status. Differences did occur, presumably due to variance in the costs of victuals at 
different locations, although there was an attempt to cut all wages during the truce of 
1302. In the 1330s higher rates were allowed due to the necessity of war. Constables 
received the money at specified dates throughout the year and lump sums were not 
uncommon, usually being paid in relation to the constables' role as sheriffs, which 
prefigured the later lump sums paid out as necessitated by the indenture system. 
Frequent non-payment of money by the Crown led to constables taking on the burden 
and leaving the Crown with long-standing debts that it attempted to meet by various 
means and which were still owed several years later. Yet despite the war castles had an 
economic role and some continued to make money from their lands. Victualling was 
equally as critical as the payment of wages. Indeed victuals were frequently paid in 
lieu of wages. Berwick and Carlisle acted as supply bases and goods were shipped 
north where possible. Various means of obtaining victuals were employed depending 
upon the desperation of the situation and their impromptu seizure was not uncommon. 
Non-arrival of money or victuals could severely Jeopardise the continued existence of 
garrisons. 
The personal stature of the bannerets and knights who commanded the castle 
garrisons varied throughout the century with periods of hard warfare marked by the 
appointment of veteran commanders of national standing. Lulls saw men of a more 
local stature installed while the Percy family also came to have a significant influence 
over those who were appointed to Roxburgh from mid-century onwards. The type of 
men appointed consequently reveals the importance the Crown attached to the 
garrisons during various phases of the war. Surviving records also allow critical 
glimpses of the men-at-arms who served within garrisons and it is clear that an 
identifiable core of these men were engaged in long-term garrison service with 
movement both between castles and within their own personal status being a feature of 
this service. Protections from later in the century reveal that those serving within 
garrisons came from throughout the country With the majority from south of the Trent 
while it is also evident that the geographical origins of the constable directly affected 
the regional make up of the garrison. 
In operational terms the defence of a castle by its garrison from within the 
walls was the severest test it could face. Scottish attacks by both siege and assault were 
meticulously planned and were especially effective within the hostile territory of 
Scotland. Garrisons could withstand these but that they frequently succumbed to them 
illustrates that an isolated castle relied on the external support of the wider military 
system to maintain its resistance with the lack of censure against constables who lost 
their castles evidence that contemporaries also recognised this fact. The role of the 
constable in guiding the defence and deciding when to enter into surrender 
negotiations highlights the critical role he played when forced onto the defensive. 
Beyond their walls garrisons undertook a wide-ranging spectrum of activities ranging 
from short-range defensive forays to ambitious long-range strikes and were able to 
launch these in co-operation with one another. Garrison troops also operated in 
conjunction with English field-armies and when necessity dictated participated in 
major battles. Communication both between garrisons and between garrisons and 
higher commanders was an ongoing feature with messengers frequently paid for 
carrying out such duties while the gathering and dissemination of intelligence was also 
an incessant activity practiced by garrisons and their commanders, information being 
gathered by means including spies, scouts and informers. However it must be 
remembered that although garrisons undertook a wide range of activities beyond their 
walls these were encompassed within a clearly defined limit of what such a limited 
sized force could be expected to either achieve or oppose. 
In summary it is clear that the English Crown invested tremendous effort and 
expense in maintaining these large garrisons as they were seen as essential for the 
active prosecution of the war against Scotland. The heavily garrisoned castles were 
meant to primarily operate aggressively. It is for this reason that they contained such 
large numbers and seasoned troops and also underwent a drive to make them fully 
mobile. In fact the castles and their garrisons were at their most vulnerable during 
periods when England was forced into prolonged defensive warfare and actually came 
into their own when England was strategically on the offensive. The study of the castle 
building has overemphasised the defensive, largely passive, role of castles in warfare; 
a study of their garrisons reveals that in the fourteenth century the English Crown 
attempted to utilise the castle as an aggressive instrument of war. 
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THE GARRISON AS AN ENTITY 
I 
1. 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The importance of English garrisons in the fourteenth century Anglo-Scottish wars is 
reflected in their size. Much that has been written about garrisons has been centred on 
a study of the numbers involved and has stressed the extremely small number of 
people necessary to run a castle during peacetime, a skeletal garrison that amounted to 
little more than a domestic staff. This sense of a minimal garrison also existed in 
Wales in the great castles built by Edward I and due to the incongruity of such small 
numbers manning such large castles it is a noteworthy and often remarked feature of 
the period. This does not mean that the size of wartime garrisons has been totally 
neglected but for the majority of English castles they were never in a state of war in 
this period and this in turn marks out the castles that became the backbone of the 
English war against the Scots as particularly insightful into the size of wartime 
gaffisons. 1 
As this thesis is a military study of garrisons it concentrates on those retained 
within a garrison who were combatants, namely the knights, men-at-arms and foot- 
soldiers and, as the period progressed, hobelars and mounted archers. In analysing the 
numerical size of garrisons it is only these troops who contribute to the overall totals 
despite there being a host of non-combatants alongside them within the garrison whose 
varied roles supported and maintained both the soldiers and the castle. 2 The primary 
' For the size of wartime garrisons see J. S. Moore, 'Anglo-Norman Garrisons', Anglo-Norman Studje., ý 
XWI, ed. C. Harper-Bill (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 217-27; M. Prestwich, 'The Garrisoning of English 
Medieval Castles', 7he Normans and their Adversaries at War, ed. R. P. Abels, B. S. Bachrach 
(Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 186-90. 
2 See pp. 73-5. In fact these were effectively semi-combatants as in the event of a direct attack on the 
castle they would no doubt have strenuously joined in its defence. Indeed anyone ser-Ong within a 
frontline castle was a potential combatant whatever their role; their essential difference to the 
combatants lay in their primary role lying elsewhere and their consequent lack of equipment and 
training. 
3 
role of these garrisons was military, they were a fighting force, and that 
contemporaries treated them as such is evident in the almost total absence of any 
reference to non-combatants in financial accounts and muster rolls, the very documents 
which form the basis of any analysis of numbers. As in this study the size of a garrison 
meant the number of fighting men contained within it. However the full picture should 
be borne in mind as non-combatants could swell the actual size of a garrison 
enormously as a rare survival from 1300 makes clear. On 28 February a return was 
made of the personnel within the garrison of Edinburgh which amounted to a total of 
154 troops; the rarity is that the return includes a list of the non-combatants as well 
which more than doubled the overall size of the garrison to 347.3 Whether such 
numbers were commonplace, and 193 supporting staff does seem high, it is impossible 
to say without a broader range of evidence, yet what is certain is that all the numbers 
subsequently quoted would in actual fact be significantly higher than the troop total. 
The importance of this lies more in its implications for the greater demand their 
presence made on wages and victuals than in a militouy sense. 
An overview of the numbers within the garrison of Roxburgh throughout the 
fourteenth century and within Edinburgh until its final loss in 1341 illustrate that the 
size of garrisons did not remain constant (figs. I and 2). The 154 strong gamson of 
Edinburgh in early 1300 had been almost halved to 85 by November of the same year 
and throughout 1301 and 1302 remained approximately the same size. It declined 
markedly in 1303 and by the summer of 1304 stood at a lowly 33. By the next 
recorded period of 1311/12 it reached its highest documented peak of 194 men. After 
Edinburgh's recapture in 1335 its garrison remained remarkably constant at around the 
120 mark, rising slightly in the summer of 1339 but having suffered a notable decline 
3 CDS, ii, no. 1132. Exceptional circumstances also swelled numbers such as the complete rebuilding of 
Edinburgh in 1335/6 with 85 men specifically brought in for this, CDS, iii, app. iv. 
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by the spring of 1341 when it fell once again to the Scots. Roxburgh traces a similar 
pattern with substantial numbers at the start of the century, including an exceptionally 
high 264 in 1300, the ensuing lowering to 31 in late 1302 no doubt due to the truce of 
that year, followed by another decline after December 1303 which saw it reach a low 
of a mere 27 men in May 1304 while a substantial 170 were present in 1311/12. 
Interestingly it had dropped to 123 by 1313 which suggests it was declining from then 
until its loss a year later as Edinburgh was similarly dropping before its loss in 134 1. 
In mid-century the numbers were again high although they did vary with the garrison 
almost halved in October 1335 and having almost doubled again by June 1340. 
Roxburgh also provides figures for the second half of the century With 55 men 
considered enough in the decade after victory at Neville's Cross, rising to a powerful 
138 in 1381/2 following renewed hostility With Scotland and culminating in the 
massive 300 strong garrison of 1400. 
Salient features can be drawn out from a comparison of the Edinburgh and 
Roxburgh garrisons. In early 1300 both were extremely well-manned, a decline set in 
during 1303 that brought them to a significant low in the spring/summer of 1304 but 
by 1311/12 they were once again heavily manned numbering in the high one hundreds. 
Their recapture in the 1330s brought in strong garrisons totalling around the mid-, one 
hundreds which, except for a two year reduction in Roxburgh, remained relatively 
constant until their loss in the early 1340s. Quite clearly these noticeable trends reflect 
the nature of the war, the considerable fluctuation in numbers a reaction to the pressure 
of war at that time. The peaks in 1300,1311/12 and the 1330s mirror the hard and 
intense warfare of these years. Similarly the decline and exceptional low of 1303/4 
took place due to the apparent victory won by the English at that time and the belief 
that the Scots had been conclusively beaten, a belief also prevalent when the rather 
Figure 1: Numbers within the Edinburgh Garrison. 
Bnrts Knts Men- Hobelars Cross- Archers Mtd. TOTAL 
at- bowmen Archers 
Arms 
Feb 1300. 1 8 67 0 18 60 0 154 
CDS, ii, no. 
1132 
Nov 1 1 29 0 20 34 0 85 
1300- 
Pentecost 
1301. 
E101/68/1/11 
Autumn, 1 0 41 0 20 20 0 82 
1301. 
E 10 1/9/16 
Feb 1302. 1 0 30 0 20 20 01 71 
CDS, ii, no. 
1286. 
Sept 1302. 1 0 41 0 20 20 0 82 
CDS, ii, no. 
1324 
Jan 1303. 1 1 24 0 20 20 0 66 
E101/11/1 
20 Nov-8 0 1 23 6 20 17 0 67 
Dec, 
1303. 
E101/12/18 
9 Dec-20 1 0 12 0 20 0 0 33 
Aug, 1304 
(ibid). 
1311/12. 0 1 83 29 41 40 0 194 
CDS, iii, pp. 
393-412. 
8 Sept-2 1 8 51 0 0 21 36 117 
Nov, 1335 
BL Ms 
Cotton Nero 
C Vill. 
2 Nov 0 5 55 *60 0 0 [*60] 120 
'35-12 (hobs & 
July '36 archers) 
(ibid). 
12 July 1 4 55 *60 0 0 [*60] 120 
'36-30 (hobs & 
Aug'37 archers) 
(ibid) 
16 July 0 4 63 0 0 0 71 138 
1339. 
E 10 1/22/20 
I March- 0 0 49 0 0 0 60 109 
16 Avril 
1341 
E 10 1/23/1 
6 
Eigure 2: Numbers within the Roxburclh Garrison. 
Buts Knts Men- Hobelars Cross- Archers Mtd TOTAL 
at bowmen Archers 
Arms 
20 Nov- 1 1 42 0 20 100 0 164 
24 Dec, 
1299 
Lib. Quot. 
25 Dec 1 1 62 0 40 160 0 264 
'99-13 
Jan 1300 
(ibid) 
14 Jan-5 1 1 62 0 40 160 0 264 
July 1300 
CDS, v, 233 
6 July-10 1 1 23 0 30 100 0 155 
Nov 1300 
ibid 
Nov 1 2 27 8 20 40 0 98 
1301- Feb 
I 1302 
E101/10/6 
Sept 1302 1 0 10 0 10 10 0 31 
CDS, ii, 1321 
20 Nov- 1 1 19 12 34 45 0 112 
16 Dec 
1303 
E101/12/18 
Mqy 1304 1 1 8 0 6 11 0 27 
CDS, v, 373 
1311/12 0 1 54 21 33 61 0 170 
CDS, Iii, pp. 
393-412. 
Jan 1313 0 1 36 15 20 51 0 123 
Parl Writs, ii, 
p. 95, 
2 Feb-14 0 3 57 80 0 0 0 140 
Oct 1335 
BL Ms 
Cotton Nero 
C Vill 
14 Oct 0 1 35 40 0 0 0 76 
'35-Aug 
'37 (ibid) 
4 June 0 6 76 *50 0 0 [*50] 132 
1340-3 (hobs & 
June '41 archers) 
E 10 1/22/40 
Feb 1350 0 1 24 0 0 0 30 55 
CDS, iii, 
1546 
1381/2 0 1 87 0 0 0 50 138 
CDS, iv, 306 
[-1-400 2 4 94 0 0 0 200 300 
CDS, iv, 567 
7 
moderate garrison totalling just 55 men was installed in Roxburgh in 1350, the 
decisive victory of Neville's Cross fought only four years previously. The sudden drop 
in Roxburgh in October 1335, on the surface so unusual,, was in fact also a response to 
the state of the war, the substantial garrisons that had been installed further north in the 
castles of Edinburgh and Stirling believed to be sufficient enough for a significant cut 
in the Roxburgh garrison. 4 
The size of a garrison was therefore directly related to the immediate pressure 
of the war. It was also directly affected by economic necessity; the ruthless speed with 
which the government reduced garrisons, as in 1304 and Roxburgh in 1335, 
demonstrates that a sizeable garrison was not kept just for the sake of it and that there 
had to be a pressing reason for the retention of such a large body of men. It is precisely 
this that leads to such fluctuations in garrison size and not only explains these 
inconsistencies but marks the size of garrisons out as a highly instructive indicator as 
to the state of the war at a given time. A combination of economic imperative and the 
demands of war dictated the slZe of garrisons. 
A more detailed study of garrison numbers reveals what effectively appears to 
be a two tiered system when under the pressure of immediate warfare. The upper level 
averages around the mid-one hundred mark and is evident in Edinburgh's first extant 
total of 154 whilst Roxburgh begins on 164 and, after rising to 264, returns to a more 
normal 155 in July 1300. Similarly the powerful garrisons of 1311/12 fall within this 
higher tier; Roxburgh containing 170 men, Linlithgow 155 and Edinburgh setting its 
upper limit with 194. This is also true for mid-century (excepting the reduced 
Roxburgh garrison discussed above) with Roxburgh numbering 140 in 13 35 and 13)21n 
1340/1, Edinburgh 120 in 1336/7 and 138 in 1339 and Stirling totalling 124 in late 
4 R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots: Ae Fonnative years of a Military Career, 132 7-35 (Oxford, 
1965), p. 225. 
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1336. Although the size does vary in each case there is definitely a broad degree of 
consistency among these totals that places them approximately between the 120 to 190 
mark. As the retention of such numbers of men indicates all the instances in which this 
level of manning are evident occurred during years of pressurised warfare. 
However warfare was also prevalent during the second tier of garrison size. 
Here the size of garrisons stands at an approximate average of 80 With Edinburgh from 
November 1300 through until late 1302 a prime example, the garrison never varying 
from between 71 and 85 men. Roxburgh also enters this tier periodically; totalling 98 
in the winter of 1301/2 and 76 in late 1335-37. In autumn 1301 Kirkintilloch also held 
a garrison of 88 men. Indeed, excluding the cutbacks of 1303/4 and Roxburgh in 1350 
after Neville's Cross and in 1400, the garrisons of both Edinburgh and Roxburgh 
contained numbers that approximate to the parameters of one of these two levels of 
manning. As with Kirkintilloch garrisons of other major English-held Scottish castles 
also on the whole fit into one of these tiers which implies that there were two generally 
recognised sizes of garrison that these castles retained whilst at war, one based around 
the mid-one hundred mark and the other around the 80s. There was no explicit rule that 
created these and it emerges only from noticeable patterns among the totals of 
garrisons. There was no stipulation that garrisons had to approximate to these sizes and 
it could be that it was just chance that so many did. However it seems more likely that 
these were generally accepted levels for front-line castles active in warfare, nothing 
more than rough guidelines but important all the same. Below these two tiers lay more 
minor numbers retained in phases of relative peace, such as in 1304 .5 
A series of garrisons which as a whole do not fit so neatly are those recorded in 
the north of England in 1323 when they fon-ned the mainstay of the English defence 
5 These three approximate levels of manning reflect those that have been seen to have operated in the 
Anglo-Norman period with one level for peacetime and two upper levels for wartime, S. Morillo, 
Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 74-5. 
9 
against the Scots (fig. 3). Dunstanburgh with 130 men and Newcastle with 70 do fit the 
pattern but the 107 of Barnburgh and the 31 within Barnard castle sit slightly uneasily 
within the defined parameters. The reason for this most likely lies in the fact that these 
were not major castles inside Scotland and that this together with their geographical 
position influenced the size of their garrisons. This explains the small number in the 
most southerly Barnard castle and the quite considerable numbers in the major 
Northumberland castles of Dunstanburgh, Bamburgh and Warkworth. The 70 in 
Newcastle appears adequate due to the support readily available in the town. In fact 
Bamburgh and also Warkworth both fit into the overlapping area between the two 
levels of manning, a position which suggests a balance between the two and 
consequently something approaching an ideal size for an active wartime garrison. 
There are a further two garrison totals that appear as anomalies in comparison 
to the rest. The figure of 264 men which constituted the Roxburgh garrison between 
late December 1299 and July 1300 is quite striking and means that during these 
months Roxburgh contained over a hundred more men than was usual. Immediately 
prior to this in early December 1299 its garrison numbered 164 and in July 1300 it fell 
to a similar size of 155; its overlarge size was consequently a temporary measure that 
lasted just six months and must surely have been enacted with the campaign of 1300 in 
mind, the extra 109 men leaving the garrison to join the king"s army in 
jUly. 6 The 
presence of these extra men was almost certainly an expedient for the campaign with 
the number of archers in July returning to the one hundred of 1299 although the 
crossbowmen remained increased by ten and the men-at-arms were significantly 
reduced. The second striking figure is the 300 men of the Roxburgh garrison in 1400. 
This is by far the largest throughout the period and towers over the 84 men present 
See p. 256. 
10 
nineteen years earlier in 1381/2. Renewed hostilities with Scotland accounts for the 
heightened strength of the garrison and its exceptional size would have been aided bv 
the fact that apart from Berwick there was no other major English fortification that far 
north, indeed none other within Scotland, thus concentrating all available manpower 
and more importantly all available finance on its garrison. It was this that made 
possible the retention of such a sizeable and costly garrison at the end of the century. 
Although Roxburgh reached its peak in 1400 by then the overall total of men 
serving within all garrisons would have been well below its highest point. Calculating 
such an overall total is rather problematic due to the need to find a specific date when 
the numbers within all the major garrisons are available. There are few documents 
such as that dating from September 1302 which list the number of men serving Within 
every Scottish fortification held by the English and which actually states in a summary 
the overall total as calculated by contemporaries. 7 The first total given is for the overall 
total based on the number of men who should be serving in these garrisons, a figure of 
507, but the actual total due to men not being present is given as 467. A series of 
indentures follows for the keeping of these castles which reaches a similar total of 508. 
However these three calculations only include bannerets, knights and men-at-arms 
with no total being given for the foot of the garrison which, when taken from numbers 
in the document, constitute a body of 596 men. Adding these foot-soldiers to those 
who were mounted creates a combined total of approximately 1,100 men engaged in 
garrison service in the autumn of 1302. The next period for which an overall total can 
7 CDS, ii, no. 1324. The garrisons were those in which the troops were paid by the king or were serving 
for lands in Scotland and consisted of Dumfries, Lochmaben, Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Selkirk, 
Peebles, Lanark and Carstairs, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Kirkintilloch, Ayr, Bothwell and Dalswinton. It 
should be noted that none of these overall totals include the garrison of Carlisle due to the difficulty in 
finding matching dates. 
be ascertained is from the garrison rolls of 1311/12.8 Here the major garrisons in 
Scotland amount to a total of 630 men including both mounted and foot-soldiers. the 
garrison of Berwick town contained an additional figure approaching 800 men, a 
staggering size more than double that of the other garrisons combined, which, when 
added to those garrisons, produces a total of approximately 1,430 men. The 
outstanding omission from these rolls is the garrison of Stirling which, based on the 
figures for the similar sized castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Linlithgow, must have 
numbered something between 155 and 190, increasing the overall total to a figure 
approaching 1,600. The third and final period in which an overall total can be obtained 
from a range of castles is in the 1330s, the widest range coming in the years 1335/6. 
The overall total here, including both Berwick with 284 and Perth with a particularly 
substantial 481, emerges as a force of approximately 1,300 men. 9 
Obviously calculating overall totals such as these can never be exact and those 
reached can only at best be a rounded estimate. Yet despite this the extent to which the 
overall figures for these three separate periods are broadly similar is remarkable; all at 
least amount to over one thousand men being actively engaged in garrison service with 
1,100 the minimum and 1,600 the maximum, the 1,300 of 1335/6 appearing almost as 
a median between the two. All three penods are ones in which the Scottish war was 
being vigorously prosecuted by either the English or the Scots or by both and it 
follows that in times of active warfare there were between 1,100 and 1,600 troops 
engaged in manning these English-held front-line garrisons in the first half of the 
fourteenth century. The loss of the major Scottish fortifications in 1314 and again from 
8 CDS, iii, app. vii, PP- 393-412. The garrisons were Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Bothwell, 
Livingston, Berwick castle and Berwick town. These figures are only approximate and calculated on 
those serving on the same date. 
9 BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 248r-251v. In this case dates from 1335 and 1336 have been used to 
obtain the widest range of garrisons without risking a distortion of the true numbers. The garrisons 
include Roxburgh and Berwick (February 1335), Edinburgh (September 1335), Stirling and Perth 
(October/November 1336) and Dunottar (May 1336). 
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1341 onwards naturally confines these totals to those two periods in which a series of 
major fortifications were in English hands. Outside of these penods, the total of men 
engaged in garrisons would have been significantly lower only perhaps approaching 
one thousand at the end of the century with the large garrison of Roxburgh added to 
that of Berwick. More interesting is the number of men in garrison sen'Ice after 
Bannockburn, a figure which can be obtamed from the accounts for the payment of the 
garrisons of the north-eastern castles of England, now front-line garrisons, in 1323.10 
In all these five major castles contained garrisons that together totalled 432 men. This 
is an extremely low number compared to the three periods discussed above especially 
as 1322/3 was also a period of active warfare. It demonstrates the extent to which the 
number of men in garrison service had been reduced in these years declining to 
roughly only a third of the total which was present both earlier and later and which 
appear to be the normal wartime total. However the numbers in each individual 
garrison in 1323 are appropriate to their size and this proves that it was a lack of strong 
fortifications in which to install garrisons that led to such a low overall total. The 
manpower was there but the bases were not, a fact which highlights the importance of 
the occupation of strong Scottish fortifications, particularly first-rate castles, to the 
English war effort. 
Numbers alone therefore establish the critical importance of garrisons in the 
prosecution of the Scottish wars by England. Individual garrisons were routinely 
numbered around the eighties and mid-one hundreds with the whole of the garrison 
establishment totalling easily over a thousand men at one time. This was a powerful 
fighting force in terms of the medieval period and especially so With regard to 
garrisons throughout the Middle Ages. Such numbers incurred great expense to 
10 BL Stowe MS 553, fos. 56v-63v. The numbers are taken from May 1323 and the castles listed are 
Bamburgh, Barnard, Warkworth, Newcastle and Dunstanburgh however in 1322, when conflict was at 
its height, the numbers were approximately the same. The one missing garrison from this list is Norham. 
13) 
support them in wages and victuals, the latter also necessitating an enon-nous logistical 
effort. It is strikingly clear that wartime garrisons in this period consisted of an 
extremely substantial number of fighting men and mark it out as a period in which the 
size of the English medieval garrison reached its apogee. 11 
Having established the siZe of garrisons it is necessary to recognise that they 
contained the full variety of troop types that existed in this period and the next issue to 
address is the proportion of each of these within the garrisons. In defining these 
categories and their numbers a few words of clarification are necessary. Bannerets and 
knights, usually acting as constables, formed only a small section of garrisons but their 
rank alone necessitates a separate category for them. In some financial accounts they 
are routinely numbered among a block of men-at-arms with an ensuing note of how 
many were actually bannerets and knights. 12 The classification of men-at-arms also 
includes those described as esquires and sergeants due to their inseparable similarity in 
military terms. The foot-soldiers are placed in the separate categories of crossbowmen 
and archers where this is possible and they have not been referred to together as foot- 
soldiers. Two new additions to the military establishment also appeared in this period, 
the hobelar in the first quarter of the century and the mounted archer in mid-century, 
with both entering into garrison service. These then are the types of troops of which 
garrisons consisted. Once again the limitation of evidence has necessitated the 
selection of several different periods allied with individual examples from Roxburgh 
later in the century to produce a representative overview (fig. 3). 
As would be expected bannerets and knights constitute only a small fraction of 
garrison troops, less than 1% of the garrison in most cases. Naturally there were 
exceptions such as Edinburgh in 1300 when they accounted for almost 6% but this was 
11 For a broader comparison of wartime numbers see J. S. Moore, 'Anglo-Norman Garrisons', and 
Prestwich, 'The Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles', passim. 
12 For example in the lists for Roxburgh, BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VHI, fo. 248r. 
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Figure 3: Breakdown of TroOD Types serving within Garrisons. 
[N. B. for ease of simplification most double figure percentages ha-ve been rounded off 
to the nearest whole number]. 
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a rarity. The true backbone of the garrisons was the men-at-arms - mounted, armoured. 
well-armed and having received some training - and these consistently accounted for a 
significant proportion of garrisons. The overall numbers themselves are impressive 
with 217 present across the three major castles in 1311/12; when translated into a 
percentage of the total this figure comes out as 42%. In 1300 they accounted for 31% 
of the two selected garrisons combined and remarkably in late 1336 they constituted 
exactly the same as they did in 1311/12 with 42%. Similar figures emerge within 
Roxburgh in 1350 (44%) and 1400 (3 1%). 
13 These results indicate that men-at-anns 
consistently provided between a third and a half of individual garrisons from 1300 
until 1400. This again is a broad summary and there are individual exceptions such as 
the high 52% in Linlithgow during 1311/12 and the low 23% present during early 1300 
in Roxburgh together with the 63% in Roxburgh in 1381/2. The north-eastem 
garrisons of 1323 also exhibit a proportion well below this range with just 210, ýo being 
men-at-arms. However the majority of garrisons do fall into this range such as 
Edinburgh (49%) and Kirkintilloch (30%) in the autumn of 130 1, reaching a combined 
total of 40%. The actual numbers behind these percentages illustrate that men-at-arms 
could serve in extremely significant numbers, the 217 of 1311/12 accompanied by the 
129 from only two garrisons in early 1300 and the 133 of three major garrisons in 
1336. The number in some individual garrisons is also arrestingly large; 83 in 
Edinburgh during 1311/12 and a vast 94 within Roxburgh in 1400. It is evident from 
these figures that men-at-arms remained the mainstay of garrisons by contributing 
between a third and a half of their total number throughout the century, marking these 
troops out as outstanding in their consistent employment in garrisons during this 
period. 
13 These figures for Roxburgh alone suggest a gradual decline in men-at-arms as the century progressed 
however the decline was in percentage only with a massive 94 men-at-arms in the garrison in 1400. 
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Before the 1320s the rest of the garrison consisted of foot-soldiers, both 
crossbowmen and archers, who constituted the remainder of the garrison. In earl-v 1300 
they made up 67% of the garnsons of Roxburgh and Edinburgh combined and 43"o of 
the 1311/12 garrisons even though Linlithgow contained no archers at all. During the 
autumn of 1301 58% of the Edinburgh and Kirkintilloch garrisons combined were 
foot-soldiers and 61% of the Roxburgh garrison in 1301/2. The overall figure for 
1311/12 is slightly distorted by the lack of archers in Linlithgow and more 
representative are the figures for Roxburgh and Edinburgh alone, respectively 55% and 
42%. On average foot-soldiers made up between a half and two thirds of the early 
garrisons of the period which complements the proportion constituted by the men-at- 
anns and picks out the foot as frequently providing over half of the troops in these 
garrisons. 
As mentioned the foot-soldiers themselves fall into two definable categories, 
crossbowmen and archers, with a specific reference usually being made with regard to 
this. On occasion the number given is referred to as that of the 'foot' of the garrison 
and, if no further information is added stateting that a number of these were 
crossbowmen, then it is not possible to determine separate figures for the two 
categories. Fortunately most documents do make this specification and it is possible to 
identify the archers as on the whole being more numerous in garrisons than 
crossbowmen as the figures testify; in 1300 14% being crossbowmen and 53% archers, 
23% as opposed to 35% in autumn 1301 and in 1311/12 within Roxburgh 19% of the 
garrison were crossbowmen and 36% archers. However Roxburgh is the only garrison 
to exhibit this in 1311/12; the overall figures place crossbowmen in the majority with 
23% over the archers' 20% while in Edinburgh there was one more crossbowman than 
archer. It is particularly noticeable that Linlithgow contained no archers but possessed 
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a substantial 45 crossbowmen. Edinburgh is also instructive with the majority of 
archers gradually decreasing from 1301 onwards until they were in equal numbers to 
the crossbowmen in 1302, falling below the latter in 1303 and actually disappearing 
from the garrison altogether for a time in 1304 (fig. 1). There is a definite trend 
towards a reduction in the number of archers which culminates in the figures for 
1311/12. In the cutbacks of 1303/4 the archers were the first to go from the garrisons 
and suffered the greatest reduction. Yet this was an underlying pattern rather than a 
wholesale change as the figures for Roxburgh testify with the number of archers 
remaining well above the crossbowmen in both 1311/12 and early 1313. In contrast 
crossbowmen remained relatively consistent with the large number of 119 present 
across the three major garrisons of 1311/12. 
In light of this trend it is perhaps not surprising that archers almost totally 
disappear from garrisons in the years after Bannockburn but what is surprising is that 
crossbowmen suffer the same fate. After 1314 foot-soldiers became virtually non- 
existent within garrisons. The northern garrisons of 1323 contain only 20 'foot' 
(unspecified) which were in Barnard castle, the four remaining garrisons not even 
having one foot-soldier between them, a figure that works out at a insignificant 4% of 
those garrisons combined, while in late 1336 foot-soldiers are entirely absent from the 
three major garrisons of Stirling, Roxburgh and Edinburgh. Their last appearance in 
the major garrisons of the 1330s is in the original garrison installed in Edinburgh upon 
its recapture in autumn 1335, the accounts testifying to the presence of 21 archers, 
forming 18% of the entire garrison. 14 After Neville's Cross in 1346 there were never 
any foot-soldiers, neither crossbowmen nor archers, in the one surviving garrison of 
Roxburgh. It is an exceptional feature of active wartime garrisons in this period that 
14 The town of Perth continued to retain significant numbers of foot-archers in its garrison with 129 
present in 1336 and 120 in 1337, BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VHI, fos. 250v-25 Iv. 
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foot-soldiers go from being the predominant component in the early years to becoming 
relatively scarce, and by implication increasingly obsolete, by mid-century if not 
earlier. 
The place of the foot-soldier within garrisons was taken by the incorporation of 
mounted troops the first of which was the hobelar. These lightly armed troops With 
uncovered horses first began to be retained in garrisons in 1302/3, in late 130 1 at the 
earliest, but in a mere handful of numbers at the most. It is in 1311/12 that they come 
to the fore as a major element in garrisons with a total of 80 present across the three 
major garrisons, numbering between 21 and 30 in each garrison and amounting to 15% 
of these garrisons combined. By 1323 they accounted for an overwhelming 72% of the 
northern garrisons, a massive 330 split between the five northern castles with 60 in 
Newcastle, 80 in Warkworth, 90 in Bamburgh and one hundred in Dunstanburgh, 
Barnard castle the only one without any at all. This ground-breaking change occurred 
in the years following Bannockburn and is evident in the mobile forces first spread 
throughout the northern garrisons under Arundel in 1317. In 1323 the number of 
hobelars completely dwarfs even that of the men-at-arms who are relegated to only 
21% of the overall total and whose numbers appear well reduced with only sixteen in 
Bamburgh and nine in Newcastle, although their combined total of 98 is still 
substantial. But without doubt by 1323 hobelars had risen from being an unknown 
force within garrisons in 1300 to entirely dominating them at the expense of foot- 
soldiers and even displacing the traditional proportion of men-at-arms, the magnitude 
of this change almost revolutionary in nature. 
The figures from late 1336 suggest that the emergence of the hobelar as the 
mainstay of garrisons was ongoing albeit with their former overwhelming percentage 
somewhat tempered by men-at-arms regaining their former proportion. Once more 
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hobelars accounted for over half of these garrisons with a combined total of 180 
hobelars which translates to 56%. Their continued presence in garrisons seems assured 
but their demise is as drastic as that of the foot-soldiers and even more sudden. After 
1346 hobelars vanish completely from garrisons as indeed they ceased to exist in 
general having been a phenomenon of the first half of the fourteenth century. Their 
presence in the garrisons of the 1330s and into the early 1340s is extremely 
problematic and stems from inexact terminology and their apparent, almost 
inseparable, closeness to the latest and what was to prove the most decisive troop type 
to emerge in the century, the mounted archer. Edinburgh is typical of this awkwardness 
with 60 'hobelars and archers' present from late 1335 until 30 August 1337; by July 
1339 these hobelars had vanished altogether with 71 mounted archers now appearing 
in the garrison, 60 of the latter serving in the spring of 1341 immediately prior to the 
loss of the castle. Roxburgh is similarly confused and offers the same clue as to the 
reason for this apparent incongruity. In October 1335 the 80 hobelars who had served 
there since February were reduced to 40 and these remained throughout 1336 and into 
1337. The clue comes in 1340/1 when 50 'hobelars and archers' were in the garrison. 
The archers referred to in these cases are clearly mounted archers as their inclusion 
alongside hobelars indicates; these troops are both classed together and indeed 
received the same wage rate. In effect this depicts a transitional stage in which the 
hobelar and mounted archer co-existed before the latter replaced the former. It is the 
emergence of the mounted archer which explains the sudden disappearance of the 
hobelar from garrisons in mid-century. 
It is the mounted archer then which comes to dominate the garrisons of the 
second half of the century from the late 1330s onwards. They constituted 51% of the 
Edinburgh gamson in 1339 and 55% in early 1341; 54% of the Roxburgh gamson in 
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1350, an unusually low 36% in 1381/2 and an extremely predominant 67% in 1400 
when the garrison included the large total of 300 mounted archers. It is worth noting 
that this 67% is reminiscent of the 72% hobelars accounted for in the northern 
garrisons of early 1323 creating another link between the hobelar and the mounted 
archer in terms of garrison service. That mounted archers took the role of both the 
hobelar and foot-soldiers is evident in their average proportion of approximately 55- 
60% being the same as that accounted for by hobelars, crossbowmen and archers 
together in 1336 which produced a combined figure of 58% while 'hobelars and 
archers' similarly accounted for 56% of the garrisons in 1336. In terms of garrisoning 
the mounted archer therefore evolved from the changes that took place among the foot- 
soldiers and was intimately connected with the advent and retention in significant 
numbers of hobelars and consequently occupied the same proportion of garrisons that 
all of the former had previously held combined. 
The type of troops serving with garrisons naturally mirrors military 
developments in general during this period, the emergence of the hobelar - and indeed 
its demise - and of the mounted archer leading to them both being readily incorporated 
into garrisons, these new troops installed in front-line garrisons almost as soon as they 
came into existence and appearing in substantial numbers. Far from being conservative 
in their composition garrisons were at the cutting edge of military development and 
underwent transitions in composition themselves throughout the century resulting in 
garrison forces that were fully mobile which made them a powerful mobile striking 
force that was intended to operate outside the castle walls. Within the evolving 
garrisons one element remained constant for the whole period, the men-at-arms 
consistently providing between a third and a half of garrison troops, the 94 within 
Roxburgh in 1400 illustrating that they were as strong if not stronger in number at the 
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end of the century as in the beginning. Whatever developments took place men-at-arms 
remained the solid backbone of garrisons throughout the century. 
Discussion of the size of garrisons and of the proportion various troops 
contributed to them suggests that a garrison consisted of one large body of men serving 
as a single integral unit. This was not the case. A garrison was not composed of a 
solitary block of men all serving under exactly the same terms nor was their presence 
in the garrison necessarily for the same reason. Muster and account rolls reveal that 
men were categorised as belonging to a certain administrative grouping which 
explained their presence in the garrison and in which they invariably remained 
throughout their service in that garrison, a feature that was particularly true of the men- 
at-anns. 
The clearest examples of this come from the early 1300s With the return for the 
garrison of Edinburgh in 1300 an illuminating starting point. The constable, the 
banneret John Kingston, had five esquires of his own retinue serving With him, whilst 
two other knights present had one esquire each and another five knights two esquires 
each. These esquires were serving in Edinburgh because of their personal service to 
their knightly lords. In addition there were twelve men-at-arins present who were not 
overtly connected to the constable or the knights plus the foot of the garrison as well. 
The seventeen esquires are therefore added to the twelve men-at-arms to calculate the 
full complement of men-at-arms in the garrison although their service and presence 
within it was of a different nature. An eighth knight, Walter de Sutton, was also in the 
garrison, his presence directly attached to that of the constable as he is described as a 
socius, a companion, of the latter. Similarly, in early 1302, of the 30 men-at-arms 
within Edinburgh twelve were of Kingston"s personal retinue whilst in the autumn of 
that year there were ten men of his retinue in the garrison, another three provided býý 
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Kingston for his lands in Scotland and a further 28 men-at-arms of which fourteen 
were serving for lands in Scotland. 15 During the winter of 1301/2 Kingston had twelve 
men-at-arms of his retinue in Edinburgh, another knight had three men-at-arms and a 
further two knights two men-at-arms each. Two more men-at-arms were listed 
separately being described as 'esquires of the household" and were followed by yet 
another separate group of nine men-at-arms. " 
These examples from Edinburgh are typical of all early fourteenth century 
garrisons. In the autumn of 1301 the men-at-arms in Kirkintilloch consisted of three 
esquires in the retinue of William Francis, the constable, two from another knight in 
the garrison and a third knight providing three from his retinue. 17 Linlithgow depicts a 
similar set-up with the constable, William Felton, having a personal retinue of fifteen 
esquires while the sheriff of Linlithgow, Archibald Livingston, had his own separate 
retinue of ten esquires, a further twenty men-at-arms serving for the lands in Scotland 
of eight knights whilst another ten men-at-arins were serving for their own lands in 
Scotland and on top of this there were also sixteen men-at-arms who were sergeants of 
the household. 18 
Separate groupings are clearly evident in the garrison rolls of 1311/12. 
Edinburgh again serves as a typical example and only a few cases need be cited: men- 
at-arms being classed in separate groups although serving for the same length of time, 
one group of 24 and another of 17 both present for the year yet distinctly categorised 
separately; two hobelars, served for the entire year as did another but entirely separate 
group of eleven; indeed in Edinburgh it also extends to the foot-soldiers with the bulk 
of the crossbowmen and archers, numbering 25 and 27 respectively, classed together 
" CDS, ii, nos. 1132,1286,1321. 
16 E 10 1/68/l/15. 
17 E101/9/16, m. I. 
18 E101/10/5, m. 2. 
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and serving for the year but with another entry in the rolls for another four 
crossbowmen and six archers who were also present for the year. The separation of 
foot-soldiers into various groups is unusual, as it is for hobelars, both normally being 
classed in their troop type as one unit with no separate grouping of troops of the same 
type. The rolls for the exceptionally large Berwick garrison illustrate more clearly the 
separate groupings which contributed men-at-arms to the garrison, the personal 
retinues of knights such as William and John Felton and Robert Grey standing out 
markedly as do further groups consisting solely of men-at-arms, such as that headed by 
the name of Robert Elvet, all quite definitely separate from one another, the latter 
implying the presence of a group of men-at-arms who may possibly have entered into 
an agreement to serve together. 19 The rolls for 1311/12 are full of individual groups, 
some serving for the same time and others for a whole range of periods, and plainly 
demonstrate that a garrison was not one single block of men but consisted of an 
assortment of smaller groupings making it a much more complex and varied body of 
men. 
It is considerably more difficult to gauge whether this was also true of 
garrisons in mid-century and later. The rolls and accounts portray each component of 
the garrison as one single entity listing knights then men-at-arms and finally hobelars 
and mounted archers with the only exception occurring in the rolls for Edinburgh 
during 1335-6 and 1336-7 where knights have the number of men-at-arms in their 
retinue noted next to their name. 20 That constables and knights continued to retain their 
own esquires in the garrison in which they themselves were serving is without doubt 
but is only testified to elsewhere in this later period by some of the names of those 
amongst the men-at-arms being intimately connected to the person of the constable or 
19 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 394,397. 
20 Jbid, pp. 360,362. 
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one of the knights .21 The routine omission of men being directly identified as 
belonging to a personal retinue is not due to this feature disappearing but is down to a 
change in the means by which garrisons were retained and the subsequent alteration in 
the paperwork which hides any identifiable retinues. Garrisons in the second half of 
the century laid greater onus on the constable for all aspects of the garrison, a situation 
ushered in by the widespread use of the indenture when appointing constables. 
However the personal retinue still remained a distinct feature as exemplified by Ralph, 
lord Greystoke, bringing his own following With him on his way to take up his office 
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as constable of Roxburgh in 1380. The evidence from a series of protections for 
Roxburgh late in the century makes it clear that there was a definite link between the 
geographical basis of the constable and a proportion of the men serving Within his 
garrison; 23 indeed the greater individual responsibility placed on the constable by 
means of the indenture may well have increased the proportion of men in garrisons 
who were in the retinue of the constable or were associated with him in some way. 
The indenture became predominant in garrisoning from the 1330s onwards 
with every constable of Roxburgh after Neville's Cross being appointed by indenture 
as was every keeper of Berwick and the wardens of the March. Indentures were usually 
intended to last for one year but it was possible for them to extend over a number of 
years, in 1393 Henry Percy's indenture as warden of the East March and Berwick to 
last for the next five years after the indenture of his father, the earl of Northumberland, 
for the same office expired having run for the previous five years. The earl of 
Westmorland's indenture giving him charge of the west March and Carlisle in 1405 
was intended to last for seven years . 
24 The indenture of Richard Grey and Stephen 
21 See pp. 189-90. 
22 Bower, vii, p. 397. 
23 See pp. 205-12. 
24 CDS,, iv, no. 445; CD, ý, v, no. 929. 
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Lescrope as joint constables of Roxburgh dated 21 December 1400 perfectly illustrates 
the kind of stipulations a typical indenture contained. They were to keep the castle for 
three years maintaining a sufficient garrison, the exact numbers not being specified but 
to cost no more than 4,000 marks a year during war whilst building works were 
underway and 3,000 marks when these were finished. During periods of truce the wage 
bill was to be no more than 2,000 marks and the garrison was to number forty men-at- 
arms, including themselves, and eighty archers. In the event of the conclusion of a final 
peace their pay was to be arranged with the king. If there was a 'royal' siege of the 
castle, effectively by the Scottish host, the king was bound to rescue them after three 
months notice. Further clauses concerned more minor details such as maintaining the 
mills and not damaging the utensils of the kitchen or brewery. Similar clauses were 
contained within the indenture for Berwick in 1386, the garrison to cost f7,000 in time 
of war with the numbers of men-at-arms and archers specified as well as an order that 
the majority of these had to come from south of Richmond and Craven. The agreement 
of a truce meant a reduction of the garrison by a half but upon its end the garrison 
25 
would return to its previous strength . 
Perhaps the best example of an indenture comes from the private castle of 
Lochmaben in 1371. The keeper, William de Stapelton, was to hold the castle for six 
years, receiving L200 for each of the first two years and 250 marks for the succeeding 
years being paid the half-year in advance. Stapelton was to have the grass, hay and 
wood of the castle at his own cost as well as the fishings for himself and his garrison. 
A third of the any financial gain Stapelton made from the castle's lands and a third of 
any prlsoners taken by the garrison were to go to the earl of Hereford, the owner of the 
castle, who was also to receive any prisoner valued at over f 100 for which he would 
11 CDS, iv, nos. 360,568. 
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pay that sum to Stapelton and the earl was also to receive all profits of war made by 
the men of Annandale which did not include those of the garrison themselves. 
Stapelton's annual fee in the event of war would be 500 marks. The castle xvas alwavs 
to be victualled for half a year and if besieged to be relieved by the earl in half a year 
and if not the keeper was entitled to surrender. Similarly if Stapelton was for a variety 
of reasons unable to keep the castle then the earl would relieve him on three months 
notice. 26 Indentures consequently covered all aspects of garrisoning and were the 
foundation on which garrisons from the mid-fourteenth century onwards were based. 
They quickly became an all-encompassing contract between the two parties with 
financial considerations, especially the distinction between periods of war and peace, 
uppermost. However indentures were a two-way process with the constable able to 
voice his own concerns in the clauses; an agreed period by which relief would come if 
besieged was a common feature of later indentures and constables had their own 
financial concerns, Thomas Ughtred carefully stipulating matters regarding pay and 
victuals for his tenure as warden of Perth in 1338 and Richard Tempest in 1352 having 
it written into his indenture as warden of Berwick that if he was not paid within a 
month he would be free to leave his office after giving due notice. 27 
The garrisons of the recaptured castles in the 1330s were also retained by 
means of indentures with individual constables holding their office directly from them. 
Typical is John Stirling's indenture on becoming constable of Edinburgh in October 
1335 which stated that his yearly fee, presumably for the sheriffdom, was E20, the 
number of men-at-arms, hobelars and archers in his garrison were explicitly specified 
and were to be discharged should a garrison no longer be required. Stirling was also to 
receive rebellious Scots into the king's peace. Interestingly Stirling ignored the 
26 CDS, iv, no. 178. 
27 CDSJ iii, nos. 1283,1567. 
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numbers stated in the indenture and installed an extra forty men, this being given 
retrospective and no doubt reluctant sanction by the king. 28 A more intriguing note is 
struck in 1337 when a number of officials, including the chancellor and chamberlain of 
Berwick, were to treat and agree with the constables of Edinburgh, Roxburgh, Stirling 
and Bothwell for their stay as constables of these castles . 
29This process would have 
resulted in the drawing up of indentures but the interest is in the fact that these officials 
were also to treat and agree with men-at-anns, hobelars and archers for their stay in 
Perth, a process which su gests an indenture was entered by the officials With 9 
these soldiers for their service in the garrison rather than the more usual method by 
which constables supervised the personnel of their own garrisons. An echo of this 
occurs in February 1302 when a list of the numbers and names of men-at-arms who 
were to serve in Scottish garrisons was sent to the king, the sense of this being a loose 
form of indenture increased by it being accompanied by an indenture in which the Irish 
undertook to send men-at-anns and foot-soldiers to the king. 30 
This raises the question of the extent to which indentures were used with regard 
to garrisons in the early fourteenth century. Such contracts for military service in 
general first appeared in 1270 and the Crown first entered into contracts with its own 
subjects for military service in the 1290s so by the time of the first garrisons such a 
system was still in its 'nf .31 
There are hints that despite this the concept of using 1 ancy I 
an indenture as the basis for garrison service was already in circulation as the proposal 
of 1298 from the abbot and convent of Jedburgh and No de Aldeburgh to keep 
Jedburgh castle for five years With various clauses and for 5,000 marks per year 
implies. On 2 January 1300 Robert Clifford agreed to serve with thirty men-at-arms in 
" Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 225 -6, app. i, no. 17. 
29 CDS, v, no. 767. 
30 Ibid, no. 278. 
3' For a more wide-ranging discussion of indentures see M. Prestwich, Annies and Warfare in the 
Middle Ages: Ihe English Experience (Yale, 1999 edition), pp. 89-97. 
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Lochmaben castle alongside John de St. John for a fee of 500 marks and with a 
number of stipulations included in this indenture; 32 in October 1298 two agreements 
concerning garrisons were agreed with Robert Hastangs, one dealing With his own 
garrison of Roxburgh which related to the delivery of victuals, the number of his 
garrison and his own pay until Pentecost whilst the other dealt with the munition and 
garrison of Jedburgh which was temporarily without a constable; the agreement made 
with Matthew Redman that he would remain as keeper of Dumfries castle with a set 
number of men from I August to 20 November 1304 for a fee of f60 is a clear case of 
an indenture being concluded with a constable for his stay and that of his garrison. 33 
An attempt to determine whether all such agreements were indentures is 
complicated by agreements which appear to have a much looser basis. In October 1298 
the king and council ordered set numbers of troops to remain in the Berwick garrison 
as had been arranged by the sheriffs of Roxburgh and Jedburgh and Simon Fraser and 
again in 1298 it was the king who issued instructions as to the number of men who 
were to be in the garrison of Dumfries while in 1301 it was Dumfries along with 
Lochmaben in which the king commanded specific numbers of men to be retained . 
34 It 
was doubtful these ever amounted to anything approaching an indenture but the 
specifying of numbers and sense of an agreement having been reached lend them a hint 
of similarity. This is also true of Thomas Gray agreeing to provide a further seventy 
troops for the Norham garrison in 1322 and the promises made by the king to the 
warden of Lochmaben in 1299/1303 when the latter agreed to take up the position and 
which, he protested, had not been kept. 35 
32 SteVenSon, ii, pp. 264-6,407. 
33 CDS, ii, nos. 10 16,1018; CDS, v, no. 3 76. 
34 CDS, ii, nos. 1022,1028,1257. 
35 CDS, iiý no. 772; CDS, iv, no. 1795. 
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The most conspicuous evidence that indentures were used in these early years 
comes in the form of files of indentures for the keeping of castles that date from 
February and August/September 1302. Those from February are all dated on the 12 th of 
the month and each one accounts for a castle which means there were eleven 
indentures and each specified the number and type of men to be retained in the 
garrison and the duration of time the indenture was intended to last for. The second file 
totals thirteen indentures regarding the garrisoning of the same number of fortifications 
and once more specifies numbers and duration. 36 This is conclusive proof that 
indentures were indeed used for garrisoning at this early date but, as With Redman's 
indenture for Dumfries,, the short time-span these indentures were intended to last for 
is most noticeable. Whilst Redman's was for less than four months the files from 1302 
were to last from February to Pentecost and August/September to Christmas 
respectively. John Kingston's agreement to hold Edinburgh was noticeably longer, 
enduring from the end of November until Whitsun. The dating of the files also 
illustrates that both the periods covered by these brief indentures were outside of the 
main campaigning season and such general files do not exist for the campaigning 
season itself The use of indentures was therefore originally a matter of practicality37 to 
see garrisons through what was considered a 'dead' period and which, by implication, 
was not as practical to use when the activity of the campaigning season came around. 
In the early fourteenth century indentures were only a temporary expedient 
with regard to garrisons. Unfortunately a lack of evidence makes it impossible to 
accurately gauge their development from this to the all-encompassing indentures upon 
which garrisons came to be based by the 1330s. It is not possible to tell whether 
indentures were in use for the large garrisons of 1311/12 but the great amount of 
36 CDS, ii, nos. 1286,1321. 
37 PrestvAch, Armies and Warfare, p. 91. 
personnel entering and leaving and serving for different dates is in stark contrast to the 
garrison accounts for the 1330s and suggests that indentures were not in widespread 
use in 1311/12. The first true example of an indenture that resembles those agreed later 
in the century is that concluded with the burgesses of Berwick in June 1317 when they 
agreed to keep their town themselves for 6,000 marks for an entire year and also that of 
1316/17 agreed with William de Ros to keep Wark castle for either half a year or a 
year with a specified number of men, twelve men-at-arms at his own cost and the rest 
receiving specified wages which equated to those seen as standard for the 
day. 38 It is 
only after Bannockburn that indentures took on the wide-ranging importance they were 
later to translate into an overriding predominance with regard to the formation and 
installation of garrisons. 
38 CDS, iii, no. 558,576. 
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2. 
FINANCE 
The whole system of maintaining garrisons on a permanent or semi-permanent basis 
ultimately depended on the hard currency of money. It was the payment of wages 
which devoured the vast majority of this continuous outlay with fin-ther costs, such as 
the purchase of victuals, weaponry and clothing, together with building works being 
accounted for either in addition to the wages or being centrally provided. Money was 
essentially for the wages of the troops. Without money to pay the garrison soldiers 
there was no hope of retaining any semblance of a permanent military force in 
Scotland or northern England. ' It was an absolute priority that the wages of these 
garrison soldiers were paid especially as wages did not contribute to making a profit 
for their recipient but went solely to providing for their subsistence. Non-payment of 
wages consequently meant it was impossible for a soldier to remain in service. 
Substantial sums were spent on wages by the Crown. In 1306/7 the cost of the 
wages for the garrison of Dumfries - consisting of eight knights, 28 men-at-arms, 20 
crossbowmen, 40 archers and five non-combatants - was calculated at 60s. 4d. a day. 
The yearly total for the three knights, 37 men-at-anns and 40 hobelars of the Alnwick 
garrison in 1314/15 worked out at f 1,252. Id. 3 This provides an insight into the 
tremendous cost the payment of large garrisons entailed and it becomes even clearer in 
the overall total of all the garrisons retained by the Crown. The wardrobe book of 
1299/1300 reveals that, for that financial year, garrisons cost the greater part of all 
expenses with a total of f 13,574 being spent on their maintenance while it has been 
1 There was an extremely short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to institute a form of castle-guard in the 
first few years of the century with a proportion of garrison troops serving for lands in Scotland, CDS, ii, 
nos. 1132,1286,1321; Prestwich, 'Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles, pp. 190-5. 
2 CDS, v, no. 477. 
3 Prestwich, 'Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles', p. 188. This total also includes more minor 
payments for works on the castle and compensation for horses. 
estimated that the northern castle garrisons retained by the CroNNn in the years 
following Bannockburn cost E8,000 annually, E20,000 if the towns of Berwick and 
Carlisle are included .4 Quite clearly the maintenance of these large garrisons was 
enormously expensive and wages accounted for the overwhelming majority of money 
that needed to be paid out. 
The permanent nature of garrisoning necessitated a constant flow of money and 
a well-organised administrative machine to deal with payment and to keep the complex 
and detailed accounts this entailed. In response a permanent extension of the royal 
wardrobe was created in Berwick with clerks such as John de Weston and James 
5 Dalilegh overseeing the costs of garrisoning. The detailed and finely kept account 
books of the 'war wages", vadia guerre, of John de Weston, paymaster of the Lothian 
garrisons between 1298 and 1304, provide the most outstanding source for the study of 
garrison personnel in this period, a lasting testimony to just how strictly these financial 
accounts were recorded and set down .6 As with all matters concerning money in the 
medieval state rigorous checks were kept on expenditure especially in an area so 
exposed to fraud as wages claimed for a multitude of individuals; as well as the 
detailed account books each constable submitted, usually yearly, an account, a 
compotus, in which the numbers and total cost of his garrisons' wages were stated, the 
1330s seeing yet a ftu-ther check in the form of a royal clerk, John Swanlond, who, as 
well as overseeing the costs of building work on castles, was to oversee the payment of 
the garrison soldiers. ' The payment of wages owed to garrisons was expertly 
4 F. Watson, Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-130 7 (East Linton, 1998), pp. 111-2; C. 
McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and France, 1306-28 (East Linton, 1997), p. 
146. The cost of victuals has also been incorporated into some of these estimates. 
5 For a further discussion of this administration see, M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under 
Edward I (London, 1972), pp. 162-5. 
6 E101/10/6; E101/1 1/1; E101/12/18. 
7 Although in this sense he may have performed the same role as John de Weston had occupied earlier in 
the century. 
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scrutinised and painstakingly recorded by an administration set up for that very 
purpose. 
These kind of detailed accounts make it clear that payment was being made to 
each individual who served within a garrison. It is for this reason that the names of the 
knights, men-at-arms, hobelars, mounted archers and, on a very few occasions, those 
of the crossbowmen and archers, appear in the accounts. The dates during which these 
men remained in a garrison are meticulously recorded and any movement from that 
garrison or a change in their own status were duly noted in the accounts. Although it 
seems that it was deemed preferable to include names it was just as acceptable for the 
numbers of each type of soldier within the garrison to be sufficient, a fact testified to 
by the frequency with which only the numbers of foot-soldiers appear. By this form of 
accounting payment was made to the constable based on a careful calculation of each 
individuals' wage; it was then down to the constable to pay each member of his 
garrison accordingly. 
This system, based on the payment of each individual, was prevalent for the 
first half of the fourteenth century. It is clearly in evidence throughout this period 
appearing in Weston's account books during the early 1300s, in the extensive rolls 
8 
recording the payment of garrisons in 1311/12, the compotus accounts for the 
northern castles in 13239 and still in use in the 1330s when William de Felton"s 
garrison of Roxburgh is named in its entirety together with the pay due to each 
soldier. 10 It was the accepted form for calculating and recording the payment of wages 
to garrisons from the last decade of Edward I into the reign of Edward III and by its 
emphasis on each individual was particularly onerous in the burden it placed on clerks 
to ensure they completed their financial accounts accurately as demonstrated by those 
CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412. 
9 BL Stowe Ms 553, fos. 56v-63v. 
10 E 101/22/40. 
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for Roxburgh under Felton in the 1330s where dates, wage rates and the total sum to 
be paid have been crossed out and the correct details inserted; it is doubtful that such 
amendments were that uncommon. 
This system of payment was able to ftinction due to a recognised daily rate of 
pay for each individual which, as wages were for subsistence, was intended to meet the 
cost of their maintenance and consequently rose the higher in rank and status a soldier 
was according to the increased expense of his equipment. " By the late thirteenth 
century acknowledged rates of pay had become accepted for each type of soldier: 4s. a 
day for a banneret; 2s. for a knight; 12d. (i. e. Is. ) for an esquire, sergeant and man-at- 
arms; crossbowmen received 3d. and archers 2d.; hobelars and horse archers, when 
they came into existence, were both paid 6d. 12 These rates were the same for those 
serving in field forces and in garrisons and were therefore standard for any forin of 
paid military service and they remained at these rates for most of the fourteenth 
century. It also says something about the burden of garrison service that bannerets and 
knights were willing to accept pay at a time when many of such a status were 
unwilling to do so. 
Due to the relative permanency of garrisons the financial accounts for garrison 
service provide one of the most in-depth insights into pay rates and the earliest 
accounts of this period immediately raise the question of exactly just how uniform 
these accepted rates of pay really were. A number of discrepancies are evident. In 
Edinburgh, whilst other garrisons were paid at the accepted rates, the men-at-arms 
were receiving only 10d. a day in late 1301 and Into 1302, this incongruity all the more 
striking as the sergeants in Edinburgh were in receipt of the full 12d. during the same 
time. During the same period all but two of the men-at-arms in both the town and 
11 Although it is unlikely these rates met the real cost to each soldier, Prestwich, Armies mid Warfare, p. 
86. 
12 Jbid, p. 84. 
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castle of Berwick were on 10d. and the men-at-arms in Carstairs were also paid just 
I Od. " There is no obvious reason for these discrepancies and it would seem that in the 
earliest years of the century pay rates for garrison soldiers were far from fixed and 
accepted. 
However a clue to this fluctuation might be sought in another anomaly that 
disrupts the accepted pay rates during 1302. It is noticeable that from February 1302 
esquires (valets) serving in Berwick town saw their wages drop from 12d. to 8d. a day. 
Even more conspicuous is the wholesale drop in pay rates in Roxburgh at the same 
time. Before 1302 those in the Roxburgh garrison received the accepted rates however 
in February this all changed; Robert Hastang, constable of the castle and a banneret, 
was in receipt of only 2s. 6d. a day rather than 4s., the wage of the knights fell to l6d. 
and that of the esquires and men-at-arms to 8d. In June the garrison of Jedburgh was 
being paid similarly; Richard Hastang, constable and knight, receiving 16d. and 
esquires and men-at-arms 8d. John Kingston, banneret and constable of Edinburgh, 
was on 2s. 6d.,, and from February knights in Edinburgh were on 16d. and esquires and 
men-at-arms 8d.; again from February men-at-arms in Bothwell were paid just 8d. 
Berwick town also experienced the same reduction from February; John Newenham, 
knight, dropping to 16d. and esquires and men-at-anns to 8d.; John Pencaitland, 
previously paid expressly high, also felt the drop, receiving only 12d. 14 
It is clear that from February 1302 pay rates for garrisons were formally 
reduced for all those whose status was above that of the foot soldier. That this was a 
deliberate policy enacted by the Crown is evident in the reductions taking place at 
exactly the same time and in the lower pay rates being uniform across the garrisons-, 
2s. 6d. for a banneret, 16d. for a knight and 8d. for an esquire and man-at-arms. 
13 E101/10/5- 
14 E101/10/6. 
17 
However by late 1302 this deliberate reduction of wages was no longer in existence 
and pay rates rose back to what they had been before the wholesale changes of 
February, Roxburgh again receiving the accepted rates by December at the latest and 
Edinburgh seeing a return to its previous rates in November. This cut in pay was a 
temporary measure enacted during the Truce of Asnieres which lasted from late 
January 1302 until the autumn,. Edward I exploiting a relative hiatus in the Scottish 
war to ease the financial crisis that faced him at this time. 15 If this was an attempt to set 
a precedent whereby two rates of pay were established, one for war and one for peace, 
then it proved unsuccessful as it was never repeated. In the autumn of 1302, With the 
end of the truce and the onset of winter, rates returned to their previous levels. Indeed 
it is in the months after this general reduction that the accepted rates of pay become 
more common for all garrisons; Edinburgh only returned to I Od. for men-at-arms for a 
brief period before it was brought into line, the men-at-arms receiving 12d. from 
November 1302 onwards. Jedburgh and the other previously lower paid garrisons 
followed SUit. 16 
This reduction did not extend to the foot soldiers of the garrisons but there is a 
separate discrepancy that disrupts the apparently accepted rates of pay for 
crossbowmen serving within garrisons. In 1301 the crossbowmen in both the castle 
and town of Berwick were on the normal 3d. but by 20 November 1302 whereas those 
within the castle were still receiving 3d. those in the town were paid 4d. Roxburgh is 
exactly the same, the crossbowmen in the castle being paid 3d. and those in the town 
4d. 17 In this case there is a definite difference in pay between men of the same status 
and role and who were serving in the same geographical location. It follows that there 
15 For the truce and the financial crisis see M. Prestwich, Edward I (London, 1988), pp. 494-6. It was a 
similar financial crisis in 1319 which led to a general reduction of the wages of the men-at-arms (to 
l0d. ) serving on the border with the wardens of the march, Raimes, p. 24. 
16 E101/11/1- 
17 E101/9/16; E101/10/6; ElOl/I 1/1; E101/12/18. 
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must have been some intrinsic difference between living in the town or the castle 
which warranted the additional Id. a day. This almost certainly relates to the fact that 
wages were for the purpose of subsistence; it may have been more inexpensive living 
in the castle, those in the town may have had to pay some form of rent, there might 
have been some difference in the availability of food and drink. It is extremely unlikely 
that the extra pay was a form of compensation for the added danger of residing in the 
town rather than within the more secure walls of the castle although it cannot be 
entirely ruled out. 
Further evidence that this difference was based on the cost of subsistence is 
provided when it is noted that the same discrepancy in pay also occurs between 
gaffisons as well as between castles and towns in the same place. Crossbowmen in 
Edinburgh and Jedburgh were always paid at 3d. in contrast to those in the garrisons of 
Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow who were consistently on 4d. Even in 1311/12 those in 
Roxburgh were on 4d. whilst the Edinburgh crossbowmen were still paid 3d. 18 Once 
again the reason for this must be in the need for subsistence , indicating that it was 
more costly to stay at Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow than within Edinburgh and 
Jedburgh, the rate of pay raised accordingly to compensate for the extra cost. In effect 
there were consequently two rates of pay for crossbowmen in garrisons, 3d. and 4d., 
the amount dependent on where the crossbowmen was stationed and the corresponding 
cost of subsistence. Such careful considerations illustrate the details officials 
considered in financing garrisons and an awareness of the difficulties of subsistence 
particular to each garrison. Yet this two tier pay rate only operated for crossbowmen; 
archers received 2d. regardless of where they were based, whether Edinburgh or 
Kirkintilloch, a castle or a town. The sheer number of archers manning garrisons may 
"I CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 406,409. 
1%9 I 
have precluded this system being extended to them but it suggests that archers in some 
of the more costly garrisons would have found their daily lives a particularly arduous 
struggle to make ends meet. 
These two different rates for crossbowmen also appear in the wardrobe book 
for 1299-1300 in which the great majority of crossbowmen whose wages are stated 
were being paid at 4d. a day. Those within Roxburgh - from how the account is 
written it would appear they were serving in the castle - were originally receiving 3d. 
but on 25 December 1299 this was raised to 4d. 19 Robert Hastang's compotus for 1300 
also reveals that the crossbowmen in Roxburgh were still in receipt of 4d several 
months later . 
20 This suggests that the two tier rate for crossbowmen also existed as a 
variable rate that was dependent on immediate conditions as well as the cost of 
subsistence within each garrison. 
Another type of soldier for whom pay rates vary is the hobelar and this may be 
due to them being relative newcomers to garrisons although once again subsistence 
could well be the main factor. The accepted rate for a hobelar came to be fixed at a 
daily wage of 6d. but there are numerous instances in these early years when some 
hobelars were receiving 8d. The first noticeable occasion is in Kirkintilloch in late 
1301 when three men-at-arnis are singled out as being paid 8d. rather than the 12d. the 
others were on; it appears this was due to these men having uncovered horses and 
therefore being hobelars, the three continuing to receive this rate in 1302 and it is 
evident hobelars in Kirkintilloch were pennanently on 8d. 21 Similarly hobelars serving 
in Linlithgow were always paid 8d . 
22 At the same time those in Edinburgh were 
19 Lib. Quot., p. 136. 
20 CDS, v, no. 233. 
21 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/12/18. 
22 E101/10/6; E101/1 1/1. 
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1, permanently paid 6d. as were those in both the town and castle of Roxburgh. -I 
Interestingly although the hobelars in Berwick town were on 6d. from 20 November- 
29 November 1302 - receiving 4d.. before their horses were valued - one of their 
number, Adam de Lanark, was paid 8d , in this case his higher rate of pay surely 
originating from either an enhanced status or special terms of service. 
Indeed variation in pay rates due to specific circumstances or the identity of 
certain individuals was not uncommon. John de Pencaitland was to expressly receive 
20d. a day in Berwick, no doubt as he was the former Scottish constable of Jedburgb 
who had surrendered that castle to the English and who afterwards evidently entered 
into the service of Edward 1; alongside him in Berwick was John Newenham, a knight 
and official, who was also singled out for a higher rate, receiving 16d . 
2' The one 
occasion in which foot archers in garrisons were in receipt of a higher wage was when 
they also doubled as craftsmen such as masons or carpenters to undertake urgent 
building works on their castle, the archers in Roxburgh being paid 2d. a day extra in 
February 1302 whilst repairing the walls and houses of the castle, the supplementary 
25 2d. to end when they had finished the walling. In cases such as these there is an 
obvious reason for the receipt of pay that differs from the accepted rates. 
The different rates paid to crossbowmen and hobelars are much less clear cut. 
However it is surely no coincidence that both crossbowmen and hobelars received 
higher wages in Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow, a fact which reinforces the theory that it 
was more costly for soldiers to remain in these garrisons, the one contradiction being 
that the hobelars in Roxburgh town were not on a higher rate although the 
crossbowmen there were. Once again it is evident that rates of pay to garrison soldiers 
23 E101/10/6; ElOl/l 1/1. 
24 CDSý ii, no. 1086; E101/10/6, m. 1. The indenture for the force, of men-at-arms to serve with the 
wardens in 1319 contains many examples of men specified as receiving a higher wage due to various 
reasons, Raimes, p. 24. 
" CDS, ii, no. 1286. 
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were not necessarily the accepted rates and that there was an element of fluctuation 
and flexibility in them. 
These variable rates are rather unexpected and would have created interesting 
situations within the garrisoning community as men of a lesser status were on occasion 
paid the same as those considered to be above them. The period 1302-1303 is 
particularly striking when it is considered that vintenars of crossbowmen were 
receiving 6d., the same as hobelars were being paid in Edinburgh and Berwick, and 
during the wholesale wage reduction of 1302 these same vintenars, whose pay was not 
cut, were paid only 2d. less than esquires and men-at-arms and ordinary crossbowmen 
were receiving only 4d. less than the latter. It is in the years between 1301 and 1304 
that the accepted rates of pay did finally become commonly accepted for garrison 
soldiers but only after variations and a temporary period of wholesale reduction had 
taken place. It is tempting to see the newly created garrison of Linlithgow as playing 
an important role in raising and establishing these rates in garrisons; from its first 
appearance in the accounts in 1303 all those serving there received the highest possible 
wage commensurate with their status including hobelars on 8d. and crossbowmen on 
4d. 26 Yet, as the 8d. for hobelars illustrates, there were still two different rates for 
hobelars and crossbowmen within garrisons in 1304 and beyond. 
An absence of any surviving accounts prohibits a continuation of the detailed 
study of pay rates in the following years. The next substantive document is the account 
roll for the pay of several garrisons in 1311/12 and this reflects the trends noticed 
between 1300 and 1304 with a discrepancy between crossbowmen in Roxburgh, who 
received 4d., and those in Edinburgh and BerWick who were on the more usual 3d., 
26 EIOI/1 VI, c. f mrn. 2-3. 
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although the pay of hobelars now appears to be a consistent 6d. across all garrisons. 27 
In 1322 the men-at-arms in Bamard. castle were only paid 8d., an echo of the Imposed 
reduction of 1302, the lower rate of pay for men-at-arms serving with the wardens on 
the border in 1319 indicating that this too was the result of a serious deficit of 
money. 28 The last detailed garrison account of this type is that of William de Felton for 
Roxburgh from June 1340 until March 1342.29 Although the accepted rates were paid 
to knights, esquires, men-at-arms and sergeants there are two interesting aspects to 
note concerning pay. The first concerns the watchmen in the castle who were paid 2d. 
a day between 4 June and 30 September 1340, received 3d. from I October 1340 until 
3 June 1341 and then on 4 June were again on their former 2d. until 30 September. 
Unfortunately their pay after this is unclear but the existing evidence plainly depicts a 
two tier rate of pay for these watchmen, one that operated at a lower rate from June 
until the end of September and at the higher rate from October until June, timings 
which strongly suggest that the castle was believed to be more vulnerable during the 
long dark nights of winter and into spring, the watchmen being duly compensated for 
the greater and more serious work they would have to endure throughout this period. 
Upon the return of the shorter nights of summer the risk of attack lessened and 
consequently so did the pay of the watchmen. The second aspect to note is more wide- 
ranging in its implication, affecting as it does both the hobelar and the horse archer. 
Within the account these are classed together with no distinction between the two and 
their pay is a surprisingly low 4d. There is no previous record of hobelars regularly 
being paid at this rate before the 1330s and although the horse archer was a relative 
newcomer its pay rate was quickly established as 6d., the same as that of the hobelar. 
Exactly why they were only paid 4d. in Roxburgh in the early 1340s is unclear. 
" CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412. 
28 RLStowe. MS 5-53, fo. -Sgv- 29 E 10 1/22/40. 
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Additional information concerning this unusually low rate of pay is contained 
within the 1339/40 compotus of Thomas Rokeby for the castles of Edinburgh and 
Stirling. Included within this is a separate memorandum stating that the (horse) archers 
were allowed wages of 6d. a day 'on account of the necessity of the war' as Rokeby 
had sworn that they would not remain in the garrison for less . 
30 Here it is obvious that 
the nominal set rate for horse archers was less than 6d.,, most probably the 4d. that such 
men were receiving in Roxburgh. That 6d. came to be the accepted rate implies that 
these fluctuations within garrisons played an integral role in establishing this rate and 
that originally, at least with regard to garrisons, horse archers were actually paid only 
4d. This is supported by evidence of pay from 1335-37. Horse archers in Thomas 
Roscelin's newly installed garrison of Edinburgh were paid 4d. in 1335 as were those 
that entered into Stirling in 1337. The hobelar is more problematic; paid 4d. in 
Berwick (where the men-at-arms were incidentally on just 8d. ) but 6d. in Stirling, 
Edinburgh and indeed in Roxburgh, this rate in the latter illustrating that hobelars there 
had actually suffered a pay cut by 1340.31 With the advent of the horse archer in the 
1330s there was an evident disparity between their pay and that of the established 
hobelar, 6d. becoming accepted for the horse archer due to the precedent set by the 
hobelar after the ultimate redundancy of the latter from the 1340s onwards. 
The concept of warfare necessitating a higher rate of pay is neatly encapsulated 
in the protest John Stirling, constable of Edinburgh, submitted in 1335. Stirling 
complained that whereas he was paying the hobelars of his garrison 6d. the chancellor 
would only allow 4d., a wage at which the hobelars refused to remain in the gamison. 
Again two rates of pay appear for the hobelar, 4d. undoubtedly the official rate but 6d. 
the more realistic and indeed more traditional rate. That there was some conflict 
30 CDSý iii, no. 1323. 
31 BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 248f -249r. 
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between official rates can be seen in another protest of Stirling, the chancellor only 
willing to pay Edinburgh's watchmen 3d. rather than the 6d. which he was paying 
them. Admittedly 6d. seems quite exorbitant but the point is that the constable had 
some flexibility in deciding his garrisons' rates of pay although these did need official 
sanction for them to be ultimately paid out. The overall sense gained from Stirling's 
protests is of a no-nonsense commander battling with officialdom to receive realistic 
wages for his men which reflected the proper cost of their service. Indeed there is an 
unmistakable feeling that there was an official policy to pay out as little as possible, 
the chancellor in Scotland only paying Stirling himself the wage of a knight despite 
him having been made a banneret on St. John the Baptist's Day. 32 
Consequently there were two factors which could alter the rate of pay: the cost 
of subsistence at a given garrison or the necessity of war, the latter a situation in which 
men could demand a higher rate for their continued service. 33 That garrison soldiers 
expected to be paid certain accepted rates is evident from the complaints made against 
the constable of Roxburgh, Richard Tempest , in 1362, when 
he was alleged to have 
retained in his garrison Scottish grooms and 'other unfit persons' in place of the proper 
men-at-arms and archers. Tempest was receiving the full amount for a properly 
manned garrison and was able to pay these impostors at a lower rate and rake off the 
rest of the money for himself . 
34 It was a fraud impossible without impostors as regular 
garrison soldiers knew exactly what pay they should receive and would have 
demanded their expected wages. A similar fraudulent act, albeit with the roles slightly 
changed, was alleged to have taken place at Berwick in 1317. It was claimed that the 
chamberlain there was paying five pounds a day more than was needed to the garrison 
32 CDS5 iii, no. 1194. 
33 Necessity of war could also mean victuals were in short supply and this could have been the reason 
men needed the extra pay, the issue again returning to that of subsistence. 34 CDS, iv, no. 64. 
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as some men drew their pay although they were not on duty for months, others who 
were being paid as men-at-arms and crossbowmen were not knowledgeable enough or 
equipped to perform their apparent roles, knights enrolled their grooms as men-at-arms 
and took their appropriate pay, there was even a claim that the chamberlain was paying 
people such as local townsmen and traders as men-at-arms even though they would 
prove useless if called upon to fight. 35 Whether true or not these allegations 
demonstrate that pay rates remained clearly defined and that both those in charge - 
whether clerks of the Crown or constables - and the soldiers themselves were acutely 
aware of what these were for each type of soldier. Without them no such fraudulent 
scheme could have been contemplated. In fact in 1382 these rates were actually 
specified for the garrison of Roxburgh, knights receiving 2s., men-at-arms 12d. and 
mounted archers 6d., all exactly matching the accepted rates from the first half of the 
century. 
36 
However there is one area in these accounts where pay rates cannot be known 
for sure. In a number of accounts the constable receives a sum of money, sometimes 
termed a fee, with which he paid the men-at-arms in his own retinue. This payment of 
a lump sum in the first half of the century, a certum grosso, is almost wholly exclusive 
to situations in which the constable was also sheriff of the locality and it was therefore 
the appropriate fee for that sheriffdom. In autumn 1301 Robert Hastang, for the castle 
and sheriffdom of Roxburgh, paid ten men-at-arms of his own retinue from his certum 
and Richard Hastang, in Jedburgh, paid five from his certum while in 1302 John 
Kingston took payment 'in gross' for a knight and ten men-at-arms in his garrison of 
Edinburgh. It is evident that these payments were in respect of the office of sheriff as 
demonstrated in Linlithgow where the wages of the constable's retinue are actually 
35 CDS9 iii, no. 553. 
36 CDS, iv, no. 306. 
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stated as they were paid individually whereas the sheriff, Archibald de Livingston, was 
taking in gross for his ten men-at-arms, the separation of the office of constable and 
sheriff between two different individuals making it clear the payment related to the 
office of the sheriff. 37 Similarly, in 1335, the indenture of John Stirling as constable 
and sheriff of Edinburgh included the payment of a sum described as the accustomed 
fee for the sheriffdom. 38 In these circumstances the exact rate at which these men-at- 
arms were paid is unclear but it must be adjudged to have been largely the same as the 
rest of the garrison. An account for Carstairs appears to indicate that the constable's 
retinue of men-at-arms was on 10d. each which was the same as the rest of the garrison 
and, although they were not paid from a certum, that the retinue of the constable of 
Linlithgow was paid at the same rate as the entire garrison strongly supports the idea 
that their wages were on a parity with others of their status within the garrison. 
The amount of this certum rarely varied as demonstrated by the fact that it was 
sometimes referred to in documents as a 'fixed sum' of money. 39 In February 1302 
John Kingston was to receive M for the pay of his own retinue to keep the castle and 
sheriffidom of Edinburgh and Edmund Hastings in Berwick was also to be paid E40 
that was to go to the payment of his retinue . 
40 The sums due as the certum for the 
octave of Hilary in 1302/3 were 40 marks for Robert Hastang in Roxburgh, 20 marks 
to Richard Hastang at Jedburgh, 100 marks to Kingston in Edinburgh while John de St. 
John was to be paid 200 marks for Dumfries and Lochmaben as well as for keeping 
Galloway and Annandale . 
41 In 1303/4 the constable of Dumfhes, Matthew Redman, 
was to be paid a fee of E60 and for Dundee f40 was to be received by Thomas de 
37 E 10 1/9/16; E 10 1/ 1015. 
38 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, app. i, p. 243. 
19 CDS, v, no. 305. 
40 CDS' ii, no. 1286. 
41 CDS, v, no. 345. 
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Umfraville. '2 These are just some of the recorded examples of a certum being paid to a 
constable and going largely towards the payment of wages to his personal retinue, an 
important financial contribution to garrisons even though it was related to the office of 
sheriff that the constable also occupied. 
Payment of a fee for the keeping of the sheriffdom was thus a traditional 
arrangement but the demands of garrisoning in the climate of heavy warfare led to new 
measures being taken in 1302. During August, with the autumn and winter fast 
approaching, a series of indentures were concluded with various garrisons regarding 
their keeping until Christmas. Rather than remaining with the routine method of 
paying each soldier individually based on their duration of service fixed amounts were 
to be paid to a number of constables which they were to receive in advance and from 
which they would pay their men. William Francis, whose garrison of Kirkintilloch 
totalled 28 men-at-arms and 60 foot along with various others, was to be paid their 
wages in advance; pay for Alexander Balliol's men in Selkirk forest totalled f50 of 
which he received an advance of L20; John Kingston in Edinburgh was to be paid f 60 
for wages although it is unclear whether this sum was for his whole garrison or his ten 
men-at-arms. This approach was only used with a few garrisons whilst others, such as 
Linlithgow, were still paid based on the service of individuals, but its usage indicates 
there was a developing sense of flexibility in methods of payment of garrison wages. 43 
This flexibility briefly appears elsewhere in these early years. Perhaps the most 
noticeable instances are the occasions on which garrison soldiers were actually paid in 
advance. An early example of this dates from October 1299 when William de Ponton 
was ordered to enter the garrison of Lochmaben with his men-at-arms, the king writing 
to Dalilegh that he was to pay Ponton and his men the wages that they would be due in 
42 BL Add MS 8835, fo. 37v. 
43 CDS) ii, no. 1321. 
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advance 'as has been paid to others in a similar position%, 44 a statement that makes it 
clear this was not an unusual occurrence in certain circumstances. The kind of situation 
which necessitated an advance is described in another advance of payment to 
Lochmaben in early 1299, a request that a reinforcement of crossbowmen on their waý. 
to the garrison should receive fifteen days pay in advance at 3d. a day due to the 'great 
1 45 deamess in the country as no victuals could be got there. Advance payment of wages 
continued to be used until mid-century with Thomas Gray receiving a month's pay 
totalling E63 in advance in 1322 and in 1338 Thomas Rokeby was promised 300 marks 
in advance for keeping Edinburgh and Stirling although this was later specified as 
actually being 'beyond his pay,. 46 A similar system was put into operation at 
Lochmaben in 1300 to pay a force of 30 armed horsemen under Robert Clifford, a total 
of 500 marks being paid to him in three separate instalments. 47 Perhaps the most 
interesting financial set-up was that concluded on 30 July 1304, John de Benestede and 
Walter de Bedwynd entering into an agreement with Matthew Redman that the latter 
would stay as keeper of Dumfries castle with a specified number of men from I 
August to 20 November, Redman receiving E60 for this from the king which would be 
paid in three equal instalments at the terms of Assumption, All Saints and St. 
Anclrew' S. 48 
The appearance of these arrangements, although sporadic before the 1340s, are 
extremely interesting as they point towards the system by which garrisons were paid in 
the second half of the century, albeit they prefigure this later system in a much more 
minor way. An offer to undertake the keeping of Jedburgh in 1298 by the abbot and 
convent of Jedburgh along with No de Aldeburgh envisaged that they would keep the 
44 CDS, v, no. 299. 
45 CDSý ii, no. 1057. 
46CDS, iii, nos. 772,1283,1295. 
47Stevenson, ii, pp. 407-8. 
48 C DS, ii, no. 376. 
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castle for five years meeting some of the costs themselves but also receiving 500 
marks annually from the Crown; 49 although this only ever remained a proposal it is a 
strikingly early example of the system that was to operate for royal garrisons after the 
battle of Neville's Cross. The 300 marks Rokeby was to be paid also bears a close 
resemblance to this later system of payment. John Coupland became the constable of 
Roxburgh in the immediate aftermath of Neville's Cross and an indenture from 
February 1350 survives in which he undertook to keep the castle for the duration of a 
year for a total amount of one thousand marks, the numbers he was to retain being 
specified and building works to be seen to at his own CoSt. 
50 By December 1357 
Coupland was a warden of the March and keeper of Berwick, contracting to serve there 
with a sufficient garrison, receiving f2000 for all his claims .51 Earlier, in May 1346, 
the earl of Northampton's castle of Lochmaben was the subject of an agreement in 
which Richard de Thirlwall undertook to remain as keeper for one year for a sum of 
E266.3s. 4d. for all Costs. 
52 It is Roxburgh that provides the best examples of this form 
of payment right up until the end of the century. Henry Percy was to be paid f 500 a 
year for his ward of the castle and sheriffdom between 1355 and 1357. An indenture 
agreed in February 1385 with Thomas Swinbume and Richard Tempest, joint keepers 
of Roxburgh, specified that they were to keep the castle for one year for a sum of 4,300 
marks. 53 The financial arrangements agreed with the joint keepers in December 1400,, 
Richard Grey and Stephen Lescrope, were more sophisticated; they were to receive 
41,000 marks per annum until new building works and a fosse were finished, 3,000 
marks a year once these were completed, dropping to 2,000 marks during periods of 
truce with the number to be retained in the garrison also specified for the last 
49 SteVenSon, ii, pp. 264-5. 
11 CDS, iii, no. 1546. 
5'Ibid, no. 1669. 
52 Ibid, no. 1459. 
53 Ibid, no. 1655; CDS, iv, no. 528. 
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situation. 54 It is telling that the 2,000 marks is referred to as a pay rate in contrast to the 
individual pay rates so prevalent up until the 1340s, a clear sign that the constables had 
a much greater leeway in soldiers' wages in time of war but also showing that the 
Crown still had a powerful say in what these rates of pay should be. This system of 
agreed sums for a period of one year coincides With a lessening interest of the Crown 
in the Scottish war and can also be explained by the relative scarcity of English 
garrisons in Scotland Roxburgh and Berwick being the only ones of any note, the need 
for tight Crown control of expenses being somewhat reduced. It was a much simpler 
task for the Crown to handle with no detailed account books of wages necessary. The 
burden was neatly transferred to the constable and his officials. 
Throughout the century, whatever the system of payment, the money itself was 
delivered to the constable in instalments at agreed points spread evenly through the 
year. The 1302 example of the garrisons of Selkirk, Jedburgh and Roxburgh receiving 
half their agreed total in advance and half at All Saints has already been mentioned and 
Matthew Redman's agreement to hold Dumfries for a few months in 1304 envisaged 
three equal payments. There is a record firom 1335 declaring that the sergeants and 
esquires at Roxburgh were owed the increment of E232 which was one quarter of their 
yearly pay. 
55 Robert Hastang's compotus of January-November 1300 for Roxburgh 
details a total payment of over f686 from the paymaster John de Weston that Hastang 
had received 'at divers times in this period' and three payments each of W, two of 
these made in May and October. 56 In 1357 Henry Percy, receiving E500 per annum as 
keeper of Roxburgh, was due L936.6s. 2d. for one and three quarter years and twenty 
days . 
57 The compotus for the earl Marshal as constable of Roxburgh in 1389/90 
54 CDS, iv, no. 568. 
55 CDS, v, no. 738. 
56 Ibid, no, 233. 
57 C DS, iii, no. 1655. 
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recorded that he was paid his annual sum of f 500 in three separate, presumably 
approximately equal, instalments from the Exchequer. 58 
The money was either delivered to the constable at his castle or given to him or 
his representative at another relatively secure location and then brought to the castle. 
Two quite typical examples of this come in 1382 when Matthew Redman, keeper of 
Roxburgh, was paid flOO beyond the sum allowed for the garrison's pay due to him 
keeping the castle personally, receiving the sum by the hands of Richard Redman, 
knight, and in 1311 when 100 marks for the pay of Philip Moubray's garrison at 
Stirling was paid to his valet Alexander Moubray; 59 the delivery of money by a 
member of the garrison, and indeed by an immediate relative of the constable, is a 
regular occurrence in surviving accounts and depicts just how carefully the 
transportation of money was dealt With. Indeed it cost money to deliver money; in 
1299 20s. was spent on bringing f 800 from the king's treasury at Newcastle to 
Berwick for its munition and 13s. on E300 being moved from York to Berwick via 
Newcastle . 
60 By 1306 it was necessary for the royal official James DaIllegh to have an 
escort of three or four esquires, a precaution as he often moved with an amount of cash 
with him, acting in a similar way to Richard de Abingdon who in 1299 personally 
escorted silver to the value of f. 20 to Lochmaben for the wages of those serving in that 
region. The very real risk entailed in moving money across hostile territory comes 
across well in the blunt letter of Edward I written whilst Wintering at Linlithgow in 
130 1. Desperate for money he states that he will not accept the excuse that it is 
dangerous to transport large quantities of coin; 61 that it was far from a mere excuse is 
11 CDS, iv, no. 413. 
59 Ibid, no. 306; CDS, v, no. 562. 
60 CDS, ii, no. 1086. 
61 CDS, v, nos. 199,204,448,263. 
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evident in the fact that the target of Edward's ire had by implication previously refused 
to send money to his king for that very reason. 
Despite the dangers of moving money it was possible for prompt payment of 
P- g, arrison soldiers; when arrears of wages do occur, as they frequently do , it is due more 
to a dearth of ready money or, less often, to the inherent reluctance of the wardrobe 
and exchequer to expend the money it owed. The E50 owed to Richard Hastang and h's 
six esquires in Jedburgh for the whole of the 29"' year (20 November 1300 - 19 
November 130 1) and up to 11 February 1302 is an example that was repeated many 
timeS62 as demonstrated again in the 1320s when the wages of John Lillebum's 
garrison at Dunstanburgh were six weeks in arrears, - 
63 admittedly no way near the 
length of Hastang's wait but extremely serious in itself The wardrobe accounts for the 
early fourteenth century are littered with payment of wages owing to small groups or 
individuals who had served in garrisons; in 1312 fourteen hobelars in Dumfries being 
paid a total of f93.9s. for their service there between July 1311 and 31 March 1312 
with ten crossbowmen in the same garrison receiving a sum of 03.7s. 6d. for the 
same duration of service. 64 In this case although payment was relatively prompt it does 
not alter the fact that these men were owed nine months wages. The detailed account 
keeping necessary to fulfil these arrears is evident in a file of 1302/3 in which a whole 
range of sums were owed to garrison foot-soldiers: 21 in Berwick town being due 
amounts from 30s. to 13s.; six archers in Edinburgh being owed half a mark each, two 
22s. 9d. and a further two 50S. 
65 The difficulties encountered by individual garrison 
soldiers in obtaining their arrears of wages could be compounded by any event that 
disrupted the normal system of payment as is made clear from the numerous petitions 
62 Ibid, v, no. 276. 
63 Ancient Petitions, pp. 28-9. 
64 CDS, v, no. 572. 
65 Ibid, no. 345. 
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for pay from members of John Stirling's garrison of Edinburgh folloýNing his capture 
along with a section of the garrison in February 1338; in November 1339 28 men who 
had been in this garrison were still owed sums varying from S. 17s. to L64.4s. 6d. 66 
The non-payment of a garrison's wages often transferred this hefh-, financial 
burden onto the constable and resulted in the Crown being in quite substantial debt to 
some of these men. In 1304 John de Kingston and his garrison were owed over L56 for 
arrears of wages for the period 2 February - 24 April 1304; later that year the debt had 
grown to over L103 to also cover the period 25 April-20 August. 67 Documents such as 
these read as both the constable and his garrison being owed the money but later 
evidence suggests that the constable had actually covered the wages of his men and 
that the Crown's debt was consequently now entirely payable to him. The money owed 
to Ebles de Mountz is a case in point. It begins in 1308 when Mountz petitioned that a 
writ be issued to the chamberlain of Scotland to pay his wages and those of his 
garrison of Stirling for the past tenn; it is not known whether this was fully paid but in 4; 7-, 
December 1312, now no longer constable of Stirling, the Crown owed 000 in arrears 
of wages and expenses to him from his time as constable; over three and a half years 
later this debt remained unpaid, Mountz now being due over f465 in arrears of pay 
. Aft- - from. his time as constable of Stirling, a figure increased by compensation owed for 
horses he lost at Bannockburn; in fact Mountz was never to see the debt repaid as in 
May 1318 his widow and children were still receiving instalments from the Crown. 
68 
William de Fiennes, constable of Roxburgh, was another who did not live to see the 
debt owed to him settled, the E324.4s. 2d. due for the arrears of his pay and that of his 
garrison still due when he was killed in February 1314 . 
69 In 1347 William de Felton 
66 CCg 1337-1339, pp. 555-6,563, CCR, 1339-1341, pp. 10,289. 
67 CDS' v, nos. 384-5. 
68 CDSj' iii, nos. 70,295,495. 
69 parl. Writs., ii, p. 95. 
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was still attempting to have his account paid for his tenure as constable of Roxburgh 
for the period 134042, Felton having bitterly complained that the treasurer and barons 
70 had previously refused to accept the debt . John de Moubray, warden of Bemick, was 
due the sum of E1,231.10s. 8d. for almost one quarter of a year in late July 1340 but, 
in his own words, had not even received one penny; if the money was not forthcoming 
Moubray declared he would leave his office .71A similar dissatisfied demand came 
from Stephen Lescrope in 1401/2. As keeper of Roxburgh it was agreed that he would 
receive 2000 marks a year yet he was unable to claim 500 marks due for the relevant 
period of the present year despite royal letters to the exchequer and he asked for yet 
another warrant ordering hasty payment as well as requesting that the assignments 
made by John Norbury, the late treasurer, also be allowed. 72 Obtaining payment of an 
outstanding debt was an occupational hazard of being a constable and one that could 
be pursued for many years until it was fulfilled. 
It was in response to these debts it owed that the Crown embarked on a wide 
variety of measures to try and fulfil its financial obligations. To pay off the substantial 
debt owed to Mountz the Crown ordered in July 1316 that flOO from the farm of 
Norwich should be paid to him until it was settled, the grant continuing for his widow 
and children less the flOO Mountz had received whilst still alive. Earlier , in December 
1312, the 000 then owed to Mountz was to be met by a charge on the Tenth due from 
the clergy the following summer. 73 The debt owed to Fiennes was to be partly met by a 
proportion of the talliage collected at Newcastle, the assessors there ordered to pay him 
f 124.4s. 2d. on 18 January 1313, a further f200 to come from the talliage of the city 
of York. This method continued into 1314 when, in February, the mayor and bailiffs of 
71 CDS, iii, no. 1382. 
71 Ibid, no. 1338. 
72 CDS, v, no. 914. 
73 CDSý iii, no. 295. 
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Newcastle were commanded to pay Fiennes f 100 from their talliage, the surviving 
document a sharp rebuke with the king stating his disapproval that the payment has not 
already been made . 
74 Similar measures were also implemented when the immediate 
payment of a gaffison's wages was a necessity. Money made from the sale of cattle 
and sheep sold at Lanercost in October 1306 was used to pay two members of the 
Edinburgh garrison in that year; in 1305 f65 needed to pay the wages of the garrisons 
of Dumfries and Lochmaben came from the sheriff of Wigtown from the farms of that 
county; the following year the sheriff of Cumberland was to immediately send money 
and victuals from his county to supply the royal castles; earlier, in 1303, the Fifteenth 
collected in Cumberland was to be used to pay the garrisons of Dumfries and 
Lochmaben . 
75 Thomas Rokeby was to receive f 1000 in 1338 for his garrisons of 
Edinburgh and Stirling, the money coming from the customs of Kingston-upon-Hull 
and St. Botolph's town. 76 That a pardon for marrying without licence depended on 
Thomas de Veer maintaining 20 men-at-arms to defend Carlisle at his own cost for a 
specified period in 1316 illustrates the lengths the Crown was prepared to go to in 
order to find ways to finance its garrisons. 77 
William Ridel obviously took matters into his own hands to ensure money for 
the upkeep of his garrison and castle at Bamburgh, ignoring arrangements whereby he 
was to provide sufficient security for local tithes to the value of L50 and seizing them 
by force. 78 Ridel's actions also hint at an often overlooked financial aspect of castles in 
that they had an economic function and indeed economic presence in the local 
landscape; in contrast to Ridel's illegal move these were quite legitimate and stemmed 
from a castle being an entity that owned land in the surrounding town, village or 
74 parl. Writs., ii, p. 95; CDS, iii, no. 351. 
75 CDS, v, nos. 331,408,414,466. 
76 CDS' iii, no. 1271. 
77 Ibid., no. 468. 
78 Dated between 1319 and 1323, Northern Petitions, pp. 252-3. 
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countryside. An example occurs in 1303 in an apparent usurping of three bondages at 
Beadnell that belonged to Bamburgh castle. More detail of the demesne lands of the 
castle comes from 1322, when the tenants of Bamburgh stated that they had ]eased the 
castle demesne for up to 40 years, paying the constable 26 marks, and protesting that 
as each new constable now made them pay a large one off sum for his own use, theýý 
were considering leaving their land uncultivated. They said the king received no profit 
from these single payments and asked for a fixed rent for 20 years. By 1327 the people 
of Bamburgh were no longer able to pay their 26 marks rent as their land had been 
recently despoiled and the same was true in 1333 . 
79Lochmaben castle possessed profit 
making appendages which included the field of Ousby, the vills of Heghetage and 
Smalham as well as a lake and a park. 80 During the early years of the war Edward I 
forcibly took possession of the manor of 'Veuz Roxburgh' to financially support the 
castle, the manor still being in royal hands in January 1314.81 
These economic attachments to a castle were traditionally there not just to 
cover expenses of daily upkeep and small peacetime garrisons but to actually make a 
profit for the owner whether it was the Crown or a private individual. By no means 
were these adequate for financing the large English garrisons required during the 
Anglo-Scottish wars and the destruction wrought by warfare, as shown at Bamburgh, 
also severely damaged their profit making capabilities. Yet any money that could be 
gained from them was vital and des ite the war it appears these lands could still 4; p-, p 
produce revenue. Despite the scarcity of money for his garrison Ridel was ordered to 
pay the countess of Angus f 50 a year from the lordship of Barnard castle, an annual 
payment he was able to meet during 1319-1321 but which in 1323 reverted to being 
placed on the customs from Newcastle and Hartlepool after it fell into arrears. In 1330 
79 Ancient Petitions, pp. 20-21,119-121,192,199. 
80 CDS, iv, no. 128. 
81 CDS, iii, no. 347. 
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Ridel obtained a writ authorising these payments he had made from the issues of 
Langton and Newsham which totalled E193.82 The offer subnutted in 1298 by the 
abbot and convent of Jedburgh and No de Aldeburgh to keep the castle of Jedburgh 
was motivated by a desire to preserve the profits they took for themselves and the king 
as his farmers of Jedburgh forest, the constable of Jedburgh having informed the king 
he could not keep the castle without the forest, by which he meant the revenues from 
the forest. Despite the king subsequently directing that they were to remain as farmers 
83 the constable of Jedburgh still encroached into the forest and disturbed them. It was 
the potential profit which could be made that led men to request the keeping of castles 
for life, even those right in the midst of the war, Ebles de Mountz requesting in 1308 
that his long unrewarded. service be compensated for by the grant of the keeping of 
Stirling castle for life; as constable Mountz must have known it was still bringing in 
revenues despite the war. 
84 
This two-way process of finance with the constable receiving money from the 
Crown and also having to account for money he received from castle revenues was a 
feature he had to include in his annual compotus among the accounts of his receipts. 
That of Robert Hastang for Roxburgh between 14 January and 10 November 1300 
includes the interesting fact that he made f 13.6s. 8d. from the sale of goods that 
remained after the last period of accounting and further sales of these brought in a 
significant L74.17s. 2d. 85 During 1335-37 William de Felton, as constable of 
Roxburgh, was in receipt of 500 marks that came from the fines of Lothian, Tevedale 
and Peebles, E200 of which he subsequently sent to the constable of Edinburgh, 
82 Ancient Petitions, pp. 189-90; CDS, v, no. 724. 
" Stevenson, ii, pp. 264-6. 
84 C 
, 
DS, iii, no. 70. 
85 CDS, v, no. 233. 
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Thomas Roscelin. 86 A later constable of Roxburgh and sheniff of the same, Henry 
Percy, was advanced money in the 1350s to the value of f 30.6s. 8d. w'hich came from 
the issues of the castle and shenffdom during his ward. 8' Despite warfare castles 
continued to produce revenue from their demesne lands and related shenffdoms 
throughout this period and these directly contributed to alleviating the enormous 
burden of financing their garrisons. 
The payment of wages to garrisons was fraught with problems throughout this 
period and was naturally most acute at times of hard-pressed warfare when it was 
needed the most. Pay was consistently based on accepted rates of which there was on 
the whole little divergence and which precluded any attempt to lessen the financial 
burden by a widespread cut in wages. Constables were far from immune to being on 
the wrong end in tenns of finance, often in arrears for their own pay as well as that of 
their men and frequently waiting several years until they saw any form of monetary 
recompense. To meet the immediate costs of garrisoning and to fulfil the debts they 
had built up the Crown resorted to every conceivable means open to thern, 
apportioning revenues such as tithes, fines, customs and fee farms to the payment of 
garrisons and long-standing debts. Surprisingly it was aided in this by castles to some 
extent still able to perform their local economic function in producing revenues, a 
function fitful and indetenninate due to the destruction of war but one that was still 
remarkable in the situation. 
Exactly just how essential the payment of garrisons' wages was can be seen in 
the actions of garrisons themselves when pay was not forthcoming. The foot of the 
Berwick garrison descended into mutiny in 1301 abetted by a Gascon knight and some 
of his men-at-arms, threatening to kill any man-at-arms who tried to ride past them, 
86 CDSJ iii, no. 1240. 
87 Ibid, no. 1655. 
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their grievance being that when the earls had been in town they had received only three 
days pay and were now a month in arrears. The remairung men-at-arms saved the 
situation by declaring they would defend the town, a decision which led the mutinous 
foot to agree that they would mount guard until the Friday and if no pay came by then 
they would leave the town. A sum of f200 soon arrived to pacify the foot but it was 
not the end of the dissension as there was disagreement between two knights over 
whether the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh should also receive a share of the 
money for their wages. 88 In October 1315 a similar disaster loomed in Berwick again, 
the garrison stating that if no money or victuals arrived by All Saints they would leave 
the town to a man while in 1336 the eighteen weeks arrears of wages owed to the 
Edinburgh garrison meant that there was a very real danger that the garrison would 
leave if its pay was not seen to at once. 89 The garrison of Alnwick effectively went on 
strike in 1317 with the fifty men-at-anns and sixty hobelars leaving the castle and 
staying in the town until their arrears of wages were satisified, an act which their 
constable John Felton rightly feared placed the castle in great danger. 90 
Such extreme actions must be seen in light of wages being essential for the 
subsistence of garrison soldiers rather than producing any profit and, in reality, 
probably not even meeting the costs of subsistence. This is why prompt payment of 
wages was so critical to garrisons; without them men faced the stark choice of either 
leaving or starving. Pay was consequently not something that could be owed 
indefinitely and paid when funds were available but was a cost that had to be met With 
an immediacy that stretched English finances to the limit and which has left a tTaIl of 
late payments, emergency measures, arrears of wages and substantial debts that taken 
together form a significant body of evidence for the historian. The perinanent cost of 
88 CDS, ii, no. 1223. 
89 CDS, iii, nos. 452,1207. 
90 A ncient Petitions, p. 15 8. 
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garrisons and the immediacy of their pay placed an unprecedented strain on the 
finances of fourteenth century England particularly in the first quarter of the century. 
Throughout the period it was the private wealth of the constable that often underpinned 
the continued financing of their own garrison without which the troops would have had 
no choice other than to desert their posts. On the whole constables could live with an 
outstanding debt owed to them for a period of time; garrison soldiers could not live 
without their pay which itself was stringently regulated by adherence to set pay rates 
which were considered necessary for their subsistence. Without their wages garrisons 
would almost immediately have ceased to exist and consequently their continued 
maintenance illustrates that the Crown, by both bureaucratic means and those more ad 
hoc in nature, managed to meet these vital financial demands. 
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3. 
VICTUALLING 
The process of providing victuals for garrisons was just as critical for their 
maintenance as that of finance and it is these two factors that together made it possible 
for garrisons to both exist and to function; money and victuals were the lifeblood of 
Gý-- garrisoning. The exceptionally close ties between money and victuals, arising from the 
fact that wages were essentially for subsistence, has already been described and it 
follows that the vast majority of a garrison soldier's pay would be spent on the food 
and drink that were essential to his survival. However having the money to buy these 
was irrelevant if there was not a ready supply of victuals and without victuals soldiers 
would be forced to abandon their garrison to seek sustenance elsewhere. Indeed the 
closeness of pay and victuals is emphasised by the occasions on which victuals were 
provided in place of monetary wages. This can be seen in 1307 when significant 
quantities of wine, flour, wheat, malt and oats were described as being for the wages of 
the Perth garrison and in the 1320s when the constable of Dunstanburgh petitioned for 
the six weeks of pay owed to his garrison, the arrears particularly damaging as he and 
his garrison were paid in victuals at the same rate as those received instead of wages 
by soldiers at Newcastle. ' Wages were essentially for the purpose of subsistence to 
such an extent that victuals could be received either in part payment or in lieu of them 
altogether. Victuals as wages may have solved the problem of sending money into 
Scotland but it did not alleviate the strain of providing vast quantities of victuals and as 
garrisons were by their very nature outposts the flow of victuals to supply them was 
problematic. 
I CDS, v, no. 493; Ancient Petitions, pp. 28-9. 
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It was the same administrative machine set up to handle the finances of 
garrisons that also supervised the constant movement of victuals to them, a process 
which ran alongside large-scale victualling operations for major English summer 
campaigns, most notably during the reign of Edward 1.2 In Carlisle during the first 
years of this administration James Dalilegh, who also supervised money there, was in 
charge of victuals and supplies. The greater importance of Berwick and the larger 
quantity of victuals that passed through there was reflected in the appointment of an 
official specifically for that job, the first office holder being Richard de Bromsgrove. 
By 1315 Ranulph de Benton held the position, now styled as keeper of the king"s 
stores at Berwick and assisted by two clerks, while the lessening of the immediacy of 
war combined with a greater emphasis on the constable running his own garrison is 
reflected in the multiple positions Robert de Clavering held in 1386, being not only 
keeper of provisions at Berwick but also keeper of artillery and clerk of works whilst 
holding both the senior positions of chamberlain and chancellor of Berwick. 3 The 
centres of this administration were therefore once again the strategic towns of Berwick 
and Carlisle and both of these were designated as the major storehouses for victuals 
intended for garrisons in Scotland as well as for the sustenance of their own garrisons. 
With these towns acting as supply bases the movement of victuals to garrisons 
radiated out from them. Whereas money seems to have mostly been transported into 
Scotland by land the larger quantities and greater volume demanded by victuals meant 
that the most frequent form of transportation was maritime in nature with the goods 
2 The infrastructure for providing victuals for these campaigns would have made it easier to supply 
garrisons however it is also true that the necessity of victualling these garrisons on a permanent basis 
would have created an experienced system and administrative staff for gathering and transporting 
victuals which in turn would have helped in the process of supplying victuals for the campaigns. 
I Prestwich, EaývardI, p. 512; CDS, iii, no. 427; CDS, iv, no. 362. 
4 Detailed studies of the quantity of victuals flowing through Berwick and Carlisle can be found in 
McNamee, 777e Wars of the Bruces, charts 3-6, and Watson, Under the Hwnmer, passim. After the loss 
of Berwick in 1318 Newcastle became the chief north-eastern storehouse, see Ancient Petitions, pp, 88- 
9. 
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being shipped towards their destination. Edinburgh was serviced by the nearby port of 
Leith, for example a hundred quarters of wheat, ten casks of wine and ten casks of salt 
being among the supplies landed there for the garrison in July 1298; victuals for 
Stirling entered the port of Blackness as was recorded in May 1311 . Perth enjoyed the 
benefit of ships being able to dock there due to the navigability of the River Tay, 1060 
pounds arriving there in 1312. Provisions to Edinburgh, Stirling and Perth were all to 
be delivered by ship in the summer of 1339.5 Wheat, flour and oats were carried by 
water from Skinburness to An-nan for Lochmaben castle in late 1299 but a delay of 29 
days followed before the goods could be moved overland to the castle, a groom being 
paid I d. a day for keeping watch over them on the banks of the River Annan. 6 VlCtUaIS 
destined for Edinburgh were moved by water in 1335, the constable complaining of the 
heavy charges that this entailed and the lack of recompense from the chancellor based 
in Berwick. 7 However it was rare for the constable to have to pay for transportation 
with the costs usually being met by the government or the merchants selling the 
victuals, transportation for the victuals sent in September 1302 to Selkirk and 
Linlithgow being paid for by Bromsgrove or his clerk and by the king respectivelY. 8 
the constable of Dunstanburgh. in the 1320s making a particular point of the fact that he 
had to transport victuals at his own cost and peril. ' 
As Beivick was itself a port, as well as acting as a supply base from which 
goods could be shipped, it also served as a point of trans-shipment to which ships 
laden with victuals collected in England sailed to either en route to Scotland or to 
deliver their supplies to. In 1341/2 officers at Berwick impressed a ship with which 
they intended to supply Stirling With victuals, in this case the supplies clearly coming 
5 CDS, ii, no. 997, CDS, iii, nos. 210,287,1314. 
6 CDS, ii, no. 1115. 
7 CDSý iii, no. 1194. 
8 CDS, ii, no. 1324. 
9 Ancient PetitiO? ls, pp. 28-9. 
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from the stores at Berwick and loaded aboard there; it also demonstrates the dangers of 
shipping goods, the vessel being taken and burnt by the Scots as it returned from 
Stirling and the crew held to ransom. 10 Storms were another hazard with 16 quarters of 
wheat and 24 quarters of oatmeal lost in this way while being shipped from 
Skinburness in January 1313 while among the losses for 1306/7 was over f 10 worth of 
wine and iron destined for Linlithgow and f4 of wine for Stirling. I' In 1299 55 casks 
of wine were saved from the wreck of the 'Holy Cross' of Lyme off Silloth. 12 When 
Berwick itself was desperate for victuals in 1315 they were to come by ship from the 
port of Boston. 13 The importance and indeed preference for supply by water is evident 
in 1300 when Edward I empowered John de St. John to retain a galley and its crew for 
the purpose of victualling the castle of Dumfries. In stocking castles for the oncoming 
winter of 1302 supplies for Linlithgow and Carstairs were to be shipped to the ports of 
Blackness and Leith respectively. 14 
Although carriage by sea was the predominant means of transportation there 
was always an accompanying movement of supplies overland. During the summer of 
1299 the constable of Lochmaben was ordered to aid with the carriage of supplies to 
his castle and in late 1298 Edward I himself gave directions for the conveyance of 
stores and the driving of cattle from Berwick to Edinburgh. It was natural that the 
movement of livestock would be on land although it was possible, if troublesome, to 
move them by ship. It is presumably With regard to the same supplies and livestock 
that the constable of Edinburgh entered into an indenture with the council which 
specified that they were to be delivered to Edinburgh partly by sea and partly by 
10 CDS, iii, no. 1427. 
CDS, v, nos. 577,492(xv). 
12 CDS, ii, no. 1115. 
13 CDS, iii, nos. 452,1427. 
14 CDS, ii, nos. 1133,1324. 
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land. 15 There are numerous records of payment for the carriage of Nictuals such as 
those paid for conducting flour and other victuals to Roxburgh in 13042 . 
16 Whiche-v-er 
method was used there was always the danger of attack by the Scots; the desperately 
starving garrison of Berwick saw two much needed supply vessels intercepted bN, 
Scottish ships in May 1316, the crew only just escaping with their lives, whilst in 1306 
one tun and two ironbound barrels of beer were lost while being moved by land due to 
the Scots who wished to kill the carriers of the victuals. 17 
The collection of the actual victuals was the responsibility of the government 
and its co-ordination rested with the administrative machine in existence at BerNvick 
and Carlisle. Naturally those looked to for the providing of victuals were the merchants 
who dealt in foodstuffs and drink and the means by which they provided them took a 
number of forms. In many cases victuals were bought directly from a merchant either 
in England or in Scotland where the merchant had brought them north himself, 
shipping again the preferred transport. Supplies for Roxburgh were purchased by this 
method in 1335 with the keeper of victuals at Berwick, Robert de Tong, spending f 12. 
8s. on 31 quarters of wheat at 8s. a quarter, payment being made to William de 
Melchebourn, a merchant of Lynn. In 1307 the chamberlain of Berwick, John de 
Sandale, spent f 11.1 Is. purchasing victuals at Berwick that were sent to supply the 
Scottish castles. During the fainine of 1316 the sergeant of the warden of Berwick 
bought the victuals that were aboard a merchant vessel in the port of Hartlepool for the 
sustenance of the Berwick garrison. Alternatively officials entered England to buy 
supplies, James de Dalileo buying 64 casks of wine in the port of Whitehaven in 
Cumberland from an Irish merchant of Dundalk, the price of 36s. 8d. a cask set 
following a valuation by twelve fteemen of the county in the presence of the merchant. 
15 CDS, ii, nos. 1602,1014,1015. 
16jbidg ii, no. 1602. 
17 CDS, iii, no. 486; CDS, v, no. 475. 
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Similarly in 1318 it was the receiver of Newcastle who journeyed south to buy ýIctuals 
including wheat and wine as well as iron and steel in London, Norfolk, Essex and 
Suffolk, his purchases to be sent by sea to provision Berwick castle. Another method 
was for burgesses of local Scottish towns,. Scots themselves in most cases, to be giý en 
a safe conduct to enter England and buy the necessary victuals,, selling them to English 
garrisons on their return. This can be seen in May 13 10 when William de Drurigge, a 
burgess of Edinburgh, shipped wheat and beans destined for Berwick, Blackness or 
Perth, which were to be sold to the king's lieges there. Ffis authority came from the 
chamberlain for Scotland although this did not prevent him from being held by the 
king's purveyors in Sandwich, a fact which illustrates just how far south he had 
ventured for victuals. It follows that the burgesses sent south were merchants 
themselves as was the case in the same month with William Cokyn, a merchant and 
burgess of Perth, who was granted a protection for his men and goods coming to 
England by leave of the English warden of Perth for the purpose of acquiring supplies 
for the warden and his garrison by trade and purchase. The danger such methods 
invited is recognised in a clause in the protection that stipulated it was void if they took 
supplies to Scots on their return. 18 
When victuals were in extremely short supply or there was an increased 
demand then the pressure turned to the English counties to provide them, the burden 
falling as always upon the sheriff. This included the contentious issue of seizing 
victuals by means of the resented method of prises. The command addressed to the 
sheriff of Cumberland in 1306 is particularly unremitting in its content due to a belief 
that he had delayed in providing victuals as previously requested resulting in loss to 
the king and endangering of castles. It orders the sheriff on pain of forfeiture to deliver 
18 CDS, - CDS, v, nos. 492(iv), 7336. ii, no. 1340; CDS, iii, nos. 146,149,511,585, 
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all the victuals and money - corn being specifically mentioned - that he can for the 
purpose of supplying the king's castles. Furthermore if any peril should come to these 
castles (presumably Dumfries and Lochmaben) then the blame would fall on the 
sheriff himself In 1313 a clerk was sent from York to the sheriff of Essex and 
Hertfordshire to supervise and speed up the gathering of victuals that were to be sent to 
Berwick for the supply of Roxburgh. In both cases the sheriff was to include the 
expenses in his annual account. At the height of famine in 1315 the sheriff of Lincoln 
was meant to send provisions including wine from the port of Boston. '9 Dunng the 
1380s a March Day held by the prior of Dax and Thomas Percy had as one of its 
objectives the provision of a number of items including victuals such as wheat and 
20 honey for the castles of Berwick and Roxburgh . 
More extreme measures could be turned to if need be. It was not unusual for 
victuals to be taken without payment with the money to be paid later and although 
such an undertaking is frequently described as a loan exactly how much choice there 
was for those providing the goods is somewhat dubious. The king's wardrobe 
recognised such debts to a variety of men in the spring of 1308. Two burgesses of 
Newcastle, a citizen and merchant of London called John de Hall along With William 
de Crathom and William de Spatone, both burgesses of Berwick, were all owed for 
victuals 'bought' from them for the king's garrisons, castles and towns in Scotland. In 
1312 the mayor, bailiffs and 'good men' of Berwick were asked for and provided a 
loan of af 100 of victuals that was sent to the castle of Stirling and in mid-century the 
burgesses of Newcastle entered into an indenture with the receiver of the earl of 
Northampton which attested to their loan of f26.13s. 4d. worth of victuals for the 
11 CDS, iii, no. 452; CDS, v, nos. 414,586. 
20 CDS, iv, no. 323. 
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earl's castle of Lochmaben .21 Roles were slightly reversed in the late 1320s when the 
bishop of Durham was forced to borrow E233 from Edward 11 to stock Norham castle 
22 
with provisions for its garrison, a debt which was still being paid off in 1332. The 
need to repay these loans, particularly when owed to merchants, is made clear in a 
letter dating from the late 1330s which describes the earls of Arundel and Salisbury 
having taken supplies from merchants and given them to the garrison of Perth for its 
sustenance. It is noteworthy that the names of these merchants had been recorded and 
the letter goes on to request that these men be paid so other merchants were not 
discouraged from coming to those parts. 23 This pointedly demonstrates just how 
dependent garrisons were on merchants for their victuals. There even seems to have 
been an awareness of the plight of the Scots from whom goods had forcibly been taken 
without payment, John de St. John stating that he was heavily indebted to the poor 
people of all parts who pleaded for victuals which he had taken from them. Indeed 
such hard-nosed measures were not confined to Scotland, the sheriff of Cumberland 
and his bailiff taking oats from the prior of Carlisle for the garrison of Dumffies 
without payment or tally. 24 The besieged garrison of Stirling receiving victuals from 
Evota of Stirling who procured them from the surrounding countryside, including her 
own land, was surely an uncommon example of native Scottish assistance; in this case 
it ultimately proved futile, the castle eventually falling and Evota being imprisoned 
by 
the Scots for ten weeks, losing her land in the town and being banished from 
Scotlan - 
25 
As with money there were obviously times when victuals were in dangerously 
short supply and again as with a lack of money the absence of victuals 
led to men 
21 CDS, iii, nos. 79,242,1440. 
22 Ancient Petitions, pp. 153-5. 
23 CDS' iii, no. 1298. 
24 CDS, ii, no. 1218; CDS, iii, no. 524. 
25 CDS, iv, no. 1800. 
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deserting or threatening to desert their post, many of the Dumfties garrison deserting in 
1312 due to a negligent supply of victuals from the central store at Carlisle . 
2' At the 
height of famine in 1315 the keeper of stores at Berwick and his two clerks were 
accused of actually attempting to profit from the severe food shortage, an inquisition 
being launched into the claim that they sold victuals from the store in Newcastle and 
that they used false measures and bought bad victuals for the garrison. This was an 
accusation of the utmost seriousness, the scarcity of victuals in Berwick being so great 
in February of the following year that a desperate foray for food met x,,, -Ith a bloody 
defeat and many of those still in the garrison starved to death whilst guarding the 
walls. Towards the end of the year a vessel laden with victuals for Benvick was run 
into the port at Warkworth where the shortage of food led to the garrison from the 
castle there plundering it of its E60 worth of victuals. 27 However these examples are 
noteworthy as they were relatively rare rather than normal occurrences. Unlike money 
there was usually at least one available means of obtaining victuals whether it be from 
crops and cattle on the castle demesne, from merchants, central stores, loans or from 
English counties (by prise if necessary) and, if need be, it could always be taken by 
force from the local area either by force or in a plundering raid. 28 It was only when 
under siege or in the dreadful famine of 1315/16 that the supply of victuals actually 
dropped to a critical level. 
In fact it reflects great credit on the administrative machine set-up to run the 
garrisons that there was usually an adequate supply of victuals even to the most 
isolated of castles. The level of detail that went into ensuring the required supplies 
were provided is clearly evident in the victualling estimates that exist for some of the 
early garrisons under Edward 1. A detailed analysis of these has already been 
26 CDSJ iii, no. 281. 
27 Ibid, iii, nos. 427,452,470,471,486,511. 
28 For such raids see pp. 248-9. 
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undertaken and the salient point which emerges is that even at this early date victuals 
were calculated by a set standard of what it would take to feed a certain number of men 
for a set number of days. The quantity of food in these estimates may have been on the 
high side yet the diet was not particularly healthy and as these are only estimates there 
was almost certainly a difference between them and what the garrison actually 
received . 
29The 
very existence of such estimates demonstrates the effort and work that 
was put into this complex and ever demanding logistical problem and this in turn helps 
to explain how these demands were on the whole successfully fulfilled. Further 
evidence of the efficient and careful running of the victualling of castles comes in the 
references to the king's store in several castles. In 1304 Robert Bruce, then in charge 
of the English-held castle of Ayr, was to receive for its garrison 60 quarters of wheat, 
40 quarters of oats and two tuns of Wine as well as a sum of silver, all coming from the 
king's store in the same castle. Two years earlier the king's store in Ayr was again to 
be used for the benefit of its garrison, Edward I ordering a clerk to deliver the victuals 
in his charge that were in the king's store. 30 These therefore were in effect separate 
stores of victuals held under the direct command of the king and not freely available to 
the garrison unless specific permission was forthcoming from the king and as such 
their existence strengthens the impression of a well-organised and efficient system of 
victualling being in operation. 
The castle at Ayr provides another insight into the detailed calculations of 
victuals due to garrison soldiers. After a period of siege those in command at Ayr 
wrote to Dalilegh asking for the following: that one knight was to receive two quarters 
of wheat and one quarter of oats whilst another was due two quarters of wheat; Robert 
29 C. f Michael Prestwich, 'Victualling Estimates for English Garrisons in Scotland during the Early 
Fourteenth Century', EHR, 82 (1967). However such estimates are not widespread which raises the 
possibility that these thorough estimates were experiments from the early years of garrisoning under 
Edward 1. 
" CDS, ii, no. 1437; CDS, v, no. 303. 
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de Nekton and Simon de Vilers were due one quarter of oats; six men were to receive 
two bushels of wheat each, ten crossbowmen three bushels each and eleven archers 
two bushels each. These calculations based on the basis of each individual suggests 
this is a case of wages being paid in terms of victuals rather than money and this is 
confirmed when those who were to remain in the garrison were numbered, each 
crossbowman receiving one quarter of wheat and each archer four bushels,, these 
victuals explicitly stated as being in lieu of their wageS. 31 
Another insight comes in a memorandum drawn up in November 1301 which 
lists the victuals in Dumfries castle for the sustenance of the garrison between 31 July 
and 10 November, a total of 55 people serving for 104 days. There were 48 quarters 
and six bushels of wheat and flour and two barrels of flour left from the previous 
constable's tenure as well as 12s. 6d. worth of bread and, in addition, five quarters of 
wheat and seven barrels of flour were delivered from the store at Carlisle on 31 July. In 
all there were fourteen casks of wine and beer with one and a half casks of wine 
remaining from the previous constable. On 31 July the store at Carlisle provided eight 
casks of wine and six quarters of ground malt, three casks to be accounted for and for 
which the garrison had received the oats as above. Two quarters of beans came from 
Carlisle. The six barded horses in the gamson required 39 quarters of oats for the 
whole period which was estimated to be contained within 56 sacks and from which a 
-r- - -- further seventeen quarters were to be used in making malt for three casks of beer. Two 
bushels of salt were already present and two quarters came from Carlisle as well as 30 
hogs, 2,900 herrings and 200 hard fish which complemented the 2,940 herrings, 150 
hard fish (hakes) and six stones of lard already there. Twenty carcasses of oxen were 
intended to have been provided although the full number was still outstanding. On top 
31 CDS) ii, no. 1293. 
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of all this f-10 was due to buy fresh meat, fish and other 'necessaries' and there was to 
come from Carlisle ten quarters of salt, ten 'bend' of hay as well as 10 Ib of wax. The 
costs can be seen in the victuals delivered to Kirkintilloch in 1305. Dalilegh's clerk, as 
well as bringing money, delivered sixteen chalders of flour at 13s. 4d. a chalder, two 
chalders of salt valued at 55s. 4d. as well as 40 stones of iron. During 1400 the 
garrison of Roxburgh paid out E12.10s. for 1,000 'stok fish' and E42.13s. 4d. for 
twelve casks of wheat flour at 66s. 8d. per cask which came from London. 33 
Victuals received by a garrison were detailed in the annual compotus under the 
section marked 'receipts' as in the surviving account for Roxburgh from January to 
November 1300, the payments being deducted from the account. The sale of surplus 
goods remaining from the previous period of accounting is a rare occurrence but shows 
that nothing went to waste. 34 The most illuminating way to give some idea of the 
various types of victuals garrisons were in receipt of is to concentrate on a specific 
example and one of the fullest is that which concerns the supplies of Stirling, 
Roxburgh and Dumfries in 1299/1300.35 As implied above fish was a major part of a 
garrison's victuals and this is made clear in the account for Dumfries which contained 
500 hake and the substantial total of 3,500 herring. Meat was also an essential 
component of the soldiers' diet and is again in evidence at Dumfries with 30 bacon(s), 
fifteen cows and oxen along with three quarters of an ox and thirteen sheep with an 
additional three quarters. Roxburgh also illustrates the essential place of meat and fish 
in feeding a garrison, being in receipt of 40 oxen and bullocks and 597 salmon. The 
gamsons contain a combination of the victuals that would have been common to all C7- 
throughout the period; casks of flour, oats, a mixture of barley and oats known as 
32 Ibid, no. 1256. 
33 Jbid, ii, no. 1686; CDS, iv, no. 567. 
34 CDS, v, no. 233. 
35 Lib. Quot, pp. 1434,151,153. 
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drageti, wheat, cheese, hard bread, beans and pease to name just several. Pepper and in 
particular salt feature heavily, the latter important for its qualities of food preservation. 
In addition to these Stirling contains items which are more surprising one of which is 
the fact that mustard was made in the castle. More remarkable is the presence of 201b 
of cumin and 21b of saffron, both which would have been used to add flavour to food 
in its preparation. Drinking needs were met mostly by wine with Roxburgh receiving 
37 casks of which three were lost to ullage due to the weakness of the casks. Dumfries 
was in receipt of a variety of measures of wi from various sources which ranged 
between ten casks and one pipe and also received three quarters of malt with which it 
would have brewed beer. 
These accounts also reveal details of the items in the castle from which the 
garrison ate and drank. The most detailed is Stirling where a clerk accounted for the 
purchase of four large metal bowls, a hundred metal dishes, a hundred and three metal 
plates and a further hundred metal cups/goblets. Dumfries also accounted for the 
purchase of cups/goblets, plates and dishes although there is a hint that some of these 
may have been wooden. Another aspect of victualling concerned the functioning of the 
garrison and ensuring it held enough raw materials for work, repairs and general 
maintenance of both the castle and the armour and weaponry of its garrison. It is in this 
regard that Roxburgh received 50 stones of iron, ten sheaves of steel and six quarters 
of sea coal. The supply of these items to garrisons was as commonplace as the food 
and wine they were in receipt of 
That various skilled jobs took place within a garrison which were essential to 
its survival has already been suggested by the supply of iron and steel that needed to be 
worked by skilled hands and the need for someone with a knowledgeable mind to 
make the mustard and mix in the cumin and saff'ron in the right amounts. Soldiers were 
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the mainstay of the garrisons and in muster rolls and accounts they appear as the only 
members of the garrisons while some accounts regularly range a little further to 
include such indispensable artificers as attilators (armourers/crossbowmakers), 
masons, carpenters, blacksmiths, watchmen and frequently chaplains. A front-line 
garrison would usually have a handful of these men permanently retained within them 
to attend to the ongoing maintenance of the castle. 36 In reality there was a much larger 
supporting cast whose purpose was to support the soldiers of the garrison by 
undertaking specific and usually skilled everyday tasks within the castle and which 
effectively transformed it into a microcosm of a medieval town. Individual protections 
for those serving in the Roxburgh garrison in the 1380s provide a wealth of skilled 
men whose expertise was essential to a garrison. To aid with the preparation of food 
and drink there was a spicer and skinner along with a vintner, brewer, taverner and 
innkeeper; for the storage and supply of food there was a grocer and several 
merchants. 37 
The return listing the garrison of Edinburgh in February 1300, unusual in that it 
includes all those within the garrison, reveals a similar group to that which the 
protections show. There was a pantryman, a cook and his boy, a baker and his boy, two 
brewers, a miller,, a cooper, a granary man, a boy keeping the swine, a herdsman, a 
candle maker, an almoner, two clerks and a water carrier, a sea coal carrier and a 
38 bowyer and his boy. The 1380s protections also contain a good many additional roles 
beyond those relating to food and drink: a draper and a mercer whose trades dealt in 
cloth and fabrics and consequently concerned the clothing of the garrison; a glazier, a 
36 A garrison was expected to be responsible for a whole range of building works within its castle from 
minor repairs to the construction of wooden houses within the walls and the erection of wooden peels. 
More ambitious building works led to the stipulation that a set number of the garrison's foot-soldiers 
should be carpenters or masons while the entire foot of the Linlithgow garrison was drafted in to hasten 
its completion in 1302, CDS, ii, nos. 1286,132 1; 1he King's Works, i, p. 409. 
37 See n. 39. 
38 CDS' ii, no. 1132. 
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woodmonger and a refiner of metals responsible for general upkeep and maintenance; 
a shipman, a falconer and, more for the purposes of entertainment, heralds . 
3' The 
spiritual well-being of the garrison was also catered for with chaplains being 
something of a fixture in certain garrisons, in 1299/1300 Berwick castle containing 
such a figure and the 1380s protections including chaplains and a vicar who were 
retained in Roxburgh . 
40 Alongside the chaplain Berwick castle also possessed a 
washerwoman and among those in the Edinburgh garrison in late 1300 was a custodian 
of the wine and two carriers/carters . 
41 The buildings Within the walls of a castle 
reflected the variety of skilled jobs and work that was undertaken with Bamburgh 
having stables, a slaughterhouse, a great kitchen, a great grange, a granary and a horse 
Mill. 
42 
As the presence of a mercer and draper indicates an interest was taken in the 
clothing of garrison soldiers. The account for Stirling in 1299/1300 describes eighteen 
measures of cloth bought in York for the robes and stockings of the garrison. One cloth 
of blue was for the robes of the constable as well as two chaplains and a cleric there; 
one cloth striped was for four esquires; another thirteen cloths striped were for the 
robes of the garrison's 52 archers. Three cloths of one unspecified colour and a 
thousand ells of linen, probably woven, were purchased in various locations for the 
stockings of the garrison. Thirty fur-lined surcoats were also bought for the esquires of 
the king's household who were in the garrison and four lots of lambs wool for capes or 
43 
hoods for the constable, chaplains and the cleric. Similarly in 1387 the constable of 
Roxburgh petitioned for and was granted permission to ship cloth for the I of the 
soldiers of his retinue., the shipping from London to Newcastle and then 
by land to 
39 CDS, v, nos. 4271,4307,4257,4165,4205,4287,4267,4345,4529. 
" Lib. Quot., p. 50; CDS, v, nos. 4577,4303. 
41 E 10 1/68/ 1 /(11). 
42 C. Bates, 'The Border Holds of Northumberland', AA, New Series (2d), v. xiv, pp. 246,25 
1. 
43 Db. Quot., p. 143. 
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Roxburgh free of custom or subsidy. The shipment contained twelve short cloths in 
two packs, two cloths of Raye (i. e. striped), sixteen pieces of cloths strutor of Essex 
and a piece of cloth of Raye of Candelwykstrete. 44 These two examples, at opposite 
ends of the century, suggest that the provision of clothing for garrison soldiers, 
especially peinnanent soldiers or those of the constable's or royal household's retinue, 
was commonplace. 
The constable of Roxburgh, Thomas Swinbume, also took the opportunity of 
the shipment to bring some of his own personal effects north. in a 'clothsek' were two 
worsted beds and within a barrel two of his saddles. It is clear from the inquiry into the 
losses of John Sampson, constable of Stirling when it first fell to the Scots,. that the 
constable of a castle did not compromise in his home comforts despite his office and 
the subsequent risk to his property. Admittedly the majority of the goods he lost were 
practical military items such as haketons, gambesons, gauntlets, a hauberk and a 
haberchion, three swords, two sumpter saddles and two hackney saddles. Yet creature 
comforts were also in evidence and included: a gentleman"s bed and all its 
appurtenances totalling 53s. 4d.; two buckles of gold; eleven gold rings; three silk 
purses and ten silver spoons . 
45Ralph, lord Greystoke, when captured whilst en route to 
taking up his office as constable of Roxburgh in 1380, had sent ahead wagons and 
carts containing many valuable furnishings, arms and his household goods, all under 
strong guard. I-Iis captor, George Dunbar, earl of March, having seized both Greystoke 
and his goods, took both to Dunbar castle where the hall and great chamber were 
adomed with Greystoke's tapestries and ornaments and when Greystoke had supper 
with the earl that eveni S. 
46 ing he was served from his own gold and silver vessel 
44 CDS, iv, no. 370. 
45 CDS' ii, no. 1949. 
46 Bower, vii, p. 397. 
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These socially distinctive items were the preserve of the constable and 
presumably the wealthier of the knights within a garrison. The metal vessels bought for 
Stirling and Dumfries were the everyday items used by the rest of the garrison and 
each castle held a ready supply of these. An inquiry of 1372 into items taken illegally 
from Bamburgh castle by the former constable mentions plates, dishes and leaden 
vessels, beds, chairs, table trestles, saddles, horse-shoes, bows and other necessaries 
for the custody of the castle. At about the same time was taken the principal table 
which had been situated in the great hall along With its trestles and also 24 mastic 
treeS47 which had been within the castle walls. Also of critical importance to a garrison 
was a supply of fresh water and hence a well, the Bamburgh garrison making use of 
three wells in the town as well as one in the great tower itself with the all-important 
48 
rope and bucket attached . 
Naturally, as war was the primary, all-encompassing purpose of a garrison, 
there was a large amount of weaponry present as the losses of Sampson and the 
mention of bows in Bamburgh demonstrate. Crossbows and their quarrels were 
particularly abundant in garrisons due to their effectiveness as defensive weapons fired 
from the walls and additional fortifications. Linlithgow was strengthened in the 
autumn of 1301 with six crossbows 'a tour' with appendages and 2,000 quarrels for 
these, twelve crossbows of two feet with 3,000 quarrels and an additIonal 5,000 
quarrels for crossbows of one foot which were already in the garrison. In anticipation 
of a Scottish attack in October 1298 the garrison of the castle of Newcastle 
built a 
springald themselves buying the necessary wood, iron, tin, brass, 
lard, string and 
canvas. They also put the projectiles for it together from the component parts, 
47 These trees yield the resin mastic which is used to make varnishes and lacquers as well as acting as a 
substance to stop the flow of blood from skin tissue. Their presence 
in Bamburgh in such numbers adds 
yet another level to the sophistication with which garrisons were supplied and 
the extent to which they 
enjoyed a measure of self-sufficiency. 
48 Bates, 'Border Holds', pp. 249-5 1. 
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purchasing 102 quarrels, 40 heads and 40 iron feathers/flights as well as building a 
platform for the springald to stand on. Nearly every garrison possessed an engine of 
some sort such as the ballista in Newcastle for which stones were brought in as 
ammunition. To ensure the weaponry and especially any engines were maintained in 
effective working order the attiliator was a common presence in garrisons such as the 
attiliator called Roger who was in Bamburgh during the hard-pressed year of 1315 
improving the ballistas, bows and other artillery. 49 
Victualling was only part of the laborious process of sustaining a garrison. 
Once the food and drink, clothing, raw materials and weaponry had arrived then there 
was a whole variety of skilled labour whose job it was to use and maintain these so as 
to support and therefore sustain the day to day existence of the garrison soldiers. 
Although their existence is rarely noted in payrolls, accounts and muster rolls, it is 
necessary to recognise that they were ever present and underpinned the daily existence 
of the garrisons. Their skills and trades also provide an insight into life within a front- 
line garrison as do the stray references to the everyday items the garrison used, 
picturing the garrison eating off their metal plates and dishes whilst seated at a large, 
probably communal, table. It gives a brief glimpse of the minutiae of life within a 
garrison and adds the human element which can so easily be forgotten, items such as 
the 20lbs of wax delivered to Stirling in 1299/1300 which would have been used for 
making candles and the dozen parchments and 2lbs of ink which have become the 
documents from which it is possible to attempt an analysis of these English garrisons 
of the fourteenth century. 
50 
49 CDSJ ii, nos. 1021,1250; Bates, 'Border Holds', p. 244. 
50 Lib. Quot., p. 143. 
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4. 
CONSTABLES 
Knights and bannerets may have constituted only the slimmest percentage of troops in 
a garrison but their importance far outweighed their numbers as the constable of a 
castle and its garrison came almost exclusively from their ranks. Being knights the 
constables were men of either national or local prominence and consequently their 
identity and careers are more accessible than those of the great majority of garrison 
soldiers with the naines of these constables frequently appearing in printed primary 
sources of the period such as the Patent Rolls and Close Rolls; indeed brief but highly 
informative biographies of many of them can be found in Moor's painstakingly 
researched volumes 'Knights of Edward I' and for the later years in Roskell's 'History 
of Parliament'. This is not to say that the careers of all constables encompassed by this 
study are readily accessible, gaps within careers often being present while some 
individuals are extremely difficult to identify altogether. However although many 
careers can and have been put together they remain as isolated careers of individuals 
rather than being considered collectively and studied as a group. That is the aim of this 
chapter; to bring together the disparate careers of these constables and to analyse the 
type of men who were appointed to such positions. 
As a group or indeed as individuals relatively little has been written on 
constables of castles for the whole medieval period, a fact lamented by Shelagh Bond 
in 1967 and true to this day. ' Bond's article, although specific to the special status of 
Windsor castle, addresses several important themes including the pay received by the 
constable and particularly focuses on the various duties of the office such as ensuring 
munitions and stores were plentiftil and overseeing castle lands and finances. All are 
1 S. Bond, 'The Medieval Constables of Windsor Castle', EHR, cccxxiii (April, 1967). 
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significant issues however they concentrate on the office of the constable and the roles 
pertaining to it rather than focussing on the actual individuals who held that office. 
Bond's comments on the change in the social status of those who held the 
constableship are more relevant here as is the article by Andrew Ayton discussing the 
career of William de Thweyt, deputy constable of Corfe castle, who, as well as holding 
2 that position, served in nine military campaigns in mid-century. It is the need to get 
beyond the office to the identity of the constables themselves that is of paramount 
importance here. 
The most recent addition to this limited body of work on constables is that of 
Rickard, a study which provides near comprehensi for the castles ive lists of constables 
of England and Wales between 1272 and 1422 and which includes an interesting 
discussion of constables - particularly royal constables - as well as many useful 
statistical tables illustrating among other things castle ownership, joint constableships 
3 
and those who served as constable on multiple occasions. Rickard also comments on 
the length of careers of constables, their level of experience, social rank and wages. 
Along with these good albeit brief discussions the real value of the work is the ability 
to use it a reference source to follow the career of an individual if serving as a 
constable more than once and in different castles. As Rickard makes clear a pattern can 
be seen in which the same families and individuals can be seen either serving as 
constables or owning castles throughout this period .4 In 
light of the period Rickard 
covers it is unfortunate that the study is not extended to include Scottish castles 
occupied by the English during the wars of the fourteenth century, an extension that 
would discover whether the men appointed constable in these castles were from the 
2 A. Ayton, 'William de Thweyt, Esquire: Deputy Constable of Corfe Castle in the 1340s', Somerset 
Notes and Queries, xxxii (1989), pp. 731-8. 
3 T. J. Rickard, The Castle Community: Ihe Personnel of English and Welsh Castles, 1272-142. 
(Woodbridge, 2002). 
4 Jbid, p. 50. 
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same domestic groups and were moving from castles in a state of relative peace to 
those under conditions of war A study of these constables With ref .5 erence to the 
domestic castle commanders can be informative in itself 
In common with the rest of this thesis it is the constables of royal castles which 
form the basis for this chapter. 6 These royal constables fall into different categories 
that are not always easy to determine. Many were constables in complete control of 
their castle and its garrison,, some were custodians on behalf of an earl or sheriff while 
others still were appointed as deputies or attorneys. Frequently it is unclear exactly 
which position the man in situ held. The terminology used in contemporary documents 
is often misleading and interchangeable, constabularis and custos the most used terms, 
interpretations of the latter varying between custodian, keeper and warden. It is 
impossible to attempt a definitive answer when each individual case is peculiar to 
itself7 Yet whatever their formal title the important point is that these men were in 
immediate control of the castle and its garrison and were effectively its constable no 
matter what their title or basis of office. 
The significance of the following study is that the men who are its subject were 
appointed to take charge of castles and garrisons that were at war, that were expected 
to be at the forefront of combat which would be attacked at some point and which 
were central to both the prosecution of the war and any attempt at conquest. These 
were men at the sharp end,, chosen specifically for the task. It is by looking at the type 
of man appointed, his background, experience and social status and how the office of 
5 This omission by Rickard also leaves the tables concerning men who were constable of several castles 
in an unfinished state. C. f William Felton (d. 1328) whom Rickard records as constable of 
five castles 
but who in truth was constable of seven when Tibbers and Linlithgow are included, ibid, p. 65, Table 2 
xviii. (The table is also mistaken in stating his span of years for these offices as 44, ending 
in 1344, as 
he died in 1328. It was his son, also William, who was a constable in the 1340s). 
6 For a brief outline of the sources see ibid, p. 29. 
7 Aid, pp. 29-30. For a short discussion of constables acting on behalf of others regarding Windsor, and 
an even shorter but useful definition of a constable, see Bond, 'Medieval Constables of 
Windsor Castle', 
pp. 224,227. 
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constable related to his previous or subsequent career that the office of a wartime 
constable can be investigated. Changes in the type of men being appointed can reveal 
alterations in the prosecution of the war, the intrusion of domestic politics, even 
developments Within society as a whole. The constables of these castles provide an 
insight into the military involvement of the higher echelons of society in garrisoning 
whilst also illuminating the importance and purpose of garrisons themselves. 
With such a large cast to cover this chapter will be split into three sections, the 
first covering the reigns of Edward I and Edward 11 from 1296-1314, the second 
encompassing 1314-23 and the third beginning in the 1330s and ending in 1402. By 
approaching each section in a loose chronological framework general themes and 
trends of the time will become more easily apparent and allow a detailed study to be 
undertaken of the men deemed to possess the appropriate skills for holding the 
critically important and precariously dangerous position of a castle constable in the 
Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century. 
(i) c. 1296-c. 1314 
The first series of appointments to captured Scottish castles took place in 1296 
following the English victory at Dunbar on 27 April and the subsequent capture of the 
major Scottish castles with Edinburgh only holding out for eight days and the keys of a 
deserted Stirling castle merely handed over by the porter. The quick taking of these 
completely intact castles facilitated the appointment of constables to them as early as 
May whilst the process of conquest was still underway. 
On 16 May, just over a fortnight after its fall, the town, castle and shenffdom 
of Berwick were committed to the custody of the knight Osbert de Spaldington. 
' It is 
I CDS, ii, no. 853. 
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interesting that although Spaldington was an experienced man in his late forties his 
background was as a justice rather than a military man who, although he had served as 
keeper of the sea off Scarborough in April 1296 and been involved in recruiting men 
for Edward I's Welsh campaign of 1294/5, had served as a justice throughout the 
1290s in Portsmouth and Lambeth as well as acting as a justice of gaol delivery in 
Nottingham, Derby and Lincolnshire. There can be no doubt that his initial 
appointment to Berwick signals the intention of Edward I to transform the town into a 
centre for an embryonic goven-iment of Scotland under his own control. The first part 
of this process required turning Berwick into an English town or borough and the 
consequent governmental and legal requirements this entailed. Spaldington was 
therefore specifically selected for this position due to his experienced legal background 
and subsequent understanding of the intricacies of government. 
Another appointment quickly followed as by 2 November 1296 Spaldington 
was recorded as keeper of the lands of the late Robert de Ros of Wark, a position 
which included Wark castle of which he was described as custos of on 28 January 
1297 and held until 28 January 1298. Whilst in this office he was sent in May 1297 as 
a commissioner to treat with Scottish magnates on the issue of them serving overseas 
against the French. 9 It is perfectly possible that Spaldington held this office in 
conjunction with his command of Berwick. The Scottish war consequently proved 
something of a career change for Spaldington, a justice whose lands lay not in the 
north but in Lincolnshire, his legal knowledge being utilised for the overseeing and 
safekeeping of sensitive front-line territories in a period of relative peace as well as 
being a commissioner to the Scots. 
9 C. Moor, Knights of Edward 1,5 vols., Harleian Society (1929-321), iv, p. 268; Prestwich, Euývard I, p. 
224. 
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Another Lincolnshire knight, Thomas de Burnham, was also appointed a 
constable on 16 May 1296, being given custody of Jedburgh castle and Selkirk 
forest. 10 As with many knights of this period the surviving evidence for Burnham 
concerns the many times he served as a domestic commissioner both before and after 
his constableship: in Lincolnshire on 20 December 1290 and several times later and he 
held commissions regarding the River Ancholme in Lincolnshire in 1294 and 
concerning the River Ouse in 1298. He was mentioned as a knight of Lincolnshire in 
August 1295 and as a knight of the shire for Lincolnshire in 1300,1301/2 and 1309. 
Burnham's involvement in the Scottish war following his time as constable was wholly 
concerned with the raising of troops to serve there in both Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, 
acting as a commissioner of array for Yorkshire on 4 November 1297 and in 1301 
being tasked with arranging the journey of troops from Lincolnshire to serve in 
Scotland as well as sending food for the army. He also acted as an assessor of the 
subsidy in Lincolnshire during March 1305. A protection exists dated 17 July 1277 
which states that a Thomas de Burnham was going to Wales for the king. This date is 
two days after Edward I and his army reached Chester in the substantial campaign of 
that year that was to become the first Welsh war. " It is not clear whether this was the 
same man appointed constable in 1296 or his father; what it does show is that there 
was a precedent of military service in the family. There is little evidence for why 
Burnham was considered particularly suited to being a constable. 
The final constable recorded as being appointed in May 1296 presents 
something of a problem. On 14 May the custody of the castle, town and sheriffdom of 
'0 CDS, ii, no. 853. Watson believes Spaldington may have continued as custodian and sheriff into 1297 
and possibly until 1298 thus combining all these offices, Under the Hammer, pp. xxv, 40. 
11 Knights of Edward I, i, p. 168; J. E. Morris, Ihe Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford, 190 1), p. 12 7 (C. f 
Ch. 3). 
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Roxburgh was committed to Walter Tuck. 12 This record of his appointment seems to 
be the only extant mention of Tuck who does not figure in the rolls of the period nor in 
Moor's exhaustive volumes or within the dramatis personae listed by Watson in her 
detailed account of the war under Edward 1.13 What this does demonstrate is just ho%v 
fragmentary the evidence can be even for men ftom the higher stratum of society, a 
point already illustrated by the difficulty in determining the length of ti ington ime Spaldi 
remained in charge at Berwick and the reasons behind Burnham's selection as 
constable of Jedburgh. Similar problems are common for the whole period. 
All three of these appointments were enacted quickly whilst the subjugation of 
Scotland was still ongoing and it is no surprise to see a new and, it would seem, more 
considered selection of constables in the autumn of 1296 to accompany Edward I's 
ordinances for the settlement of Scotland. On 5 October 1296 Burnham was replaced 
as constable of Jedburgh and keeper of the forest and sheriffdom of Selkirk by the 
knight Hugh de Eland who was to remain in the office until 1302.14 A Hugh de Eland 
had acquired land in Lincolnshire in 1279 - although he did so without licence and the 
matter was taken to the king - and possessed M worth of lands in Yorkshire for 
which he was summoned to serve against the Scots in 1300 and 1301. A knight of the 
same name is recorded as having been taken prisoner at Boroughbridge in 1322 
fighting against the king and in 1324 was fined 00 for his rebellion; if, as seems 
likely, this was the same man, he must have been in his thirties or forties when 
appointed to Jedburgh. As with Burnham it is difficult to see the reasons behind his 
selection on the limited evidence available but his lengthy stay indicates he was a good 
choice. Eland's ability as a constable appears to have been exploited as he seems to 
12 CDS, ii, no. 853. 
Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. xvii-xxvii. 
14 CDS, ii, nos. 853,1206,1286. 
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have also held the constableship of Bamburgh simultaneously, being recorded as 
constable of the latter in 1300.15 
If there are doubts about the reasons behind Eland's appointment there is 
certainly none concerning the other three major appointments of autumn 1296. Robert 
Hastang replaced Walter Tuck as constable of the castle and town of Roxburgh and of 
the sheriffdorn. on 8 September 1296.16 Hastang held land in Staffordshire and Essex 
and was a supremely experienced soldier having served against the Welsh in 1294, 
against the Scots in 1296 and 1298 and in between had served in the Flanders 
expedition of 1297. The latter coincides with the beginning of his tenure as constable 
raising the possibility that he was absent from Roxburgh for a period of time in 1297. 
Prior to becoming constable he had been staying in Ireland in October 1291 where, 
although there was no warfare, he had been granted the new castle and town of 
Balimakenegan in August 1290. Hastang remained as constable of Roxburgh until 26 
October 1305 when he became sheriff of Peebles and subsequently served against the 
Scots periodically until at least 1317.17 An experienced soldier and a significant 
landowner Hastang was an ideal man to be placed in charge of Roxburgh. 
In the same autumn the first English constables of the newly captured key 
strategic castles of Stirling and Edinburgh were appointed and the men selected 
accurately reflect the importance attached to these castles. On 8 September Richard de 
Waldegrave took charge of the castle and sheriffdom of Stirling. A knight with 
Northamptonshire lands he was closely associated with Anothony Bek, bishop of 
Durham, going overseas with him in 1283,1286 and 1294 as well as going to Scotland 
for the king in 1290. In 1295 he had been staying on the Kent coast for its protection, a 
15 Knights of Edward 1,1, p. 3 03; Ancient PetitiOns, pp. 20- 1. Considering the lengthy career span it is 
possible that two men are involved in the entry Moor makes for one individual, thus a 
father and son 
both called Hugh. 
16 CDS' ii, no. 853. 
17 Knights of E- CDS, ii, nos. 1018,1142,1337,1646,1663,1691,1707. , dwardI, ii, pp. 
198-91 
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duty he was removed from in October 1295 as he was engaged for the king elsewhere. 
However the outstanding feature of Waldegrave's career was his position as under- 
constable of the Tower of London and subsequently constable of the Tower in the 
early 1280s. 18 Here for the first time in the Anglo-Scottish wars is a constable who was 
directly chosen for his experience, and presumably an acknowledged expertise, in 
commanding a formidable and nationally important fortress although the Tower 
occupied a largely administrative rather than military role. There can be no better 
illustration of the importance Edward I attached to Stirling castle than the appointment 
of WaIdegrave as constable. That Waldegrave also had expenence of overseas 
diplomacy and strong links with Bek, the latter being of critical importance in his 
appointment to Stirling, were important factors that would have enhanced his position 
as constable of Stirling. Waldegrave also achieved a darker distinction, being the first 
constable recorded as being killed whilst in office, slain with many of his garrison 
whilst engaged in the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297.19 
Walter de Huntercombe, appointed on 5 October as constable of Edinburgh and 
sheriff of Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Haddington, combined the prodigious military 
and combat experience of Hastang with the direct experience of Waldegrave in 
commanding a castle that possessed an active, and in Huntercombe's case, military 
role. A knight owning manors in Oxfordshire, Bedfordshire, Essex and 
Northumberland, Huntercombe was summoned to serve against the Welsh in 1277 and 
1282 as well as going to Wales for the king with the earl of Cornwall in 1287, being 
summoned to the council at Gloucester in the same year and again going to Wales for 
the king in October 1293. He had also served overseas in Gascony in 1294 and was to 
18 CDS, ii, no. 853 -, Knights of Edward I, v, p. 13 7. Bek had also been constable of the Tower and it is 
evident that Waldegrave had been his deputy. 
19 Stevenson, ii, pp. 232-3; G. Barrow, Robert Bnice and the Communjjýy of the Realm of Scotland 
(London, 1965), p. 130, n. 3. 
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serve in Flanders in 1297, the latter raising the same possibility of temporary absence 
as in Hastang's case. Between 20 March 1284 and 5 October 1285 Huntercombe had 
been custos of Bere castle in Merioneth, Wales, with a garrison of thirt-N, soldiers 
including ten crossbowmen, a castle in which he had a new chamber built during his 
tenure. On 4 June 1290 he was appointed custos of the Isle of Man. Aside from these 
extensive military commitments he had been keeper of Northumberland in 1271 and 
was summoned to parliament from 1295 until 131 1.20 
The stature Huntercombe held is evident in his subsequent career going on to 
become captain of Northumberland, a commissioner of array in the same county, 
keeper of the marches of Northumberland as well as leading forces against the Scots in 
1303 and serving against them in 1308 and 1310. The constableship of Edinburgh 
between 5 October 1296 and 25 November 1298 was therefore held by a highly 
experienced veteran of the wars in both Wales and Scotland who had also seen service 
overseas,, a man who had commanded a castle and its garrison in the hostile 
enviromment of Wales and who was to play an integral part in the English war effort in 
the ensuing years. It should also be noted that Huntercombe held land in 
Northumberland which explains the number of appointments he held with regard to 
that county. He is the first constable to be recorded as holding land in this potentially 
exposed front-line county. 
Here then,, in the autumn of 1296, as Edward I organised the settlement of an 
apparently subjugated Scotland, a new type of constable to those appointed in May 
appears. The major castles are now held by knights or bannerets of national standing,, 
men who owned several manors in various counties and possesed the wealth, prestige 
and retinues that accompanied this. They were experienced in both war and the 
20 CDS, ii, no. 853; Knights of Edward I, ii, pp. 252-3. The garrison of Bere castle also contained a 
chaplain, attilator, smith, carpenter, mason, as well as janitors, watchmen and 'other necessary 
ministers', ibid, 'Castel-Y-Bere', Fickard, Castle Comnninity, p. 305. 
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command of castles of national or military significance. They had the ear of the king 
and the power and authority to exert their influence in support of their position as 
constable rather than relying on their position as constable as an office to exert power 
from. In short Hastang, Waldegrave and Huntercombe were three experienced, capable 
and formidable commanders. That Edward I left men such as these as his most 
prominent constables after his settlement of Scotland indicates that he did not take 
lightly the possibility of Scottish resistance and that he expected these commanders to 
aggressively use their garrisons to deal with any insurgents effectively. It is telling that 
he did not leave a justice such as Spalding in charge of these castles but experienced 
commanders of national standing. 
Whereas Hastang was to remain as constable of Roxburgh until October 1305 
both Waldegrave and Huntercombe no longer held their position within two years of 
their appointment, Waldegrave being killed in 1297 and Huntercombe ordered to hand 
over Edinburgh on 25 November 1298 . 
21 The recapture of Stirling in 1298 after the 
resounding English victory at Falkirk was followed almost immediately by the 
appointment of a new constable on 8 August 1298. The new incumbent, the Yorkshire 
knight John Sampson, was to remain constable until the castle was lost under his 
command in January 1300, an indication that his appointment was a considered 
decision and not an ad hoc arrangement upon its capture as those in May 1296 appear 
to have been. 22 More than any other constable Sampson was a vastly experienced 
administrator having served in the 1280s as keeper of the Exchange in York, as mayor 
of York, as a commissioner In the same town as well as being an attorney for the 
archbishop of York and a justice of gaol delivery in Oakham. In the 1290s he had acted 
as an assessor of the subsidy in Yorkshire and had bought wool for the king 
21 CDS, ii, no. 103 1; Knights ofEdward I, ii, p. 253; Watson, Oder the Hammer, p. 67. 
22 Although the close siege of Stirling would have prevented Sampson being replaced even if Edward I 
had wanted to do so. 
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transporting it to the port of Hull. There is no evidence of active military service in 
Sampson's career but,, like his predecessor Waldegrave, he did have experience of 
commanding a castle, being constable of Scarborough castle for over five years from 2 
June 1292 until 3 October 1297 -a castle he was granted to hold for life on 23 
February 1301 but ceded on 13 May 1308 - while previously, in January 1297, he had 
been a commissioner regarding the site and state of Berwick and its port, a commission 
which would have dealt with surveying the fortifications of the town. " 
As part of Edward I's reshuffling of officials in the wake of Falkirk the 
constable of Edinburgh was changed, Huntercombe moving into other important 
offices and his successor, the banneret John Kingston, taking charge in November 
1298. Whereas Sampson to an extent reflects the background of Waldegrave as a 
constable and administrator then Kingston's experience is more that of the experienced 
veteran soldier as exhibited by Hastang. Kingston, possessing lands in Berkshire and 
Wiltshire,. had served in Wales in 1277,1282 and 1282 and had been summoned to 
serve in Flanders in 1297. His service in Wales had been under Ralph Pypard, 
transferring to the earl of Lancaster and then for John de Lenham and then the king 
respectively. This background of extensive campaigning combined with his high social 
rank led to his appointment to Edinburgh where he proved to be an extremely capable 
constable, retaining the position until at least 26 October 1305 when he was made one 
of the temporary custodians of Scotland, an appointment illustrating both the height of 
his social status and his successful tenure as constable of Edinburgh. 24 
23 CDS, ii, no. 1002; Knights of Edward I, iv, pp. 205-6; Rickard, Castle Community, p. 494 - it is 
possible that it is the same John Sampson who was a private constable of the castles of Cockermouth 
(1266-1267) and Skipton (1267-1269), pp. 153,498. 
24Knights of F . ýdward I, ii, p. 284 - Barrow, 
Robert Bruce, p. 197. Kingston's social stature and success as 
a commander was renowned enough for one of the great siege engines at Stirling in 1304 to be named 
after him. 
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Kingston approaches Huntercombe in terms of social status if not in land 
whereas Sampson equates more to Hastang and Waldegrave, yet both were still knights 
of national importance with appropriate experience in either warfare, castles or 
administration and as such were specifically chosen for their role as constable of a keY 
strategic castle. In this they both continue the trend set in autumn 1296 although it is 
surprising that Sampson does not appear to have any significant combat experience 
which suggests he was selected solely for his administrative abilities. However 
Sampson does mirror the northern,, in his case Yorkshire, basis evident in 
Huntercombe's Northumberland connections, pointing to the beginnings of the link 
between knights of northem counties and the office of constable in Scotland. 
Several more Scottish castles were taken in the wake of Falkirk including 
Caerlaverock and Tibbers, both going into private hands, along with the reduction of 
Lochmaben. However the most notable seizure was that of Jedburgh the siege of which 
took place in early October 1298.25 On 18 October Robert Hastang, constable of 
nearby Roxburgh, agreed an indenture for the munition and garrisoning of Jedburgh, a 
temporary measure of expediency upon the immediate capture of the castle. 26 It was 
surely due to Hastang's position as constable of Roxburgh and his good service there 
since 1296 that the interesting situation arises of his brother, Richard, becoming 
constable of Jedburgh . 
27 Unlike his brother there is little information to be found on 
Richard's early career, he may well have served with Robert in Wales and overseas if 
old enough, but he was to remain in charge of Jedburgh until 26 October 1305 and 
went on to serve for the earl of Warwick in 1310, was a knight of the shire of 
25 Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. 68-9. 
26 CDSý ii, no. 1016. 
27 Although there is confusion as to the date of his constableship. Watson suggests that he was constable 
from 1298 and indeed he is stated as being constable on 15 July 1299 but there is a confusing entry 
dated 1301 in which the former constable, Hugh de Eland, is described as constable. The latter is surely 
misdated, c. f Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. xxi, 69; Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 198; CDS, ii, no. 
1206. 
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Warwickshire in 1321 and was summoned to the Great Council of 1324 as a knight of 
the same county. 28 Whatever his background it is clear that Richard Hastang became 
constable due to the influence of his brother but it must be assumed that he would 
never have gained it if he was not capable of executing the role successfully and his 
length of tenure suggests that he was indeed a competent commander. It would be 
wrong to view his appointment as nepotism at the cost of ability; this was warfare 
rather than the relatively cosy atmosphere of the domestic castle constables that 
operated in England. 
One representative of these domestic constables who did serve auspiciously as 
a constable in Scotland was William de Felton (d. 1328). He had served overseas in 
1297 and was to do so again in 1301 but his main links were with Wales, leading the 
men of Anglesey to the battle of Falkirk in 1298, an engagement in which he lost a 
horse. Felton was something of a specialist with regard to castles being appointed 
constable of Beaumaris castle upon its inception in April 1295 and remaining 
constable during its construction by Master James of St. George until I April 1300. A 
muster roll exists that suggests Felton made his debut as a constable in the Scottish 
wars within the minor castle of Tibbers but Felton's invaluable expertise was soon put 
to better use; in the autumn of 1301 a gamson was created for the old palace at 
Linlithgow and Felton was brought in as constable, spending the winter of 1301/2 
there with Edward 1, a time in which the king decided to transform Linlithgow into a 
place of some strength. The appointment of Felton as early as autumn 1301, a man 
who had spent five years as constable of Beaumaris during its construction , indicates 
that this decision had been taken well before the new year and that Felton was 
appointed specifically with these building works in mind. Once again Master James of 
28 ICni gh, of E s ý&ardI, ii, p. 198. 
St. George was to supervise the works and it cannot be a coincidence that Edward I 
reformed the partnership that had safeguarded Beaumaris during its construction. 
Felton was constable of Linlithgow when the works officially finished in August 1302, 
the garrison of the rebuilt castle formally entering the garrison payrolls from 29 
August 1302, Felton remaining in command until at least late 1305.29 
The trend to notice in the years from 1298 until 1305/6 is the length of time for 
which these constables were remaimng in office. Robert Hastang was the only 
constable from 1296 still serving and remained in command of Roxburgh for nine 
years. Those appointed in 1298 all served much longer than any of their predecessors; 
Kingston for at least seven or eight years, Richard Hastang for approximately seven 
years and Felton for approximately five years with the exception being Sampson due 
to the loss of Stirling whilst under his command. These men were all originally 
appointed as part of Edward I's attempt to settle the issue of Scotland and consolidate 
English dominance, a settlement that proved rapidly elusive and which was quickly 
replaced by a violent resumption of war with Scottish attacks punctuated by English 
expeditions occupying most of these years. Yet in the face of renewed hostilities the 
constables of these castles remained remarkably consistent at a tune when great 
pressure was exerted on each of them and when any doubt or weakness about their 
capabilities would have seen them quickly removed from their office. It is 
consequently evident that Edward I chose those he appointed constable in and after 
1298 with extreme care and that he intended them to be in the office for the long-term. 
It also appears that the king adopted a policy of maintaining consistency thus breeding 
familiarity between the constables who commanded the backbone of the English war 
effort in Scotland. At a time of incessant conflict in the war it is striking that these are 
29 Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 9, Morris, Ihe Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 263,268,287-8,293, Ihe 
King's Works, i, pp. 412-3; C47/22/3/32, E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/6, mm, 5-6-, E101/12/38. 
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the very years in which there is a settling down and consistency In those who were 
constable. 
The next major change occurred in October 1305 and was once again the result 
of Edward I's apparent subjugation of Scotland and the new arrangements for Its 
settlement. John of Brittany, earl of Richmond and nephew of Edward 1, became the 
new lieutenant of Scotland and consequently the de facto keeper of the castles of 
Roxburgh and Jedburgh. The order that brought these castles into his control was 
issued on 15 October 1305; Robert Hastang was instructed to hand over Roxburgh to 
either the new lieutenant or Robert de Maulay, Richmond's attorney, and likewise 
Richard Hastang was to deliver Jedburgh to Richmond or his attorney, Ebles de 
Mountz. This exchange had taken place by 25 October when Robert and Richard 
Hastang were referred to as being the late constables of their respective castles . 
30 Their 
replacements, the attorneys of Richmond, Maulay and Mountz, although appointed 
under Richmond and with the consent of Edward 1. mark the transitional stage in 
constables between the latter and the reign of his son, Edward 11. 
Robert de Maulay was constable of Roxburgh from October 1305 until ordered 
to cede the castle by Edward 11 on 12 February 1309.3 
1 There are few details of his 
previous career; Robert was the brother of Peter de Maulay and was a serviens of the 
earl of Lincoln in 1277 and witnessed a charter of the earl in 1285 as well as receiving 
a protection for staying in Scotland for Edward I in 1291. He held lands in Yorkshire 
in 1279 that had previously belonged to his brother. On 20 May 1308 Edward 11 
thanked Maulay for his services and asked him to remain in Roxburgh, presumably in 
his capacity as constable. Maulay's loyal service and the expertise he acquired as 
constable of Roxburgh were noted by Edward 11 although interestingly they were not 
30 CFR, 1272-1307, p. 529; CDS, ii, no. 1707. John of Brittany, then governor of Aquitaine, was not able 
to take up his new position until February 1306. 
" He was described as'late constable and sheriff on 21 March 13 10, Knights of EaIKardI, iii, p. 138. 
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put to use in te Scottish war but to strengthen Edward's domestic poll III itical position. In 
June 1310, ostensibly for his good service to both Edward I and Edward 11, Maulav 
was granted the castle and manor of Bolsover in Derbyshire and in May 1314 he was 
constable of Horeston castle -a position he had held since at least May 1311 - and, as 
well as having carried out repairs on both castles, he was to safely guard both Horeston 
and Bolsover castles during the political turmoil of January 1312. Maulay was to hold 
Horeston until 15 March 1322 and it was quickly returned to his keeping on 13 May. 
He was custos of High Peak castle with Richard Damory from 16 January 1319, the 
castle being in the possession of Edward 11's children John and Eleanor. Maulay also 
served as custos of several manors at this time as well as having been a steward of 
Prince Edward, earl of Chester, in 1317, and he became a commissioner of array for 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in 1322 when he was to assemble men for the 
32 Scottish expedition as well as mustering the Yorkshire levies on II March 1323. 
In the case of Maulay the expected career path of a constable is inverted. 
Rather than gaining experience as a constable in England or Wales then utillsing this in 
a front-line Scottish castle Maulay was brought away from the hard school of a war- 
tom castle and given charge of castles in Derbyshire, castles which Edward 11 saw as 
critical to control in his domestic crisis. With his experience as constable of Roxburgh 
and possession of land in Yorkshire Maulay's career should have been as a commander 
in the war; that Edward H felt compelled to remove him from this critical arena 
illustrates the extent to which he felt threatened domestically. Maulay, as with many 
constables of castles in Scotland, can be seen as operating outside the domestic castle 
constables of England and this implies that Edward II placed more trust in someone 
32 Kýnights of &Iward I, iii, p. 138; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 165,167,169. Horeston and 
Bolsover were both relatively close to the earl of Lancaster's lands in the Midlands. 
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from outside of this group and raises the issue of just how distinct these front-line 
constables were from their domestic counterparts. 
The appointment of Ebles de Mountz as constable of Jedburgh whilst acting as 
an attorney for Richmond introduces the career of one of the most interesting 
constables of this period. Indeed, given his past record, it is surprising that Mountz was 
appointed to Jedburgh rather than to the more important castle of Roxburgh. Mountz 
had served as a knight in the garrison of Edinburgh since at least 28 February 1300 - 
when he had served with one esquire, five grooms, two chargers and three hackneys - 
and had constantly remained in the garrison until 20 August 1304 when he departed to 
take up the sheriffdom of Peebles. Throughout these four years Mountz appears to 
have served as Kingston's deputy, his name appearing immediately after Kingston's on 
accounts and muster rolls which was traditional for a deputy, on several occasions 
being the only knight except for Kingston in the garrison and he is almost certainly the 
unnamed knight that sometimes appears in Edinburgh's accounts. This position of 
seniority within the garrison is confirmed by Mountz being appointed constable of 
Edinburgh on I March 1303; he was to retain this office for nearly a year until 
Kingston returned in February 1304 and Mountz left for Peebles. 33 
The evidence for Jedburgh is sketchy but Mountz was still constable on 13 
June 1306 and almost certainly remained there into 1307; on 20 May 1308 the king 
thanked him and requested that he continue in his service which indicates he may still 
have been constable at that time. What can definitely be said is that he had left 
Jedburgh by 18 December 1308 as on that date he was appointed constable of Stirling 
castle where he was to remain until spring 131 1.34 That Mountz was made constable of 
three different key strategic Scottish castles in only eight years is an unparalleled 
33 CDS, ii, no. 1132; E101/1 1/1, mm. 19-20; named in garrison - E101/68/1/1 1, E101/1 1/1, E101/12/18, 
E101/12/20. 
I 
CF9 1307 1319, p. A. 34 CDS, v, nos. 492,512,562; CDS, iii, nos. 70,2 10,3 
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record. The expertise and ability that underpinned these appointments and the status of 
Mountz as something special amongst the constables of this period Is confirmed by a 
commission he was never to take up; on 22 February 1314 Edward H appointed him 
constable of Edinburgh. 
35 
The true significance of this is revealed when the timing of his appointment is 
put into context, the date exactly coinciding with the close siege of Edinburgh which 
culminated in it being stormed and taken by the Scots in March 1314. Although 
obviously unaware of the imminence of Edinburgh's fall this does illustrate that the 
Crown was acutely aware of problems Within the castle concerning a loss of 
confidence in the incumbent constable, Piers Lubaud, by his own garrison . 
36 In this 
critical, potentially disastrous situation, the man turned to was Mountz. In modem 
terminology Mountz appears here as a 'fireman' for Edward H, a role grounded in his 
unparalleled experience of front-line Scottish castles and which had included a year in 
charge of Edinburgh itself 37 
It was clearly the unparalleled expertise possessed by Mountz that marked him 
out for such a thankless task but there is an additional dimension that may well have 
contributed towards his selection and which is specifically related to Lubaud. The 
garrison of Edinburgh's loss of confidence was exacerbated by Lubaud being a Gascon 
'foreigner' and a cousin of the late and reviled Piers Gaveston. The background of 
Mountz, though also a foreigner in pedigree, was in marked contrast to that of Lubaud. 
The Mountz family were originally from Savoy and his father, also a knight named 
Ebles,, had served as steward of Henry III's household between 1262 and 1270, 
holding the constableship of Windsor castle from 1266 until January 1269 as well as 
35 CFR, 1307-1319, p. 189. 
36 Lubaud had undoubtedly already been overthrown by his garrison by 22 February but the Crown was 
unaware of this with Mountz's commission ordering Lubaud to hand the castle over to Mountz. 
37 Mountz also knew and would have been known by troops still serving in the garrison in 1314 who had 
served in it under him in the early years of the century. 
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being an important figure in the entourage of Edward I when he was still only a young 
prince in the mid-1200s. The Mountz family was one of the many Savoyard families 
that entered into English court circles under both Henry III and the young Edward I 
and Mountz himself maintained this intimate connection with the court by becoming 
an esquire of the household of Queen Eleanor, the wife of Edward I, in 1289-90. 
Mountz interweaved this household career with that of his constableships, becoming 
steward of Queen Isabella's household in 1311 and travelling With her and Edward 11 
to France in 1313, retiring from the post in February 1314 due to his intended 
appointment to Edinburgh. Having fought and lost a horse at Bannockburn he was part 
of the force of household knights and men-at-anns sent to reinforce Berwick in August 
1314. His close association with Edward and Isabella continued in 1316 when he 
brought news to the king of the birth of his second son, John of Eltham. In 1317 
Mountz was Edward's envoy to the count of Bar and other continental magnates while 
in 1320 Mountz's widow,, Elizabeth, went overseas with Isabella. In his lifetime 
Mountz possessed land in Lincolnshire, was granted the manor of Shirlinge near 
Sandwich by Eleanor in 1290 and later , in 1312, 
for his good service to Edward I and 
to better serve Isabella, Edward 11 granted him the confiscated Templar manors of 
Bruere, Askeby, Rouston and Kirkeby in Lincolnshire. 38 
Mountz was appointed to Edinburgh at this time of crisis notjust because of his 
immense experience but also due to his impeccable personal and family pedigree. He 
had loyally served Edward I and Eleanor as well as Edward 11 and Isabella whilst his 
father had served in the household of Henry 111. Mountz was beyond reproach in terms 
of both experience and background and was thus a man whom the garrison would trust 
38 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 6,22; F. D. Blackley, G. Hermansen, The Household Book of Queen 
Isabella 
of England (Alberta, 1971), pp. xii-xiii, xv; J. Parsons, Eleanor of 
Castile: Queen and Society, in 
Thirteenth Century England (London, 1995), pp. 46,89,10 1; Knights of Edward I, III, p. 195, J. R. S. 
Phillips, Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke, 1307-24 (Oxford, 1972), p. 115. 
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implicitly and obey. The selection of Mountz to take charge of Edinburgh in 1314 was 
therefore based on political as well as military considerations and only he matched 
both of these essential requirements although he was ultimately appointed too late to 
take up the command and attempt to save Edinburgh. 
The most striking feature of Mountz's career is that before becoming a 
constable he had served as a knight, as deputy constable, in the Edinburgh garrison for 
three to four years, effectively serving an apprenticeship in garrison command under 
Kingston. This was not a feature peculiar to Mountz. William Biset was his immediate 
predecessor as constable of Stirling being granted the office after the castle had been 
retaken in 1304. Biset had served in Flanders dunng 1297 and in early 1304 had 
become sheriff of Clackmannan residing at Tulliallan castle where by April, in dispute 
with Henry Percy over possession of the castle, he had spent money strengthening the 
walls and from where he harassed the Scottish garrison of Stirling situated several 
miles upstream, the boats of which he managed to capture in April. However the most 
interesting aspect of Biset is that he had served within the Linlithgow garrison for his 
lands in Scotland since autumn 1301, appearing in the rolls as a soldarius and 
frequently referred to as serving With four of his companion soldarn', eventually 
leaving the garrison on 6 June 1303 during a general re-organisation of men. 39 Here 
again is something amounting to an apprenticeship in garrisons followed by a 
progression from command of a minor sheriffdom and castle to a major one. Biset was 
Scottish and his prominence was due to his position in Scottish society and the lands 
he held of the king. He was the first Scot to be made constable of an important 
English-held castle in Scotland. 
39 Knights of Eaývard I, i, p. 96; Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. 189,19 1; E 10 1/9/16, in. 1, E 10 1/ 10/5, 
m. 2; E101/10/6, m. 6; E101/11/1, mm. 2,5,9,19. The date he became a knight is unclear and Biset 
may well have only been an esquire when made constable of Stirling, presumably being knighted whilst 
in office. 
100 
It is an interesting fact that the advent of Edward 11's reign was not marked bv 
a wholesale change among the constables of the Scottish castles at the heart of the war. 
Those appointed in the reign of Edward I kept their offices: Biset remained in Stirling 
until late 1308 when replaced by Mountz, a man who had already served as constable 
twice under Edward I and remained in charge of Jedburgh from 1305 until most 
probably 1308; Maulay was to hold Roxburgh from 1305 until 1310; Kingston may 
well have continued as constable of Edinburgh into the reign of Edward 11. As With the 
aristocratic military commanders of the war on the whole the men Edward I had 
entrusted with these critical constableships were retained in the same capacity by 
Edward 11 and in the crisis of early 1314 it was to one of these that Edward turned to 
save Edinburgh. Similarly many of the constables associated with Edward 11's reign 
can be found fighting within the garrisons of Edward I in the early years of the war. 40 
This is a feature of one of the most intriguing constables under Edward 11, Piers 
Lubaud, the Gascon knight overthrown by his own garrison in 1314. The first 
appearance of Lubaud in garrison service comes in February 1300 when he was listed 
as an esquire serving in Edinburgh under Kingston, and incidentally alongside Mountz, 
but the majority of his early service was spent as one of the many sergeant-at-arms in 
Linlithgow, most probably first appearing in the unfortunately faded roll of autumn 
1301 and his name consistently present in the rolls and accounts up to and including 
1304/5. By June 1306 he was constable of Linlithgow and had been knighted, his 
astounding meteoric rise from a mere sergeant to a knight and constable being directly 
down to the notorious favour of Edward 11 with the influence of Gaveston, Lubaud's 
cousin, undoubtedly lending a hand . 
41 However, as with Maulay, Lubaud was 
40 M. Prestwich, 'Isabella de Vescy and the Custody of Bamburgh Castle', BIHR, 44 (197 1). 
41 CDS, ii, no. 1132; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6, m. 6; E101/11/1, mm. 2,5,9,25, E101/12/18, 
E101/12/38; CDS, v, nos. 475,492; Vita Edwardi Secundi, ed. N. Denholm-Young (London, 1957), p. 
48. 
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appointed constable whilst Edward 1, whose dislike of his son's attachment to 
Gaveston was to become manifest, was king. An explanation may be found in the fact 
that Edward I was gravely ill in 1306 and it was his son who led the army into 
Scotland, this expedition providing the future Edward H with the opportunity to 
influence the appointment of Lubaud. When and by whom Lubaud was knighted is 
also unknown but he was already a knight by the summer of 1306.42 
This undoubted favouritism does not necessarily condemn the suitability of 
Lubaud as a constable from the outset and, as with Gaveston, Lubaud on the whole 
appears to have been a brave and capable commander. Although the elevation of 
Lubaud. was unseemly in its rapidity he did possess several years experience of service 
in front-line garrisons, in particular within Linlithgow, which would have provided 
him With knowledge of and a familiarity With the castle and garrison over which he 
was given command. Whether his new status aroused simmering resentment among 
the men he had once served alongside or who had previously been his seniors and 
whom he was now in command of can only be a matter of conjecture; the long 5 
duration of his constableship and the continuity of those serving under him suggest 
that Lubaud had few if any problems with the garrison accepting his new found 
authority. 
In fact Lubaud was to remain as constable of Linlithgow for an unprecedented 
seven years with his tenure only ending With its loss to the Scots in 1313. He was 
absent during its fall as by then he was also constable of Edinburgh, a position he held 
as early as 1311/12, as well as being constable of the peel of Livingston from 
approximately the same date. These multiple constableships are the first of the period 
and are all the more remarkable in that one man was given command of two major 
42 Edward, then still a prince, received stores from Lubaud at Linlithgow and Blackness between July 
and September 1306, the prominence of Lubaud illustrating he was already constable by then. He "ý"as 
not among those knighted at the Feast of the Swans in 1306, CDS, v, no. 475. 
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fortifications and a minor but logistically important one in some of the most precarious 
and volatile years of the whole war. This multiplicity cannot but have aided the loss of 
Linlithgow and Livingston due to the absence of their commander. As the three were 
located within the same region it could be suggested that the multiplicity was an 
attempt at providing an overall commander to give greater co-ordination to the forces 
within them but it was surely more a symptom of Edward 11's domestic troubles and 
his increasing reliance on only a handful of men whom he trusted to remain loyal to 
himself It was this that led to Lubaud finding himself in charge of three garrisons that 
43 totalled a force of approximately four hundred men. The overthrow of Lubaud was 
more to do with the impossible task given him rather than a lack of ability or integrity 
on his part; his fate was sealed by the personal failures of Edward 11 more than any of 
his own. He remained loyal to the English cause to the last, entering into Bruce's 
service upon the fall of Edinburgh but being executed because it was believed he 
remained English at heart and was awaiting an opportunity to damage the Scottish war 
effort. ' 
In 1310 William de Fiennes, a Frenchman from Bouglon, was constable of 
Roxburgh. He too was advanced into his position by Edward 11, being knighted on I 
August 1311 whilst already constable and so having been appointed as a mere esquire, 
remaining in charge until the castle was taken by storm in 1314, an action in which he 
resisted courageously but was fatally injured by an arrow although still managing to 
negotiate the safe extraction of the surviVing garrison before his death. There is no 
information on Fiennes before his appearance in Roxburgh although it is likely that he 
was related to the William Fiennes who had been a second cousin of Eleanor, the NIVIfe 
43 Calculated from CDS, ni, app. viii, pp. 393-412. 
44 BrUCe, pp. 398-9 n. 766. Duncan speculates that Lubaud may have betrayed the 
Scottsh attack on 
Berwick in January 1316. 
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of Edward 1.45 Fiennes is consequently another example of Edward 11's narroNNing base 
of men whom he believed he could rely on. 
It is significant that in a period when the war was at its height and attacks on 
castles extremely likely the three major fortresses of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and 
Linlithgow were held by aliens, men who owed their commands more to the cnsis in 
English domestic politics in these years than to events in the Scottish war. The 
selection of these constables was based primarily on political concerns rather than 
those of warfare. It is also interesting that two aliens, both favountes of Edward 11, one 
of whom was related to Gaveston, were in office in such critically important castles 
when the Ordinances were promulgated and yet they were not themselves a target 
despite the Ordinances focussing on the removal of Gaveston and his following 
together with a raft of household officials including the constables of a number of 
English castles. 46 Despite their backgrounds and the highly sensitive posts they held 
both Lubaud and Fiennes escaped the wrath of the Ordainers. 47 Indeed the appointment 
of Fiennes was at the expense of a target of the Ordainers'. Henry Beaumont, whose 
grant of the castle of Roxburgh for life on 21 March 1310 was exceptionally short- 
lived, Fiennes being in charge from 26 March 13 10.48 It is clear that the politics of the 
reign were seriously affecting the constableships of the key English-held castles in 
Scotland. 
45 CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 406. As a young man Edward I, whilst a prince in Gascony in the 1250s, had his 
own administration of which the chancellor was one Michael de Fiennes, Prestwich, Edward I, p. 14. 
46 M. Prestwich, The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272-1377 (London, 1996 edition), pp. 
83-4; 'Annales Londoniensies', Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward H, ed. W. Stubbs, 
(Roll Series, 1882), pp. 198-202. 
47 There is no obvious reason why they were not targeted, particularly Lubaud with his familial 
connection to Gaveston. It may have been that the Ordainers were reluctant to interfere directly with the 
delicate situation that existed in the war. That Lubaud was not present at court may also have helped 
him avoid any censure. 
48 CDS, iii, nos. 122,129; CDS, iv, p. 400. It does not seem likely that Fiennes was acting as constable 
for Beaumont as there is no evidence whatsoever to support the idea that Beaumont had the keeping of 
Roxburgh from 1310-14. 
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Stirling, the fourth major fortress, was held between 1311 and its loss in 1314 
by a Scottish knight, Philip de Moubray. Although a Scot his tenure of office excited 
no comment in the chronicles of the period even though it was Moubray's agreement 
with Edward Bruce that effectively led to Bannockburn. In modem eyes his subsequent 
career may well raise doubts about his loyalty; having surrendered Stirling castle he 
was rewarded by Robert Bruce for having kept to his agreement by being accepted into 
the household of the latter and went on to play a prominent role in Edward Bruce's 
Irish campaign in 1315 where Moubray is believed to have died. However, as with 
Lubaud, changing sides after capture was an accepted practice and Moubray's loyalty 
before 1314 is not in doubt. He lost a horse fighting alongside Aymer de Valence at 
Methven, a battle in which he purportedly seized the reigns of Bruce's horse, and again 
distinguished himself when ambushed by James Douglas near Ediford in 1307. 
Moubray went on to become constable of Kirkintilloch castle in 1309/10 before 
49 
receiving the greater command of Stirling. With his long record of active service in 
Scotland together with his Scottish antecedents and experience of not only leading 
troops but commanding Kirkintilloch Moubray can be seen as another experienced 
commander who had served his apprenticeship in the Scottish wars, working his way 
up from Kirkintilloch to the vital castle of Stirling. 
49 CDS, v, no. 472; Bruce, pp. 90-2,98,100-2,290-5,520,674, 
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(ii) c. 1314-c. 1323 
The loss of castles in Scotland led to the castles of northern England, which had 
hitherto played a minor role in the wars, now becoming front-line royal garrisons and 
it was in these years following Bannockburn that a new type of constable emerged, a 
change determined by the castles in which these garrison forces were now 
concentrated. The greatest concentration of these castles was in Northumberland and 
the fragmentary records for these in the years after Bannockburn and into the 1320s 
allow a glimpse of the men who served as constable within these now extremely 
important fortifications. 
Roger de Horsley serves as an introduction to this new type of constable. He 
was constable of the royal castle at Bamburgh on 4 December 1315 but only lasted a 
matter of weeks being replaced on 20 December, an accusation of extortion whilst 
constable hastening his removal. However this had little effect on his career as by 6 
February 1318 he was again constable of Bamburgh and held this office for nine years 
until 8 February 1327. Horsley was also briefly constable of Dunstanburgh for nearly 
two weeks in March 1322, undertaking this position styled as a royal steward. There is 
also evidence that Horsley was in charge of Berwick castle after leaving Bamburgh in 
1327. Nor was his role just confined to being a constable: in 1321 he was to advise the 
sheriff of Northumberland on the best way to destroy Harbottle castle; in 1323 he was 
appointed to the commission that was to investigate the seizure of Norham castle; he 
was summoned to the Great Council in 1324 and in January 1326 he was given the 
task of blockading part of the Northumberland coast to prevent the landing of French 
emissaries. 1 
I Knights OfEdwardI, ii, p. 241; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 349,352,356. 
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All of Horsley's appointments were therefore concerned with Northumberland 
and it comes as no surprise that he was a knight of Northumberland, holding land in 
the county and in 1318 being paid 40 marks a year from Bamburgh castle until the 
king provided him with lands to that value in the county. 2 The traits of these new 
constables are in evidence in Horsley's career; a knight of local - Northumbrian - 
standing rather than national and operating within that locality in contrast with the 
national figures who commanded the first-rate castles of Scotland. This sets the pattern 
for the rest of the constables Edward II appointed after Bannockburn. 
Although these men mark a change in constable type on the whole they exhibit 
one key similarity with their predecessors; experience of fighting against the Scots. As 
Northumbrians it is natural that they should be veterans of the Anglo-Scottish wars and 
in certain cases documentation supports this. The pay books reveal that Horsley was 
serving in the Berwick garrison as a soldarius in 1303 3 and the assumption must be 
that he had continued in service, whether continuously or intermittently, right through 
until the appointments as constable came after Bannockburn. 
Similar lengthy service - in this case Particularly garrison based - can be seen 
in the career of William Ridel. He served as a knight under William Latimer in the 
mounted force based in Roxburgh town from at least September 1301 until 21 
December when he moved to the garrison of Berwick town where he remained with 
four of his esquires into the summer of 1302. It was whilst serving with Latimer that 
Ridel was captured by the Scots but fortunately for him he was freed in exchange for a 
captured Scottish knight rather than face a hefty ransom. His relationship wIth Latimer 
continued throughout the years as in 1311 he consented to the transfer to Latimer of 
2KnightS of F , aWard I. ii, p. 24 1. 3 E101/1 1/1, m. 15. 
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lands to which he had bought control of the minority from the king for the princely 
sum of 700 marks; Ridel was thus a man of some substance. 
He was a knight of Northumberland and served as a commissioner on a variety 
of local matters from 1312 into the 1320s and was commissioner of array in 
Northumberland in December 1321 when he was to raise 500 foot for the 13222 
expedition. Ridel's first appointment as a constable was as royal constable of Norham, 
the dates of this are imprecise but he appears to have left the office on 14 August 1314. 
His command of castles continued with his office as sheriff of Northumberland in 
1315, Newcastle castle automatically coming under his authority. He remained as 
custos of the castle from 3 May until 16 October 1315 and again from 3 August 1317 
until 12 October 1319. There appears to have been a slight overlap between this 
appointment and his following one as constable of Barnard castle, supervising the 
latter, whilst it was in wardship, with his office there lasting from 27 September 1319 
until 6 July 1323. 
An experienced local knight with some wealth Ridel combined a multitude of 
regional offices with his various constableships. In Ridel and Horsley a new breed of 
constable appear as a direct response to the altered situation after Bannockburn and the 
increased importance of the north, and Northumberland in particular, as the battlefield 
of the war. Veterans who had fought in the time of Edward I they were able and loyal 
commanders. 
Loyalty to Edward 11 is questionable in two further constables. John de 
Lilleburn was constable of Mitford castle for the earl of Pembroke in 1316 and went on 
to be constable of Dunstanburgh twice; for the king between 2 January and 
6 July 1323 
and then as a private constable in 1326. Another knight of 
Northumberland his 
4 E101/10/6, rn. 4; E101/1 1/1, mm. 2,4,8,22; Knights of 
Edward I, iv, PP. 122-3. Rickard, Castle 
Community, pp. 70,187,366. Interestingly, although still constable of 
Newcastle castle, in January 1318 
he had been serving in the Berwick garrison with twelve esquires, 
Knights of Edward I, iv, p. 12 2. 
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ambition and avarice are revealed in the several pardons he received for activities of an 
extremely dubious nature: he was pardoned on 16 October 1313 for participating in the 
campaign in which Gaveston had eventually been executed; in 1317 he was accused of 
receiving ransoms for prisoners that were not his to ransom; he obtained a pardon in 
1318 for holding Knaresborough castle against the king and surrendering it to the 
Scots as well as being suspected of involvement in the robbery of the cardinals by 
Gilbert de Middleton,, an act for which he was styled the 'king's enemy and rebel. ' In 
spite of these less than salubrious activities Lilleburn continued to enjoy important 
offices which culminated in his appointment as constable of Newcastle, a post which 
he first relinquished on 30 June 1328, occupied again from 13 August 1328 until 5 
December 1330 and then until 8 October 1331 and to which he retuned from 29 June 
1339 until 6 July 1339.5 
A constable Lilleburn would have known well, and who had an equally 
chequered career, was Roger Maduit. He too was a Northumbrian and received 
permission to crenellate his manor house there in 1310 however he also held land in 
Yorkshire. The dark stain on Maduit's career came when he fou ht against the king at 9 Cý -- 
Boroughbridge in 1322, despite having been a knight of the king's household, being 
tainted in the aftermath as a 'king's enemy and traitor'. He was pardoned with 
unseemly quickness on 15 April 1322 and extraordinarily by 15 September was 
appointed as constable of Dunstanburgh castle; within months of fighting against his 
king Maduit had been entrusted with a key northern castle. His Lancastrian links to the 
rebel earl's fon-ner castle must have been a major influence in this ostensibly unusual 
decision. Maduit remained as constable until 2 January 1323 and subsequently went on 
to become constable of Newcastle (14 December 1332-15 June 1334), constable of 
5 Knights of Edward I, iii, pp. 40-1; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 356,357,365,366,367. Lilleburn 
was thus a true survivor, serving the earl of Lancaster, Edward H, Roger Mortimer and Edward 
111. That 
his personal interests came well ahead of any loyalty is without doubt. 
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Prudhoe castle whilst it was in wardship (3 September 1325-11 February 1327) and 
6 then royal constable of Wark-on-Tweed until 20 May 1328. 
Former adherents of Lancaster Lilleburn and MadUlt7 have a sinister edge to 
their loyalty to Edward 11 and the question of why these men were not permanently 
removed from holding such an important office as constable is raised. However their 
actions must be seen in the context of the troubles that beset the war-tom region of 
northern England after Bannockburn and the local politics within that region. 
Complaints concerning oppression and draconian purveyance were also levelled 
against such loyal and dependable men as Horsley and Ridel. It is all too easy to 
dismiss the constables appointed after Bannockburn as men inferior in status, ability 
and loyalty to those that had gone before them. Illustrative of the apparent malaise that 
afflicted these new constables are the actions of the most infamous of them all, Jack le 
Irish. A valet of the royal household he was appointed constable of Barnard castle 
when it fell into wardship in August 1315 and his tenure included not only complaints 
regarding oppression and extortion but the extraordinary kidnapping of Lady Clifford. 8 
Le Irish was not typical of these constables, especially in not being Northumbrian, but 
his notoriety has come to represent these men. 
The last word on these constables should perhaps go to a man whose career and 
loyalty was impeccable. Knighted in 1302/3 John Felton served under his father 
William in the garrison of Linlithgow through 1303 until at least April 1304 and may 
well have been serving there from the appointment of his father as constable in 1300/1. 
During 1311/12 he served in the Berwick town garrison. A knight of the king's 
6KIlights OfEjWardI2 iii, pp. 130-1; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 356,367,372,376. 
7 For a brief but precise discussion of each knight and their links with the earl of Lancaster see, A. King, 
'Lordship, Castles and Locality: Thomas of Lancaster, Dunstanburgh Castle and the Lancastrian 
Affinity in Northumberland, 1296-1322', AA, 5thseries, vol. xxix, (2001), especially pp. 224-5. 
8 A. King, 'Jack le Irish and the Abduction of Lady Clifford, November 1315', Northern History, 
xxxviii (2001). 
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household he became custos of Alnwick castle during Henry Percy's minoritv, taking 
charge on 26 November 1314 and remaining in this office until the castle was handed 
to Percy in 1318; a short interval in Felton's command was brought about by his 
capture by the Scots on 27 November 1317. There must be some doubt as to whether 
he immediately returned to Alnwick as on 6 December 1317 he was described as 
constable of Newcastle. In 1318 he was a commissioner to receive the Northumberland 
rebels into the king's peace. 
Although the Felton family had Northumberland land and connections John 
was made custos of Burgh Manor in Norfolk on 18 July 1318 and he was summoned to 
the Great Council of 1324 as a knight of Norfolk. More importantly there appears to be 
a connection between the Felton family and Shropshire and the subsequent career of 
John suggests this was indeed the case as he was given command of castles in this 
area. He was constable of Ellesmere castle (8 September 1320-19 June 1321)1 
Redcastle,, also in Shropshire, for part of the wardship of James Audley (18 January 
1322 until at least 16 February 1322); Hodnet castle in Shropshire (22 January-24 
March 1322); he was appointed keeper of the castles of the rebels in Shropshire on 23 
December 1322 and on 20 March 1326 was granted for life for his good service the 
castle of Lethinhales in Herefordshire. In addition to his many offices involving castles 
Felton was ordered to deliver to the widow of the earl of Lincoln all her castles and 
lands (1322), stayed in Wales on behalf of the Despensers (1321) and travelled 
overseas for the king, to Gascony (1318) and Aquitaine (1324), as well as occupying 
the post of marshal of the army in the build up to the expedition under preparation for 
the war of St. Sardos in 1324/5. 
The greatest testimony to the loyalty and professionalism of Felton is the 
pardon he received from Queen Isabella and the future Edward III on 4 January 1327 
III 
for not surrendering the castle of Caerphilly to them even though he was threatened 
with forfeiture of life and limbs, lands and goods. The expertise Felton had acquired as 
a castle constable throughout his career is clearly illustrated in his constableship of 
Caerphilly in the culminating crisis of the reign of Edward 11; not only was CaerphilIN 
one of the most advanced castles of its time it was also where Edward H himself had 
briefly taken refuge when Isabella and Mortimer were pursuing him. 
If le Irish represents the worst side of these constables of northern castles then 
John Felton portrays the best and indeed is more typical than le Irish. John de Fenwyk, 
another Northiunbrian, who was constable of Bamburgh (on 6 February 1318) and 
then sheriff of Northumberland and constable of Newcastle (12 October 1319-3 July 
1323), had served with John Felton as his esquire in the Berwick garrison in 1311/11 
and in 1324 Fenwyk's wife, Eleanor, was in remainder to William de Felton. 10 It is 
well to remember that these constables, as knights of Northumberland, had personal 
and family connections that interlaced their local community and weaved them 
together as a cohesive force. They were all experienced veterans of the Anglo-Scottish 
wars - some if not all with garrison service - and after Bannockburn were fighting to 
protect their own lands. They may represent a break in the pattern of men appointed as 
constables in comparison to the constables of the first-rate Scottish castles but this 
should not be taken as meaning they were any less effective. 
9 Knights ofýdwardI, ii, p. 8; CDS, iii, app. viii, P. 394; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 203,348,414, 
419; A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III 
(Woodbridge, 1999 edition), p. 91 n. 42; P. Somerset Fry, Castles of Britain and Ireland, (Devon, 
1996), pp. 300-1. Felton's removal from the arena of northern England and the Anglo-Scottish wars in 
order for his expertise to be transferred to the domestic insurrections Edward 11 was facing is thus very 
similar to that of Robert Maulay described earlier. 
11 Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 10; CDS, iii, app. viii, p. 394. Fenwyk was also one of the knights amongst 
the household force sent to reinforce Berwick in the immediate aftermath of Bannockburn in August 
1314 as was John de Felton and Ebles de Mountz, E 159/10 1, m. 156. 
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(iii) 1335-1402 
Records for both garrisons and constables are almost non-existent throughout the bulk 
of the 1320s and it is not until English forces under Edward HI began the occupation of 
Scotland in the wake of the battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill in the mid-1330s 
that evidence - in fact particularly good evidence - becomes available. ' In 1335 and 
1336 garrisons were placed in the slighted ruins of the once fon-nidable castles of 
Edinburgh, Stirling and Roxburgh. New constables were placed in command but their 
tenure was to be short-lived; by early 1342 all three castles had again been lost to the 
Scots. It therefore seems logical to first address the constables of this short period as a 
group before moving on to look at those throughout the rest of the century. 7- 
The first castle to be re-occupied was Edinburgh. On 13 September 1335 
Thomas Roscelin was installed as constable. 2 He was not a northem based knight, his 
lands instead being centred in Norfolk, nor was he only of local importance; Roscelin's 
support of the earl of Lancaster against Mortimer had led to his exile in 1328 and he 
had been maintained by Lancaster whilst on the continent. Roscelin was finally 
pardoned on 4 December 1329, his estates restored and his return to England recorded 
in 1330. An opponent of Mortimer, a supporter of Lancaster and consequently of 
Edward HL there seems little doubt that this loyalty was repaid by his installation as 
constable. However this was not the only factor in his appointment; a man at least in 
his forties by this date, Roscelin would have been a veteran of the conflicts of the reign 
of Edward 11 - both domestic and external - and thus an experienced soldier. As noted 
he was well-connected, living in exile with the earl of Lancaster and interestingly 
Henry Beaumont, the latter the leading force among the Disinherited as well as the true 
' Some preliminary work has already been carried out on these particularly full garrison documents, 
P. W, Leaver, 'A long way from Home? English Garrisons in Scotland, 1335-42' (unpublished 
University of Hull MA thesis, 2001. ) 
2 Nicholson has the first date of Roscelin entering the castle as 8 September, Edward III and the Scots, 
p. 223. 
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victor of Dupplin Moor and who by the mid-1330s was making his claim to the 
earldom of Buchan a reality. 3 
Experienced and well-connected,, moving on a national rather than a local stage 
and without strong northern territorial connections, as a constable Roscelin has more in 
common with the constables appointed by Edward I than those that appeared after 
Bannockburn. Yet his term as constable of Edinburgh was to be extremel short-lived; y 11 
only a month after his appointment, on 13 October, formal letters of appointment for a 
new constable were made out and a delay of a few weeks meant that it was not until 2 
November 1335 that Roscelin actually left Edinburgh. 4 Whether the appointment had 
only been intended as a temporary measure is uncertain as Roscelin left because he 
was required to join an expedition further into Scotland led by Lancaster, Roscelin 
charged with leading an advance force that was to take and refortify Dunnottar castle, 
his links to Lancaster and his experience - albeit brief - in securing and refortifying 
Edinburgh no doubt singling him out for this task. All that can be definitely said is that 
Roscelin was removed from being constable as his expertise was needed elsewhere and 
that the refortification of another castle was his primary task suggests this may have 
been his area of expertise. Dunnottar was to be Roscelin's last action; he was killed in 
the engagement. 
Fhs replacement as constable is one of the more intriguing figures of this brief 
period. John Stirling, a Scot, first appears as Edward Balliol's sheriff of Perth in May 
1334 and it was most probably in this capacity that he commanded the Anglo-Scottish 
force besieging the castle of Loch Leven in the preceding month of March. An 
adherent of Balliol he was one of six pro-Balliol knights captured by the Scots on 8 
3 Leaver, 'Long way from Home', pp. 42-3. 
4 Nicholson, Edward III and the ScOts, pp. 22 5-6. 
Wyntoun, vi, pp. 58-62; Scalacronica, p. 101. There is a suggestion that the burning of Aberdeen by 
Edward III was in retaliation for Roscelin's death, Leaver, 'Long way from Home', p. 43. 
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September 1334 and held prisoner in Dumbarton until payment of a hefty ransom. It 
was Stirling's harsh imprisonment and ransom that brought about a subtle but critically 
important change in his career; on 8 October 1335 Edward Ul granted him two 
Northumberland manors as an indemnity for his long captivity and ransom and two 
days later an indenture was agreed in which Stirling was made sheriff of Edinburgh 
and constable of Edinburgh castle .6 The manors - in England not Scotland - and the 
indenture brought him into the direct service of Edward III rather than serving the 
latter through Balliol. Rather than a Scot fighting for a Scottish faction Stirling was 
now in effect a Scot fighting for the English king. 
The decision of Edward 1H to appoint him as sheriff and constable of this key 
strategic site was obviously based on the unquestionable loyalty Stirling had shown to 
the Balliol cause and his experience as a commander and an administrator in the siege 
of Loch Leven and as sheriff of Perth. That he was a Scot may also have helped his 
appointment rather than hindered it; Edward III may have seen an element of 
propaganda in appointing a Scot and adherent of Balliol to such an important office, an 
attempt to avoid the image of an English conquest so as to Win over the Scots in the 
region. Without a doubt Edward III did not believe he was taking a gamble in 
appointing Stirling and his trust was to be amply rewarded with Stirling proving to be 
a particularly vigorous and active constable, not only supervising the major rebuilding 
of the castle but withstanding close siege and executing daring sorties. In fact his 
aggressiveness as a constable was eventually his undoing; besieged by a Scottish force 4P 
Stirling led a party of his garrison on a sortie that ended in defeat and his own capture 
6 Nicholson, EdwardIff and the Scots, pp. 169,225-6,225 n. 3; Wyntoun, vi, pp. 28-37-5 Bower, vii, pp. 
97-103, p. 214 n. 1, CDS, iii, nos. 1183,1186. I-Es name in documents is usually spelt the same as the 
medieval spelling of the tovvn of Stirling, hence Stryvelyn. The evidence suggests Stirling may 
have had 
Northumberland, and hence English, connections in the early 1330s in that he appears to have already 
been married to his first wife, Barnaba Swinburne, by this date. 
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by William Douglas. Ffis constableship ended upon his capture, the most likel-y date 
7 being 18 March 1338 
. 
Stirling's term as constable and sheriff of Edinburgh signalled the beginning of 
an auspicious military career under Edward 111. His second term of imprisonment was 
over quickly and by the summer of 1338 he was servi I the Low Countries 
alongside Edward III and went on to participate in several more continental campaigns 
in the 1340s, culminating in the Crecy - Calais campaign of 1346/7 in which, by now a 
banneret, he was one of the lords listed as being perInItted to have his banner 
displayed. Stirling interspersed these years with Scottish campaigns and he was made 
sheriff of Northumberland in 1344 and was custodian of the town of Berwick from 
January 1345 until February 1346.8 This service was rewarded by the continued favour 
of Edward 1111 which mostly took the form of grants of land, wardships and royal 
approval of Stirling marrying Northumberland heiresses on two occasions. As with the 
two manors granted to Stirling in 1334 all of these rewards concerned the north of 
England and the vast majority centred on Northumberland itself, by the time of his 
death Stirling not only owned numerous manors in Northumberland but also several 
properties in Newcastle, a manor in Cumberland, another in Yorkshire and it seems 
that at some point he had also owned land in Norfolk. It can only be speculation as to 
why he was given a powerful landed base in Northumberland - if it was his wish so as 
to be near his native Scotland or if it was the idea of Edward HI - but what can be said 
is that his interests were exclusively northern. Although Stirling served on numerous 
overseas expeditions he remained a northemer, albeit an adopted one, and it was as a 
7 His sortie and capture appear to have occurred on 18 March 1338 as this is the date repeated 
in 
documents relating to pay owed to Stirling and his garrison after his release from captivity, see CCR, 
133 7- 1339, pp. 454,563 - CCR, 1339 - 1341, pp. 10,289. 
8 Crecy and Calais, ed. G. Wrottesley (London, 1898), pp. 5,97,205,206; The Wardrobe 
Book of 
William de Norwell, 12 July 1338-2 7 May 1340, eds. M. and B. Lyons, H. S. Lucas (Brussels, 1983), pp. 
334,339,357,387; Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 113 n. 152; 192 n. 286,263 app. 2 Table A, 
CDS, iii, no. s 1426,1442; CCR, 1343-46, pp. 324-5,555-6. 
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representative of Northumberland that he was called to parliament ftom 1363 
onwards. 9 
Indeed a rather unusual aspect of Stirling's career is the extent to which he was 
engaged in continental campaigns whilst possessing a northern power-base. In the 
1330s and 1340s most northern knights remained in the north to deal with the Scottish 
threat thereby missing out on the more lucrative French expeditIons5 ironically Stirling 
was to miss the one profit-making battle of the Scottish war, Neville's Cross,, as he 
had Just fought at Crecy. After his quick release in 1338 Stirling did not return to 
Edinburgh nor even to the Scottish war but went overseas almost immediately. By 
August 1338 his position as constable of Edinburgh had been given to one of the most 
famous northern knights of the clay, Thomas Rokeby. 10 
The rise of Rokeby both in prominence and wealth had been facilitated rather 
uniquely when he had won the reward of E 100 a year offered by the young Edward III 
to the esquire who found the location of the Scots during the ill-fated Weardale 
campaign of 1327 and he had been knighted on the spot. A Yorkshireman he had links 
to the Percy family, going overseas with Henry Percy in 133 1, and between 8 June and 
26 October 1336 he commanded the royal escort in Scotland; on the last date, 26 
October,, he became constable of Stirling castle. In 1337 Rokeby had his first 
experience of juggling two important offices when he was also made sheriff of 
Yorkshire. Perhaps it stood him in good stead for the onerous responsibility and 
workload that bore down on him in 1338 when he became constable of Edinburgh as 
well as of Stirling. It is to the credit of Rokeby's abilities as both a commander and 
9 CIPM, xv, nos. 142-6; GEC, v, no. 407-8. On entering into the service of Edward III it appears 
Stirling was not in possession of any Scottish lands, presumably they had been confiscated by the Scots. 
He was granted land in Scotland by Edward III in 1336 but these fell to the Scots and in lieu of them he 
received 200 marks a year from the customs of Newcastle and Hartlepool, see CDS, iii, no. s 1209,1397. 
10 Rokeby was in charge by August at the very latest. Upon John Stirling's untimely capture William de 
Montagu, besieging Dunbar castle, led a strong force to Edinburgh and installed a new constable with a 
sufficient garrison; this was undoubtedly a temporary constable, Lanercost, p. 312. 
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administrator that he maintained both castles through several years of Scottish attacks 
and sieges, his position as constable of these two critical first-rate Scottish castles 
unique and quite remarkable. He held both castles until they were eventually lost to the 
Scots, Edinburgh falling to assault on 16 April 1341 and Rokeby finally surrendering 
the hard-pressed and closely besieged castle of Stirling on 10 April 1342.11 
The loss of both castles under his charge did no harm to Rokeby's subsequent 
career; the circumstances of their loss absolved him from any blame. 12 Throughout the 
remaining months of 1342 Rokeby continued to serve in Scotland and on the border 
bringing with him various groups of soldiers numbering between nineteen and thirty 
men. In 1343 he was again made sheriff of Yorkshire and remained sheriff for seven 
years, an office that allowed him to take a leading role in the battle of Neville's Cross 
in 1346 and which also saw him escort the captured Scottish king, David Bruce, to the 
Tower in December of that year. He was made a banneret and in 1348 served as 
escheator for Yorkshire. Rokeby's career then took a sudden shift when in December 
1349 he became justiciar of Ireland. He remained as justiciar until his death in 1357 
with only a brief interlude from July 1355 until July 1356. This unexpected move to 
Ireland may well have been in response to the relative quiet of Scotland after Neville's 
Cross and was directly related to the administrative and military abilities Rokeby had 
exhibited as sheriff and in particular as constable of two heavily-garrisoned and vitally 
important castles. 
13 
The final constable of this short period was William de Felton, the son of the 
William who had provided such sterling service as a castle constable under both 
Edward I and Edward 11. During his Scottish campaign of 1334/35 Edward HI used the 
" CDS, iii, nos. 936,1323; DNB, xlix, pp. 152-153. 
12 See pp. 227-36. 
13 CDS, iii, no. s 1387,1399,1400,1474,1475,1512; R. Frame, 
the Custodian of David IF, The Battle of Neville's Cross, eds. 
1998), pp. 50-6. Frame discusses Rokeby's career in detail. 
'Thomas Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire, 
M. Prestwich, D. Rollason (Stamford, 
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ruins of Roxburgh castle as his headquarters and when he left on 2 February 13 3.35 
Felton took charge as constable as well as leasing the office of sheriff of Roxburgh. He 
remained as constable during the rebuilding of the castle and throughout years of 
incessant warfare until the castle was lost to assault on 30 March 1342 whilst Felton 
himself was absent on business in England. He subsequently represented 
Northumberland in at least four parliaments and from March 1342 onwards he was 
escheator and sheriff of Northumberland, still being sheriff in April 1343, and was 
serving on the border in 1346. The lands of the Felton family had grown by this time - 
largely due to the profits of their public offices - and William held an extensive 
number of manors in Northumberland as well as individual manors in Durham, 
Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire. With his power firmly based in 
Northumberland William proved a capable northern constable in the tradition of his 
family. 14 
Taking these constables as a specific group the most striking feature is the 
stability of their term as constable. Excepting Roscelin's very short tenure it can be 
seen that the constableship was seen as an office in which these men would serve for a 
number of years; Stirling remaining in charge of Edinburgh for two years and five 
months until his capture, Felton holding Roxburgh for the entire seven years it was in 
English hands, Rokeby similarly in command of Stirling for the entire five and half 
years and in charge of Edinburgh for almost three years until its 
loss to the Scots. 
Although they were appointed whilst the process of English conquest was still 
underway this was no ad hoc arrangement and that they were to remain in 
their office 
for so long demonstrates that the appointment of constables 
for these Hinportant castles 
had been carefully considered, a measured decision made 
by Edward III himself 
14 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 1 82 , 
189; CDS, iii, nos* 1204,1240,1-3381,13382,1408,14639 
Roskell, iii, p. 64. 
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This raises the question of why these individuals were selected; are there anv I 
common traits among these constables? The trend of constables possessing northern 
lands - in being northern knights and lords - which was particularly evident in the 
years after Bannockburn is also prevalent here, again with the exception of Roscelin. 
No doubt Felton owed his selection to being a scion of the great northern family of 
castle constables whose record of service in Wales, Scotland and the north stretched 
back into the reigns of both Edward I and Edward 11. It is reasonable to suppose that he 
had experienced warfare against the Scots and garrison service due to his family 
background. Roscelin was also an older and experienced figure however his 
prominence can be seen as emanating from his opposition to Mortimer and his 
connections with Lancaster and interestingly perhaps also with Beaumont. 
Stirling and Rokeby are altogether different; they were both younger men with 
less experience of command and their constableships were to be an early step in 
careers of royal service which would propel both men onto bigger and better things. 
They shared an aggressiveness that would have appealed to Edward III while another 
attraction may well have been that neither man was already endowed with wealth or 
substantial lands. Edward was thus able to reward them with these, to personally be 
responsible for their rise in status and prominence, not only to strengthen the bonds of 
loyalty but to emphasise that these determined warriors were his men. This also adds 
an element of propaganda to their appointment, a factor already described in relation to 
Stirling being a Scot but even more strikingly evident in Rokeby With respect to his 
fame originating in the Weardale campaign. The latter had been an acute 
embarrassment for Edward HI and Rokeby's name would have been synonymous with 
this; by making Rokeby constable of Stirling - the key to Scotland - there is an 
120 
unmistakable sense of Edward III symbolically projecting the message that the 
infamous Weardale campaign was now avenged. 
Edward III therefore made a careful selection of the men whom he wanted to 
be constable of these ruinous Scottish castles in the early years of his reign, men 
capable of defending them and overseeing their rebuilding. All of these constables had 
a military background as was appropriate with the 1330s being a time of incessant 
warfare with the castles they commanded at the very heart of the conflict. The added 
element of propaganda cannot be discounted either, although obviously not at the 
expense of placing the castle in incapable hands. However this stability also indicates a 
more dangerous development that was to ultimately put these castles in jeopardy. By 
the late 1330s and early 1340s Edward III had focussed his attention on war against 
France and had begun to take his eyes off Scotland, an occurrence only too clearly 
seen in placing Rokeby in the unenviable position of being constable of both Stirling 
and Edinburgh. It was not to retain stability among the constables of these castles that 
Rokeby was also given Edinburgh but because it was easier than having to appoint a 
new constable. It was a matter of convenience and probably cost-cutting; that John 
Stirling did not return to Edinburgh but went overseas starkly illustrates Edward's new 
focus. Although capable men Rokeby and Felton were not able to hold out as they 
became increasingly isolated and faced impossible odds with no external help 
forthcoming. Their abilities as constables are evident in the fact that in such a hopeless 
situation they were prepared and able to hold out for so long. 
The shattering defeat of the Scots at Neville's Cross in 1346 was not followed up by an 
attempted re-conquest of the entire Scottish kingdom and nothing illustrates this more 
clearly than the absence of a drive to reoccupy the key castles of Edinburgh and 
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Stirling even though this time they were still intact. A handful of castles in the 
Lowlands, such as Lochmaben, came once again Into English possession but into 
private hands; such ownership once more leaving the historian with scant 
documentation. The only major Scottish castle to be occupied by the English and taken 
into royal control was Roxburgh and as such it is the sole castle for which a sIgnIficant 
proportion of evidence has survived in terms of constables and garrisons. The final part 
of this study of castle constables consequently becomes a study of the constables of 
Roxburgh from 1346 until 1403. 
The first constable appointed was John Coupland who became keeper of the 
castle in November 1346. This is the clearest example of symbolism and propaganda 
having a considerable influence on the choice of constable. Coupland was the hero of 
Neville's Cross, 
., 
a mere valet who captured the Scottish king, David Bruce. The two 
front teeth Coupland. lost in the process were well worth the rewards; the rank of 
banneret and an annuity of E500 for life with another f 100 for remaining with the king 
with his twenty men-at-anns. The hero of the hour Coupland was installed as constable 
of Roxburgh within a month of Neville's Cross; not only was this another reward for 
Coupland's capture of the king but his tenure as constable was a symbolic reminder to 
all of the great success of English arms at Neville's Cross and also demonstrated what 
a detennined and successful valet could gain serving Edward HI in his wars. 15 
As was the case with Rokeby although propaganda played a significant role in 
Coupland's appointment he was also a capable constable. Indeed Coupland's previous 
career can be reconstructed in some detail. In 1337 he served with the army on the 
Scottish campaign and showed his inclination for heroics by saving the earl of 
15 CFR 1337-1347, p. 494; CDS, iii, no. 1478. Coupland appears to have received his rank and annuity 
on 20 January 1347 and thus had been constable for at least a month before his rewards were made 
formal; this confirms that Edward III made him constable primarily for his great service at Neville's 
Cross. 
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Salisbury from capture at the siege of Dunbar, walking into a trap In place of Sallsbur-v 
and becoming a prisoner himself. This selfless action appears to have gained the 
favour of Edward III as Coupland was soon a valet in royal service with an annuity of 
E20 and as such he served in Flanders under Salisbury in the summer of 1338. He then 
returned to the north and served in Salisbury's castle of Wark joining William Felton 
in defeating a Scottish incursion in 1340. In 1339 reference is made to Coupland's 
long and faith-ful service to the king. 16 A valet of the royal household, a veteran of both 
Scottish and continental warfare, experienced in serving within a border garrison and 
two notable acts of heroism were the solid foundations upon which his appointment as 
constable of Roxburgh were based. 
Not a family of distinction the Couplands were a minor northern family firmly 
based in Northumberland. The family seat was the manor of Coupland in 
Northumberland and as he rose in status and wealth it was to Northumberland that 
Coupland looked to build up his lands. Already in 1344 he had petitioned for the grant 
of numerous forfeited lands in Northumberland; in 1347 part of his f 500 annuity was 
coming from lands the king had granted him in York and Lancaster as well as 
Cumberland and Westmorland. In 1340 Coupland had shown his ruthless desire for 
land by having his cousin Joan Mautalent disinherited claiming that she was a bastard. 
This rapacity for land was finally to be Coupland's undoing; from 1358 onwards, in 
league with the royal official William de Nessfield, Coupland embarked on a 
programme of accusing numerous Northumberland landowners of treason during the 
reign of Edward III in an attempt to have their lands confiscated and seize them 
16 A. King, 'War, Politics and Landed Society in Northumberland, c. 1296-c. 1408' (unpublished 
University of Durham Ph. D thesis, 2001), pp. 106-8; CDS, iii, nos. 1304,1306,1430. 
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himself It was these underhand dealings that led to Coupland's murder on 20 
December 1363 whilst serving as constable of Roxburgh. 17 
This streak of ruthlessness was reflected in Coupland's aggressiveness as 
constable, including a particular vendetta against William Douglas. Coupland was 
especially keen to demonstrate that the town of Roxburgh and region of Tevitodale 
were loyal to the English. His aggressive reputation went before him and when 
Berwick town was taken by the Scots in November 1355 it was to Coupland that the 
English borderers turned for help and advice. His regional standing led to him being 
sheriff and escheator of Northumberland for at least six and a half years - overlapping 
with his duties as constable and raising the question as to the extent to which he was 
actually resident in Roxburgh - and his status is still evident with his arms displayed 
on two northern castles. 18 He also served as custodian of Berwick ftom 1357 but was 
removed in June 1362. In fact his term as constable of Roxburgh falls into two periods, 
1347 until 1355 and then 1362 until his murder in 1363. Coupland's tenure as 
constable is remarkable for the frequency With which orders for him to surrender the 
office were issued. 19 
John Coupland had strong credentials that led to his appointment as constable 
of Roxburgh and his loyalty to Edward III can never be questioned. However his 
chequered career as constable was down to his ruthless self-seeking ambition, his 
northem power-base and the relative freedom from Scottish attacks due to the 
shattering Scottish defeat at Neville's Cross. The dangers of appointing a northern 
17 M. Dixon, 'John de Coupland - Hero to Villain', Neville's Cross, pp. 36-49; CDS, iii, no. s 1344, 
1513; NCH, xi, pp. 216 -218. One of the victims of these false retrospective forfeitures was the former 
constable of Edinburgh John Stirling, his wife's family, the Swinbumes, being accused of supporting 
Bruce. The land was only briefly confiscated, CDS, iv, nos. 2,4. 
18 Bower, vii, p. 13 1; Wyntoun, vi, pp. 194-7; Rot Scot., 1, p. 693; King, 'War, Politics and Landed 
Society', pp. 107-8. 
19 CDS, iii, no. 1669, Rot Scot., 1, pp. 801,807,841,847,864; for frequent dismissals for just a few 
examples see Rot. Scot., 1, pp. 692,693,714,718,740. 
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constable rather than the merits are seen here for the first time. Rather than using his 
northern lands and connections to ensure the secunty of Roxburgh Coupland was using 
his office as constable of Roxburgh to enhance his own power in the north; he was 
exploiting his position as constable almost exclusively for his own gain in terms of 
power. The declining interest of Edward III in events in the north and Scotland was the 
same as in the late 1330s but this time there was no significant Scottish threat to keep 
constables focussed on their office. It has been remarked as unusual that Coupland, 
unlike his contemporaries, never built his own castle to express his new social 
standing; from his treatment of his constableship of Roxburgh it would seem that 
Coupland, believed Roxburgh to be his castle. 20 In effect Coupland was creating his 
own fiefdom based on possession of Roxburgh and the military force contained within 
it. 
In between his two terms as constable there were two further constables of 
Roxburgh. For just a year, from 1356 until 1357, the castle was directly overseen by 
the Percy family with Henry Percy as constable. Richard Tempest was then constable 
before Coupland regained the office in 1362. As With Coupland and Percy before him 
Tempest was a northerner albeit the Tempest family lands were concentrated in 
Yorkshire rather than Northumberland however Tempest was granted the manor of 
Hetton in Northumberland in 13 5 1. The mainstay of the Tempest landholdings were in 
the West Riding and Richard had previously held the position of constable of 
Scarborough castle. The family was an old and established one and was well- 
connected in the north of England, particularly with the Percy family; it is telling that 
20 A. King, 'War, Politics and Landed Society', p. 162. This interest in the practicality and reality of 
power rather than its fineries is also suggested by Coupland being a banneret yet never being knighted, 
in fact being exempted from knighthood for life in November 1358, possibly a unique situation, c. 
f 
King, p. 162. That Coupland may have had some interest in Roxburgh or believed he possessed a claim 
to land in the area is suggested by Edward III having granted him land in the ville of Ormeston in the 
county of Roxburgh in the late 1330s, the land being returned to its rightful owner in 
February 1339, 
CDS, iii, no. 1304. 
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Hetton was granted to Richard by Henry Percy in recognition for his good service to 
the latter and that Tempest was one of the executors of Henry Percy's Will. In 1374 
Tempest was one of a number of prominent northern gentry present at a feast in the 
great Percy seat of Alnwick castle and as such witnessed a deed granted by Henry 
Percy. 21 
This close connection to the Percy family is the most important feature of 
Tempest's relatively uneventful term as constable. The second most important feature 
dates from after his constableship had ended and is an inquiry launched on 28 January 
1362 into his conduct whilst constable. He was alleged to have oppressed people 
' under colour of his office', taken provisions by force without payment and to have 
maintained an inadequate gaffison which had placed the castle in great danger. There 
is no record as to the outcome of this inquiry but whatever the result it did not prevent 
Tempest from becoming keeper of Berwick several months later on 8 June 1362.22 As 
illustrated by the career of Coupland shady activities did not disqualify a man from 
further appointments and the undertaking of such an inquiry points to some substance 
in these allegations. Whereas Coupland was exploiting his constableship to carve out 
his own fiefdom Tempest was exploiting it to line his own pockets. Again the lack of 
concern from Edward III combined with the absence of any serious Scottish threat led 
to the constable being tempted to take advantage of his position. That an inquiry was 
launched at least shows that there was something in place to safeguard such an 
important castle; abuse of the position of constable may have been easy and tempting 
in the circumstances but it did not go totally unchecked. 
" War and Border Societies in the Middle Ages, eds. A. Goodman, A. Tuck 
(London and New York, 
1992), pp. 180-1. 
22 CDS, iv, nos. 64,69. John Stirling was one of the four commissioners appointed to undertake this 
inquiry. 
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The next constable for whom there is evidence is Alan del Strother who was to 
be constable for the lengthy term of approximately fourteen years, from at least 1364 
until 1377 or 1378. Like the Tempest family the Strothers, were an old and established 
family but unlike the Tempests, they were firmly based in Northumberland with their 
lands based around Kirknewton. Although one of the pre-eminent Northumberland 
families in the fourteenth century the last decades of the reign saw their position being 
overtaken by families such as the Feltons. It has been suggested that the rise of these 
other families was driven by Percy patronage and this in turn raises doubt as to 
whether Strother had close links to the Percies. Further reservations surface in the 
Strother family having links with both the earl of March and the relatives and heirs of 
the earl of Pembroke; Strother himself was a sub-contractor for March's expedition to 
Brittany in 1375. He had been a bailiff of Tynedale in 1344 and was so again in 
1376/77 and he also served as escheator of Northumberland. In December 1363 
Strother was one of the five commissioners appointed to inquire into the murder of 
John Coupland; this is perhaps not surprising when it is noted that Strother and 
Coupland were brothers-in-law. 
23 
An old and well-connected Northumberland family with a tradition of military 
service this was obviously the background upon which the selection of Alan as 
constable of Roxburgh was based. A competent administrator as with Tempest there is 
nothing that marks Strother out as an experienced military man or constable that made 
him particularly suited to such an office. One factor that may have played a part was 
that Strother was not so closely connected to the Percies as most other Northumberland 
families although it appears he was not entirely devold of such connections. 
23 Border Societies, pp. 186,19 1; CDS, iv, nos. 14,95,187,23 8. 
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The increasing dominance of the Percy family in the north of England and 
particularly in Northumberland during the second half of the century had undoubtedly 
stretched not only to influencing official appointments in Northumberland but also to 
the choice of constable of Roxburgh. On four occasions between 1347 and 1403 either 
the Percy earl of Northumberland or one of his brothers was constable and although 
there is no direct evidence for it there may have been several times when thev were the 
official 'constable' of the castle and the incumbent their custodian rather than full 
constable. Six further constables, including Tempest, had very close Percy 
connections; although most of these men appear to have been constables in their own 
right their connections make them just the type of men that the Percies would have 
appointed as their custodians. As noted already Henry Percy had been constable 
immediately following John Coupland's first term of office, albeit for only one year; 
Thomas Percy, the earl of Northumberland's brother, was constable after Strother, 
holding the office from 1377 or 1378 until 1381; the earl of Northumberland himself 
directly held the constableship in 1384 and again between 1394 and 1396. This theme 
of Percy influence is the most dominant and repetitive aspect concerning the 
constables of Roxburgh throughout the latter half of the fourteenth century. 
Matthew Redman, constable of Roxburgh between 1381 and 1382, is a further 
example of the reach of the Percy affinity. The Redman family was 
firmly based in 
Westmorland and Matthew had consequently been keeper of the West March in 1380. 
However he went on to become JP in Northumberland on five occasions, 
commissioner of array twice as well as holding other civil offices 
in that county, 
Redman's offices in Northumberland came directly from his Percy connections. 
It was 
the Percy acquisition of the Lucy inheritance in Cumberland that 
brought Redman into 
their powerful orbit. Redman's career was thus advanced 
by this connection and he can 
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be seen serving amongst those in the Percy retinue in 1384 and most famously playing 
a leading and heroic role at the battle of Otterburn in 1388. This Percy link is believed 
to have been established by 1381 when in June of that year Percy refused John of 
Gaunt entry to castles the former held in his custody; Roxburgh appears to have been 
one of these and Redman as constable followed Percy's orders. Clearly Redman's 
appointment as constable owed a great deal to this Percy connection. 24 
Redman himself was another experienced career soldier serving on the border. 
In the 1370s he had served on campaign, ironically with John of Gaunt, and before 
becoming keeper of the West March had been defending Berwick castle in 1379 and 
was keeper of Carlisle castle immediately before his appointment to Roxburgh. 25 In the 
case of Redman his record of service was split between his native nortb-west and the 
north-east; the latter, including his appointment as constable of Roxburgh, directly a 
result Percy influence. However his appointment was not just based on connections, 
Redman was experienced having served on campaign, within the castles of Berwick 
and Carlisle and as keeper of the West March before taking charge of Roxburgh, his 
subsequent career fighting at Otterburn illustrating his abilities as a commander. 
Redman's successor at Roxburgh shared a number of similarities. Thomas 
Blenkinsop, constable from 1382 until 1384, was also from a Westmorland family and 
in 1380 he and his heirs were granted the hereditary constableship of Brough castle in 
Westmorland. His links with Northumberland came from his marriage around 1369 to 
Margaret del Strother, daughter of Alan del Strother, the former constable of 
Roxburgh. This provided only a minor landholding but in 1380 her brother, also Alan, 
died, leaving two Northumberland manors. Marriage with the Strother family also 
24 Border Societies, pp. 20,84,181-2. The order issued by John of Gaunt that Redman's goods and 
chattels should be distrained to compensate Archibald Douglas for damage done during the truce has 
been seen as an attempt by Gaunt to avenge this humiliation, ibid, p. 182. 
25 CDS, v, no. 4060. 
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provi ed Blenkinsop with links to the Percys with whom he was negotiating for a 
quantity of wool in 1381 and for whom he was collecting compensation for the 
infringement of a truce, being one of the royal commissioners charged with this task. 
Six months after leaving Roxburgh Blenkinsop and Amand Monceux indented to keep 
Carlisle with fifty men-at-arms and 100 mounted archers. In his olwn testimonv 
Blenkinsop, as a witness for Lord Scrope, declared that his experience of fighting had 
been earned on the border since he had taken up arms in 1356 at about the age of 
twenty; as with many of these northern-based constables Blenkinsop was very much a 
veteran by the time he became constable. He had been knighted by 1386 but the date 
can be no more definite; there is the possibility that he was only an esquire when 
constable of Roxburgh. Having been an NV for Cumberland Blenkinsop was in the 
process of attending the 1388 Merciless Parliament representing Westmorland when, 
during a recess, he was captured in the north by the Scots and died in captivity. 26 
Once more the same features are repeated; a northern figure, experienced in 
warfare and, although again in this case without immediate Northumberland 
connections, these were developed through marriage into a prominent Northumberland 
family that had a history of service with the Percys. 
In February 1385 the first joint constables of Roxburgh took office. One of 
these two was Richard Tempest, the great-nephew of his namesake who over twenty 
years before had been removed from Roxburgh for alleged embezzlement. As with 
his 
great-uncle this Richard was a Yorkshireman possessing considerable influence 
in both 
the North and West Ridings. He began his long military career by fighting against the 
Scots when he was just fifteen; he served with John, Lord Neville, in an expedition 
to 
relieve Bordeaux and was part of the force John of Gaunt led 
into Scotland in 1383. As 
26 Roskell, ii, pp. 250 - 25 1; CDS, iv, no. 320. 
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constable during the Scottish campaign of 1385 Tempest along With his fellow 
constable undertook to serve on the expedition and once his term at Roxburgh finished 
in February 1386 he was made keeper of Berwick castle, an office which he held from 
April 1386 until May 1387, and then served as deputy keeper to the earl of 
Northumberland from at least I December 1390 into the early months of 1395. 
Tempest remained on the border between 1387 and 1390, his taste for the martial life 
exemplified by Richard H granting him a special licence to hold a tournament With the 
Scots in June 1387. In February 1397 he was the deputy of John, earl of Huntingdon, 
half-brother of Richard 11,, who had been made warden of the West March. 
As a Tempest there were naturally strong links to the Percys and as noted he 
served as the earl of Northumberland's deputy of Berwick castle for five years. Indeed 
Tempest was in receipt of an annuity of twenty marks from the earl and his support of 
the Lancastrian usurpation in 1399 has been seen as being heavily influenced by his 
adherence to the Percys. However this was not a blind and total loyalty, in 1403 
Tempest not only failed to support the Percy rebellion but served with 72 armed men 
against the rebels in Wales and must have fought against the Percys at Shrewsbury. He 
remained a prominent northern figure serving on numerous commissions and holding 
civil offices, representing Yorkshire in parliament. An able and experienced 
commander Tempest's tenure of Roxburgh can be seen as both an appointment of a 
capable man and a natural step in a career carved out of border warfare. The 
particularly soldierly essence Tempest was imbued with is neatly captured towards the 
end of his active career; in 1415, at the age of sixty, he indented to serve Henry V in 
France with six armed men and eighteen archers in the Agincourt campaign. 
27 
27ROSkIl. iv, pp. 573-5. 
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This flavour of active soldiers in charge of Roxburgh rather than administrators 
is enhanced by the second man who served as constable alongside Tempest, Thomas 
Swinburne, a knight who has been described as 'one of the foremost military captains 
of his day. ' Swinburne was to have three terms as constable of Roxburgh; the first 
alongside Tempest from February 1385 until February 1386, the second as sole keeper 
between February 1386 and 12 July 1388 and finally as keeper for the earl Marshal 
from 1389 to approximately 1390. In contrast to the majority of later fourteenth 
century constables Swinburne's career quickly took him away from the north of 
England; having been bailiff of the duke of York's lordship of Tynedale before 
February 1390 he went on in the 1390s to be warden of Guines castle, captain of 
Calais and keeper of Hammes castle. In the early 1400s he became constable and 
steward of the lordship of Clare, was the lieutenant of the earl of Northumberland 
whilst the latter was constable of England, was an envoy to various countries including 
France and Castile, became sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire and his illustrious career 
culminated in his appointment as mayor of Bordeaux (1405-1411) and as captain of 
28 
the critically important Fronsac castle in 1409 until his death in 1412. 
Undoubtedly SWInburne was a fine soldier and commander, his appointment as 
constable of Roxburgh coming early in his career and proving an invaluable 
experience for his later appointments. Indeed particularly striking is the number of 
castles he was placed in charge of, encompassing some of the most important wartime 
castles of the day. That Swinburne had a peculiar talent for command of castles is 
evident in his appointment along With John Pelham in 1409 to make a special survey 
of Calais and all other castles and forts in the nearby marches. Swinbume's 
appointment as captain of Fronsac was in response to the petition he made to the 
28 Ibid, pp. 547-50. 
132 
counci of its dangerous state; among men of the highest level Swinbume was seen as 
the man for such a difficult yet important job. 
The politics of the reigns of Richard 11 and Henry IV weigh heavflý, in 
Swinburne's career. Both Swinburne and his father, Robert,, had links with Thomas 
Percy and as with Tempest it was under the earl of Northumberland that Swinburne 
served in Scotland in 1385. However Swinburne's tenn as constable of Roxburgh, 
intended to last until 1390, was cut short in 1388 when the earl of Northumberland 
complained that he had not been reimbursed for a breach of the truce by SWInbume; in 
1390 his term as bailiff of Tynedale was under investigation. Although his relations 
with the Percys must have consequently been somewhat shaky Swinbum's early 
removal as constable of Clare in July 1403 was surely down to his Percy corinections 
and their rebellion in that year, suggesting that these connections were still alive. 
Swinburne also gained the favour of Richard 11 due to his support of the 
victims of the Appellants. In 1388 he stood surety for Michael and Edmund de la Pole, 
brothers of the exiled royal favourite, the earl of Suffolk,, and in 1389/90 SWInbume 
married Elizabeth, the widow of another victim, Thomas Trivet. Elizabeth was a 
favourite of Richard's and for this and Swinbume's support of the Appellants' victims 
Richard opened the way for the appointments to Guines, Hammes and Calais. 
Swinbume was most likely overseas when Richard H lost his crown but Henry IV was 
happy to use such an experienced soldier when in autumn 1403 he served against the 
Welsh rebels and then began diplomatic missions ftom Calais. The willingness of 
Swinburne to serve overseas and leave the north was due to the fact that although 
he 
possessed a Northumberland manor he also possessed one 
in Essex; the lands of his 
wife were also largely in the south. Indeed he had little 
interest in his northern holdings 
1 
-3) 3 
which included those he acquired from the Felton inheritance, his mother having been 
a daughter of William Felton (d. 1367). 
The circumstances of Swinbume's second term as commander of Roxburgh are 
of special interest concerning the politics of 1388 and the Merciless Parliament. 
Although Swinbume was prematurely removed as constable in 1388 by May 1389 he 
was back in command, presumably until 1390. However this time he was styled 
'keeper for the earl Marshal'; on I June 1388 Thomas Mowbray, earl of Nottingham 
and earl Marshal, was made warden of the East Marches, captain of Berwick and 
constable of Roxburgh castle for two years. A leading Appellant this was an attempt 
by Richard 11 to win Mowbray back to his cause by giving him public office. The 
choice of Swinburne as his keeper of Roxburgh is a telling one; he was not only 
appointed for his immediate experience of this office but because he was associated 
with the victims of the Appellants and thus royal favour. There may also have been an 
attempt to placate the Percys in Mowbray's actions, the latter having taken the office 
the Percys traditionally held . 
29 Alternatively Swinbume may have been forced on 
Mowbray to ensure he did not politically misuse his constableship of Roxburgh. 
As with his co-constable Tempest the constableship of Roxburgh was an early 
step on a larger military career, an exceptionally illustrious career in Swinbume's case, 
becoming mayor of Bordeaux and constable of Fronsac castle. This joint constableship 
marks the return of a strong martial edge to the office of constable. SWinbume in 
particular is important in his mainly southern base and his active participation in the 
divisive politics of the day. With the appointment of Tempest and especially 
Swinburne there is the sense of a re-invigoration of the office of constable of 
Roxburgh, pulling it away from the northern backwater it had idled towards in the 
29DNB, xxxix, pp. 230-6; J. A. Tuck, 'Richard 11 and the Border Magnates', Northern 
History, in 
(1968). 
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1350s, 1360s and 1370s, a change prompted by a gradual renewal of the %var in the 
1380s following the death of Edward HI in 1377. 
The constable of Roxburgh between Swinbume's departure in 1388 and return 
in 1389 was Thomas Urnfraville. A member of the prominent northern Umfraville 
family Thomas fits the mould of most of the later constables of Roxburgh. He 
possessed landed estates in Northumberland,, Durham and Yorkshire and had 
extremely strong Percy connections as his widowed aunt, Maud,, had married Henry 
Percy, first earl of Northumberland, in the 1380s. In the late 1380s Umfraville served 
on various commissions in Northumberland including a survey of Bamburgh castle 
and an inquiry into the discipline of the Berwick garrison as well as becoming sheriff 
of Northumberland (I December 1388-15 November 1389), an office he held whilst 
also constable of Roxburgh, subsequently undertaking various diplomatic missions in 
Scotland. Immediately prior to becoming constable Umfraville had fought alongside 
the PercYs at Otterburn, indeed Otterburn was one of his Northumberland holdings. 
Although he had been an MP during the Merciless Parliament Umfraville had some 
sympathy with the victims, standing bail for Robert Clifford (the future bishop of 
Worcester and London) and for an associate of Clifford's. A northern, local figure, and 
on the whole holding civil rather than military office, Umfaville is in stark contrast to 
Swinburne and is reminiscent of the administrative constables of Roxburgh. 30 
In the mid-1390s John Stanley served as constable, 'keeper', of Roxburgh. 
There is an element of difficulty in identifying exactly which John Stanley this was 
with the most likely candidate being a knight of the king's household who before and 
after his constableship held offices in Ireland. In 13 89 this Stanley received 100 marks 
a year for life from the king and a further forty in 1397, the latter whilst he may have 
30 Roskell, iv, pp. 686-8. 
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been constable. A justice of Chester prior to the constableship upon lea-ving Roxburgh 
he was Controller of the Household and from December 1399 unt'l July 1401 held the 
auspicious position of Lieutenant of Ireland; by 1414 he was the lord of the Isle of 
Man. Having been made Steward of the Household of Henry IV he also received the 
office of Steward of Macclesfield which his father had held. This reflects his northem 
family links; indeed in 1403 he was granted the forfeited lands of his nephew, William 
de Stanley, who had participated in the Percy rebellion of that year. Stanley had an 
impressive career, his dedicated service to the Crown standing out markedly. 31 
On 14 January 1399 Stanley concluded an indenture with Robert Urnfraville in 
which the latter undertook to become the 'keeper' of Roxburgh castle, a position 
Umfraville no longer held by September 1399. The younger brother of Thomas, the 
former constable, Urnfraville had the same connection to the Percys and indeed served 
as Hotspur's keeper of Roxburgh. Although not in possession of the large estates his 
late brother held the few lands Umfraville did possess were in the north and he closely 
supervised the Umfraville heir, Gilbert, the young son of his brother folloWing the 
untimely death of Thomas. Urnfraville already held Harbottle castle when constable of 
Roxburgh and he immediately won the favour of the new king, Henry IV, when he 
soundly defeated a Scottish invasion force during Henry's first parliament in 1400; for 
this he was made a knight of the garter. Later in the same year he defeated another 
force at Redeswire and by December 1402 was a king's knight receiving an annuity of 
M. 
Serving as sheriff of Northumberland twice (1400-01 and 1404-05) 
Umfaville's Percy connections were evidently not unbreakable and he played no part 
in their rebellion; after the battle of Shrewsbury he was given charge of Warkworth 
31 It is unusual that his entry in the Complete Peerage fails to include a period as constable of 
Roxburgh, 
the years when he held this office being left merely as a gap, GEC, v, 248-50. 
As a Stanley the 
constable, whatever his precise identity, was very definitely a Lancashire figure of national prominence. 
136 
castle where he appointed the former Percy retainer and later famous chronicler John 
Hardyng as constable. As well as undertaking missions as an envoy into Scotland 
Urnfraville was made chamberlain and receiver of customs at Berwick for life (1404). 
became a vice-admiral of England plundering along the Forth in 14 10; in the same 
year he led a commission of array and took a force into Scotland plundering and 
burning the town of Jedburgh; he was appointed constable of Roxburgh for six years in 
1411; in 1415, as constable, he defeated a Scottish force and then participated at 
Harfleur and Agincourt; he fought a Scottish force in 1417 and helped negotiate a 
seven year truce with the Scots in 1429/30.32 
Umfravaille's first term as constable was succeeded by the second joint 
constableship which was held by Stephen Lescrope and Richard, lord Grey of Codnor. 
Lescrope's father was Richard, first Baron Scrope of Bolton and chancellor of 
England; he was still alive whilst Stephen, his third son, was constable, dying in 1403. 
Father and son were both loyal to Richard 11, Stephen one of the few faithful to the 
end, but he readily accepted Henry IV on his usurpation, Stephen leaving Roxburgh in 
1401 to become deputy lieutenant in Ireland where he won a notable victory in 1407 
but died of plague the folloWing year. In 1397, under Richard 11, Lescrope had been a 
justice of Munster, Leinster and Uriell; whether this experience in Ireland adequately 
equipped him for his duties as constable of Roxburgh is unclear although it obviously 
led to his return to Ireland under Henry IV. Through his father Lescrope had northem 
connections -a brother, Richard, was the archbishop of 
York by 1398 - and by his 
own marriage to a Tiptoft family co-heiress he gained land in Yorkshire near 
Doncaster and also obtained Castle Combe in Wiltshire. 
33 
32 CDS, iv, no. 567; Hodgson, part ii, ii, pp. 48-54, A. King, 'War, Politics and 
Landed Society', p. 219. 
33DNB, XXXiii, pp. 143-4; Roskell, iv, p. 324. Lescrope's widow went on to marry 
John Fastolf 
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Richard, lord Grey, was of a similar family with a history of royal senice. He 
had been summoned to parliament from 1393; in 1395 he had served in Ireland Nvith 50 
men and 60 horse and received an annuity of 80 marks for life; following his period as 
constable of Roxburgh in 1401 he was made admiral of the Fleet from the mouth of the 
Thames to the north and a Knight of the Garter in about 1404; in 1405 he was keeper 
of Brecknock castle in Wales and Horston castle in Derbyshire and in the same year 
was king's chamberlain and joint deputy Constable and Marshal of England-, he 
became constable of Nottingham castle in 1406 and near the end of his life in 1417 
34 was appointed captain of Argentan castle in Normandy. These are merely the main 
highlights of his high-profile career, one spent in the service of the Crown. His lands 
and those of his wife were concentrated in the East Midlands, holding lands in 
Northamptonshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and Leicestershire. 
The last constable of the period was Ralph Neville, first earl of Westmorland. 
In 1402 he was given the traditional Percy office of Captain of Roxburgh castle, a 
position he continued to hold into 1404. This appointment was entirely political in 
nature,, a conscious attempt to counter-balance the dominant power of the Percys in the 
north at a time when the latter were increasingly disaffected with Henry IV; in fact 
Neville's appointment has been cited as one of Hotspur's grievances against the 
Crown. That such a move was considered necessary clearly illustrates the extent to 
which the constableship of Roxburgh had become associated with the Percys. It is 
likely that Neville installed a 'keeper' to run the castle for him on a clay to clay basis 
however there is no remaining reference to such an individual. Neville's strong 
northern power-base ensured the security of Roxburgh not only against the Scots but 
34 As with Stanley Grey's entry fails to record his term as constable of Roxburgh, GEC, ii, pp. 127-9. 
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against any hint of sympathy with the Percy rebellion in 1403, however unlikely such a 
show of sympathy from the garrison might have been. 35 
In all there were seventeen men who served as constable of Roxburgh castle 
between 1347 and 1403.36 It is telling that from 1347 until 1377 there were only five 
changes of constableship in 30 years; in contrast thirteen changes took place between 
37 1377 and 1403. This accurately reflects the general malaise that took hold of the 
office of constable of Roxburgh for the last thirty years of the life of Edward III, a 
combination of continental distractions and then old age leading to a disinterest in 
Scotland. This along with a relatively weak and sporadic Scottish threat meant that the 
office of constable of Roxburgh became much less of a front-line command in a war 
zone; it was slipping towards becoming a military backwater. Coupland's two terms as 
constable were of eight and then two or three years, Strother was in charge 
continuously for thirteen years; in the circumstances it is not surprising that some 
constables exploited their position albeit in different ways. 
The accession of Richard 11 marked a turning point With conflict against 
Scotland resuming and in response the position of constable of Roxburgh regained its 
former character of a front-line and active command. This is reflected in the regular 
changes of constable and the appointment of military minded men such as Matthew 
Redman and Thomas Swinburne. Changes also took place in response to the political 
climate of the day, Richard 11 installing the earl Marshal as warden and constable and 
in the 1390s moving John Stanley, untainted by Percy connections, into the office, 
Henry IV similarly appointing strong royal servants in the persons of Stephen 
Lescrope and Richard, lord Grey. 
35 DNB,, -,,, xxx, pp. 272-7. 
36 Including each joint constable and counting two terms as constable by the same man as just one. 
37 The five changes between 1347 and 1377 involving only four different constables due to John 
Coupland's two separate terms. 
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The effect of appointing men from outside of Yorkshire and the north-east was 
intended to limit the burgeoning power of the Percys. There can be no doubt that as 
well as holding the position of constable of Roxburgh themselves on several occasions 
they were instrumental in deciding who was appointed and indeed it has been shown 
that the majority of these constables had strong Percy connections. This in turn 
illustrates the extent to which the office of constable of Roxburgh had become a post 
for northern knights , in particular those of Northumberland, an extension to the public 
LIE, 
offices available for men of the county. This in turn led to many of the constables 
being related by marriage with brothers, cousins and uncles of constables in turn being 
constables themselves. It was not necessarily an attractive post to those who were not 
northerners as Swinburne's quick readiness to focus elsewhere shows; John of Gaunt 
and the earl Marshal both found that as wardens of the march without a northern power 
base they were unable to execute their job effectively. 38 Even if the govemment did not 
wish it to be so, for practical reasons the constable was predominantly northern and 
this trend continued into the fifteenth cenwry. The type of man appointed constable in 
the second half of the fourteenth century can therefore be seen to accurately reflect 
both the state of the war and the domestic politics of England and it was as a result of 
these, and the number of troops retained permanently within the Roxburgh garrison, 
that the constableship was increasingly held by men of substantial national standing as 
the century drew to a close. 
38 C. f Tuck, 'Richard 11 and the Border Magnates', passim. 
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5. 
GARRISON SERVICE 
Whereas constables have not previously been studied as a specific group with regard to 
their role the majority of those who served in garrisons - the multitude of esquires, 
men-at-arms, hobelars, mounted archers, crossbowmen and foot-archers - remain 
largely anonymous with little if any attempt having been made to identify them. The 
lack of any substantial body of work on military service, as opposed to that of military 
obligation, of men below knightly status is common for the entire medieval period and 
has only recently begun to emerge as a subject of serious academic study. In ten-ns of 
the fourteenth century the research to date has focussed on identifying the men who 
constituted the military community during the reign of Edward 111.1 The concept of 
such a community pre-supposes a body of men continually involved in military service 
over a period of years and this consequently takes on extra importance with regards to 
garrisoning as it was one of the few permanent or semi-permanent military institutions 
in which these men could find ready employment. If there was such a community then 
its members will be found amongst those serving in garrisons. 
Identifying the men who served within garrisons takes on an additional 
significance beyond the importance of the study of the military community itself2 It 
addresses the question of whether the English garrisons in the Anglo-Scottish wars 
were made up of a singular group of men who were constantly engaged in garrison 
service rather than any other form of 1Mlitary service, in effect speciallsing in this 
field 
of service. If this is so then, by the pen-nanent nature of garrisons,, these men were 
to 
all intents a standing army in the pay of the English Crown. The exercise of attempting 
' The key work for this period is Ayton, Knights and 
Warhorses, Passim. 
2 As Ayton notes, 'There are few aspects of medieval English 
history as worthy of investigatIon, yet as 
neglected, as military service, ' Knights and 
Warhorses, p. I- 
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to identify the service of these men is consequently of great importance in developing 
an understanding of garrisoning in this period. Such a study also reveals the Individual 
careers of these soldiers and the movement and flexibility inherent in garrison service 
and by implication within the military community as a whole. 
However there is a good reason why such prosopographical studies are so 
scarce even excluding the sheer difficulty and painstaking effort such an exercise 
entails. The single greatest problem is in finding documents that can illustrate service, 
one document that identifies individuals serving in a garrison at one single moment in 
time reveals nothing about the extent of the service of these individuals. To research 
service it is essential to have more than one document, ideally several, which cover a 
number of consecutive or near consecutive years and from which duration of service 
and individual careers can be unravelled. As there is no secondary body of work which 
contains these names it is to the surviving documents that attention must be turned, in 
particular accounts for the wages of garrisons, muster rolls and protections granted to 
individual soldiers. 3 
The survival of consecutive documents limits the detailed study of garrison 
service to two separate periods in the fourteenth century, 1300-1304/5 and 1334-42. 
The latter is the most comprehensive and straightforward comprising as it does of a 
near unbroken series of muster rolls for the major fortresses of Roxburgh, Stirling and 
Edinburgh. 4 In contrast the earlier series of documents are more miscellaneous in their 
composition being disparate muster rolls and accounts. These are frequently imprecise 
in date, on occasion name only certain sections of the garrison and sometimes omit a 
garrison altogether. However the evidence from these is invaluably pulled together 
by 
the existence of three outstanding account books compiled 
by John de Weston of the 
3 For a comprehensive discussion of the benefits and pitfalls of using these sources 
see ibid, ch 5 
4 In addition there are rolls covering the garrisons of the towns of 
Berwick and Perth. 
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wages paid to royal garrisons in Scotland in 1301-2,1302-3 and 1303-4.5 Indeed from 
these it is possible to view garrison service on an almost monthly, and at times week] ýý 
basis which provides a unique and unparalleled insight into these earl), fourteenth 
century garrisons. Another important survival is a lengthy muster roll which includes 
the names of those serving in several garrisons - Berwick town and castle, Roxburgh 
town and castle, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Bothwell and Livingston - which dates from 
6 1311-12. By using this roll in conjunction with the earlier documents an attempt at 
gauging garrison service in a more long-term context can be undertaken, analysing the 
rolls to determine whether soldiers from the early garrisons were still serving almost a 
decade later. The only identifying feature is in the name and although there is an 
inherent shortcoming in this the lack of any other recognisable information means it is 
the only one that can be used. It is this lack of information which means the most that 
can be gained is I information aboutparts of the careers of aproportion of the military 
community. ' 7 In this case it is fortunately enough to determine patterns of service 
within garrisons. 
The search for the career of an individual can also be extended to service 
beyond the garrisons., searching for their name among the vadia guerre of expedition 
forces or armies, in horse inventories and among the retinue rolls of commanders; 
there is a range of singular documents where a recognisable name might be found but 
such research is as much a matter of chance as much as anything else. One source that 
does reveal the names of individuals in military service is the lists of protections 
granted to men leaving their county or town to take up service. These are particularly 
5 Respectively E101/10/6, ElOl/I 1/1 (a particularly fine account book) and E101/12/18. Unfortunately 
the latter does not continue until the end of the regnal year on 19 November 
1304 but ends in the spring 
and summer with the reductions in garrison personnel which took place at 
that time. N. B. Due to the 
large number of entries for each garrison in these account 
books reference to individual manuscript 
numbers are only given if they concern a specific detail or 
individual. 
6 Reproduced in depth in CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393412. 
7 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 139. 
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useful for those serving in garrisons in the later years of the fourteenth century and the 
number of protections for those serving at Roxburgh in the 1380s and 1390s makes it 
possible to attempt a preliminary study of garrison service at that time. The protections 
also reveal, albeit fragmentarily, the careers, or in some cases hint at the careers, of 
individuals in the second half of the century. Although limited in its scope the 
evidence for garrison service allows study from three well spaced periods throughout 
the century. 
There is another serious limitation in assessing garrison service apart from the 
lack of surviving documentary evidence. A glance at the accounts and rolls reveals that 
although the names of the men-at-arms and hobelars are included those below them in 
status,, the foot-soldiers who made up the bulk of the garrison in the first quarter of the 
century, the crossbowmen and archers, remain almost totally nameless. It is rare for 
these infantry soldiers to appear in any form other then their mere numbers. So scarce 
are their names that it is impossible to find even the few near consecutive lists that are 
necessary to begin an analysis of garrison service. Where names do exist all that can be 
done is to interpret them with reference to the garrison in its entirety and, as Will be 
seen, this can still yield important results. 
Those whose record of service in garrisons it is possible to trace are therefore 
the esquires, sergeants, men-at-arms and hobelars; the muster rolls from mid-century 
also allow the service of mounted archers to be followed. The term man-at-arms 
encompasses various levels of wealth and status but the majority were of sub-knightly 
class and in mid-century it has been calculated that over 75% of an army was 
comprised of soldiers classed as men-at-arms; it was these men who have accurately 
been described as the experienced and reliable backbone of English royal armies and 
144 
garrisons. 8 Esquires (scutiferri) were of an equivalent status as a man-at-arms 
(soldarius) as were the sergeants-at-arms of the royal household but as the accounts 
and rolls class men in these set ranks so this chapter will retain these classifications 
where necessary. However even among men of this status there are occasions when 
some of these also remain nameless. This problem arises from the component groups 
of men-at-arms that comprised a garrison. It is almost impossible to find the names of 
those who served for lands in Scotland, whether the lands were their own or those of 
their lord. In the case of the latter only the name of their lord is given followed by the 
number of men he was obliged to provide. This was routine procedure as it was With 
those serving in the retinue of the constable himself or that of a knight of the garrison; 
again these men appear as mere numbers after the name of their lord. 9 As Will be seen 
having these names,, especially those serving with the constable, can be particularly 
revealing. Whilst these two groups remain either hidden or at best fitfully revealed it is 
still the men-at-arms of the garrisons for which there is the greatest evidence of their 
record of service. 
These then are the parameters within which this study of garrison service is 
constrained; a limited body of men confined to those of a role and status above that of 
the foot-soldier and restricted to two main periods in which their service can be viewed 
over a number of consecutive years together with a later period in which several 
isolated careers can be picked out. By working within these limitations and using these 
separate periods as case studies it is possible to determine the patterns of English 
garrison service in the Anglo-Scottish wars. 
8 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 5. 
9A good example of this is Linlithgow in late 1301 when fifteen unnamed men-at-arms were with 
the 
constable, another ten unnamed with a knight (in this case the sheriff) and a 
further unnamed nineteen 
who were supplied by knights who owed their service for lands in 
Scotland; a total of forty-four men-at- 
arms remaining nameless in this one document, E 10 1/9/16, m. 1. 
145 
(i) The Earlv Fourteenth 
The earliest comparable documents from which service can be determined concern the 
garrison of Edinburgh. The first is a list of the garrison, excluding foot-soldiers, dating 
from between 27 November 1300 and Pentecost 1301 which names fifteen men-at- 
arms who were serving in the garrison whilst eleven esquires of John Kingston and 
three esquires of Ebles de Mountz remain nameless. 10 Unfortunately the dating of the 
second document, a roll of garrisons in Scotland, is only listed as belonging to the 29h 
year (20 November 1300-20 November 1301) but the inclusion of Kirkintilloch in this 
roll fin-nly dates it to the autumn of 130 1.11 This provides the names of twelve men-at- 
arms and two sergeants serving in Edinburgh as well as ten nameless men-at-arms with 
Kingston, one unnamed knight (obviously Ebles de Mountz) and another seventeen 
men-at-arms who were serving for lands their lords held in Scotland and consequently 
remain unidentified. It is likely that those serving in Kingston's retinue remained 
constant between the two periods in question despite a reduction by one. However it is 
to the named men-at-arms, the soldarii, that attention must be turned and this reveals 
the startling fact that of the original fifteen there is only one, Philip de Northbury, who 
is still present amongst the twelve soldarii in autumn 1301. In the space of several 
months, at most under a year, fourteen men-at-arms had left the garrison and eleven 
different men had taken their place. There was no change in constable over this period 
and Mountz remained as deputy. This striking turnover in garrison soldiers is however 
10 E101/68/1/1 1. 
11 E 10 1/9/16. Kirkintilloch was taken by the English in summer 130 1, Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 
143, 
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misrepresentative and indeed is outstanding in being the only suniving example in 
which such a wholesale change occurs in such a short period of time. 12 
In fact it is the continuity among the men serving in the garrison which is the 
most remarkable feature that the ensuing documents for Edinburgh reveal. The next 
document is a list of garrisons that dates from approximately September 1302 and the 
twelve soldarii listed as serving then and the two sergeants are exactly the same as 
13 those who were in the garrison a year earlier in autumn 1301. Two months later, in 
November 1302, these twelve men were still the same although between 12 February 
1302 and I September 1302 four men, Hugo de Abercorn, Robert Walingford and 
Hugo and Godfrey de la Mare, disappear from the account only to reappear in 
September. A Peter de Spalding enters into the garrison accounts during their absence 
but himself disappears on their return as does Robert de Derby, the latter interestingly 
a member of the garrison from the earliest roll along with Northbury. " Here are 
revealed the first signs of movement within a garrison. The detailed account books 
depict the changes that took place to the garrison as 1303 progressed yet in November 
of that year six of the twelve were still in the garrison and two others, Stephen de 
Walton and the sole survivor from the earliest roll, Philip de Northbury, had only left it 
on 29 September 1303 and 28 August 1303 respectively. 15 The latest firm date which 
names the garrison covers the period 9 December 1303 until 20 August 1304 and 
among the eleven men-at-arms named there remain four from the garrison of autumn 
1301, namely Alan de Walingford, Robert de Walingford, Roger de Sutton and Walter 
" Subsequent rolls and accounts reveal that at least eight of these original fifteen remained 
in garrison 
service, a fact which illustrates the pattern of movement and continuity within garrison service although 
failing to exhibit the trait of continuity within one particular garrison. That a significant change in 
garrison personnel had taken place in Edinburgh during early 1300 can 
be seen in a return of February 
which refers to fourteen archers of the old garrison and 46 archers of the new garrison, 
CDS, ii, no. 
1132. 
13 E101/10/5, m. 1. 
14 E101/10/6. 
15 ElOl/I 1/1. 
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de Eynhou. Another veteran of the garrison in August 1304 was Robert de Derby '. Nho 
had served intermittently in Edinburgh from before autumn 1301, possibly as early as 
late 1300.16 
It is clear that there is a definite consistency of service within the Edinburgh 
gaffison between autumn 1301 and the last extant date of August 1304. The twelve 
men-at-arms who entered in 1301 remained an almost constant core of the garrison 
throughout the entirety of 1302 and into the summer of 1303. In November 1303 half 
of their number still remained within the garrison and four continued service into at 
least August 1304. The two sergeants, George de Saunford and Benedict de Fletwik, 
also remained a constant presence until December 1303. Around this core of long-term 
service movement did take place with men both entering and leaving the gamson but 
these too served within the garrison for a length of time that measured in months or 
even years. The twelve who formed the long-tenn core of the garrison served for at 
least two years whilst some remained for at least three and possibly even more. This 
consistency in personnel and their duration of service within the same garrison are the 
salient features an analysis of these documents reveals. 
This consistency and length of service is paralleled throughout all garrisons. 
Kirkintilloch provides one of the clearest examples of this continuity within garrison 
service. The first list of its garrison occurs in autumn 1301 after its capture in the 
preceding summer and contains the names of twenty-one men-at-arms. 17 These remain 
almost remarkably constant and in the last available account for the garrison that ends 
on 28 April 1304 there remains in Kirkintilloch eleven men-at-arms of the original 
garrison who had thus served within it for approXimately two and a half years, 
18 the 
16 E101/12/18. 
17 E 10 1/9/16, m. 1. Although three of these appear to be hobelars and two are specIfied as being part of 
Sutton's retinue. 
18 E 10 1/ 12/18. 
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whole period for which it had been an English possession. In Roxburgh, between the 
first and last dates available, November 1301 to August 1304, of the twenty-seven 
men-at-arms originally recorded there were six who served there for the entire duration 
which amounted to nearly three years of service in the same garrison. Another three 
men-at-arms had served until December 1303, a period of just over two vears. 19 
Linlithgow is an unusual example in that only a handful of men-at-arms are named and 
these were serving for their lands in Scotland. Of the few names identifiable in autumn 
1301 two, Philip de Morteyn. and Patrick le Sauser, remained until April 1304 as did 
Ralph de Benton who was present in September 1302 and almost certainly in the faded 
roll for autumn 1301. Much more telling is the continuity of service among the 
abnormally large number of sergeants serving in the Linlithgow garrison. The faded 
roll names sixteen sergeants in 1301 but only the names of four of these are legible. 
However the following roll for September 1302 also contains sixteen names which 
include the four legible names from 1301 and it must be presumed that the sixteen 
were the same in both instances. If so then these sixteen remained constant between 
autumn 1301 and September 1302 and subsequently up until 25 December 1302. Eight 
of these remained in the garrison until November 1303, by March 1304 this had been 
reduced to six and in late 1304/05 two were still present. 20 These men left the garrison 
as its numbers were cut rather than due to changes within its personnel. 
In each castle between the years of 1301 and 1304/5 it is clear that the garrison 
retained a solid core of men-at-arms which remained in that particular garrison for a 
length of time measuring several months at the minimum and averaging at over two 
years. It was not uncommon for men to serve in a garrison contlnuously 
for three or 
four years and the upper limit of this duration is dictated 
by the availability of 
19 E101/10/6; E101/12/18. 
20 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/1 1/1; E101/12/18, 
E101/12/38. 
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documents; the evidence suggests continuous penods of service would have lasted 
longer than four years and underpins the fact that garrison service was largely 
undertaken by a recognisable group of men-at-arms whose service was long-tenn and 
could include a particular attachment to a specific garrison. 
Whether this remarkable pattern of continuity was also true for the foot of the 
garrisons is impossible to gauge due to the absence of information from a range of 
garrisons as is available for analysing men-at-arms. Indeed there is only one instance 
when it is possible to compare the foot of a garrison and this arises with the rolls for 
Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301 and September 1302 when the crossbowmen and archers 
of the garrison are named on both occasions. The level of continuity is exact; not only 
are the nineteen crossbowmen and nineteen archers the same on each occasion but the 
order in which their names have been written down is exactly the same. 21 In a period of 
one year there was no change at all among the foot of the garrison. That this equates to 
the same level of remarkable continuity exhibited by men-at-arms in this period is 
evident in that the same two rolls have the names of the nineteen men-at-arms in 
Kirkintilloch and the twenty in Carstairs, recorded in exactly the same order for 1301 
22 
and 1302 . Such precise 
levels of continuity begin to raise the suspicion that these 
rolls are not entirely reliable, that the identical order of names may be the result of a 
clerk copying down the earlier roll in an attempt to save time and effort. 
23 Any 
suspicion is dispelled by the accounts for the men-at-arms in Kirkintilloch in 
November 1302. Again the nineteen names are written in the same order but now With 
an important difference; two of the names included in the previous rolls are absent and 
in the exact place each name occupied in the list two new names have been written. 
24 
21E 10 1/9/16, m. 1; E 10 1/ 10/5, m. 2, 
22 E101/9/16; E101/10/5, mm. 1-2. 
23 For such practice of 'neat' accounting by clerks see Ayton, 
Knights and Warhorses, pp. 148-154 
24 EIOI/I 1/1, m. 3. 
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The noting of this change in personnel demonstrates that this account has been updated 
and is no mere clerk's copy. As it dates from only two months after the September roll 
it in turn proves that this was not a copy and consequently that the exact continuity in 
Kirkintilloch and Carstairs is correct. That the continuity of the men-at-arms in 
Kirkintilloch was matched by that of the foot indicates that long-term and continuous 
service in one garrison was a feature that could encompass all soldiers who served in 
garrisons. 
25 
Having established that there was a particularly strong element of continuity 
with men serving in the same garrison for a number of years it is now necessary to 
concentrate on the movement of men into, out of and around this core. An aspect of 
this has already been touched upon with regard to Edinburgh where four men-at-arms 
disappear from the garrison accounts only to reappear several months later. Hugo de 
Abercom, Robert de Walingford and Hugo and Godfrey de la Mare have all 
disappeared by 12 February 1302 but all return to the garrison on I September 1302 
and all remain at least until December 1302.26 There are numerous individual cases in 
which a man-at-arms briefly leaves and then returns to the same garrison. Peter de 
Spalding, after entering the Edinburgh garrison on or before 12 February 1302, served 
until 31 August and then left, his name returning to the accounts when he re-entered on 
25 December 1302 and he proceeded to remain until he left again on 9 December 
1303 . 
27 Exactly where these men went to during their absence is impossible to tell but 
what it does demonstrate is that their attachment both to garrisoning and to a particular 
garrison persisted even during an absence of several months,, an attachment that saw 
25 That some foot-soldiers might well have been long-standing garrison troops 
is tantalisingly hinted at 
in 1298 when the constable of Edinburgh, John Kingston, referred to crossbowmen serving 
in Edinburgh 
who had previously been in the garrison at Bourg and Blaye, Stevenson, 
ii, p. 301. 
26 E101/10/5, m. 1, E101/10/6, m. 5; ElOl/I 1/1. 
27 E101/10/6, mm. 2,4; ElOI/l 1/1, m. 9; E101/12/18. 
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their eventual return. The arrival of Robert de Derby back in Edinburgh after over a 
year away from the garrison reinforces this point. 
However the most important aspect these exits and returns highlight is the 
attachment of these men-at-arms to garrison service itself rather than to a specific 
castle. Although they left Edinburgh they did not necessarily leave garrison service. as 
the evidence will show the most likely destination to which these men went was 
another garrison. Continuity in garrison service is not restricted to men remaining in 
the same garrison but to them remainmg within garrisons. Before attempting to 
determine any such patterns of movement it is logical to first address the factors which 
led to changes taking place within a garrison. 
The account for Kirkintilloch mentioned above in which the names of two 
men-at-arms, Henry de Inge and Adam de Sutton, are missing and their exact position 
in the list taken by two new names, Robert Jolif and Robert de Driburgh, leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that this is a case where replacements have been brought into 
. 
2" This is one of the main reasons f the garrison or the alteration of personnel within 
garrisons with soldiers both leaving and entering in the same process, replacements 
immediately instated into the garrison to keep up the number of men the garrison was 
required to contain. Exceptionally neat and precise account keeping allow Jolif and 
Driburgh to be confidently picked out as replacements but some accounts are more 
explicit on this issue. The account book for 1303 describes on several occasions the 
newcomers as entering loco, 'in place of, ' a previously serving soldier within the 
garrison. On I September Thomas de Yinele entered loco of William de Walesby who 
had departed six days earlier on 26 August; on 24 June Henry le Bataille, a hobelar, 
entered loco another hobelar, Cadmer de Hibernia, who had left the previous day; four 
28 E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/1 1/1, m. 3. 
152 
men-at-arms entered in June loco another four who were no longer in the garrison. 29 
These replacements normally enter the accounts the very day after the previous 
incumbent has departed or at the most within a handful of days. Thi i icates a well is 
organised system of garrisoning in which the dates on which soldiers were due to leave 
were known in advance and their replacements lined up in readiness; altematively it 
could suggest well organised accounting practices to ensure the maximum amount for 
was paid out for wages. 
As with those who left and then returned to a garrison the reasons why men 
departed from garrisons are rarely stated. The majority would have moved to continue 
in military service elsewhere but some would have left to return home, to leave 
military service or due to ill-health or old age; the departure of others would have 
occurred in a more final way in that they had died whilst in garrison service. Most men 
who left Kirkintilloch are described as recesserunt, 'having left, ' the garrison, a vague 
terin that reveals nothing about their reasons for leaving or their destination but which 
does illustrate they were moving on and that some kind of system of movement was in 
operation. Kirkintilloch also provides the only evidence for this early period of the 
replacement of men-at-arms who had been killed in garrison service. On 24 June 1303 
four men-at-arms entered the garrison, their arrival being in place of, loco, 'those who 
had been killed above. ' There is no record in the accounts of any men-at-arms being 
killed. However only one group of four men-at-arms left the garrison and their last date 
of service was 23 June, the very day before the replacements entered. In contrast to 
others who left the garrison these four are not tenned as having left, recesserunt, 
instead the 23 June is referred to as being their last inside, finite infta, the garrison. It is 
clear that these four men - William Wisse, Meredith Wales, Richard le Vaus and 
29 E101/1 1/1, m. 22. 
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Simon de Kingeslond - had been killed whilst in garrison service. 30 The names of 
replacements appearing the next day raises questions concerning how it was possible 
to immediately replace such a sudden and unexpected loss. It is likely that accounting 
practices were responsible for this neat and seamless dating to ensure full payment of 
wages. 31 
The arrival of reinforcements was another regular feature that altered the 
personnel of a garrison as well as increasing it in size. On 25 December 1302 five 
men-at-anns, including Peter de Spalding and Robert de Derby, entered the Edinburgh 
garrison. The names of these five are written together in the accounts and are ,,, Islbly 
distinguishable from the men-at-arms already serving there. While the period of 
accounting for the latter begins on 26 December that for the five men-at-arms starts on 
25 December. These facts identify these men as new arrivals and that they were 
reinforcements is revealed in the statement included in the accounts that they were 
there by order, per preceptum, of John de Segrave. In the following accounting periods 
these men are included with the rest of the men-at-arms in the garrison illustrating that 
their addition to the garrison was not a temporary measure. It was also by order of 
John de Segrave that the first hobelars, seven of them in total, entered the Edinburgh 
garrison, their arrival also taking place on 25 December. 32 A reinforcement of seven 
men-at-arms entered Roxburgh town on 18 February 1303 and another two amved on 
17 March; in both cases they were onginally entered separately in the accounts and the 
date on which they entered is specified as the first on which they began receiving 
30 ElOl/I 1/1, m. 22. 
31 The clerk may well have left the dead men in the accounts until their replacements entered the 
garrison thus ensuring an immediate replacement in the accounts and avolding the inclusion of an 
awkward number of days without payment that would create greater work when balancing the accounts. 
32 ElOl/l 1/1, mm. 9,18. 
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wages. Two additional hobelars entered service in Roxburgh town on 18 February and 
33 a further lone reinforcement on 17 March . 
A further factor which altered the personnel within a garrison occurred when 
the constable or a knight of the garrison either entered or left its service with the 
subsequent effect this had on their personal retinue. Again Kirkintilloch provides an 
example of this when one of the three knights in the garrison, John Gymming, departed 
from Kirkintilloch taking his two men-at-arms with him. Three men-at-arms entered in 
place of them, in this case a man-at-arms replacing a knight. 34 The most revealing 
occasion concerning alterations among the personal retinues within a garrison occur 
during the brief replacement of John Kingston as constable of Edinburgh by his deputy 
Ebles de Mountz, Kingston leaving and Mountz taking charge in March 1303 and 
Kingston returning and retaking the constableship in February 1304. Mountz had 
served in the garrison since at least 1300 and had once had three esquires with him. 
Immediately prior to becoming constable there was one esquire serving in his retinue 
and upon his appointment on 1 March 1303 a second esquire entered into his retinue. 
On I May, two months after Mountz's appointment, Eustace Danesi, his valet, began 
to receive payment and another valet, Richard de Lisle, was paid from 13 May. Also 
on I May William le Skirmisher became part of Mountz's retinue; up until then he had 
been a man-at-arms in the garrison first entering as one of the five reinforcements on 
25 December 1302. From 17 May these three and an Edmund Walraunt are stated as 
being Mountz's valets and from 30 September another valet, Richard Walraunt, joined 
33 E101/11/1, m. 17. 
34 E101/1 1/1, m. 22. Intriguingly these three replacements were William Wisse, Richard le 
Vaus and 
Simon de Kingeslond, all who would meet their deaths just over six months later as three of the four 
men from Kirkintilloch that were killed. It is peculiar that they entered the garrison together and were all 
killed at approximately the same time. It is also unusual that only one man-at-arms replaced a 
knight, to 
keep the total of wages the same it was more normal for two men-at-arms to enter thus the 
2s. wage of 
the knight being split equally. 
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their number, entering the garrison in place of Stephen de Walton, a man-at-arms who 
had served in Edinburgh since autumn 130 1.35 
The appointment of Mountz as constable led to new personnel entering the 
garrison as part of his personal retinue. Two features in particular stand out; the 
incorporation of an existing man-at-arms of the garrison, Skirmisher ,i nto Mo untz's 
own personal retinue and the replacement of a man-at-arms with a valet who also 
entered his personal retinue. The appropriation of Skirmisher may have been due to a 
connection with Mountz as they had been serving together in Edinburgh since late 
December and the arrival of Richard Walraunt also hints at a personal connection with 
Edmund Walraunt already having been brought in as a valet and Richard having served 
there with Mountz in 1300/1. Mountz had been serving in the garrison for a number of 
years yet his elevation led to the creation of a retinue consisting of five valets four of 
whom were not previously recorded as being among the garrison. 
The temporary change of constable at Edinburgh also illustrates that the 
personal retinue of a constable or knight of a gamson went with him wherever service 
led, a fact already demonstrated by Gymmng's two men-at-arms leaving Kirkintilloch 
when he departed. On the first day of his constableship Mountz admitted into the 
garrison seven men-at-anns who belonged to the retinue of John Kingston. 36 The 
names of these men do not previously appear in the garrison accounts however it is 
evident that they had been serving in the garrison being among the twelve unnamed 
esquires of Kingston's retinue. Their 'admittance' by Mountz was therefore only a 
matter of form and etiquette with regard to the retinue of another lord; in reality these 
seven men never actually left the garrison but remained in it continuously. That 
Kingston left just over half his retinue behind demonstrates that his absence was only 
35 EIOI/1 IM, mrn. 19-20. 
36 EIOI/1 VI, m. 19. 
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ever envisioned as a temporary measure. Despite this his prolonged absence still led to 
the departure of five esquires from the garrison for almost a year. On his return in 1304 
Kingston took charge of Edinburgh with eight unnamed esquires in his retinue; it is 
likely these would include the five who had previously left Edinburgh with him. The 
seven he left behind remain classed among the men-at-arms rather than rejoining his 
retinue. On Kingston's return in February Mountz left to take up the sheriffdom of 
Peebles and he took with him the five valets he had added to his retinue whilst 
constable. 
37 
A change within a garrison of the constable or even a knight could result in 
men both entering and leaving the garrison. Although the example described above is 
the best remaining documented case for this period it deals with a temporary change, 
albeit of nearly a years duration, and with a new constable who had already been a 
member of the garrison for a number of years. That alterations took place within such a 
limited scope provides an insight into the extent of the alterations that could happen 
when a completely new constable took charge of a garrison. The formal 'admittance' 
of men into a garrison when in reality they were already serving there as unnamed 
esquires within a personal retinue raises the possibility that men who appear to enter a 
garrison may already be there and alternatively that those who suddenly disappear 
from the accounts and rolls could have entered into an unnamed retinue. This is only a 
possibility when there is no supporting evidence such as when first in receipt of wages 
or having specifically left, recesserunt, the garrison. It adds another consideration to 
the whereabouts of men like Peter de Spalding with his peculiarly fitful presence in 
Edinburgh during 1302. 
37 E101/12/18. 
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Perhaps the most obvious means by which personnel changed was when the 
numbers of men serving in a garrison were reduced. The account book for 1304 
contains many examples of this, a wholesale cut-back in garrison numbers that had 
started in late 1303 continuing into 1304 to such an extent that the accounts for that 
year finish at various dates during the spring and summer . 
38 Linlithgow perfectly 
illustrates these reductions. From September 1302 until June 1303 the number of 
sergeants consistently totalled between sixteen and seventeen, it then declined to 
seven, to six by late November 1303 and eventually to just two in March 1.304.39 In 
such a case as this there is little if any actual change among the personnel With 
reductions removing men from the original sixteen and seventeen until only two of 
them remained. Reductions do not alter the personnel of a garrison so much as they cut 
down its number thereby reducing the original garrison. 
Garrison service within a particular castle therefore encompassed an element of 
fluidity but was firmly underpinned by a foundation of long-term service. Within each 
garrison there was a solid core of men-at-anns who had served together for a period of 
up to three or more years. Movement took place around this core; replacements and 
reinforcements entered the garrison, others departed, a new constable or knight brought 
in new faces among his retinue or, if leaving, would take familiar faces with them, 
while numbers could also be cut and men subsequently left with no option but to leave. 
To understand the pattern of garrison service it is important to recognise that although 
it was stable it was not static; although there was long-term service men were not 
inextricably attached to a particular garrison. 
This is immediately evident when attention is turned away from the narrow 
focus of service within a single garrison and opened out to a study encompassing all 
38 C. f E101/12/18. 
39 E101/1 1/1; E101/12/18. 
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the major garrisons. As has already been observed continuity in garrison service is not 
exclusively limited to service within a particular garrison but expands to cover service 
in any garrison. The very phrase 'military community' expresses the strong element of 
interchange necessary to create such a community, the idea that the men who 
comprised it moved around in the same military world rather than remaining separate 
and static. Examples of movement among those serving in garrisons have already been 
shown; the question is the extent to which this happened and whether it was a regular 
feature of garrison service. 
The only method by which this can be determined is to undertake a detailed 
study of the accounts and rolls and look for the recurrence of names of men-at-arms 
appearing in a different garrison to that which they were previously recorded in. 
Although this is a time-consuming business it does not take an excessively long time to 
compile numerous examples of men-at-arms who moved between garrisons. One of 
the first is Thomas de Ramesey, a member of the Edinburgh garrison from its earliest 
roll, - who 
had served there at least until Pentecost 1301 and who had entered into the 
newly created garrison of Kirkintilloch by the autumn of that year. 40 John Unthank 
served in Carstairs from autumn 1301 until at least Pentecost 1302 and subsequently 
appears as one of four reinforcements sent to Kirkintilloch on 24 June 1303, a garrison 
where he was still serving in April 1304.41 In autumn 1301 Walter Chilton had recently 
entered the Edinburgh garrison where he served until 25 December 1302; on that very 
same date he makes his first appearance in Roxburgh where he was still present a year 
later in December 1303 . 
42 The man-at-arms who can be attributed with the greatest 
movement in these years is Adam de Sutton: he served in Kirkintilloch in autumn 
1301; Jedburgh from 20 November 1301 until II February 1302; in Bothwell between 
40 E 10 1/68/ 1 /11; E 10 1/9/16, m. 1. 
41 E101/9/16,2; E101/68/1/25/1); E101/1 1/1, m. 22; E101/12/18. 
42 E101/9/16,1; E101/1 1/1, m. 8; E101/12/18. 
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12 February and 10 June 1302; by September 1302 he was back in Kirkintilloch, 
although he appears to have been elsewhere between November 1302 and I February 
1303 but then returns,, and was still serving in the garrison on the last available date of 
43 28 April 1304 . 
As well as individuals moving between garrisons a detailed analysis reveals 
several men-at-arms moving simultaneously. Particularly instructive are those who 
moved to Bothwell from a number of garrisons in early 1302. Bothwell had fallen to 
the English by 22 September 1301 having already been granted in anticipation to 
Aymer de Valence in the preceding August. 44As such it was a castle in private hands 
that was to be gaffisoned by its owner and consequently would not feature in official 
rolls and accounts. Yet there is one entry for Bothwell in Weston's account book, an 
entry that covers the dates 12 February until 10 June 1302, and in which the names of 
twelve men-at-arms are given. 45 Five of these men are especially interesting. John de 
Ascheburne was serving in Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301, he then made the move to 
Bothwell in February and was back in Kirkintilloch by September 1302 where he was 
still serving in April 1304 . 
46 Three of these five came from the Jedburgh garrison. 
Adam Chettelkinde served in Jedburgh between 20 November 1301 and II February 
1302 as did William Menaunt and the highly mobile man-at-arms Adam de Sutton; on 
the very next day, 12 February, they began service in Bothwell where they remained 
until June. Chettelkinde was back in Jedburgh by at least May 1303, Menaunt was in 
Berwick by December 1302 where he was still serving in May 1303 and as already 
47 
mentioned Sutton was in Kirkintilloch by September 1302 . 
The fifth man was John 
43 E101/9/16, m, 1; E101/10/6, mm. 1,3; E101/10/5, m. 2; EIOI/I 1/1; E101/12/18. 
44 Watson, Under the Hwnmer, p. 121. 
45 E101/10/6, m. 3. 
46 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/6, m. 3; E101/10/5, m. 2; EIOI/I 1/1; E101/12/18- 
47 21. An extreme scarcity of records for E101/10/6, mm. 1,3; E101/10/5, m. 2; EIOI/I 1/1, mm. 2,7, 
the names of the Jedburgh garrison hinder any further analysis concerning that garrison. 
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de Herle who also served in Bothwell between February and June and who in June 
1303 was settled in Linlithgow as one of William Felton5s personal retinue. It is likelv 
that Herle originally came to Bothwell from Linlithgow as Felton's personal retinue 
was reduced from fifteen to eleven at that time. 48 
Therefore five of the twelve men brought into Bothwell in June 1302 can 
definitely be placed as having been serving in other garrisons immediately prior to this 
move. Having served in Bothwell they then returned to either their former or another 
garrison. The reason for the inclusion of these men among the accounts is revealed in 
an indenture of 12 February 1302 in which it was agreed that Valence was to retain 
seventeen of his own men-at-arms in Bothwell while the king would provide another 
thirteen whose wages he would pay at 8d. a day. 49The twelve men named in Weston's 
account were those the king was supplying and paying; it is unclear why there is not a 
thirteenth name. To provide these men they were stripped from other garrisons. The 
number of men-at-arms in Jedburgh was reduced from nine to five in February 1302 
and of this reduction three of the four removed from Jedburgh entered into Bothwell. 50 
This was not a reckless shuffling of numbers as a truce, the Treaty of Asnieres, was in 
existence from 26 January 1302 and lasted until November 1302 .51 The subsequent 
movements of these men illustrates that they had departed from Bothwell by at least 
autumn 1302 and consequently that their stay in Bothwell was a temporary measure 
enacted during the truce to help consolidate the occupation of that castle. It is almost 
certain that all twelve of the men-at-arms who entered Bothwell had previously been 
serving in garrisons and continued to do so afterwards; a likelihood reinforced 
by the 
fact that another of these twelve, Adam de Doxford, was, like Menaunt, in 
Berwick by 
48 E101/10/6, m. 3; E101/1 1/1, m. 25; 13101/10/5, m. 2. 49 CDSý ii, no. 1286. 50 E101/10/6, mm. 1,3; CDS, ii, no. 1286. 51 Watson, Under the Hwnmer, p. 138. It was also during the temporary security of this truce 
that wages 
were reduced and building works undertaken. 
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December 1302.52 These activities categorically prove a pattern of movement from 
garrison to garrison and one that was centrally controlled. 
Carstairs was also taken during the summer of 1301 and as with Bothwell 
movement into and out of this garrison can be traced in the records. The first entry for 
the garrison, dating from autumn 1301, names twenty men-at-arms two of whom were 
Hugo de Langeton and Robert Belton; both of these men had previously been serving 
in the Edinburgh garrison before Pentecost 1301, members of the earliest list for that 
garrison. 53 This goes a long way to explaining the near total change in the personnel of 
Edinburgh during 1301 by showing that two of these men had been moved to the new 
garrison of Carstairs and suggests that the rest of the Edinburgh garrison was likewise 
dispersed into other garrisons. The evidence of another original member, Robert de 
Derby, which has already been mentioned, proves that these men remained in gamson 
service. There was also movement out of Carstairs. William Corbridge was serving 
there in November 1301 until Pentecost 1302; when he next appears he is in Roxburgh 
from 25 December 1302 and is still present there in December 1303.54 John de Belton 
served in Carstairs in the autumn of 1301 but he is not among those, such as 
Corbridge, who remained until at least Pentecost 1302. " 
As will shortly be seen John de Belton later appears in the large Berwick town 
garrison and the well-documented movement of men into Kirkintilloch in the spring 7__ 
and summer of 1303 goes some way to illustrating the role Berwick held in relation to 
the other English garrisons. Richard de Inge and Edward de Kincardine were two of 
the four who entered Kirkintilloch in June 1303 to replace the four men-at-anns who 
52 E101/10/6; E101/1 1/1, m. 7. 
53 E 10 1/9/16,2; E 10 1/68/ 1 /11. 
54 E101/9/16,2; E101/68/1/25D; E101/12/18. 
55 E101/9/16,2; E101/68/1/25D. 
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had been killed; both had previously been serving in Berwick town. 56 A ]one 
reinforcement who entered on 17 May, John Murrok, had come straight from the 
Berwick garrison. 57 Robert Jolif arrived as a replacement in November 1302; between 
20 November 1301 and II February 1302 he too had been one of the Berwick to%vn 
garrison and had returned there by I February 1303 
. 
58 In these cases Berwick was 
acting as a pool of manpower from which other garrisons could obtain replacements 
and reinforcements as and when they were needed. 
Another aspect of Berwick's role is evident in 1303. On 27 May payments 
were made to 41 men-at-arms who had come to the king at Roxburgh to participate in 
the campaign of that year . 
59Fortunately thirty-seven of these men are named and they 
make extremely interesting reading. Nineteen can be identified as men who had been 
serving or who were subsequently to serve in garrisons. More intriguingly still twelve 
of these nineteen had previously been part of the Carstairs garrison. Six of these had 
served in Carstairs from the first record in autumn 1301 until the last in September 
1302. In total over half of the 20 men-at-arms who had comprised the Carstairs 
,, garrison joined the 
king at Roxburgh in May 1303. It is also clear that the force of 41 
men-at-an-ns of which they were a part was in fact from Berwick; in April 1303 the 
king ordered John de Weston to wam the Berwick garrison to be at Roxburgh in May 
on the day the levies were to muster there for the campaign . 
60 That this was indeed a 
force from Berwick is confirmed by the presence of men-at-arms recognisable as 
56 ElOl/I 1/1, mm. 2,22. 
57 ElOl/I 1/1, in. 22. See note below. 
58 E101/10/6; E101/11/1, mm. 8,10,23. Joliff and Murrok however present problems in the latter 
account book. Murrok is recorded as entering Kirkintilloch on 17 May 1303 but is still paid as one of the 
Berwick garrison until 24 May 1303. Joliff is recorded as remaining in Kirkintilloch until 31 January 
1303 but according to the account for Berwick has returned there by 26 December 1302 and remains in 
the garrison until May 1303. The discrepancy of several days in the case of Murrok suggests an 
accounting error and this must also be the reason for the contradictory period of over a month with 
regard to Joliff, the latter a significant error in the accounts. 
59 BL Add Mss 883 5, fos. 90r- 105r; CDS, v, no. 472(s). 
60 CDS, ii, no. 1356. 
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serving in that garrison: Edward de Kincardine has already been shown as serving in 
Berwick; William Weston had been there between at least 20 November 1301 and II 
February 1302; John Pencaitland had been in Berwick for several years. 61 In fact 
Berwick was the only garrison ordered to provide soldiers for this campaign. 
The reason for the incorporation of so many of the Carstairs garrison into that 
of Berwick was not due to a stripping of numbers but to the actual loss of Carstairs in 
late 1302. The suspicion aroused by their presence in this force of 41 men-at-arms is 
conclusively confirmed by a remarkable entry in Weston's account book. On 25 
December 1302 nineteen men-at-arms entered the Berwick town garrison; not only are 
all theirs names recognisable but the entry ends With the explicit statement that they 
had come from the garrison of Carstairs and the note in the margin that names their 
62 
entry simply reads Tarres (Carstairs). That they were first at wages on 25 December 
reveals that the castle had fallen in late December and was therefore one of the 'castles 
and towns' John de Segrave reported on 20 January 1303 as having been taken by the 
SCOtS. 63 They remained in Berwick town, now classed with the other men-at-arms, 
until at least late May 1303. The most striking aspect is that the Carstairs garrison was 
kept intact and its members retained in garrison service. John de Belton had obviously 
retuned to Carstairs prior to its fall as he was among those who entered Berwick; on 9 
December 1303 he began service in Edinburgh. 64 As the subsequent careers of some of 
these Carstairs men-at-arms show Belton remained in garrison service and he did so 
continuously due to the men from Carstairs being brought into the Berwick gamson; It 
ning should was seen as important that men engaged and experienced in garnso 
i 
continue in that particular occupation. 
61 E101/10/6, m. 1; ElOl/I 1/1, m. 2. 
62 ElOl/I 1/1, m. 7. 
ore that of Selkirk. 63 CDS 
, 
ii 
, no. 1342. This 
date of late December places its loss shortly 
bef 
64 ElOl/I 1/1, m. 7; E101/12/18. 
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In this case Berwick clearly acted as an intake for extra, to some extent surplus. 
manpower. It provided a secure location for men who were without or had left a 
garrison and was somewhere in which they could remain both in pay and in garrison 
service, a facility beneficial to both the individual man-at-arms and the Crown. 
Berwick can be seen as being the hub of the system of garrison service, taking extra 
men in, maintaining them and then recycling them to other garrisons when needed. 
Evidence of the latter can again be seen with men who had served in BerNNick and in 
the force that met the king at Roxburgh; Thomas Yinele left Berwick to enter 
Kirkintilloch on I September 1303 and Richard Walraunt re-entered Edinburgh on 30 
September 1303.65 
Bothwell and Carstairs plainly show a redeployment of men-at-arms engaged 
in garrison service. In late 1301 and early 1302 there was a movement of experienced 
garrison soldiers out of established garrisons and into newly acquired fortifications 
such as Kirkintilloch and Bothwell. There was also a wholesale redeployment during 
the truce of 1302 the aim of which was to consolidate new acquisitions and on the 
termination of the truce in November there was another movement of men either back 
to their previous garrisons or to a different one. There was a redistribution of those 
from Berwick who had joined the king at Roxburgh: as noted Kincardine entered 
Kirkintilloch; Thomas Yinele also joined that garrison on I September 1303; Richard 
Walraunt returned to Edinburgh as a valet of Mountz on 30 September. 
66 Such 
wholesale movements had to have been controlled and organised centrally to ensure 
they were executed with co-ordination. The incorporation of the entire Carstairs 
garrison into Berwick and the eventual dispersal of its individuals into other gamsons 
also required careful organisation as did the movement of individuals and the need to 
65 E101/1 1/1, mm. 20,22. 
66 BL Add Mss8835, fos. 90r-105r. I- 
E 101/11/1, m. 22; EIOI/11/1, m. 20. 
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keep track of their whereabouts. Above all it demonstrates that movement between 
gamsons was a normal and accepted routine for the men-at-arms who were engaged in 
garrisoning and whether they moved as an individual or as part of a group it was a 
regular and ongoing feature of garrison service in these years. 
There was also another form of movement within garrisons, one that functioned 
vertically within an individual garrison rather than the horizontal movement between 
garrisons. As noted previously on 26 December 1302 three men-at-arms entered 
Kirkintilloch in place of John Gymmng and his two esquires. One of these 
replacements, William Wisse, is especially of interest when the rare rolls of the entire 
garrison for autumn 1301 and September 1302 are consulted. In both documents Wisse 
was a member of the garrison however he was not serving as a man-at-arms but as one 
of the garrison's nineteen crossbowmen. 67 Here one of the vacancies created in the 
garrison was filled by the elevation of an existing member of the garrison from the 
position and status of a crossbowman to that of a man-at-arms. Nor was this Wisse's 
only advancement whilst in garrison service as before becoming a crossbowman in 
Kirkintilloch he had been a vintenar of nineteen archers in the garrison of Berwick 
town between 20 November and 23 December 1299.68 One of his fellow crossbowmen 
in Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301 and September 1302 had been Thomas Norreys and on 
24 June 1303 he too appears in the same garrison now as a man-at-arms, a status he 
still held in 13 19.69Norreys' elevation occurs when he is listed as one of the four 
replacements for those who had been killed; as with Wisse neither man actually left the 
garrison but technically entered the garrison on that date in their new role and 
receiving commensurate pay. Intriguingly Wisse was one of those killed and Norreys 
became a man-at-arms the very next day; there is a definite hint here that the elevation 
67 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/1 1/1, m. 22. 
6'Lib. Quot., p. 146. 
69 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/1 1/1, m. 22; Raimes, pp. 21-2. 
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of Norreys was directly in place of Wisse, that there was a policy of raising men from 
the ranks practiced by the constable, William Francis, the demise of one crossbowman 
who had been raised to a man-at-arms immediately replaced by the creation of another. 
This process of elevation in status within a garrison is illustrated more 
explicitly in the accounts for Linlithgow and those raised to the status of men-at-anns 
come from the more commensurate group classed as hobelars rather than the more 
lowly foot serving as crossbowmen. Five hobelars had served in Linlithgow since at 
least I September 1302 - Robert de Winepol, Robert Paulyn, Richard Daneport, Adam 
de, Humberland and John de Hibernia - but on 26 December 1302 the status of 
Winepol and Hibernia suddenly changed. From that date they were to be classed as 
men-at-arms, were to receive the appropriate wages of 12d. a day rather than the 8d. of 
a hobelar and their horses were valued as covered . 
70 Hibernia was still serving as a 
man-at-arms in Linlithgow on the last extant date of 1304/5 71 whereas Winepol, after 
serving from his elevation on 26 December until the end of the accounting period of 6 
June 1303, disappears from the garrison; in fact he did not even serve for the whole of 
this period being described as absent, vacabat, for 24 days. This rather patchy record is 
explained when it is realised that Winepol was the royal clerk of the works for the 
major refit of Linlithgow, taking up this position on the death of the previous clerk in 
early 1302 and holding it until the major works finished in December 1302. During 
June, July and August 1303 Winepol was engaged on the king's business which 
included travelling from Linlithgow to Berwick to collect money for the wages of the 
workers at Linlithgow. 72 His elevation to the status and pay of a man-at-arms was 
70 ElOl/I 1/1, m. 9. For the formality of a horse having to have been officially valued 
before the pay rate 
of a man-at-arms could be received, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 
90-92. 
71 E101/12/38. 
72 ElOl/I 1/1, m. 19; The Kings's Works, i, pp. 413414; CDS, v, no. 4720). Winepol received 
L6 6s. 8d 
for the 'other business' he undertook for the king. 
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consequently due to his role as clerk Of the works and the good service he had duly 
performed in supervising the finances of these extensive works. 
The elevation of hobelars to replace men-at-arms is a constant theme within 
Linlithgow. After Winepol disappears from the accounts in June one of his former 
counterparts as a hobelar, Adam de Humberland, became a man-a-arms although on 
this occasion there is no statement detailing his rise in status; 73 on 7 June 1303 another 
five hobelars came into Linlithgow and at some point between April 1304 and winter 
1304/5 Humberland. had risen to become a man-at-arms and he still retained this status 
74 in 1311/12 . 
As the difference between a hobelar and a man-at-arms was mainlv based 
on the value of the horse and the finer aspects of equipment there was not necessarily a 
significant difference between the two in practice and this accounts for the regularity 
with which hobelars rose in status in Linlithgow and indicates that such a phenomenon 
was a not an uncommon occurrence. 
75 
However a change in status was not always permanent nor was it always 
upwards. Adam de Humberland is a case in point: he served as a hobelar between 
September 1302 and 7 June 1303; from then until 13 March 1304 he was a man-at- 
arms; on that date he returned to being a hobelar and was still a hobelar on 28 April 
1304; yet this was not the end of his drop in status as in 1304/5 he was in the garrison 
serving as a crossbowman . 
76 Indeed in the 1304/5 roll for Linlithgow alongside 
Humberland two more names stand out among the twenty crossbowmen; 
Richard de 
Daneport, who had been a long-serving hobelar in the garnson 
from September 1302, 
77 
and William de Blatherne who had entered the garrison as a 
hobelar on 7 June 1303 . 
73 E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/1 1/1 - 74 E101/1 1/1, m. 25; E101/12/18; E101/12/38; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 
411. 
7' Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p- 92. gained his 76 E101/10/5,2; E101/1 1/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/38. Between then and 
1311/12 he had re 
former status. 
77 E101/10/5,2; E101/10/6; E101/1 1/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/38. 
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Here three hobelars have been lowered to the status of crossbowmen at some point 
between late spring 1304 and 1305. This development was due to the significant cut in 
garrison numbers that was enacted in 1304 as a result of the perceived English victory 
in the war against the Scots. It is interesting here that there was a definite policy to 
retain these three men in the garrison which extended to finding a place for them 
among the crossbowmen; in turn the three men were content to accept this so as to 
remain in garrison service. 
Once again it is apparent that garrison service was a flexible and fluid system 
which included the regular movement of men between garrisons and the ability for 
those within a gamson to be elevated or lowered in status as opportunity and necessity 
dictated. These patterns of movement occurred within a stable framework of long-term 
service, both in garrison service as a whole and within a particular garrison, men 
remaining as garrison soldiers for the entire three to four years the documents cover. It 
is clear from these rolls and accounts that there was a garrisoning community, that 
there is an identifiable body of men between 1301-1304/5 to whom garrison service 
was their sole occupation. 
The extent to which this body of men was engaged in garrison service can be 
set in a longer context by two means. The first, and most revealing, is to compare the 
names of those who served in these early years with the rolls for 1311/12 which name 
the knights, men-at-arms and hobelars serving in several garrisons in Scotland which 
encompass Berwick, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Bothwell and Livingston. 
78 In 
all there are approximately 43 men from these earlier years still serving within 
garrisons in 1311/12 with their service, assuming the likelihood that they remained 
in 
garrisons throughout, therefore of a duration of at least six and at most twelve years. 
78 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393412. 
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This is a considerable number of men and demonstrates a strong element of continwtv 
in garrison service. Another equally striking feature in 1311/12 is that of these 43' men 
25 were serving in the exact same garrison within which they had primarily served In 
1300-1304/5. This feature becomes all the more remarkable when broken down to 
individual garrisons: ten out of the eleven veterans in Linlithgow had previously 
served there; twelve out of thirteen in Edinburgh; three out of three in Roxburgh. In 
these three garrisons, out of 27 veterans, there was a total of 25 who were serving in 
the same garrison in both periods. There were also sixteen veterans in Benvick 
however none of these had been serving there in 1300-05 but had been members of 
various garrisons. 79 
It is doubtful that all of these veterans had remained in the same garrison 
between 1300-1304/5 and their next appearance there in 1311/12. A few examples will 
suffice: Patrick Sauser appears to have left Linlithgow after April 1304 but was back 
there in 1311/12; similarly Raymond Caillou left Linlithgow in June 1303 before re- 
appearing there in 1311/12; Hugo de Abercorn left Edinburgh in December 1303) but 
was back there in 1311/12; John de Cley was in Edinburgh in 1311/12 yet had 
departed from that same garrison in March 1304.80 The tendency of names to disappear 
and then reappear has already been observed and over such a number of years it must 
be presumed that this was the case for some if not all of these long-serving garrison 
soldiers; it also follows that although they may have briefly departed from a particular 
garrison they never actually left garrison service throughout this period. 
Admittedly when the numbers of those serving in garrisons in both periods is 
put into the context of all the men-at-arms listed the roll of 1311/12 their proportion 
79 Eight had been in Edinburgh; two in Linlithgow; two in Kirkintilloch; two in Carstairs, one in 
Bothwell and one in Roxburgh. Once again this demonstrates how Berwick acted as a pool of manpower 
for garrisons. 
80 E 10 1/ 12/18; CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 4 10-11. 
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is not large; only 16% in Edinburgh, 14% in Linlithgow and a rather low 6% in 
Roxburgh. The particularly sizeable garrisons retained in 1311/12 go some way to 
explaining this, the number of men-at-arms dwarfing some of the garrisons of 1300- 
1304/5. New men were needed to make up the numbers of these garrisons alongside 
the veterans of garrison service. Another important factor in considering these 
percentages is that there is no evidence for the men who manned garrisons between 
1305 and 1311/12 and these would undoubtedly account for a significant proportion of 
those listed in 1311/12. Although a share of the men who had served in 1300-1304'5 
would, for a variety of reasons such as age, health and death, no longer be serving in 
1311/12, taking the above factors into account the percentage of veterans m,, ho 
remained serving is significant. Indeed , in practical terms, the continuous core of 
garrison service they represented lent the garrisons they were based in a wealth of 
experience that far outweighed their number. 
These men also maintained continuity in garrison service in 1311/12 by means 
of a more personal nature in that members of their family were serving in these later 
garrisons . 
81 In fact the service of men from the same family was an established feature 
in garrisons between 1300 and 1304/5 with the rolls and accounts littered with men-at- 
arms sharing a surname: the most noticeable were the brothers William and John Cotes 
who served together in the Roxburgh garrison from 1301 and remained there side by 
side into at least 1304; Edinburgh contained both Adam and Robert de Walingford as 
well as Hugo and Godfrey de la Mare, Adam and Roger de Sutton, Robert, 
Adam and 
William Colle de Derby and also John and William Disteford ; 
82 serving together in 
81 As in most examples in which careers are pieced together this 
is based on surnames being the same 
and the logical assumption that men sharing a surname and serving side-by-side were 
from the same 
family, This method - the only one possible - in 
fact limits the study of family involvement as it does 
not allow for links through maternal ties or marriage; many men 
in the garrison and indeed the military 
community would have been tied through such links. 
82 E101/68/1/1 1; E101/9/16, in. 1; ElOI/l 1/1, mm. 8,20. 
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Carstairs were Robert, John, Richard and Marmaduke Belton, Adam and Robert de 
Broughtone and Hugo and John de Langeton; 83 amongst the sergeants in Linlithgow 
were John and Simon de Vilers and John de Vilers junior; another of the sergeants in 
Linlithgow was William de Hull and among Felton's retinue was a John de Hull. "' As 
would be expected family connections were strong among personal retinues and this 
important aspect is revealed on one of the few occasions in which the retinue of a 
constable is individually named: with William Felton in Linlithgow were John and 
Richard de Felton as well as John, Hugo and Robert de Herle; 85 in Edinburgh whilst 
constable Mountz brought both Edmund and Richard Walraunt into his retinue. 86 
Family connections in garrisoning were not the exclusive preserve of men-at- 
arms. Whilst the two Cotes brothers were serving as men-at-arms in Roxburgh a third 
family member, Thomas de Cotes, was a hobelar in the same garrison; Roxburgh also 
contained Robert de Castro, man-at-arms, and William de Castro, hobelar. 8' Entering 
Linlithgow separately but at approximately the same time in November 1302 were 
Robert and Hugo Yueldedy, a hobelar and vintenar of archers respectively. 88 Whilst 
William Wisse was still a crossbowman in Kirkintilloch there was an archer named 
Adam Wisse; also in Kirkintilloch were two crossbowmen called Roger and Walter de 
London and Henry and Sampson de Kingston, both archers. 
89 Two of the 
crossbowmen in Linlithgow were Adam and John le Mareschal; 
90 another two le 
Mareschal's were Robert and Walter, respectively a crossbowman and archer in 
Edinburgh; in the same garrison was Simon de Ramesey, archer, and Thomas de 
83 E 10 1 /9/16, m. 2. 
84 EIOI/1 VI, mm. 2,25. 
85 EIOI/1 VI, 25. 
86 EIOI/11/1,20. 
87 EIOI/1 IM, 21- 
88 EIOI/1 YI, 20. 
89 EIOI/10/5, m 2. 
90 EIOI/12/38. 
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Ramesey, man-at-arms. 91 In Berwick there was an archer, Alan Forester, and a 
crossbowman, William Forester; another archer was Edmund de Algate and a builder 
92 in the garrison was Thomas de Algate. 
Garrisons were therefore interlaced with family connections even in the earliest 
years of their creation between 1300-1304/5. The 1311/12 roll is invaluable in 
demonstrating the development of these families which were involved in garrison 
service. By 1311/12 the Herle family had increased its level of service from three to 
five members with William and Alan de Herle now serving with Robert and Hugo in 
Linlithgow while John was in Edinburgh; also still in Edinburgh were John and 
William Disteford but now accompanied by Thomas; alongside them was Hugo de 
Abercorn, a veteran of the garrison from 1301-4, now with William de Abercorn. John 
de Hellebeck, who had served in Linlithgow as part of Felton's retinue, had been 
joined there by Richard de Hellebeck; Robert and Henry Aschebume were in 
Linlithgow, surely related to John de Ascheburne who had been an ever present 
member of the Kirkintilloch garrison. Having served for several early years in 
Edinburgh Peter de Spalding was in Berwick with Richard de Spalding; John de 
Enefeld, previously a sergeant in Linlithgow, and David de Enefeld were in Berwick, 
Stephen de Ocle, presumably a relative of Thomas who had served in Edinburgh, was 
in Berwick as was John Walraunt,, surely a relation of those in Mountz's retinue, 
Edmund and Richard. Henry Bentley, who had served in Kirkintilloch, was now in 
Berwick with William de Bentley. The Felton family had several more men in service 
with Robert and Owen in William's retinue in Berwick and Henry serving there in 
John's retinue. This expansion of garrison service within particular families is nicely 
illustrated by a son following his father into service in 1311/12; Godfrey Ampelford, 
91 E101/68/1/1 1. 
92 E 10 1 /9/18. 
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who was a veteran of Carstairs and Berwick, now in Berwick with another Godfre. y 
who, it is stated, was his son. 
93 
Family service within garrisons can be seen to have taken a firm foothold as 
early as 1300-1304/5 and to have developed and grown by 1311/12. Within garrison 
service as a whole and particularly within individual garrisons members of the same 
family can be found serving together and, more pertinently, mark a growing vocation 
or tradition of service in which sons were following their fathers into garrison service 
once old enough to take up arms. The veterans of 1300-1304/5 did not only bring 
experience to the garrisons of 1311/12 but also their relations, this was one of the 
means by which the increased demand to fill the large garrisons of these years was 
met. This represents another strand of continuity within garrison service. 
The second means by which the service of this early body of identifiable 
garrison men-at-arms can be set in a more long-term context is to make use of the 
various misce any of rolls and lists of names after 1311/12. These are few in number 
but one of the most relevant is the surviving indenture drawn uP for the terms of 
service of the wardens of the Marches in 1319 and which lists the men-at-arms who 
were to serve in this force. 94 There are several familiar names: Thomas Norreys,, the 
former crossbowman turned man-at-arms from Kirkintilloch, still serving as a man-at- 
arms in the Marches eighteen years later; 95 Henry de Bentley, who had served in 
Kirkintilloch from autumn 1301,, had been in Berwick in 1311/12 and by 1319 was 
serving in the retinue of the warden John Cromwell ; 96 also serving were William and 
John Cotes, the former stalwarts of Roxburgh. Including these there are seven men-at- 
arms serving With the wardens in 1319 who can be identified among those who had 
93 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 394,396,397,399,410,411,412. 
94 Raimes, pp. 21-2. 
95 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/1 1/1; Raimes, p. 21. 
96 E101/9/16, m. I; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/1 1/1- Raimes, p. 21. 
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served in garrisons up to eighteen years previously in 1300-130415. Their presence is 
explained by the loss of the major Scottish castles in 1313/14 and consequentlý, the 
loss of the garrisons in which they had traditionally served. That they had found 
employment with the wardens in 1319 illustrates these men remained on the border 
searching for, and in this case finding, a role similar to that which the-y had previously 
been engaged in. Thomas de Bradford was another man-at-arms who served with the 
wardens in 1319 and who had previously been in the Carstairs gamson, entering into 
Berwick and joining the king at Roxburgh. Bradford is noteworthy as he can be 
identified among the lists of knights and men-at-arms of England drawn up in 1324 
where he features as a man-at-arms of Northumberland. 
By use of the wardrobe book for 1299-1300 the careers of some men can be 
traced a little further back. Before entering the new garrison of Kirkintilloch in 1301 
Henry de Bentley, whose career is covered above, had been one of several constables 
with uncovered horses who had been in charge of 900 archers in Benvick during July 
1300.98 Alan de Walingford was in Berwick during November 1300, entered 
Edinburgh in late 1301 where he remained into 1304 and where he was also recorded 
as serving in 1311/12.99 John Bagpuz was another ever present member of the 
Edinburgh garrison from autumn 1301 until December 1303; he had previously served 
in Berwick with 22 fellow men-at-arms from 24 October 1300 and had returned to 
Berwick by 1311/12.100 It is clear that careers could stretch over a lengthy period. John 
97 E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/10/5, m. 1; ElOl/I 1/1; BL Add Mss 8835, fos. 90r-105r, Raimes, p. 
21 , 
Parl. 
Writs, ii, pp. 636-58. The 1324 list is surprisingly devoid of any recognisable men of the garrison 
community. For a brief comment on the shortcomings of this list as well as 
its uses see NI. Prestwich, 
'Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century England', War wid Government in the 
Middle Ages. ed. J. 
Gillingham, J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984). 
98 Lib. Quot., p, 148. Bentley was therefore another soldier who had risen in status whilst in garrison 
service, his elevation to a man-at-arms occurring between July 1300 and autumn 
1301. 
99 Lib. Quot., P. 147; E101/9/16; E101/10/5; E101/10/6; E101/68/1/15; E101/11,1 E101/12/18 
E101/12/20; E101/12/1 1; CDS, iii, app. vii, p, 410. 
100 Lib. Quot., p. 147; E101/9/16, E101/10/5) E101/10/6; E101/68/1/15, ElOI/l 
1/1, E101/12/181 
iii, app. vii, p. 399. 
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de Belton first appears on 17 May 1303 in Edinburgh, serving until 19 November and 
then returning from 9 December into 1304; in 1311/12 he was in Edinburgh and by 
1319 had found service with the wardens of the March. 101 In 1319 John de Enefeld was 
one of the men-at-arms with the wardens; he had previously been a sergeant in 
Linlithgow from at least 1301 until 12 March 1304, had moved to Ber-%ýick by 
1311/12, returned to Berwick in August 1314 as part of the force sent to reinforce it 
against the Scots after Bannockburn and, as a further point of interest, was one of two 
sergeants-at-anns watching over the corpse of Edward 11 in 1327.102 John de Luca, 
another long-serving sergeant in Linlithgow, was also in the force of reinforcements 
sent to Berwick in August 1314.103 Although, due to the limited availability of 
evidence, there are significant gaps in the given examples it is possible to build up an 
overview of the careers of certain men-at-arrns and it is one that demonstrates garrison 
service for these men extended over many years. 
The early rolls and accounts also reveal further details about certain men-at- 
arms involved in garrisoning who are mentioned in other documentation including 
chronicles. They reveal that William Prendergest, pardoned by Edward 11 for all his 
offences on 25 January 1315 due to his gallant but ultimately unsuccessful service in 
holding Jedburgh against the Scots, had previously entered Edinburgh as a hobelar by 
order of John de Segrave on 25 December 1302 and had been among the Berwick 
garrison during 1311/12, information that clearly depicts Prendergest as another long- 
serving garrison soldier. 104 Raymond Caillou is described by Barbour as a Gascon 
101 EIOI/I 1/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/20; E101/12/1 1; CDS, iiiý app. vii, p. 410; Raimes, p. 21. 
102 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/11/1- CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 397- Raimes, p. 
E 159/10 1; 1. Mortimer, The Greatest Traitor: The Life of Sir Roger Mortimer (London, 2004), p. 186. 
103 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/11/1; E159/101, m. 156. This force sent to 
Berwick includes men who had fought at Bannockburn and it is therefore likely that Enefeld and Luca 
had also fought there. 
104 ElOl/l 1/1, m. 18; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 394; CDS, iii, no. 418. Prendergest was therefore another 
hobelar turned man-at-arms. 
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knight who, against orders, led a section of the Berwick garrison on its desperate and 
ill-fated foray to counter starvation on 14 February 1316, an undertaking in which 
Caillou was killed. In fact, as A. A. M. Duncan notes, he was a sergeant in Llnllthgow 
in 1311/12 and to this information can be added the fact that he had also been present 
in Linlithgow as a sergeant from at least September 1302 and had left that garrison on 
6/7 June 1303. Caillou then is one of the few men for whom there is conclusive 
evidence that he was killed whilst in garrison service. 105 Particularly of interest is the 
career of Peter de Spalding due to its dark and treacherous ending. He entered 
Edinburgh as a man-at-arms on 12 February 1302 and, despite a brief interval between 
I September and 25 December, remained there until 8 December 1303 and in 1311/ 12 
appears in the Berwick garrison. Spalding was still in Berwick in 1318 and this is 
known as he was the traitor bribed by the Scots to allow them to scale the section of 
wall where he was on guard at night. This treacherous act led to the fall of the town 
and subsequently the castle as well as to Spalding's own death although at whose 
hands is unknown. 106 The burgesses of Berwick who employed Spalding to defend 
their town had no reason to suspect him due to his impressive record of garrison 
service; his betrayal of Berwick is all the more astounding in light of his previous 
career. 
The petition of Lucas de Barry submitted between 1314 and 1319 highlights a 
career not contained in the rolls and accounts. 107 Barry, a valet of the king's household., 
related that he had served in Lochmaben under John de St. John for three years, under 
105 Bruce, pp. 566-571 (also p. 566, n, 325); ElOI/I 1/1, m. 19; CDS, 
iii, app. vii, p. 411. 
106 E101/11/1; E101/12/18; Bruce pp. 616,620,626. Barbour misnames him as 
Simon Spalding and 
refers to him as a burgess of Berwick, pp. 616-617, n. 1.23. James 
Douglas apparently offered Spalding 
the massive sum of 1800 to undertake this act of treachery. Barbour 
implies Spalding remained with the 
garrison that held out in the castle who, upon their surrender, 
handed him over to the Scots having 
implicated him in a plot to kill Robert Bruce; whatever the reality 
Spalding's treachery led directly to 
his death, Bruce, p. 618, n. 56; p. 626, n. 192-199. 107 CDS, iii, no. 682. 
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John de Castre in the garrison of Dumfries and also in the peel of Linlithgow when it 
was besieged. Twice he had been taken prisoner and heavily ransomed. By the king's 
command Barry stated he had been in Douglas castle under Robert Clifford when it 
had been attacked by James Douglas and Robert Bruce in 1307 and that he had served 
Edward 11 all through his Scottish wars until Bannockburn where he had been taken 
prisoner and ransomed so heavily he had been forced to sell or lease all of his lands. 
This full and arduous career is authenticated by one brief entry in the Linlithgow 
accounts; on 26 February 1303 one Luc' Barri entered Linlithgow, serving for one 
month and leaving on 27 March 1303.108 The extensive garrison career culminating in 
Bannockburn that is related in this petition is one not revealed in the existing accounts 
and rolls and illustrates that the number of men engaged in garrison service was much 
larger and more consistent than that which can be reconstructed working with the 
limited surviving evidence. 
Despite these restrictions there is clear evidence about those, in particular the 
men-at-arms, who performed garrison service in the early years of the fourteenth 
century. The most striking feature is that even in the earliest years an identifiable body 
of men manned these garrisons. This group remained relatively stable with men 
regularly serving for several or more years in the same garrison. There was also a 
pattern of movement within this identifiable garrison community with men moving 
between garrisons and, although less frequent, the movement of men in terms of an 
alteration in their own personal status Within a garrison. The extent of the service of 
these men is again evident in 1311/12 when many were still serving but now with 
additional members of their family alongside them, a feature which shows that despite 
the absence of actual evidence there was continuity in those engaged in garrison 
108 ElOl/I 1/1, m. 19. A rather unfortunate piece of timing on Barry's part! This places the first siege of 
Linlithgow within the same one month period, an attack that has only ever previously been dated to 
cearly' 1303, c. f The King's Works, i, pp. 414-15. 
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service between 1300-1304/5 and 1311/12. Most striking of all is the length of time 
these men remained in garrison service with over 40 serving for at least six to twelve 
years and where further evidence is available there are several cases of men engaged 
for approximately eighteen years. If it had not been for the wholesale loss of Scottish 
castles in 1313/14 there would have been many more examples of such exceptionally 
long-term service. 
A large number of men-at-arms who took up garrison service entered into a 
long-term commitment. Indeed it is natural that they should seek the lengthy sen, ice 
that garrisoning offered as it provided them with a virtually permanent paid position in 
military service which lasted throughout the seasons and year after year which 
consequently gave them the means for their own subsistence. Garrison service quickly 
established itself as a military profession and as such right from the start these men 
effectively became professional garrison soldiers. However it must be remembered that 
this service provided them with the means to subsist but little else; in the first quarter 
of the fourteenth century it was a particularly dangerous and violent profession. John 
de Ryhull was serving in Carstairs around Pentecost 1302 and having survived the loss 
of that castle entered into Berwick with the rest of the garrison in 1303; eleven years 
later his career in garrison service - and his life - came to an abrupt end when he was 
slain during the Scottish assault on Roxburgh in 1314.109 The dangers for the long- 
serving garrison soldier in these years were immediate and daunting; heavy ransom at 
best, maiming or death at worst. Yet despite this garrison service for these men had 
become and remained a way of life. 
Another member of the ill-fated Carstairs gamson neatly summanses the 
attachment of these men to garrison service despite its dangers. In 1305/6 Godfrey de 
109 EIOI/68/1/(25D); E101/1 1/1, m. 7; CDS, iii, no. 358, 
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Ampelford requested the grant of a bailliary, constabulary or forestry in England or 
Scotland as a reward for serving the king all through his Scottish war. He had lost all 
his possessions at the onset of the war whilst in Banff castle. An ever present member 
of the Carstairs garrison from 1301 he too had entered into Berwick on the loss of 
Carstairs and had been part of the force that joined the king at Roxburgh for the 1303 
campaign. Whilst in Carstairs he had been maimed of an eye. Garrison service had lost 
Ampelford both his possessions and an eye leaving him an impoverished and 
disfigured man-at-arms. It is not known whether his request was successful but what is 
clear is that he remained in garrison service and was in Berwick in 1311/12. This time 
he had his son serving alongside him. ' 10 Despite all he had suffered, the hardships and 
the risks, Ampelford believed garrison service offered enough in terms of subsistence 
to expose his son to its dangers. A pennanent position with regular wages brought 
many men into garrison service and provided it with a remarkable degree of continwty 
in service right from the very earliest years. 
110 CDS, ii, no. 1880; E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/68/1/25(D); E101/10/5, m. 1; E101/1 1/1, m. 7, CDS, iii, 
app. vii, p. 396. 
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(ii) Garrison Service in Mid-Century 
The three first-rate Scottish castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Stirling were retaken 
and rebuilt by the English in the mid-1330s and immediately upon their recapture 
substantial garrisons were installed within them. Although by May 1342 all three had 
again fallen to the Scots the intervening years during which garrisons were retained 
within them have left a rich seam of accounts and rolls from which an analysis of 
garrison service can be attempted. ' Although most are not as detailed as Weston's pay 
books it is possible to analyse the evidence from mid-century in relation to the patterns 
of service that have been seen to exist in the early years of the century and to assess 
whether a core of long-term service was still a prevalent feature of these gamsons. 
During these years the constables of both Stirling and Roxburgh, respectively 
Thomas Rokeby and William de Felton, remained in command throughout and as the 
constable has been seen to have an influence on the personnel of a garrison it is logical 
to first assess the continuity of service within these castles. The first roll for Stirling 
covers January 1336-7, the second 16 July 1339 - 26 January 1340 With the third 
following on and ending with the loss of the castle in April 1342. In each roll the entire 
garrison is named and the total number of men-at-arms amounts to 82,53 and 58 
respectively. The gap between the first and second rolls is approximately two and a 
half years yet 20 men-at-arms appear on both rolls which indicates they had been 
present in the garrison throughout that time, their presence from 1336 until January 
1340 equating to almost four years continuous service. Seven of these men-at-arms are 
still present on the final roll and consequently had remained within the Stirling 
garrison for approximately six years, serving from the reoccupation of the castle until 
' They are as follows: E101/19/21 (Edinburgh, 1335); E101/19/24 (Edinburgh 1335-6,1336-7)1 
E101/19/27 (Roxburgh, 1335,1336-7); E101/19/40 (Stirling, 1336-7); E101/22/20 (Edinburgh and 
Stirling, 1339-40); E101/23/1 (Edinburgh 1340-1, Stirling 1340-2); E101/22/40 (Roxburgh, 1340-2). A 
general analysis of these garrisons has been carried out, see Leaver, 'A Long Way 
from Home"', and p. 
112 above, n. I- 
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its surrender. Another two men-at-arms who featured in the first roll reappear in the 
final roll having been absent during 1339-40; 2 this suggests service in another garrison 
and indeed one of these men, Edmund de Hastings, appears in the Edinburgh garrison 
in 1339-40. Clearly an element of long-term service was therefore present Within the 
Stirling garrison. 
However it is also evident that there was a great deal of transient service within 
the garrison with the most notable feature being the departure of thirteen of the 20 
men-at-arms who had served from 1336 until 1340 all of whom appear to have left 
garrison service entirely after four years of service. The turnover of personnel is also 
substantial with only 20 of the original 82 men-at-arms still serving four years later 
which means that by July 1339 there were 33 new men-at-arms in the garrison. Again, 
although there is continuity between those serving in 1339-40 and 1340-2 with 21 
men-at-arms appearing in both rolls (including the seven who served throughout), this 
still means that 32 had left by 1340 with 37 brought in as replacements during 1340-2 
This constant change in personnel is the dominant feature of the men-at-arms within 
the garrison but it does exist around a definite core of long-term service and the co- 
existence of the two is reminiscent of the core of stability surrounded by movement 
which was the key feature of the garrisons of the early fourteenth century. 
Roxburgh exhibits a similar pattern of service. The earliest evidence is a 
financial account detailing the men-at-arms serving in the garrison broken down into 
several six week periods encompassing 16 March - 22 November 1335.3 The first 
period nairnes 23 men-at-arms and fifteen of these served until 22 November, another 
four remained until October while two who entered on 26 April were still present in 
November which altogether amounts to a substantial degree of continuity over these 
EIOI/19/40, m. 12, EIOI/22/20, m. 3; EIOI/23/1, m. 5. 
EIOI/19/27, mm. 6-8. 
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eight months. This detailed account is followed by a roll listing the names of the 
garrison for 1336 - January 1337 and although it is a virtually consecutive document 
only twelve men-at-arms from 1335 remain in the garrison with a significant turnover 
of personnel having taken place with 26 men-at-arms entering the gamson. ' There 
follows a gap of approximately three years until the rolls for 1340-2 and just two men- 
at-arms from 1335-7 are still present, John Blese and John Scot both having served in 
Roxburgh, presumably continuously, for seven years from its recapture until its loss to 
assault on 30 March 1342. There are a ftniher ten men-at-arms from the roll of 1336-7 
present with six remaining until the loss of the castle and four leaving at various dates 
between late 1341 and early 1342 and who had therefore served in Roxburgh for 
approximately six years. John Coupland, later to become constable of Roxburgh, was 
present in 1336-7, absent in 1340-1 but had returned by 1341-2 again suggesting a 
more long-term commitment to garrison service. The final roll actually contains two 
., 
the first from 4 June 1340 -3 June 1341 and the second following on until accounts, 
the end of March 1342. The latter contains 75 men-at-arms and of these a massive 69 
are from the former roll which totalled 70 men-at-arms and which demonstrates a 
nl, % 
5 
remarkable degree of continwty over these years. 
In contrast to Stirling and Roxburgh three different constables commanded 
Edinburgh between 1335 and 1341 which was not a factor likely to promote continuity 
of service. Four rolls exist for Edinburgh and only one man-at-arms, Roger de 
., appears 
in all four serving under each constable with a record of service of Coddeford, 
over five years from the capture of the castle until its loss while another four men-at- 
6 
arms served for between five and six years from October 1335 until the castle's oss. 
The most striking feature of Edinburgh is the near wholesale change in personnel in 
4 E101/19/27,9. 
5EI01/22/40,2. 
6 E101/19/21, mm. 1; CDS, in, pp. 360,363; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4. 
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October 1335 which marked the changeover from Thomas Roscelin to John Stirling. 
Of the 34 named men-at-arms listed as serving with Roscelin in September only six 
remained under Stirling in October with 28 having left the garrison after just one 
month's service. 7 This may partly be explained by these 34 men being classed as 
Roscelin's retinue but the near complete removal of the onginal 1335 gamson is 
similar to events in Roxburgh and suggests that the men immediately tasked with 
consolidating the retaken castles were those readily available and that they were not 
intended to garrison the castles in the long-term. Yet even under John Stirling a 
significant turnover of men-at-arms continued with only 25 of the 59 present in 1335-6 
appearing among the 63 retained during 1336-7 which translates to over half the men- 
at-arms leaving and 38 entering which is a substantial degree of change considering 
these were consecutive years under the same constable and indeed this is remarkably 
similar to the proportion of continuity and change seen later in Edinburgh between 
1339-40 and 1340-2.8 
Rokeby was in command by the time of the roll covering July 1339 - January 
1340 and considering the two year gap since the previous roll along with the change of 
constable it is not surprising that only twelve of the 63 men-at-arms from 1336-7 were 
still in Edinburgh and, with the new garrison also totalling 63 men-at-anns, 51 new 
men-at-arms had consequently entered with just 19% of the garrison's men-at-arms 
having served under John Stirling. A consecutive roll for 1340-1 follows and of the 49 
men-at-arms listed there are 28 from the previous roll with slightly over half of those 
from 1339-40 remaining in the garrison. 9 The almost equal rates of continuity and 
change are again reminiscent of the same rolls for Stirling however both contrast with 
the overwhelming degree of continuity within Roxburgh between 1340-1 and 
1341-2. 
7 Two knights also remained the same. E101/19/21, m. 1; CDS, Ili, p. 360. 
8 CDS, iii, pp. 360-3. 
9 E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4. 
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As with service during the early years of the century the pattern of a core of 
continuity surrounded by change is common among the men-at-arms serving in all 
three garrisons during mid-century. However the substantial size of these garrisons 
combined with the men-at-arms being named in their entirety enables a complete 
analysis and this emphasises the striking rate of turnover in their ranks even in 
consecutive years when the constable remained the same. The movement of men-at- 
arms into and out of garrisons appears to be at a greater volume than in the early years 
nor do large numbers of these men move into other garrisons. Yet despite this there is 
still a core of long-term service measured in years during which significant groups of 
men remained in the same garrison and, although smaller in proportion to those on the 
move, these experienced garrison soldiers were carving out a professional career in 
wartime garrisons. 
In mid-century these conclusions can further be set into the context of the 
garrison as a whole as the majority of the rolls also name the hobelars and archers, the 
latter mainly mounted,, within the garrisons. Of most immediate interest is that of 
Edinburgh under Roscelin in September 1335 where the archers appear in two separate 
groups, 33 being from the West Riding of Yorkshire and 29 from York itself, both 
groups led by individuals who are classed and paid among the men-at-arms, this itself 
being a unique occasion in which the rolls specify men as coming from a definite 
area. 10 That they were drafted in from their localities suggests that their appearance in 
the garrison was a temporary measure enacted to secure the castle and this is bome out 
by just one of these archers, John Plumpton from York, remaining in October when 
John Stirling took command. These archers were paid for 49 days service and then 
10 E 10 1/19/2 1, m. 1. All those from York were mounted. 
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departed, presumably back to their homes. " That all but one left Edinburgh together 
with the large-scale change among the men-at-arms at this date demonstrates how 
wholesale the turnover in personnel was when the castle changed constable. The rolls 
for 1335-6 and 1336-7 name 67 and 58 mounted archers respectively and 30 appear in 
both which is in direct contrast to the near total change in 1335 and indicates that a 
significant proportion of those who entered under John Stirling did so on a more long- 
term basis, serving for two years. In 133940, after a gap of two years and "th 
Rokeby now constable, only two of these 30 remained in the garrison while nineteen 
of the 71 archers serving in 1339-40 were also present in 1340-41. As the latter 
indicates there was an even greater turnover in personnel among the archers yet there 
is still a definable thread of long-term service averaging two years and exemplified by 
John Plumpton who remained in Edinburgh until its loss thus serving for almost six 
years. 
12 
There is slightly more continuity among the mounted archers in Stirling wbere 
six served for approximately all six years. Including these there are twelve of the 80 
archers from 1336-7 amongst the 59 for 1339-40 and of the latter seventeen were 
present amongst the 65 of 1340-2.13 In 1336-7 40 hobelars were in Roxburgh and by 
1340-1 five of these were still present while another two from 1336-7 had rejoined 
them by 1341-2 which amounts to a length of service of between five and six years. 
The accounts for the hobelars and mounted archers in Roxburgh in 1340-1 and 1341-2 
are astonishingly consistent with 49 of the 50 present in the former appearing in the 
latter which displays the same remarkable degree of continuity as the same garrison's 
men-at-arms in these years with nearly all serving for at least two years until 
Roxburgh 
11 Suggesting that they were undertaking the traditional required service of approximately 
forty days. 
12 E101/19/24, mm. 12,23; E101/22/20, m. 3-, E101/23/1, m. 4. 
13 E101/19/40, m. 12, E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, in. 5. 
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fell. 14 In summary the hobelars and mounted archers display the same coexistence of 
continuity and change that was prevalent among the men-at-arms and which points 
towards a large movement of men into and out of garrisons that operated around a 
smaller core of longer service which ranged from between two to six years xvith the 
upper limit set by the loss of the castles themselves. Stirling serves to encapsulate this 
core of long-term service in that seven men-at-arms, six mounted archers and another 
two soldiers served throughout its entire occupation, these fifteen men serving for 
approximately six years in the one garrison. 
The two additional soldiers who served continuously within Stirling were Alex 
de Gipthorp, and John de Harlowe. In 1336-7 both appear among the large number of 
watchmen in Stirling but by 1339-40 they were classed among the mounted archers 
where they remained throughout 1340-2.15 Obviously they underwent a change of role 
but whether this involved a change in status is unclear as the pay rate of a watchman 
and mounted archer were frequently identical. Indeed Gipthorp and Harlowe are 
noteworthy as there is little if any movement in status or role among the gamsons of 
mid-century and there is certainly no clear evidence of hobelars or mounted archers 
rising to become men-at-arms or of the latter declining in status. In contrast to the 
earl *II W1 ier years there is no evidence of any such vertical movements 'thin these 
garrisons and the large volume of men-at-arms entering and leaving the garrisons 
indicates that there was no shortage of availability among troops of this type and that 
garrisons brought them in if needed rather than promoting them from within. 
The rolls are more productive in providing evidence of the horizontal 
movement of men between garrisons. A notable figure is Roger Banastre, leader of the 
archers from York, who entered Edinburgh in 1335 and who had moved to Stirling 
bN 
14 E 10 1/ 19/27,9; E 10 1/22/40, m. 2. 
15 E101/19/40,12; E101/22/20, m. 3, E101/23/1, m. 5. 
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January 1336 where he was classed among the men-at-arms. 16 John de Leche and John 
Wythe were both hobelars/archers in Edinburgh during 1335-7 who subsequntly 
moved to Stirling, Leche appearing in the latter by 1339-40 and now classed as a 
watchman and Wythe having moved by 1340-2.17 Hugo Martell was a mounted archer 
of the Stirling garrison in 1336-7 and had moved to Edinburgh by 1339 where he 
served until 1341, his movement reversing that of the three described above. 18 The 
previously mentioned man-at-arms Edmund de Hastings was in Stirling during 1336-7, 
Edinburgh between July 1339-40 and by 1340-2 had returned to Stirling. ' 9 This 
interchange of personnel between Edinburgh and Stirling should be expected as bv 
1339 Rokeby had also become constable of Edinburgh and it is natural that he would 
find it expedient to transfer men between the two garrisons. Martell is a case in point, 
featuring as the first mounted archer in both rolls for Edinburgh which indicates that he 
was the senior archer within the garrison and that Rokeby had transferred him from 
Stirling to become de facto leader of the Edinburgh archers. Interestingly this 
interchange does not extend to Roxburgh and only one garrison soldier, the 
hobelar/archer William de Spens, moved between Roxburgh and these garrisons. 
Indeed Spens' six years of service extended across all three major garrisons serving 
within Roxburgh during 1336-7, Edinburgh 1339-40 and Stirling 1340-1, a record 
unique to Spens alone in mid-century. 20 
Considering the size of these garrisons and the detailed evidence 
for their 
personnel it is clear that movement between garrisons was not as pronounced as earlIer 
in the century. Again, as with changes in role and status, the mid-century garrisons 
appear to have lost something of the circulating communitY of garrison soldiers xhich 
16 EIOI/19/21, m. 1; EIOI/19/40, M. 12. 
17 EIOI/19/24, mm. 12,23; EIOI/22/20, m. 3; EIOI/23/1, m. 
5. 
18 EIOI/19/40,12; EIOI/22/20, m. 3; EIOI/23/1,4. 
19 EIOI/19/40,12; EIOI/22/20, m. 3, EIOI/23/1,5. 
20 EIOI/19/27,9; EIOI/22/20, m. 3; EIOI/23/1, m, 5. 
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existed earlier, the high proportion of turnover among their ranks seeing new troops 
enter the garrison from outside this community while those that departed did not 
necessarily go to another garrison but either served in the field or returned home. The 
only pattern of movement that can be detected is that between Stirling and Edinburgh 
which is directly related to the fact that Rokeby was joint constable of both castles. It 
is also evident that no discernible groups moved between garrisons with the only 
evidence for this again coming from Rokeby's joint constableship when ten mounted 
archers moved to Edinburgh from Stirling in January 1340 .21 There is a sense that for 
significant proportions of these men garrison service was more transient than before 
being a temporary phase of their military service. 
Yet this is not to deny that a core of long-term service undoubtedly existed and 
for these troops garrisoning was as much a family profession as it had been for those 
veterans serving in the century's early years. Familial relationships between those 
serving in garrisons, particularly within the same garrison, are extremely numerous and 
reference to several examples from Roxburgh is sufficient to illustrate this. Among the 
men-at-arms serving in 1340-1 were Andrew Baddeby and his son Edward; Edward de 
Letham and his son Alex; Thomas de Thes' and his son William along Mth Gregory 
and Adam del Home. The hobelars and archers included Nicholas de Knaresdall and 
his son William and Thomas de Chireden and his son William while in 1341-2 John 
and Adam Taillour were hobelars as were John Tywe, John Tywe junior, Hugh Tywe 
and John son of Ralph Tywe. That sons were subsequently joining their fathers iin 
garrison service can be seen in three men-at-arms who had served in Roxburgh since 
1336-7 being accompanied by their sons in 1340-2: Roger Corbet now with Richard 
alongside him, Thomas de Whitfeld joined by his son Robert and Thomas de Espeley 
21 E101/19/40, M. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3. 
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by his son William while among the hobelars/archers was John de Esplee who was 
surely another family member. 22 Quite clearly for many of those to whorn garrison 
service was effectively a profession it also remained a family occupation. 
Links can also be seen between the soldiers of the garrisons and their 
constables. During the tenure of John Stirling as constable of Edinburgh the garrison 
contained the men-at-arms Alexander and Gilbert Stirling and Thomas Medilton 
(Middleton) while among the archers were William and Robert Medilton. Another 
archer was Robert de Bothecastre (Bewcastle) and among the men-at-arms was 
Mongow de Bothcastre. 23 All of these had clear connections to John Stirling With the 
Middleton family being his relations by marriage while the Cumberland manor of 
Bewcastle was a possession of Stirling's through marriage and this personal 
relationship is reinforced by none of these men remaining in Edinburgh under Rokeby. 
In 1336-7 Rokeby's castle of Stirling contained Thomas Rokeby, man-at-arms, while 
in 1339-40 Thomas de Rokeby 'nepos' and John de Rokeby appear as men-at-arms in 
his new command of Edinburgh. The lands of Rokeby were centred near Bamard 
Castle and the man-at-arms Robert de Castro Bernard served in Edinburgh during 
1339-41, William de Bernardcastell, archer, in Stirling during 1339-40 and Thomas de 
Bernardcastell was a watchman in Stirling throughout 1340-2. Just south of Bamard 
Castle is Bowes and the Stirling garrison in 1340-2 contained an archer called William 
de Bowes. 24 
Immediately prior to becoming constable of Stirling In 1336 Rokeby had been 
serving with the king's army in Scotland with an individually named retinue of 
five 
men-at-arms and nine archers and it is logical to assume that these men would 
feature 
22 E 10 1/19/27, m. 9; E 10 1/22/40, m. 2. 
23 CDS, iii, pp. 360-3; E101/19/24, mm. 12,23. 
24 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5. 
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among his garrisons . 
25 The first man-at-arms was the same Thomas de Rokeby who 
served in Stirling in 1336-7 and, appearing as the first named man-at-arms, occupied a 
position of seniority among these men, most probably acting as deputy constable. The 
name under his in Stirling is John de Ark, another man-at-arms who had served in 
Rokeby's retinue, and who again occupied a position of seniority in Stirling. He 
remained in Stirling during 133940 when Rokeby and his fellow knights moved to his 
new command of Edinburgh and , in the absence of any knights, Ark features as the 
first named individual which indicates that he was commanding Stirling on behalf of 
Rokeby, a likelihood enhanced by his apparent connections to Rokeby due to his 
service among the latter's personal retinue. 26 John de Lincoln served in Rokebv's 
retinue and subsequently remained in Stirling as a man-at-arms but by 1339 had left 
garrison service. The fourth man, Thomas Hunt, served in Stirling throughout 1336-7 
and 1339-40 before transferring to Rokeby's second command of Edinburgh during 
1340-1.27 Strangely the fifth man-at-arms,. William de Shirbum,, appears to have never 
served in any garrison and nor did any of the nine archers which suggests that they did 
not possess close links to Rokeby despite serving within his retinue. 
Another interesting figure serving under Rokeby is Gilbert de Carlisle who first 
appears as the sixth named man-at-arms in Stirling in 1336-7. By 1339, after the 
knights, he was the second named man-at-arms in Edinburgh however by 1340-1 
Rokeby and his knights had retuned to Stirling and Gilbert de Carlisle now appears as 
the first named man in the Edinburgh garrison indicating that he was Rokeby's deputy 
. 
28 eature about the senior there when it was lost to the Scots in 1341 The intriguing f 
positions of command apparently occupied by Ark and Carlisle is that Rokeby 
did not 
25 E 10 1/19/40, m. II- 
26 E101/19/40, mm. 11-12; E101/22/20, m. 3. 
27 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4. 
28 Ibid. 
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appoint any of the knights who served with him to command the castle from which he 
was absent, three knights residing with Rokeby in Edinburgh during 1339-40 while 
Ark was the senior man in Stirling and two knights serving in Stirling alongside 
Rokeby during 1340-1 while Carlisle was the senior figure in Edinburgh. Clearly both 
men-at-arms were experienced garrison soldiers, in effect having served a similar 
apprenticeship to those appointed constable of the castles of northern England after 
1314, and both were men whom Rokeby trusted to obey his orders and exercise 
authority over those they commanded. That both Ark and Carlisle were appoInted 
rather than the knights of the garrison indicates that it was not unusual for a constable 
to appoint such trusted men-at-arms as de facto commander of a garrison during his 
own personal absence. 
Finally attention must be turned to the annotations made to the rolls themselves 
to search for further details about these garrisons. The roll for Stirling dated 1336-7 
reveals that one knight, four men-at-arms and one watchman all left on 13 June 1-3 336 
while the same day also saw two knights, eight watchmen and a substantial 
reinforcement of 40 men-at-arms enter the garrison. One watchman died on 22 June 
1336 but there are no other recorded deaths nor is there any evidence to indicate any 
movement among the archers. In the six months of 1339 detailed in the following roll 
there is no evidence of any movement throughout the entire garrison which contrasts 
with the same roll's account for Edinburgh which notes that a knight and five men-at- 
arms left the garrison on 20 September 133 9.29The roll for 1340-1 includes a group of 
25 men-at-anns which entered Edinburgh on I March 1341 and 30 archers who 
entered on 20 January 1341. Strangely no movement out of the garrison is recorded 
nor apparently did anyone die despite this being a period when the castle was 
29 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. I One of the men-at-arms had previously entered 
Edinburgh on 
the same date as the knight John de Whitfeld. 
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increasingly at the forefront of the war. The same roll for Stirling is more detailed %kith 
thirteen men-at-arms and 26 archers entering the garrison on 30 June 13341 and fifteen 
men-at-arms and twelve archers entering the garrison on 20 January 1342 with a 
further four men entering individually on various dates. Most interesting are the deaths 
recorded in Stirling of which the most prominent was the knight John de Stricheley 
who died on 10 October 1341 while William Brumpton, man-at-arms, died on 26 
January 1341; three archers who died are all listed together at the end of the roll, one 
dying in 1340 and the other two in 1341 . 
30 The accounts for Roxburgh during 1340-2 
are notable for the detailed reference to various dates on which men, either 
individually or in groups, left the garrison in late 1341 and early 1342, evidence that 
the strength of the garrison was declining in the months immediately preceding its loss. 
However no reinforcements are specified as entering Roxburgh nor are any of the 
garrison recorded as dying in the course of these two hard pressed years. 31 
In many ways the annotated details included in these rolls are enigmatic in 
what they reveal about garrison service. The apparent uniformity in the composition of 
the Edinburgh gaffison between January 1340 and April 1341 With no one leaving 
certainly seems dubious especially as reinforcements were entering the garrison while 
the six months of 1339 in which there was no movement whatsoever within Stirling is 
similarly doubtful. The sheer scarcity of deaths among the garrisons is particularly 
strange considering these were men at the forefront of the war and yet the account for 
Stirling is quite specific that only five members of the garrison died in the two years 
between January 1340 and Apnil 1342 while the almost total absence of any record of 
deaths for Edinburgh and Roxburgh is extremely mysterious. When compared to the 
account books of John de Weston for the early years of the century there is an 
30 EIOI/23/1, mm, 4-5. 31 EIOI/22/40, m. 2. 
1 I Ij 
unmistakable sense that the rolls of mid-century do not quite give a fullý, detailed and 
accurate account of the intricacies of garrison service in these years. 32 
What these rolls do show is that the garrisons of mid-centurv were very 
reminiscent of those of the early century in terms of their patterns of sen-ice ýýith a 
large number of men serving for between one and two years together with a smaller 
but invaluable core of men undertaking long-term service which in over twentv cases 
encompassed the entire six years during which these castles were reoccupied by 
English garrisons. Operating in conjunction with this was a substantial number of 
troops whose service measured from between a month to a year and to whom garrison 
service was only ever a temporary employment. It is this transient element of gamson 
service which is most noticeable in mid-century with its regular large-scale turnover in 
personnel which was so frequent that it inhibited fluid movement both between 
garrisons and in individual status and prevented it from approaching the extent to 
which such movement was prevalent in the earlier garrisons. As the annotated accounts 
show this turnover of personnel was again centrally organised with groups of men 
leaving and entering the garrisons together on set dates although the scale and 
frequency of the turnover in mid-century suggests that this was a more common 
feature of the mid-century garrisons. However it is important that this should not 
obscure the clear element of long-term service within these garrisons which saw 
fathers bring their sons into garrisoning and in which garrison service was still a 
profession which could no doubt count amongst its ranks some of the most 
experienced men-at-arms of the English realm. 
32 A comparison of these rolls with the wardrobe account for the same period contains similar enigmatic 
discrepancies. For instance whereas the wardrobe book largely matches the numbers contained in 
Edinburgh during September 1335 those for 1335-6 vary significantly: 5 knights as opposed to 7,55 
men-at-arms compared to 83; 67 hobelars rather than 60. If the wardrobe book excludes those men-at- 
arms classed as the constable's companions then there is still a discrepancy of six. 
This problematic mix 
of near matches and large discrepancies is true for all garrisons when these rolls are considered 
alongside the wardrobe accounts, see BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 248,,, --249r. 
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fifl) Garrison Service in the Later Fourteenth Centurv 
The survival of consecutive documents that allow a detailed analysis of garrison 
service in both early- and mid-century are extremely rare chance survivals and do not 
occur again after the 1340s. There are a handful of accounts and rolls for Roxburgh in 
which the garrison is named but these are separated by a significant number of vears 
and are nothing approaching consecutive; as such singular documents they provide no 
information that can significantly aid the study of garrison service. ' To gain an insight 
into service in this period it is therefore necessary to turn to another source of 
evidence, the protections which name the men-at-arms who were serving in the last 
remaining stronghold other than Berwick, the castle of Roxburgh. 
Letters of protection come with their own particular problems as a source of 
information. The most obvious is that they reveal the intention of men to serve in a 
certain place or with a certain captain and do not necessarily mean that that service did 
in fact subsequently take place. This problem is exacerbated by men with property 
fraudulently taking out protections in order to delay legal proceedings against them 
while never actually intending to undertake the claimed military service. Indeed the 
provenance of protections as a source for garrison service in this later period might 
seem to be cast into doubt when it is realised that the later fourteenth century, and 
garrisons in particular, were prone to such unreliable practices. However it appears that 
the prominence of evidence for these trends was due to a tightening up of procedures 
to protect against them and consequently despite the susceptibility of protections to 
I There is a retinue roll of Roxburgh for 1380-1382 (EIOI/531/29) and then another 
for 1399-1401 
(EIOI/42/40). The former is during the constableship of Matthew Redman and there is a roll 
immediately prior to this when Redman was in charge of Carlisle castle 
but any useful comparison of 
these men is prohibited by the poor quality of the latter roll (E 10 1/3 9/11 
). 
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fraud and the fact that they describe intentions rather than actual service there is little 
reason to fundamentally distrust the information they convey. 
The relevant protections appear on the Scottish RoIIS3 and although these cover 
the entire century there are signif Icantly more that concern garrisons in the later 
decades of the century. As the incompleteness of protections is one of their greatest 
4 
shortcomings, whether it be for a garrison, a retinue or an army, it is not unusual that 
these protections only name some of those who served and do not come near to 
allowing any kind of reconstruction of the entirety of the garrison at a given time. 
Instead where the name of a man can be found in more than one protection a snapshot 
of their career is briefly glimpsed and a thorough reading of the protection lists reveals 
several men who were engaged in garrison service. Again this only illuminates a part 
of their career leaving unfilled gaps but it is from the multiple protections of these men 
that the pattern of garrison service later in the century can be provisionally determined. 
The protections provide a total of 32 men, almost exclusively men-at-arms, for 
whom there is more than one entry and more than one appearance in a garrison. Out of 
these 32 there are two men, Nicholas de Rigby of Lancashire and Robert de 
Belyngham (possibly from Bellingham in Northumberland) whose careers stand out 
markedly from all others (fig. 4). Rigby has the greatest number of protections, a 
substantial total of nine, that run from November 1384 until September 1397, 
extending over a period of thirteen years. Each protection is for service 
in either the 
Berwick or Roxburgh garrison and at times they run consecutively throughout these 
years, a separate protection appearing for each year between 1386 and 
1390. All of the 
Protections were for a year and in 1387-9 they fit perfectly With each one 
dated 
2 ghts. These ideas and the limitations and uses of protections are comprehensively 
covered in Ayton, Knj, 
and Warhorses, pp. 157-161. 3 Calendared in CDS, v, pt. ii, pp. 395-579. 4 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 159. 
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Fiaure 4: 
Protections Illustrating Garrison Service in the Later Fourteenth 
Centurl 
Robert de Belynii 
zham: 
(CDS, v, no. 3935) 26 November, 1364. Defending Roxburgh castle vOth Alan del 
Strother; for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 3978) 28 April, 1372. Defending Berwick castle: for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 3988) 9 May, 1373. Defending Jedburgh castle; for one year. 
(Ibid, no. 4023) 24 May, 1376. Defending Berwick castle with Henry, Lord 
Percy, keeper; for one year. 
(Ibid.. no. 4090) 11 Februaly, 1382. Defending Berwick castle vAth William de 
Risseby, keeper; for one year. 
Nicholas de Rigby (of Lancashire): 
(CDS, v, no. 4148) 3 November, 1384. Defending Berwick castle with the earl of 
Northumberland; for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 4253) 17 July, 1386, Defending Berwick town with Thomas Talbot 
(and Richard Tempest); for one year. 
ITLid. 
ýJv . no. 
4297) 23 February, 1387. Defending Berwick town with Richad 
Tempest; for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 4345) 18 Februarv, 1388. Defending Roxburgh castle with Thomas 
Swinburne, keeper; for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 4388) 11 Februaly, 1389. With the earl of Northumberland, captaln of 
Berwick castle; for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 4448) 28 January. 1390. DefendIng Berwick castle wIth the earl of 
Northumberland; for one year. 
(Ihid., no. 4496) 11 Julv, 1394. Defending the town and castle of 
Berwick with 
the earl of Northumberland; for one year. 
(Ibid, no. 4530) 4 July, 1396. DefendIng Berwick town with 
Henry Percy, the 
son, keeper of town; for one year. 
(Ibid., no. 4555) 24 September 1397. Defending Roxburgh castle with 
John 
, 1.59 /I Stanley, keeper; for one year. 
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between 11-23 February while those for 1394 and 1396 also tie together, both dating 
from July and suggesting another, now lost, protection for 1395. There is an element of 
overlapping in those for 1386 and 1387 - the former dated July and to last for a year 
and the latter breaking this year of service being dated in February - and similarly for 
the last two years of 1396 and 1397. This inconsistency in the full year not always 
elapsing before the appearance of another protection does not mean they are unreliable 
but more accurately reflects the fact that there had been an alteration in service, in this 
case a change in the captain of the fortification with Tempest taking over from Talbot 
in 1387 and in 1397 a change of fortification with Rigby entering into Roxburgh. 
These nine protections provide the fullest account of a career in garrisons in this later 
period. 
It is certainly a striking career. Rigby can be seen to have been almost 
permanently engaged in garrison service and the assumption must be that in the few 
gaps that do exist in these years he was also present in garrisons. His service extended 
over a period of at least thirteen years and was limited to the two major fortifications 
still in English hands, seven of his protections being for Berwick and two for 
Roxburgh. Rigby's movement between the two is indicative of a man whose 
profession was garrisoning these fortresses against the Scots and proves conclusively 
that garrison service as a career, indeed as a profession, existed in the last decades of 
the fourteenth century. 
The career of Robert de Belyngham supports this. After Rigby he is the 
individual attributed with the most protections, a total of five, three of which 
encompass service in Berwick, one for Roxburgh and the other a rare record of service 
in Jedburgh. There are only two consecutive protections, the dates of which are late 
April 1372 and early May 1373, these being followed by a gap of three years until the 
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1376 protections and then another gap of six years until the last extant date of Februar-Y 
1382. Another blank of six years exists between the 1372 protection and the first in 
which Belyngharn is named, serving in Roxburgh and dated late November 1364. 
These voids of information in Belyngham's career deny any confident attempt at 
determining the permanency of his service in garrisons other than to say that i it is likel-v 
he was continuously engaged in the mid-1370s. However, as with Rigby, it is clear that 
whether permanent or semi-permanent Belyngham was IIM ice ga 'son servi 
over a period of at least eighteen years. There is no doubt that the surviving protections 
of these two men provide definite evidence of long-term garrison service. 
Other careers are suggestive of long-term service. William Ripon, parson 
(without doubt occupying the role of chaplain within the garrison), had a protection for 
service in Roxburgh dated 30 April 1371 and a second dated 24 May 1373, the latter 
for Berwick and intended to last for a year. These dates suggest continuous service 
between 1371 and 1374 albeit in different garrisons. There is also a third protection 
from 23 April 1377 again for a year in Berwick; the month tallies With those in the 
previous protections and suggests continuous service but additional information in the 
1377 protection raises considerable doubt about this as Ripon is described as 'lately 
5 
parson of St. Martin's in Mikelgate, York' . This 
implies that Ripon's service was not 
completely continuous and that after his earlier service in garrisons he had spent a 
period of time as parson in York before once again returning to garrison service. The 
three protections of Henry Strother, esquire, date from November 1394, June 1400 and 
March 1403 respectively. 6 The two gaps of six and then three years make It Impossible 
to deduce the permanency of his service however each protection is for Roxburgh and 
each time the castle was under a different keeper. Despite the sigp-ificant blanks it is 
' CDS, v, pt. ii, nos. 3972,3989,4033. 
6 Ibid, nos. 4499,4601,4667. 
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difficult to avoid the conclusion that Strother was a Permanent soldier of the Roxburgh 
garrison, the protections widely-spaced evidence of what was in fact continuous 
service in that garrison. 
There are a further six men whose protections span a significant number of 
years but with no information in between. All but two of these cases are based on only 
two existing protections. John Skelton, an esquire of Newcastle, had a protection for 
one year's service in Roxburgh in February 1401 and another for Berwick seventeen 
7 
years later in March 1418 . As an esquire from Newcastle it would be no surprise to 
find that Skelton had a long record of service in these garrisons and it is entirely 
possible that it could extend over seventeen years yet on the basis of a mere two 
protections garrison service could just as easily have been an occasional and possibly 
infrequent activity in which Skelton was engaged. This vagueness and ambiguity fits 
for the remaining five men. The protections of John Toppeclif, citizen of York, are for 
Roxburgh in 1389 and subsequently Berwick in 1399; 8 those of John Lukke of Bristol 
are both for Roxburgh and dated 1390 and 1397; 9 John Bermyngham, minstrel/herald, 
plied his trade in Roxburgh in 1389 and 1396; 10 two consecutive protections exist for 
Thomas Muschance in Roxburgh dated February 1347 and April 1348, a third, also for 
Roxburgh, comes from April 1364; 11 Robert Cristendome, a bowyer from York, had 
protections for Berwick in June 1388 and July 1389 but his first was for service in 
Roxburgh 24 years previously in 1364.12 
Naturally these present insurmountable problems. There is the possibility 
that 
some of these may represent long-term garrison service over seven years, 
ten years, in 
7 id, nos. 4630,4721. 
8 Ibid, nos. 4402,4593. 
'Ibid, nos. 4453,4543. 
10 Ibid, nos. 4400,4529. 
11 Ibid, nos. 3804,3833) 3955. 
12 Ibid, nos. 3958,4375,4430. 
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the final case upwards of twenty years. It is also possible that the protections depict the 
few occasional years in which these men were engaged in gamsons. The most that can 
be said is that for these men garrisoning was a factor which re-occurred in their lives 
and was a military institution which they had a certain attachment to. 
The remaining sixteen men are much less problematic. Once again fourteen of 
these are based on just two protections and the remaining two on three. These illustrate 
permanent service over a maximum of a few years. A number of them run 
consecutively: those of Thomas Cooke, of Skeldergate in York, were for a year in 
Roxburgh dated 23 May 1376 and a year in Berwick from II May 1377; 13 for William 
Melton, of Kirby in Leicestershire, from 17 October 1387 for a year in Roxburgh and 
16 June 1388 for a year in Berwick; 14 the three of James Radclyf, dated 20 February 
1387ý 25 February 1388 and II February 1389, all for one year and respectively 
regarding service in Berwick, Roxburgh and then Berwick again. 15 It is clear from this 
evidence that Cooke and Melton served at least two continuous years in garrisons and 
Radclyf three. A number of others have one year gaps between protections: Nicholas 
Ruggeley, of Cannokbury in Staffordshire, having one for a year in Roxburgh on 9 
November 1387 and the second again for Roxburgh dated 9 October 1389; 
16 tWo for 
John Yolstones, of Lancashire, dating from February 1389 for six months in Berwick 
and from October 1389 in Roxburgh for a year while an earlier protection is dated 'ý 
February 1387 for a year in Berwick; 17 John Lyn-ford, of Buckinghamshire, having one 
for a year from 29 October 1387 and a second from 26 November 1389, both for 
service in Roxburgh. 18 In such cases the likelihood is that despite the gaps in the 
13 Ibid, nos. 4022,4036. 
14 Ibid, nos. 4314,4369. 
15 Ibid, nos. 4294,4349,4388. 
16 Ibid, nos. 4326,443 1. 
17 Ibid, nos. 4288,4393,443 1. 
18 Ibid, nos. 4319,4443. 
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records these men were also serving continuously within garrisons, an assumption 
reinforced in these three instances by the distance of their place of ongin from the 
garrisons in which they served; it is unlikely they would be making the same long 
journey twice in alternate years unless there were special circumstances. 19 
The evidence these sixteen provide is therefore one of continuous garrison 
service over a period of two or three years. Without doubt a proportion of these sixteen 
would have been men engaged in a level of service that extended to a career of se-veral 
or more years as exemplified by those of Rigby and Belyngham. Taken as a whole the 
evidence protections provide for these 32 men is indicative of garrison service in the 
earliest years of the century with a significant number of men serving for a length of 
time measured in years and accompanied by revealing examples of men serving for 
periods of ten years or more, the eighteen years of service of Belyngham a striking 
echo of the longest identifiable careers in the first quarter of the fourteenth century. In 
the later decades of the century the garrisons of Roxburgh and Berwick were 
permanent features of military service and had been for many years so it should come 
as no surprise to find that they were manned by men to whom such service had 
effectively become a profession. The limitations in the evidence that protections 
provide concerns the extent to which men of this kind were prevalent in garrisons; 
what they do make clear is that such long-term and continuous service 
did exist in the 
later fourteenth century. 
In the examples already given it is also evident that there 
is the same sense of 
central stability and peripheral movement within garrisons as that which 
has been seen 
to exist earlier in the century. This is best illustrated by the careers of 
Belyngharn and 
Rigby who combined their stable garrison service of eighteen and 
thirteen years xvith 
19 For the possibility of just such a circumstance see the example of 
John Swan. 
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service in three and two different garrisons respectively, each moving between these 
garrisons on at least three separate occasions. In the course of these movements 
Belyngharn and Rigby each served under approximately five different keepers. Various 
patterns of movement can also be distinguished in other careers and mirror those ftom 
the garrisons of mid-century. There are men serving in the same castle alongside the 
same constable: John Broun. in Roxburgh with John Stanley in 1396 and 1398; Alan 
Katerall. in Roxburgh with Thomas Swinbume in both 1386 and 1388; William Robtot, 
again in Roxburgh with Swinburne, in 1386 and 1387 . 
20 Alternatively there are men 
serving in the same castle but under different constables: John Bermyngham's two 
recorded years in Roxburgh under Thomas Urnfraville and seven years later under 
John Stanley; William Essh remained in Roxburgh in 1361 and 1362 first serving 
under Richard Tempest and then John de Coupland .21 There are also cases in which 
men appear to have moved with the constable: Thomas Rokeby was in Richard 
Tempest's Roxburgh garrison in 1361 and by 1363 had followed Tempest to his new 
command of Berwick; Richard del Croke served under the younger Richard Tempest 
in Berwick in February 1387 but the intended full year of this protection was cut short 
by another from June 1387 for service in Roxburgh under Thomas SWInbume, the 
22 
latter holding the constableship along With Tempest. There are another three careers 
which followed the movement of Tempest from Berwick to Roxburgh, bringing these 
men from the Berwick garrison into Roxburgh . 
2' These various movements reflect 
those of mid-century and advocate the belief that the men-at-arms of the garrison 
community were the same mixture in both cases being a combination of permanent 
'0 CDS, v, pt. ii., nos. (Broun) 4537,4569; (Katerall) 4212,4345; 
(Robtot) 4245,4308. 
21 Ibid, nos. (Bennyngham) 4400,4529; (Essh) 3946,3949. 
22 Ibid, nos. (Rokeby) 3947,3953; (Croke) 4294,4307,4386. 
23 The other three men are Robert Holt, James Radclyf and 
William Worthyngton. 
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garrison soldiers and those serving due to their links with the constables of the 
garrisons. 
Despite the limited evidence these protections provide the,, %,, concluwel-y 
demonstrate that there was a recognisable garrison community in the later decades of 
the century and one that possessed attributes recognisable in those of both early- and 
mid-century. This idea of community is again reinforced in this period by the presence 
of families being engaged in garrison service. The Nowell family of Rede in 
Lancashire exemplify this. There exist two individual protections for Richard Nowell - 
on both occasions for Roxburgh under Thomas Swinburne in 1386 and 1387 - and 
four for John Nowell dated January 1386, November 1386, February 1387, March 
"I 1388 and February 1390, all of which are for service in the Berwick gamson. -' On 
each protection for these two men they are described as being the 'son of Laurence 
and therefore Richard and John were obviously brothers. There is another protection 
which dates from February 1348 for the service in Berwick of a Richard Nowell; this 
cannot be the same Richard due to the large interval of time nor is he descnbed as the 
son of Laurence" however it is possible that he was an elder generation of the same 
family. What this does show for certain is that two brothers were serving 
simultaneously in different garrisons and that the tradition of garrison service within 
the Nowell family may have stretched over forty years In length. Consequently the 
service of the Nowell family in garrisons, possibly covering two or three generations, 
is a singular survival in terms of evidence although based on family links 
for service in 
early- and mid-century it is unlikely that such familial attachment to service was 
rom Berwick to Roxburgh with Tempest, was exceptional. Robert Holt, who moved f 
24 CDSý 
-v,, pt. ii, nos- 4,217,4278,4290,4338,435553,4451 25 Ibid, 'no. 3830. 
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joined by his brother John when he returned to Berwick in 1389, the protection stating 
that Robert and John were both the sons of Geoffrey. 26 
The fleeting glimpse the protections reveal of the careers of these . 332 men 
perfectly illustrates just how partial the reconstruction of military service in the 
fourteenth century is. They provide no more than a narrow insight into garrison service 
in the later years of the century and although it is possible to draw from them the 
conclusions described above the evidence is not substantial enough to deliver a 
definitive analysis of garrison service at this time. Viewed in the context of evidence 
gathered from service in the two earlier periods s1milar patterns and tralts wIthin 
service can be seen to exist as does the concept of these men belonging to a 
garrisoning community. The relative lack of evidence in these later years is due to a 
lack of accounts and rolls in which names are given and to the limitations inherent in 
using protections as a source of information. 
However, although protections have their own particular shortcomings, they 
compensate for this in having their own particular benefit to the historian. As Will have 
been seen in some of the examples given above many of these protections specify 
exactly where the individual undertaking garrison service came from. This information 
may take the form of the individual's county being stated possibly alongside their town 
or village while on occasion only their town or village is included. This makes 
protections of singular importance in addressing the issue of the geographical ongins 
of those in garrison service. It is possible to try and identify men by their surnames but 
this is by its very nature an inexact method devoid of any degree of certainty. 
27 Rolls 
and accounts contain no reference to this important information and make it impossible 
26 Ibid, no. 4387. 
27 A truth illustrated by a member of Swinburrie's garrison of Roxburgh, William Wysbech, %% ho was in 
fact from London and another man of the Roxburgh garrison, John Berwick, who came from Surrey, 
ibid, nos. 4284,4577. 
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to attempt an analysis of this kind in the two earlier periods so such a studý, is 
exclusively confined to this later period. Within these years two groups of protections 
stand out as being particularly well suited to such an exercise. " 
The first are those which relate to the periods when Thomas SWInbume was 
constable and then keeper of Roxburgh, a time frame which approximates to 1386-88 
and then, as the lieutenant of the earl Marshal,. 1389-90 . 
29Dating from these penods 
there exist 62 protections for Roxburgh in which the geographical origins of each 
individual is identifiable. 'o When these are broken down into separate regional 
categories the results are extremely interesting (fig. 5). By far the most striking 
outcome is that only 34% of these 62 came from north of the Trent and that the vast 
majority, two thirds of the total, were actually from regions south of the Trent. A more 
detailed breakdown is even more revealing. Out of the 21 men identifiable as northern 
twelve were from Lancashire alone, a proportion amounting to 57% of the northern 
total. When compared with all 62 individuals Lancashire accounts for a significant 
19% coming second only to the south of England (excluding London) xkith 26%. 
London is the third greatest provider of men at 16% of the overall total and, if included 
with the south, creates a combined contribution amounting to 42%, approaching a half 
of all 62 protections. Those from the north-eastern counties of England, the region 
closest to the garrisons, amount to a modest 15%, lower than the 18% of the Midlands 
and only higher than the minimal 6% from Wales. 
28 All of the examples used in the following analysis are based on place names which can 
be positively 
identified, either by county, county and town or village, or by the existence of only one 
town or village 
of that name in the whole country. If there is any element of 
doubt the example has not been included 
nor have any surnames been used as an indicator of county, town or village e. g. 
William Bamburgh Is 
excluded as, despite the Northumberland connotations of 
his name, no place is actually specified. 
2" The first year Swinburne was joint constable with Richard Tempest, see pp. 
129-3 3. 
30 Where there is more than one protection for the same individual 
it is still only counted as a single 
example. 
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Figure 5: Geographical Breakdown of Roxburah Protec ions 
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These results are extremely revealing. They reflect the stipulations that were 
contained in a number of indentures of the 1380s and 1390s which were explicit in 
stating that a significant proportion of the garrison had to be recruited from further 
south however these clauses drew the southern limit of the line from which they could 
be drawn as the northern boundary of north Yorkshire; 31 the preponderance of men 
from regions south of the Nfidlands is particularly noteworthy. There is no doubt that 
men from the north-eastem regions - Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland - were 
heavily engaged in garrison service in both Roxburgh and Berwick but this is not 
reflected in the existing protections. Six of these eight north-eastern protections 
concerned men from Yorkshire, one from Humberside and one from Northumberland. 
This apparently inexplicable dearth of protections for Durham and especially 
Northumberland raises the possibility that men-at-arms from these regions did not 
necessarily seek protections due to the proximity of their homes and the garriSorLS. 
32 
The prominence of men from London in these protections is another surprising aspect 
particularly as in the late 1380s these garrisons were accepted institutions in the north 
and largely regulated by the northern magnates and gentry. 
It is possible to explain some of these results by taking the connections of the 
constable, Thomas Swinburne, into consideration. 33 The first point to note is that 
although Swinbume had land in northern England he also possessed land in the south, 
the manors of Little Horkesley and East Mersea in Essex were both held by his father 
whilst Thomas was constable. More relevant here though are the London possessions 
of Thomas. Through his mother, Agnes Felton, in 1380 he took possession of all the 
Felton properties in London including the valuable 'Coppldhalle' which 
had a number 
" CDS, iv, no. 360. All but 20 men-at-arms and 20 archers within a garrison of over a 
hundred in 
Roxburgh in 1386 were to be 'strangers' from the southern side of the county of 
Richmond and Craven 
32 However if Robert de Belyngham was indeed from Northumberland 
his five protections would go 
some way to disproving this theory. 
33 His career is covered in greater depth pp. 131-3. 
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of shops annexed to it. 34 It can be no coincidence that of the ten protections of men 
described as citizens of London all but two of them were also specified as being 
engaged in a skilled trade including a clothier, woodmonger, mercer and draper. 35 
Swinburne was utilising his London connections to bring to Roxburgh the skilled men 
necessary for a garrison to function effectively. It is extremely likely that some if not 
all of these men were from the shops annexed to the 'Coppidhalle. ' This explains the 
high proportion of Londoners in the Roxburgh garrison whilst Swinbume was 
constable. However the large number of men from the south outside of London cannot 
be so easily explained as Swinburrie's landed connections were limited to Essex and 
36 
only one of these southerners also came from Essex. The counties of Kent, Suffolk 
and Somerset all provided men for the garrison and two came all the way from 
Cornwall. There is nothing in Swinburne's territorial possessions that explains their 
presence in the garrison. 
A number of unifying features are distinguishable amongst some of the 
garrison. The two Cornishmen, John Argom. and John Tresvellak, are named together 
in one protection that dates from 17 October 1386 and which was intended to last for a 
year; 37 this suggests they previously knew one another before entering the garrison 
together where they subsequently served alongside one another. A similar familiarity is 
evident With regard to William Melton of Kirby in Leicestershire and William 
Wheitley also of Kirby, although in this case the former entered Roxburgh on 17 
October 1387 and the latter a month later on 15 November. 
38 Three of the significant 
Lancashire contingent also share close geographical connections: Adam Robinson was 
from Singleton and so presumably was Adam Singleton of Lancashire, the third man, 
34 Roskell, pp. 547-550 
35 CDS, v, pt. ii., nos. 4197,4205,4257,4271, 
36 John Trumpet, from 'Bunstede, ' ibid, no. 4247. 
37 Ibid, no. 4266. 
38 Ibid, nos. 4314,4328. 
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John Latimer, being from Barton by Kirkham, Kirkham lying only a handful of miles 
from Singleton 
. 
39 The four men who contribute the figures for Wales can also be 
explained by Swinburne's connections. This again came from Swinburne's Felton 
relatives who had links to land in this area, a Felton being listed among the knights of 
Wales the list of 1324 40 In addition there is still a village named Felton just to the 
north-east of Hereford and in Shropshire the villages of West Felton and Felton Butler 
lay a few miles either side of Knockin, the village from which the Shropshire soldier in 
the garrison, the knight John Lestrange, was specified as being from. " This maternal 
link also explains the presence of Duncan de Felton in the Roxburgh garrison in 
1386.42 
The four cases in which men had a protection for service in Roxburgh under 
Swinbume in both his first period as constable and subsequently when reappointed as 
keeper imply that there was a personal link between these individuals and SWInbume 
and that on his reappointment he brought them back into his garrison. It is possible that 
these men remained in the garrison in the intervening period when Thomas Urnfraville 
was in charge but the timing of the second protections makes this seem unlikely. John 
Swan is a case in point. A grocer from Mertok in Somerset his first protection for 
Roxburgh dates from 15 June 13 86 and his name next appears in a protection dated 10 
. 
43 rom Swinburne's second tenn in May 1389 The latter is the first extant protection f 
charge and logically it follows that one of Swinbume's first acts was to bring Swan 
back into the garrison as he valued his previous service which, on the evidence of 
Swan's trade, would have involved the provisioning and storing of victuals within the 
castle. This would fit with we evidence assembled above which illustrates that the 
39 Ibid, nos. 4203,4339,4416. 
40 Parl. Writs., ii, p. 648. 
41 CDS, v, pt. ii., no. 4316. 
42 Ibid, no. 4222. The name of Duncan also has Scottish overtones. 
43 Ibid, nos. 4241,4415. 
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personal connections and tles of the constable could significantlY affect the 
geographical orbit which garrison soldiers came from and the Individual personnel 
within the garrison. 
The second group of protections again concerns the garrison of Roxburgh this 
time under the constableship of John Stanley,, the dates of which approximate from 
early 1396 until February 1399.44 There are 21 protections from which a place of 
origin can be positively identified and they are instructive not just as a preliminan, 
survey of the garrison ten years later but also in placing the results from the 62 
protections of Swinbume's constableship into a broader context. The outcome of the 
regional breakdown of these 21 protections is again revealing (fig. 5). Once more the 
majority of the garrison came from south of the Trent but this time the difference is 
much less, the south only 53% compared to 47% for those from the north of the Trent. 
The figure of 24% from the counties south of the Nfidlands excluding London is 
comparable to the 26% of the previous results although the London total has 
diminished from 16% to 10% under Stanley. This drop also lowers the southem total 
including London from 42% to 34%, the Midlands total is slightly up on before at 19% 
as opposed to 18% but the north-eastern contribution is minimally lower than before 
coming in just 1% below on 14%. This means that it is the remarkable number of 
protections from Lancashire that shortens the divide between the north and the south in 
their contribution of soldiers to the Roxburgh garrison. Of those from north of the 
Trent an astounding 70% were from Lancashire and this Lancastrian domination 
extends to the entire 21 protections where they account for 33% of the total which 
amounts to one whole third of the surviving protections from the constableship of 
Stanley. 
44 For these dates see pp. 134-5. 
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Once again the background of the constable, in this case Stanlev, can go some 
way to explaining these results, specifically the presence of so many men from 
Lancashire. Although detennining precisely which John Stanley this constable ývas is 
exceptionally problematic it is certain that as a Stanley he held lands and possessed 
connections in Lancashire. 45 Indeed the most likely candidate was a justice of Chester 
prior to becoming constable of Roxburgh and he subsequently inherited his father's 
position as Steward of Macclesfield and became Surveyor of the forests of 
Macclesfield, Mare and Mondrem in Chester and in 1403 was appointed Govemor of 
the City and County of Chester. 46 There was a clear affinity between the knightly 
Stanley family and Lancashire and it was this connection which brought an 
exceptionally large number of Lancastrians into the Roxburgh garrison during the 
constableship of John Stanley. 
There is no evidence that Stanley held any lands other than in his Lancashire 
heartland and this is important in placing the results of Swinbume's protections into 
context. Under Stanley there are no protections from Wales or from Hereford or 
Shropshire and the number from London is significantly reduced. This is proof that it 
was Swinburrie's connections to these areas which brought men from them 
into his 
garrison. It is also evident that neither man possessed any strong links in the 
Midlands 
yet under both their constableships this region provided a consistently respectable 
proportion of men; there are seven men from Coventry alone when 
both groups of 
protections are combined. Although Swinburne had land in Essex and 
London his 
southern interests were confined to these areas and in no way explain 
the large 
percentage of men from across the southern counties evident 
in the protections; 
Stanley had no southern connections. It follows that these regions, the south and 
the 
45 His identity is discussed in pp. 134-5. 
46 GEC, v, no. 248-50. 
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Midlands, were providing men for the Roxburgh garrison on a regular bas's 
irrespective of the identity and connections of the incumbent constable as opposed to 
the previous areas in which the numbers of men they provided were intimately linked 
to the person of the constable himself 
The combining of these two sets of results affords a test group of 83 protections 
from the late 1380s and late 1390s. Such a joint total provides a more representative 
illustration of the regional make up of the garrison by tempering the effect of the 
constable on the personnel of the garrison. The most noticeable feature of these 
combined results is that the counties south of the Trent provided more men than those 
to the north, 63% as opposed to 37%, almost two thirds of all 83 protections. Of this 
63% the large majority of 40% came from London and counties south of the Midlands. 
These results reflect the indentures which stipulated that the majority of a garrison 
should come from further south but it is surprising that they came from so far south. 
The northern total is just as interesting in itself when it is considered that of its 37% an 
overwhelming 23% came from Lancashire,, a result which translates as 61% of all 
soldiers from the north coming from Lancashire alone. This peculiarly high level of 
Lancastrian service is exhibited in the individual career of Nicholas de Rigby and 
demonstrates that Lancashire was a fertile recruiting ground for the Roxburgh garrison 
over twenty years before it was acknowledged as such for the army which fought in 
Normandy under Henry V. 
47 
ide an . nsi mson The protections of the late fourteenth century provi 1 ight into ga i 
service not available in the earlier periods. An analysis of the regions which were 
supplying men for the garrison opens a new aspect to the study of garrison service. The 
Importance of the person of the constable in influencing those who constituted the 
47 C. T. Allmand, Henry V (Yale, 1997 edition), p. 208. It also supports the view of the north-western 
counties contributing substantial numbers to armies both in the mid- to 
late-fourteenth and eark 
fifteenth centuries, ibid, p. 209, n. 2 1. 
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garrison is especially noticeable as is the fact that certain areas consistentlý,, provided a 
proportion of men irrelevant of the identity of the constable. It was a mixture of men 
from both of these that went into making up the personnel of a garrison. Indeed the 
most outstanding feature revealed here is that garrison service was not confined to the 
north or even extended southwards only to the Midlands but that it encompassed the 
whole of England with the largest regional majority coming from the southern counties 
and London. Garrison service was not regional in nature but national, recruiting men 
from all over the kingdom, and consequently it was a feature that could touch the lives 
of all those aspiring to military service. Those who did serve in these later garrisons 
were just as much an identifiable community as in earlier years and included men for 
whom garrison service was a profession which extended over several years. Service in 
garrisons was an important feature of the military landscape as much in the last 
decades of the fourteenth century as it had been in the very earliest years of the wars. 
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II. 
THE GARRISON IN ACTION 
215 
6. 
DEFENCE FROM WITHIN THE WALLS 
In February 1314, on the night of Shrove Tuesday, sixty Scottish knights crawled 
towards the stout walls of Roxburgh castle, the dark cloaks that covered their armour 
apparently leading an English watchman to mistake them for cattle or oxen. Throwing 
a rope ladder up against the wall its crook of iron clattered as it fastened into an 
embrasure; before the watchman could cry out the first Scot had scaled the ladder and 
with his drawn knife stabbed and killed him. As he dispatched another guard the rest of 
the Scots - led by James Douglas - clambered up the ladder and, regrouping, they 
burst into the great hall where the English garrison was celebrating the feast day With 
dancing and singing. The English, caught unawares, fled to the great tower where they 
doggedly held out for the night but, realising the desperation of their situation, the 
constable took terms of surrender the next day and handed the castle over to the Scots. 1 
In this way one of the strongest and most heavily-garrisoned English-held castles in 
Scotland fell to the Scots. 
This account by Barbour is probably the best known description of a castle 
falling to the Scots and in many ways serves as a classic exemplar for the fall of 
English-held castles in Scotland. The plucky, courageous Scots, outnumbered and 111- 
equipped, striking swiftly under the cover of night, catching the garrison unawares as 
the Englishmen feasted and celebrated. The unmistakable sense of risk about the whole 
thing, the drama of being seen but mistaken for cattle, the clatter of the iron crook of 
the ladder, of just being able to silence the watchman in time; a bold and 
daring attack 
with little forethought or planning which relied solely on surprise and 
breath-taking 
1 Bruce, pp. 380-6. 
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audacity. This is the way the Scottish capture of English-held castles is generally 
perceived as having taken place. 
The implication for the garrisons that succumbed to such attacks is one of 
incompetence and this condemnation has been believed to be true of many English 
garrisons in the wars. They had the numbers, the equipment and the enormous 
advantage of defensive fortifications yet still they failed to hold out against the much 
weaker Scots. This is the common background against which the defensive capabilities 
of garrisons are seen to have been impotent and it cuts garrisons dead at their roots, 
bringing into question the most basic function of a garrison; its ability to defend the 
fortification in which it was based. To many this may seem the raison d'&re of a 
garrison, the one duty it had to accomplish above all else. An inability to hold their 
fortification in the face of the enemy becomes an irreversible condemnation clearly 
demonstrating their impotence; if they could not defend their own base then they were 
good for little else. 
This raises issues of extreme concern with regard to the English garrisons 
considered here. Alongside the great debacle of Bannockburn nothing resonates so 
powerfully of English military failure than the apparent ease with which Scottish 
forces were able to seize English held fortifications - including major fortresses such 
as Edinburgh and Roxburgh - throughout the first half of the fourteenth century. In the 
first quarter of the century so many fell to Robert Bruce that the total has been declared 
as impossible to fathom and the feat described as 'one of the great military enterprises 
of British history. ' 2 Nor was it only Bruce between 1306 and 1318 who proved 
spectacularly successful at this; William Wallace managed to seize his fair share in the 
preceding years and between 1336 and 1342 the great castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh 
Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 369. 
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and Stirling as well as many smaller fortifications once again fell to the Scots. There 
seems to have been a catastrophic failure among the English garrisons in defending 
their own fortifications, a humiliating inabili I I ItY to withstand the irregular and 
frequently ill-equipped Scottish forces that opposed them. There is an undeniable sense 
that blame should be attached to these great swathes of losses, that they should never 
have fallen as they did. Indeed of Edinburgh and Roxburgh in 1314 it has been stated 
that, 'Well guarded, these castles should have proved more than a match for 111- 
equipped besiegers. In fact, they fell within the space of a single Lent. 0 It is to the 
condemnation of the garrisons that they did. 
That this happened is not in contention; the question is how it happened. Were 
garrisons - and by implication castles - inherently susceptible to attack in the Anglo- 
Scottish wars? Was it a failure on the part of the English garrisons or does it signify a 
general European trend in which castles were becoming less secure from attack? In 
more practical terms what were the expectations and capabilities of a garrison under 
the ultimate pressure of attack? Only by analysing why so many castles fell to the 
Scots can these important questions that strike at the heart of garrisoning in its most 
basic operational role be answered. 
The reasons most frequently advanced to explain the two main periods of 
losses are vague generalisations; ascribing the first to the inadequacies and domestic 
distractions of Edward 11 and the second to the increasing continental distractions of 
Edward 111. Although both did have their affect they reveal nothing of the processes by 
which the castles actually fell. To understand the reasons for the losses it is necessary 
to analyse how the Scots went about taking these castles, the methods and tactics that 
they employed. By addressing these it is possible to gauge the forces and pressures 
Ibid, p. 195. 
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garrisons had to endure and their strengths and weaknesses as perceived by their 
contemporaries, the defensive capabilities of garrisons being drawn out In the process. 
Unfortunately such a study relies almost exclusively on chronicle evidence and 
the unreliable and often dramatic nature that this often follows. The capture of castles 
by Robert Bruce and his associates is only described in depth by Barbour and the 
spectacular successes of Bruce are only matched by the equally spectacular renditions 
Barbour provides of them. Such embellishments were a convention of medieval 
chroniclers going back as far as Orderic Vitalis, an element of legend or chaawn 
prevalent when describing the capture of castles. 4 Yet this does not deny the basic truth 
of the details they reveal if the drama and embellishments are stripped away. Barbour's 
account of Roxburgh is a good example of this and a number of important details can 
be drawn out of his account: the reliance on the cover of darkness and surprise. 
thorough preparation in constructing the ladder and knowing where to place it; a co- 
ordinated plan where the assaulting soldiers were well-drilled enough to crawl slowly 
towards the castle and silence the guards; the attack itself timed to coincide with 
Shrove Tuesday when the garrison would be celebrating and off their guard. Planning, 
preparation and intelligence are all in evidence in this apparently ad hoc attack. By 
approaching the chronicles in this manner the truth about the ability of garrisons to 
defend their fortifications will become clearer. 
Barbour may have claimed they were 'mony wys 5 for men to take castles and 
peels but essentially there were three; assault, siege and treachery. The drama of 
Barbour's accounts of Bruce's successes between 1306 and 1318 are made possible bý 
4 M. Chibnall, 'Orderic Vitalis on Castles', Anglo-Norman Castles, ed. R. Liddlard (Woodbridge, 2003), 
p. 150. J. Sumption makes the same point concerning the young Du Guesclin tricking 
his way into 
Fougeray castle with his men disguised as wood-cutters, Trial by Fire (London, 1999), p. 
33. There are 
also unmistakable classical overtones especially with regard to Odysseus tricking 
his way out of the 
cave in the Odyssey. 
5 Bruce, p. 369. These were by no means mutually exclusive for example an assault could take place 
during a siege as happened at Edinburgh in 1314. 
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the tactic repeatedly made use of, the surprise assault. Not only was this used against 
Roxburgh (1314) but also against the castles of Brodick (1306/7), Turribem, (1-307). 
Inverness (1307), Douglas (1306,1307), Forfar (1308), Berwick (1312), Linlithgow 
(1313) and Edinburgh (1314). The town of Perth was sensationally taken by sudden 
assault (1313) and Berwick was similarly attacked (1316,1318) with this first pen'od 
ending with the assault on Norham. castle (1327). In fact so repetitive did this tactic 
become that it has been reduced to a simple formulaic description: the essential factor 
of surprise; going in under the darkness of night; forcing entry on the most suitable 
section of the walls by means of rope ladders fitted with grappling hookS. 6 
This formula not only fits for all the attacks mentioned above - except 
Linlithgow and Berwick (1316) - but also for the assaults on Edinburgh (1341), 
Roxburgh (1342) and the town of Berwick (1355). 7 All assaults went in under the 
cover of night; prefabricated scaling ladders were used to mount the walls; surprise 
was essential to their success as demonstrated by the only two failures amongst all 
these attacks - Berwick (1312) and Norham (1327) - proving unsuccessU due to the 
loss of surprise as the attack was about to go in. By reducing these assaults to such a 
simplistic formula the implication is that time after time garrisons were easily 
outwitted and overcome with embarrassing ease. This is not necessarily the case; as 
with Roxburgh (1314) rather than looking at a simPlistic overview of the assault it is 
necessary to delve deeper into the complexities that underlay these assaults. 
The most revealing details come from Barbour's accounts of the early attempts 
of Bruce and his followers against smaller Scottish castles in the years 
before 1312 
after which scaling ladders began to be frequently used. The years 
from 1306 until 
1312 were the first attempts of Bruce and his men to seize castles, 
the trial and error 
6 Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 193. 7 Norharn: Lanercost, p. 256. Roxburgh: Bower, vii., p. 15 1; Wyntoun, vi., pp- 
160-4. BenNick- BoK, er, 
vii., p. 281; WYntoun, vi., pp. 200-4. 
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they experienced effectively proving an apprenticeship in assaulting castles, and 
consequently a study of these years reveals the tactics they leamt to be necessarv in 
mounting an effective assault. 
From the outset it is obvious that the direct initial target of attack was, never the 
castle itself but the garrison within it. This is in evidence at Brodick (1306/7) where 
the Scots ambushed a section of the garrison carrying victuals to the castle killing at 
least thirty and then driving a sortie from the remaining garrison back into the castle 
where it only just managed to prevent the Scots from entering by blocking the 
entrance; 8 at Tumberry (1307) where two thirds of the 300 strong garrison. lodged in a 
village outside the castle, was attacked so fiercely by the Scots that those in the castle 
dared not venture out to come to their aid; at Douglas where on two separate occasions 
a significant section of the garrison was lured out of the castle - once by driving the 
cattle away forcing the garrison to pursue them and once by sending men carrying 
sacks of victuals past which some of the garrison then tried to seize - and then 
ambushed; ' again at Douglas during the infamous 'Douglas Lardner' of 1308 when the 
castle was seized after the Scots attacked almost the whole garrison whilst its members 
were in the local kirk on Palm Sunday. 10 
It is clear these ambushes were carefully planned. Vulnerable times were 
chosen, sections rather then the whole of the garrison were taken on, ruses to draw 
some of the garrison out of the castle were utilised; in short a conscious attempt was 
made to attack the garrison outside of the castle and on terms favourable to the 
attackers. Careful planning suggests detailed reconnaissance being carried out before 
any such assault and there is ample evidence for this. Before assaulting 
Brodick 
(1306/7) the Scots hid and watched the movements of the garnson, noting how the 
8 Bruce, P. 166. 
9 Ibid, pp. 242,312-6. 
10 Ibid, pp. 202-13. 
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constable, John Hastings, frequently left the castle to hunt., the vulnerabilltv of 
Turnberry's garrison was recognised by a spy named Cuthbert whom Bruce had sent to 
spy out Carrick; James Douglas watched in secret to see whether the keeper of 
Douglas castle came out easily and, seeing that he did indeed venture out carelessly 
with his men,, undertook an ambush on them. 11 Before embarking on an assault the 
Scots observed the garrisons and their constables from a distance to glean all the 
intelligence they could which would contribute towards a successful attack. In fact 
they often started with an advantageous knowledge of the area and land themselves, 
particularly so for James Douglas when facing his own castle of Douglas, and neatly 
summarised by Barbour when describing Bruce agreeing to attack Brodnck, putting 
the words into Bruce's mouth that, 'For I knaw rycht weill the countreAnd the castell 
rycht sua knaw 1. ' 
12 
Planning and reconnaissance were accompanied by thorough preparation. Men 
were disguised as victuallers, were hidden and remained silent ready to mount a savage 
ambush, drove off cattle and were able to storm en masse into a kirk. Painstaking 
preparation is much more evident in the assaults after 1312 when the presence of 
specially crafted ladders for scaling walls came into Widespread use. These did not just 
materialise but required the acquisition of materials and prefabrication as well as 
knowledge of how to raise them on the walls. Interestingly there were two types of 
scaling ladder, those used at Perth being constructed of wood and those at 
Berwick and 
Roxburgh of rope, the uniqueness of these rope ladders plainly evident in the 
lengthy 
and highly detailed description given of these 'ladders of wonderful construction' in 
11 
I rwic As Lanercost and the fact that they were put on display to the people of 
Be wi 
11 Ibid, pp. 166,178,242. 
12 Jbid 
, P. 
169. 
13 Ibid, pp. 378-9 n. 365-72; Lanercost, pp. 200-2. Forfar 
in 1308 was the first castle in this penod 
recorded as having its walls scaled by Scots on ladders 
but as Barbour makes no comment on these 
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Scottish targets became more ambitious the use of these ladders and consequently the 
need for thorough preparation became an essential feature in Scottish assaults. 
This hallmark of thoroughness and forethought evident in the Scots early 
assaults on castles was carried through into the later and more spectacular assaults. 
That assaults were still based on these traits can be seen with Roxburgh (1314). The 
assault was by no means the ad hoc attack it at first appears to be: Douglas and his 
men had been in Ettrick forest for some time making sporadic attacks 'night and day' 
on the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh, an activity which would have allowed 
both a full reconnaissance of the castle and garrison as well as an assessment of the 
garrison's strength and capabilities; the assault was deliberately timed for Shrove 
Tuesday when most of the garrison would be distracted by celebrations; a special 
prefabricated ladder for assault was assembled; the attackers each had a black cloak to 
camouflage them in the darkness of night during which the assault took place, 
watchmen were quickly silenced and the whole force stormed the great hall. 14 
Reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, carefW planning and timing, pinpointing and 
exploiting weaknesses, thorough preparation; they are all evident here. These were the 
solid foundations that underpinned Scottish assaults and demonstrate that garrisons 
which fell to assault were not by implication incompetent but on the receiving end of 
highly developed, premeditated and organised attacks. 
Assault was therefore not the romantic reckless escapade that chroniclers, 
especially Barbour, frequently depict, but something that relied on more mundane but 
exact preparations. It is Barbour's qwxotic details that obscure the remarkable 
ladders and the assault was an impromptu attack by foresters it appears these were ordinary 
ladders, 
Bruce, p. 334. Intriguingly a chronicle dealing with the I 100s, the Chronicle of 
Princes, states that 
Cilgerran castle in Wales was captured in 1165 by ladders with hooks on the ends placed against 
the 
walls. As with Roxburgh (1314) these ladders were the idea of an obscure man among 
the attacking 
force, JR. Kenyon, 'Fluctuating Frontiers: Normano-Welsh Castle Warfare c. 1075 to 1240', Anglo- 
Norman Castles, p. 253. 
14 Bruce, pp. 378-86. 
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complexity of the efforts that went into these assaults. For instance the tale that 
Edinburgh was assaulted when a Scot, William Francis, revealed he knew a route up 
the north side of the rock on which the castle stood, a side considered unscalable, one 
he had used in his youth to secretly visit a sweetheart in the town below at night. ' 
When it is considered that the Scots had been besieging the castle for several weeks 
prior to this assault it was surely in this period that efforts were made to scout a route 
up the relatively unguarded north side to facilitate an entrance to the castle. That 
Lanercost and the Scalacronica simply state that Edinburgh was seized by the scaling 
of the north side which was considered impregnable and thus less guarded reveals the 
basic truth of the assault; 16 William Francis is a romantic embellishment of Barbour. 
Garrisons were not repeatedly caught out by such melodramatic assaults but by 
carefully planned, intimately organised, calculated attacks based on days, maybe 
weeks, of reconnaissance and preparation. When the assault came it was co-ordinated 
and swiftly efficient. Garrisons were continually assessed, their routines watched, the 
character of the constable deduced, weaknesses and vulnerabilities noted. Ruses, 
trickery and disguise were careftdly employed to lure or distract the garrison, to split it 
up and ambush it. That some of these early assaults, such as Brodick, failed to gain the 
castle illustrates that this was a learning process for the Scots, albeit a bloody one, and 
it was over several years experience that they became practiced and effective in 
assaulting castles. This was the daunting character of the assaults that garrisons were 
faced with. 
Another way of facilitating an assault was to encourage treachery, to have a 
man inside the fortification who would provide the attackers with entrance. 
The 
calamitous loss of Berwick in 1318 was in no small part due to Peter 
de Spalding, 
15 Ibid, pp. 388-90. 
16 Lanercost, p. 204; Scalacronica, p. 51 
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apparently a burgess of the town and definitely a soldier of the garrison, who arranged 
for the Scots to scale the section of the town wall where he would be on watch; in 
return he would receive a reward of E800.17 In 1384 the humiliating loss of Bem-Ick 
castle was down to the earl of Northumberland's deputy in charge there being bribed 
by the Scots. 18 In more spectacular terms in 1314 the constable of Bothwell, Walter 
fitz Gilbert, handed his castle straight over to the Scots in the aftermath of 
Bannockburn, an act which led to the capture of many notable Englishmen who had 
fled there after the battle including the earl of Hereford. 19 Following an abortive 
Scottish siege of Stirling in late May 1337 the constable of the English-held castle of 
Caerlaverock, Eustace de Maxwell, handed the castle over to the Scots, an act 
considered especially tTaitorous as Edward III had just supplied him With a large sum 
of money, flour and wine . 
20 The latter two examples clearly demonstrate the dangers 
for the English of appointing Scottish constables, their nationality heightening the 
threat of treachery. Such treachery was an accepted means of gaining access into 
fortifications but appears a relatively rare method in the loss of the castles under 
discussion here. 
Although the tactic of assault seems to be predominant under Bruce this was 
far from the case and the more traditional method of the siege was used in equal 
measure. It is often assumed that Bruce reverted to assaults as he was not in possession 
of the equipment required to mount a set-piece siege but as William Wallace had 
already proven sieges could be successful without any equipment, embarking not on a 
physical attack on the castle with siege engines but by undertaking the long and dravm- 
out process of surrounding the castle and denying it access to victuals or 
17 Bruce, pp. 616-9; for Spalding's long record of service within garrisons see p. 
176. 
18 Ae Westminster Chronicle, ed. and trans. L. C. Hector, B. F. Harvey (Oxford, 1982), p. 104 n. 
2 
19 Lanercost, pp. 209- 10; Bruce, pp. 514-6. 
20 Lanercost, pp. 303-4. As previously noted the alleged treachery of Lubaud 
during the siege of 
Edinburgh in 1314 is without any foundation 
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reinforcement, aiming to starve the garrison into submission. By these means Wallace 
eventually took the powerful castles of Stirling and Bothwell in 1300. when the 
English army retreated in 1298 Wallace and his followers 'set themselves down 
before the English-held castles in Scotland and took many of them 'through famine in 
21 the castles'; forced to leave his slege of Dundee castle to face the English at St'ling 
Bridge he entrusted the burgesses of the town with continuing the siege on pain of life 
and goods, the castle capitulating on his victorious return. 22 
Bruce certainly made frequent use of this type of prolonged siege. The earliest 
known instance was the castle of Elgin in 1307/08 and considering another six castles 
in Scottish localities fell in this year it is reasonable to assume at least some of these 
were besieged ; 23 Dunstaffnage was taken in 1309 after a siege; 24 although Edinburgh 
was taken by assault in 1314 this attack went in only after the castle had been besieged 
for several preceding weeks; 25 Perth was similarly taken by an assault launched 
following a period of close siege; 26 Dumfries (1313) was starved into surrender and the 
ensuing surrender of the castles of Buittle and Caeverlock shortly afterwards suggests 
they too had been subject to siege; 27 Berwick castle was besieged after the town fell 
(1318) and Wark and Harbottle also succumbed to siege in the same year; 28 in 1327 
Norharn, Alnwick and Warkworth were all besieged; 29 most famous of all was the 
siege of Stirling castle (1314) which ultimately led to Bannockburn. Dramatic assaults 
may well be predominant in the chronicles but in reality the lengthy set-piece was used 
to wear down garrisons just as often and with the same success. 
21 Lanercost, p. 165. 
22 Wyntoun, v, p. 308; Bower, vi., pp. 84-7. 
23 Bower, vi., p. 435, n. 35-6. 
24 Bruce, p. 366; Bower, vi, p. 345. 
25Bruce, pp. 386-96. 
26jbjdý pp. 334-41. 
27 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 194-5. 
28LanerCOSI, p. 220. 
29Bruce, p. 742; Bower, vii., p. 35; Scalýcronica, p. 82. 
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It is telling that in the 1330s and 1340s, when in possession of siege engines, 
the Scots took the vast majority of castles by siege; it always remained preferenti al to 
the more risky and dangerous option of assault. The sieges undertaken in these years 
were more active, using siege weapons to batter the walls and garrison, a development 
that meant some sieges could be over relatively quickly. These active sieges were 
almost all successful and were used against numerous castles in just a handful of years- 
Dundarg (1334); Cupar (1335,1339); Dunottar, Kinneff, Lauriston (all 1336); St. 
Andrews, Leuchars, Bothwell (all 1337); Edinburgh (1337,1341); Stirling (1337, 
1342); also later successfully against Lochmaben (1385). Siege engines were used in 
almost all cases and the success rate illustrates why the Scots adopted this method 
almost to the exclusion of assault. 
30 
The set-piece siege was therefore an eventuality that garrisons could expect to 
face sooner or later. This was a pressure altogether different from a sudden and 
unexpected assault; morale, determination and tenacity over a period of days and 
weeks, maybe even months, were demanded of the garrison in this situation. That 
garrisons could hold out for a lengthy period is evident in the siege of Bothwell castle 
in 1300- 1. Here the constable, Stephen de Bramptone, and his garrison held out for just 
over fourteen months in the most desperate conditions; a close siege had resulted in 
many of his men dying and those still alive were ravaged with famine when an assault 
finally took the castle .31 Thomas 
Gray, as constable of Norham, endured two lengthy 
sieges, one of seven months and the other of almost a year, holding out on both 
occasions as the garrison was able to be resupplied. 32 When the town of Berwick fell in 
30 It is easy to miss this significant change in Scottish methods 
due to the dramatically successful 
assaults on the two major castles of Edinburgh (already besieged) and 
Roxburgh, the drama of which 
obscures the fact that these were the only two castles to be attacked 
by these means in this period. 
31 CDS, ii, no. 1867. It seems likely that Bothwell was besieged after 
Stirling had fallen and so it 
Vrobably eventually fell in the spring of 1301, Watson, Under the 
Hwnmer, p. 98. 
2 Scalacronica, p. 64. 
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1318 the castle garrison remarkably held out for eleven weeks before surrendering on 
terms due to lack of victuals and no prospect of relie e3 while In 1337 Stirling held out 
against a two month siege throughout April and May. 34 Edinburgh was also 
unsuccessfully besieged in June 1337; intriguingly there exists fragmentary evidence 
indicating that this siege may have been fitfully ongoing from then until the castle's 
surrender in 1342, broken only by a brief period of truce in 1340 . 
35 If a siege of such 
lengthy duration is true then the ability of Rokeby and his garrison to hold out is little 
short of spectacular. 
Naturally garrisons could not hold out forever; as With Bothwell there came a 
point when the garrison became so weakened it was unable to offer further resistance. 
Yet Bothwell is an unusual example in that most castles surrendered rather than reach 
a stage of such hopeless desperation. The question therefore is on what basis was it 
considered acceptable for a constable to offer terms of surrender when besieged. It is 
instructive to compare how Stirling held out in 1337 with its surrender only five years 
later, Thomas Rokeby being the constable on both occasions. When it was besieged in 
1337 the castle was not only well supplied with men and victuals but the Scots 
believed Edward III was rapidly advancing towards them with an army; in 1342 
Edward III was in France with an army and thus there was scant hope of a strong force 
coming to Stirling's relief . 
36 A second factor was that in 1342 victuals were running 
extremely low - 'That thai had na thingfor till eit' - due to the 
length and closeness of 
37 
the siege. It was the lack of victuals and no immediate prospect of relief, together a 
hopeless situation, which convinced Rokeby his only option was to surrender. 
33 Lanercost, p. 220; Scalacronica, p. 58; Barbour incorrectly states that the castle only 
held out for six 
days, Bruce, p. 626, n. 192-9. 
34 Bower, vi i., p. 13 1; Lanercost, p. 3 03; Wyntoun, vi., p. 94. 
35 Bower, vil., pp. 238-239, n. 18-22. 
36 Bower, vii, p. 145. 
37 Wyntoun, vi, pp. 132-6. 
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These are recurring themes that decided the outcome of a siege and can be seen 
in those previously mentioned. Norham was able to hold out as further supplies 
reached the castle, Berwick castle surrendered after eight weeks as victuals ran out and 
Wallace's close sieges took castles due to lack of victuals, famine becoming rife 
amongst the garrisons, combined with little hope of relief as the sieges were timed to 
coincide with the English army's return into England. Ironically, despite his 
melodramatic style, it is Barbour who succinctly summarises the three critical factors 
that decided the outcome of a siege. Explaining why James Douglas destroyed 
Douglas castle rather than occupying it Barbour states that Douglas simply did not 
possess the means to withstand the inevitable siege, writing; 
And it is to peralous thing 
In castell assegyt to be 
Quhar want is off thir thingis thre, 
Vitaill or men with that arming 
Or than gud hop offrescuing. 38 
Victuals, manpower and the prospect of relief were the three essential elements that 
dictated the success or failure of a siege. Naturally these are inter-linked; as victuals 5 
decline manpower is weakened leading eventually to a garrison ripe for the taking. If 
there was seen to be no hope of relief then a constable would usually surrender before 
things became desperate. The truth that these three factors were critical can be seen in 
the events of 1314. The inability of the Scots to take Edinburgh by siege was down to 
the fact it was so well supplied with men and victuals that, 'it dred na mann-yS 
mycht, )39 and this was true of Roxburgh as well, there being enough victuals 
for a 
Shrove Tuesday celebration. It may well have been the inability of the force besieging 
Edinburgh to take the castle that led Douglas to decide on an assault on Roxburgh; that 
38 Bruce, p. 211. 39jbidg 
p. 377. 
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Edinburgh also had to be taken by assault is proof that these castles were well-manned 
and supplied and consequently were impervious to siege. In contrast Stirliniz was short 
on victuals which lead the constable to agree to terms of surrender if relief did not 
40 It is clear that the three f come by an agreed date. actors of victuals,, manpower and 
relief helped dictate the events of 1314. 
A fourth factor which also played a role was the fear that Scottish success bred 
in garrisons. In 1337 the garrison of Bothwell was aware of the wholesale Scottish 
capture of castles throughout 1336 and 1337, an apparently inexorable run of success 
accomplished with the aid of well-equipped siege-train and in particular a certain 
siege-engine known as 'Bostour'; it was mainly through their fear of the ferocity of 
this weapon that the garrison of Bothwell and several other castles hastik- 
surrendered . 
41 Scottish success could therefore undermine the will of a garrison to 
resist and once one surrendered others would follow. Just one month after Perth fell to 
assault in 1313 Dumfries surrendered and this resulted in the ensuing surrender of 
Caeverlock and Buittle. 42 The surrender of Dundee occurred upon the news of the 
English defeat at Stirling Bridge and the loss of Edinburgh and Roxburgh could not 
fail to influence the constable of Stirling castle into agreeing conditional terms of 
ailure to come to t surrender. Such fear was bred by Scottish success and English f 
aid of the garrisons. Yet fear was never a factor on its own; although it is 
highlighted 
40 Jbid, p. 402, n. 810-30. On 25 March 1314 victuals were to 
be bought and shipped to Stirling castle 
by Thomas Sanser, serviens, with a stipulation that four Scots, two of whom 
were relations of the 
constable, were to ensure the goods were taken to the garrison and not 
to the Scots. The siege must have 
been underway by then and it is doubtful the victuals reached the 
beleaguered garrison. The loss of 
Linlithgow in 1313 and Livingston shortly afterwards, both essential staging 
posts on the overland route 
to Stirling, would explain why it was short of victuals. If these supplies were 
unable to get through they 
would surely have gone to Edinburgh and Roxburgh which explains 
why these were relatively well- 
stocked in 13 14, Rot. Scot. i, 121 a, 111 b. 
41 Both Bower and Wyntoun single out an engine of this name, one 
that seems to Imply some kInd of 
battering ram capable of breaking through walls, Bower, vii, p. 
125- Wyntoun, vi., pý 9'21. 
42 Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 194. 
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in the case of Bothwell it needs to be noted that the gamson of Bothwell had also 
consumed nearly all their victuals nor was there any hope of relief . 
43 
Lanercost advances another reason for the surrender of Bothwell claiming it 
was due to the absence of the constable, the castle having been committed to Robert 
Ufford who at the time of its fall was attending parliament where he was invested as 
earl of Suffolk, stating that it was due to his absence that the garrison surrendered so 
44 
quickly. The implication is that the captain left in charge was neither as strong nor as 
capable as the constable and exerted less authority over the garrison. Bothwell is not 
the only example: in 1358 Berwick was lost whilst the warden of the town, William, 
baron Greystoke, had left his post to personally attend the king in France . 45 Wark 5 
castle was taken in 1400 when the owner, William Grey, was absent being elsewhere 
on the king's service; 46 William Felton, constable of Roxburgh, was In England when 
the castle was taken by assault in 1342 whereby 'he escha it the deid ; 47 Edinburgh p 
was unsuccessfully besieged by the Scots whilst the constable, John Stirling, was 
"absent; 
48 it was during an absence of Thomas Gray from Norham that one of his men 
betrayed the outer bailey of the castle and consequently the second ward and great 
tower were forced to hold out for three days until the Scots left fearing the return of 
Gray from the south ; 49 Edinburgh fell to a daylight assault in 1341 whilst the 
constable, Thomas Rokeby, was resident at his other command of Stirling and In 1313 
Linlithgow was similarly taken when the constable was in Edinburgh which was 
another castle under his command. 
43 Wyntoun, vi, p. 92. 
44 Lanercost, p. 301. Wyntoun has the captain who decided upon surrendering as 
William de V, Ilers, a 
'worthy man' who held the tower. In contrast Bower gives Villers as the one 
Englishman killed during 
the siege, Wyntoun, vi., p. 92; Bower, vii, p. 125. 45 cDs, iv, no. 3. 
46 Ibid, no. 542. 
47 Wyntoun, vi., pp. 160-164. 
48 Lanercost, p. 3 08, 
49 Scalacronica , p. 
64. 
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The similarities between the last two events are striking, indeed so striking that 
the latter has had doubt cast on its authenticity so closely does it resemble the details of 
the fall of Edinburgh in 1341.50 The Scottish made use of a ruse at Edinburgh, 
pretending to be merchants from England and gaining access Into the castle; 51 NNIth 
Rokeby resident at Stirling and a captain subordinate to him at Edinburgh it is entirelý' 
possible that the Scots exploited this confusion, maybe claiming that Rokeby knew the 
merchants with their victuals were expected or indeed that they had been organised by 
Rokeby himself It was the confusion created by the lack of the presence of the 
constable himself that made this audacious daylight assault possible. When it is 
considered that in 1313 the constable of Linlithgow, Piers Lubaud, was absent as he 
was also simultaneously constable of Livingston and Edinburgh, the same tactic of 
daylight attack appears perfectly feasible. Again a captain was in charge at Linlithgow 
and it is revealing that it appears it was not the constable or even the captain that 
arranged for the husbandman to enter the peel but the soldiers of the garrison. 52 The 
lack of firm authority in the absence of Lubaud appears to have left the garrison 
unwary and undisciplined thereby facilitating the daylight assault that quickly seized 
this well-manned peel. The absence of the constable could prove fatal to a garrison's 
-I- ability to hold its fortification. 
The absolutely critical role of the constable in holding his garrison together in 
the face of an enemy attack is a constantly recurring theme under both siege and 
assault. Constables were studied so as to ascertain and exploit their weaknesses, if 
considered strong leaders then attacks were timed to coincide with their absence, the 
50 Duncan notes the similarity although he does not question the reliability of 
both assaults however he 
does believe the name of the husbandman Barbour provides as being instrumental 
in taking Linlithgow, 
William Bumnock, may well be borrowed from the 1341 loss of Edinburgh in which 
William Bullock 
was a leading participant, Bruce, p. 368, n. 150, n. 153. 
" Bower, vii., pp. 145-147; Wyntoun, vi., pp. 138-144. 
52 'Ihai off the pele had wonnyn haylAnd with this Bunnok spokyn had thai 
To lede tha, hay', Bruce, pp. 
370-1. 
232 
lack of absolute control exercised by a captain allowed for a confusion of command, 
indeed ambushes were undertaken to capture the constable as Thomas Gray found on 
two occasions when constable of CUpar. 53 The authority and level of esteem constables 
could be held in by their garrison is evident In Scottish attempts to exploit this 
relationship. When John Stirling was captured with over twenty of his garrison in 13 38 
William Douglas brought them before Edinburgh castle. As well as prom's'ng those 
inside life, limb and goods if they surrendered Douglas also threatened that if they did 
not then Stirling would be drawn at the tail of horses and hanged on a gallows before 
the gate while the other prisoners would be beheaded before the eyes of the garrison. 
Despite these threats the garrison refused to surrender replying that the castle belong), ed 
to the king; Douglas' bluff being called Stirling and the prisoners were taken to 
Dumbarton castle. 
54 
This tactic required the captured constable to be a figure of authority who was 
respected by his gaffison. Yet the most startling incident that reveals exactly how 
critical a strong and respected constable was to a garrison under attack was the 
extraordinary overthrow of Piers Lubaud by his own garrison in early 1314. Besieged 
by the Scots the garrison of Eclinburgh were apparently suspicious of Lubaud as he had 
spoken to the Bruce and the siege was set so close. This combined with him being a 
Gascon and a cousin of Gaveston led to the garrison overthrowing Lubaud and 
aPPointing one of their own as constable. Undoubtedly these were contributing factors 
in their mistrust of Lubaud but overriding these must have been the knowledge that as 
constable he had already lost Linlithgow and Livimgston to the Scots. 
This record 
would have been enough to convince the garrison to adopt this radical move 
to 
increase their own defensiVe ability and thus their own safety. 
It is telling that the 
53 Scalacronica, pp. 48-9.1 Dunbar at 54 Lanercost, p. 312. This blackmail tactic was also tried by the 
English during their siege of 
that time; once again there was no surrender and the threat was not carried 
out. 
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garrison appointed another constable from amongst themselves who they believed was 
imbued with the qualities an effective constable should possess; a man who was wan . 
wise and active and who would use his knowledge, strength and cunning to try and 
hold the castle. 55 It was this constable who rallied the garrison against the surprise 
assault. He was at the forefront of the savage fighting, leading by example; so pivotal 
was he to the engagement that Barbour claims it was only upon his death that the Scots 
were able to win the castle, the garrison finally breaking when he was slain, Barbour 
stating that if he had not been killed then Thomas Randolph, leading the Scots, would 
have been in mortal danger. 56 Similarly it was Fiennes who was in the thick of the 
fighting during the Scottish assault on Roxburgh, holding out overnight in the tower 
where he was mortally wounded by an arroW, 
57 
and Bramptone who held the remnants 
of his garrison together over eighteen months of arduous siege. A garrison needed to 
trust and believe in their constable; this was why Ebles de Mountz was earmarked to 
take over from Lubaud, the former being a knight with a strong loyal pedigree who had 
served in the Edinburgh garrison for many years and knew a number of those still 
serving there. 58 An effective constable could make or break the ability and will of a 
garrison to resist attack. 
Siege brought with it another onerous responsibility to the constable; the 
decision of if and when to agree to terms of surrender. The tempting knowledge that 
by 
surrendering good terms could be guaranteed, saving life and limb and maybe even the 
goods of the garrison, rather than enduring the grim fate of a siege presented a 
fine 
balance. Despite the temptations of conditional surrender no garrison surrendered 
without holding out for a period of time. As with Thomas 
Rokeby at Stirfing It was 
55 Bruce, p. 378. 
56 Jbid7 pp. 3 94-3 96. 
57 Jbid) pp. 3 78-3 86. 
58 See pp. 96-9. 
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only as time passed and victuals ran low that he looked to conclude terms. The 
garrisons that did surrender having agreed conditions were: StIrl g (1314, in 1342): 
Bothwell (1337); Berwick castle (1318); Wark and Harbottle (1318); Lochmaben 
(1384). In the cases of Stirling (1314), Wark, Harbottle and Lochmaben the conditions 
included a clause that stipulated the garrison would surrender by a specIfic date If the 
castle had not been relieved by then. By entering into the latter a constable would be 
attempting to cover himself from any recriminations that may follow the surrender of 
his castle, in effect a get-out clause that protected him from any 11 1 itigation afterwards. 
Constables were aware that recriminations could follow the loss of their castle. 
Alexander Balliol had all his lands and goods confiscated upon losing Selkirk peel in 
January 1303 due to being under the king's suspicion, having to wait until 26 March 
1305 until they were returned due to petition by the council and in consideration of 
Balliol's good services . 
59 The greatest recriminations came in 1318 when Berwick was 
lost after Edward 11 had entrusted its keeping to the burgesses at their own request. 
Enraged, he ordered all the goods of the county that were at Kingston-on-Hull to be 
seized, he had the leading burgesses of Berwick retained as hostages and certain 
townsmen taken prisoner. 60 In 1358 William baron Greystoke was pardoned by 
Edward III at the request of the queen for leaving his post as warden of Berwick in 
1355 whereupon the town fell to the Scots as he had left to attend the king in person 
during the war in France; ` in 1400 William Grey was also pardoned for the 
loss of his 
castle of Wark as he had been absent on the king 1) s service. 
62 There were also pardons 
for the loss of Bewcastle by John Middleton in 140 163 and In 1385 two pardons 
for the 
59 CDS, ii, no. 1649. 
60 CDS' iii, no. s 593,594; Northern Petitions, pp. 65-70. 61 CDS, iv, no. 3. 
62 jbidg iv, no. 542. 
63 Ibid, iv, no. 585. 
earl of Northumberland for allowing Berwick castle fall to the Scots. 64 The loss of 
Lochmaben in 1384 led to the constable, Alexander Fetherstonhalgh, being arrested 
and transported under guard to Windsor castle where he faced an inquest into the 
reasons why he had surrendered the castle. 65 
In light of the number of castles lost in the fourteenth century it is remarkable 
how few recriminations there were. None of the three major castles of Edinburgh, 
Roxburgh and Stirling feature in royal inquests; despite being lost a number of times, 
including instances of surrender, there was no blame attached to the constables who 
lost these castles, 66 many of whom went on to hold further important commands. In 
fact the handful of cases in which there were repercussions usually had another reason 
other than a purely military one with domestic politics often involved. Alexander 
Balliol's treatment seems intimately connected with his name and Scottish antecedents 
when it is considered that the garrison in Selkirk forest had withdrawn from their post 
leaving his garrison isolated; at the same time as he lost his peel the fortification at 
Carstairs, was also lost but no action was taken against the constable, Walter Burghdon, 
who instead he took up another position. 67 That the majority of incidents where blame 
was attached come from the last two decades of the century is due to the Good 
Parliament of 1376 in which accusations were brought against the king's chamberlain 
alleging he had sold the fortress of St. Sauveur to the French and prevented the relief 
of the castle of Becherel. 68 Although these accusations were a device to remove the 
chamberlain they effectively politicised the issue of castles being lost to the enemy 
64 Ibid, iv, no. 333. 
65 Ibid, iv, nos. 327,331,342. Fetherstonalgh's treatment seems harsh in light of the 
fact no one was 
willing to be constable of Lochmaben due to its perilous state nor had any relief arrived 
before the date 
he agreed to surrender by. The integrity of the castle defences were certainly precarious at the time, 
Wyntoun, vi, pp. 288-91; Bower, vii., pp. 395-97. 
66 The closest this comes is the letter absolving Fiennes from any blame, his 
loyalty called into question 
more to avoid paying a debt to his widow than due to any real suspicion, 
CDS, v, no. 600. 
67 From 31 January 1303, immediately after the loss of Carstairs, he was serving in the Berwick garrison 
with nine of his esquires, E101/1 1/1, m. 4. 
68 G. Holmes, The Good Parliament, (Oxford, 1975), pp. 5,13 1. 
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hence the need to pardon those in charge of Wark and Bewcastle. The charges brought 
against the earl of Northumberland for losing Berwick followed this precedent but 
were instigated by John of Gaunt as part of an ongoing battle for power between the 
two men rather than there being a real sense that the earl was to blame. 69 
This lack of blame and recrimination clearly illustrates that the constables and 
by association their garrisons were not considered by contemporaries to be at fault in 
the loss of their castles to the Scots throughout the fourteenth century. Action taken 
against constables was so minimal as to be almost non-existent: Thomas Rokeby was 
never held responsible for the loss of Edinburgh or surrender of Stirling; no blame was 
ever attached to Philip Moubray or Piers Lubaud even though they served Bruce 
afterwards. 70 Pardons later in the period appear due to the sensitivity of the issue in the 
charged political climate. That virtually no blame was attached to constables and their 
garrisons for the loss of castles makes it is clear that contemporaries recognised it was 
not due to their negligence or defensive inability that these losses occurred but that it 
was due to something entirely beyond their control; the failure of the military system 
that was essential to their survival. 
It is a mistake to view this period as one in which garrisons were unable to 
effectively defend their fortifications. If supplied with the necessary requirements - 
manpower, victuals and the prospect of relief - then garrisons could and indeed 
did 
hold out in the face of Scottish attacks. It was the responsibility of the military system 
to provide these basic requirements and without them there was only so much a 
garrison could do; the great crime was not that the garrisons should 
have held out 
longer but that they should have been saved sooner .7' 
Garrisons that fell to surpnse 
assaults should not be condemned either; the painstaking reconnaissance, planning 
and 
69 Tuck, 'Richard H and the Border Magnates', pp. 40-2. 70 The Vitas taint of treachery against Lubaud is without foundation, see PP. 
10 1 
71 A similar sentiment is expressed by Watson, Under the Hwnmer, p. 
98. 
-1 ") 
thorough preparation that went into Scottish assaults made them a formidable method 
of attack and it was this not the weakness or indiscipline of garrisons that made them 
successful. Indeed it was the ostensibly simple nature of these assaults that made them 
so dangerous, a garrison only being aware of the assault when the attack actuall-y went 
in. That garrisons were beaten by this method should come as no surprise when it is 
considered that major French fortresses in the 1350s have been seen as being 
extremely vulnerable to surprise attacks by night; escalade may have been a new peril 
in France in the late 1340s but it was a tried and tested feature of the Anglo-Scottish 
wars by then. 72 
It is telling that, apart from the opportunistic attacks on English castles later in 
the century, the castles of northern England remained largely impervious to siege and 
assault. Scottish attacks were mounted against them but almost without exception they 
failed comprehensively. It was the very fact that these castles were in England which 
resulted in their garrisons repelling these attacks; external support was at once more 
immediate and constant along with intelligence on the presence of the enemy and their 
activities. Although it is true that the Scots never embarked on such an intensive 
offensive against English castles as they did against the occupied Scottish castles it 
was undoubtedly the difficulty of operating in hostile territory and an inability to 
effectively isolate these English castles which precluded their systematic seizure by the 
Scots. This highlights the crucial importance of external support to garrisons and the 
near insurmountable straits garrisons in occupied Scottish castles found themselves in 
when denied this support and effectively left isolated in hostile territory. 
The extent to which attacks on garrisons and their fortifications can be regarded 
as a routine danger during this period needs finally to be addressed. There Nvere two 
72 Sumption, Trial by Fire, pp. 46,98. 
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major perio sn which such attacks proliferated and whIch taken together only amount 
to eighteen years, approximately twenty when Wallace's actions are also taken into 
consideration. To those serving in garrisons in these periods an enemy attack by siege 
or assault was a very real day-to-day threat and it is this ever present threat of attack 
which is important; from the late 1290s until Neville's Cross in 1346 the frightening 
prospect of a Scottish attack would never have been far from the minds of garrison 
soldiers. Even after Neville's Cross there was always the danger of a sudden assault or 
siege like those which befell Berwick castle in 1378 and 1384. 
The Scalacronica intriguingly hints that the attacks known to historians may 
only be half the story. Thomas Gray was twice ambushed outside his castle of Cupar, 
had to fight off a Scottish attack on Norharn, was twice besieged in Norham for 
lengthy periods while in another attack the outer bailey of his castle was taken. The 
incidents the Scalacronica describes are reminiscent of the attack which the constable 
of Lochmaben, Tilliol, recounted in a letter; 73 it is only the chance survival of this 
74 letter that reveals this attack. In fact Scottish attacks of varying type and intensity 
seem to have been more regular and widespread than existing evidence suggests. As 
Gray says of Norharn it would 'tax anyone to work out the history of that castle' due to 
the 'combats, feats of arms, hardships through lack of supplies, sleges' to which It was 
exposed, these numerous attacks occurring in just eleven years . 
75The history of each 
front-line castle would be the same complicated story and for the garrison the fife- 
threatening danger of attack was indeed a daily reality. 
Castles fell in spite of the dogged efforts of garrisons to hold them not because 
of some inherent inability Within garrisons when faced with attack. 
Credit should be 
given to the Scots rather than blame cast onto garrisons. What must 
be stressed is that 
73 See pp. 275-6. 
74 See chapter on intelligence and communications. 
75 Scalacronica, pp. 48-9,61-4. 
in all these attacks on castles it was the constable and his garrison which was targeted. 
Siege engines could damage walls but the days of gunpowder weapons which could 
attempt to dismantle a castle around the garrison had not yet arrived. Consequentlý, it 
was not the frailty of stone and mortar which was exploited to seize a castle but the 
human weakness of flesh and bone. The garrison was the weakest point of a castle's 
defences. As such it was exposed to all the violence and pressure the attackers could 
bring against it. This should be remembered when assessing the ability and willingness 
of a garrison to maintain the defence of its castle. 
Yet despite this the loss of castles throughout the period was not brought about 
by a general reluctance or inability of their garrisons to defend them but was due to the 
garrisons becoming isolated from the external support of the English military system, 
the support of which was essential for their survival. Denied supplies, reinforcement 
and the prospect of relief it was not so much a case of whether the castle would fall but 
of when. That contemporaries recognised this fact can be seen in the lack of official 
censure against constables for the loss of their castleS. 76 The swathe of English-held 
Scottish castles lost in the wars was not, as often stated, the fault of the gamsons but 
rather was down to a failure of the infrastructure upon which their continued survival 
rested. In this context praise must been given to garrisons for their tenacity in 
continuing to oppose the enemy when finding themselves Increasingly isolated. 
The 
defence of its fortification may have been the most basic role of a garrison 
but it was 
also the most demanding; on the defensive and pinned behind its own walls a garrison 
experienced the severest test of its strength and commitment it was ever 
likely to face. 
" It is also evident in the indentures which, in the case of a siege, stipulated 
a time by which relief 
should arrive and if this passed then the constable was 
free to negotiate the surrender of the castle, that 
agreed between the Crown and the keepers of Roxburgh 
in 1400 stating that in the event of a 'royal' 
siege then a relieving army should appear within three months, 
CDS, iv, no. 568. 
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7. 
BEYOND THE WALLS 
Although it was the garrison which manned the castle defences when under attack this 
was by no means their solitary area of operational activity; the military role of the 
garrison was also aggressive, conducting a wide range of operations beyond the 
confines of the castle walls encompassing both strategically offensive activities and, 
when part of a defensive strategy, tactically offensive operations. The origins of the 
castle were aggressive in nature with a principal mechanism being its function as a 
fortified base from which troops could dominate the surrounding countryside. ' Yet 
despite this the capability of English garrisons operating in the field has been cast into 
serious doubt. A detailed analysis of the Scottish invasions of 1138 and 1173-4 has 
revealed that forays by the northern garrisons to resist these were a particularly rare 
occurrence and that their limited size precluded any engagement outside their castle 
2 
walls. More pertinently for the period in question here it has been observed that 
garrisons were neither large enough nor mobile enough to halt Scottish raids and that 
they were less valuable as a defence against invading armies than might be expected. 
Indeed garrisons were unable to protect the demesne land of their own castle while the 
occurrence of forays has been seen as occasional With only some evidence for them 
being undertaken. 3 In light of these facts the question is raised as to whether these 
garrisons were able to perform this key aggressive role in this period. 
The documents frequently cited by historians to illustrate the failure of 
garrisons to undertake this role are the letters that Edward 11 sent to the constables of 
M. Strickland, 'Securing the North: Invasion and the Strategy of Defence 
in twelfth-century Anglo- 
Scottish Warfare', Anglo-Norman Warfare, ed. M. Strickland (Woodbridge, 1992), p. 
215. 
2 Ibid, pp. 215-6. 
3 M. Prestwich, 'English Castles in the Reign of Edward H', Journal of 
Me&eval Hisloty, 8 (1992), p. 
165; idem, Armies and Warfare, pp. 206,2 10-11. 
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Barnburgh, Warkworth, Dunstanburgh and Alnwick In September 1322. Edward 
severely reprimanded them for failing to act against a Scottish raiding party. stating his 
disbelief at their failure to harass the enemy and that the raiding force has so far not 
been subject to challenge or damage from the gamsons. The reason for Edward's ire 
was twofold; firstly the Scots were infesting the neighbourhood of the castles 
themselves and secondly the enemy force was small, not more than a hundred men-at- 
arms and a hundred hobelars, a force the garrisons together could easily outnumber. In 
no uncertain terms he commanded the constables to do better and make some exploit 
on the enemy. 4 These letters have been misrepresented; their importance is not in 
showing garrisons to be incapable of aggressive action but that such activity was an 
expected and regular activity in which they should be engaged, in fact so regular that 
their inaction on this occasion is greeted by disbelief and a stem rebuke. It is telling 
that in the same month Edward thanked the constable of Norham for his intelligence 
5 
concerning the Scots; the latter escaped censure due to his obvious activity. The 
reasons for Edward's anger are also instructive; the Scots being in the neighbourhood 
of the castles and relatively small in number. Being superior in number and not having 
to stray far from their castles were consequently circumstances in which a garrison 
should be acting aggressively. Although unable to halt a major invasion force garrisons 
were expected to take on significant Scottish raids in the field. 
Contemporary Scottish commanders certainly did not dismiss the threat a 
garrison could pose as their strategy in 1327 demonstrates. Three battles invaded 
England, one immediately investing Norham and another investing Alnwick while a 
third under Bruce raided Northumberland with impunity. Upon 
Bruce's return 
unsuccessful attempts were made to take these castles but it is clear that the priority 
4 CDS, iii, no. 783. 
5 Jbid, no. 787. Edward 11 was in Durham at the time and would 
have been in receipt of the latest 
intelligence about this force. 
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had been to block these garrisons in their castles so they could not operate in the 
Scottish rear. Similarly in late 1297 Carlisle was besieged for a month by a section of 
the invading Scottish host while the bulk of the army under Wallace continued ftirther 
south and ravaged northern England. Tellingly both Wallace and Bruce thought it 
necessary to detach part of their army to neutralise the active threat of the gamsons 
and it follows that the Scots certainly thought the garrisons capable of sign-ificant 
offensive action. 
These then were contemporary attitudes of Edward 11, Bruce and Wallace to the 
offensive abilities of garrisons and it is clear that garrisons were expected to undertake 
an active role beyond their walls. Further proof is contained more formally within 
orders and indentures concerning garrisons. The file of indentures for the keeping of 
castles in Scotland in late 1302 include several which specifically refer to the making 
of forays, stating that if such a foray is made out of the constable's bailiwIck then he 
and his men would be paid full wages for its duration. 6 These forays were not to be 
instigated by individual constables themselves but by command of the king or his 
lieutenant thus envisioning centrally controlled and by implication co-ordinated 
aggressive operations. These stipulations for making forays were written into the 
indentures for Edinburgh,, Jedburgh, Roxburgh and Berwick and clearly demonstrate 
that garrisons were to be used aggressively. Earlier in 1298 instructions were given to 
the commanders of Berwick stating that soldiers there under the king's pay were not to 
make a foray Without an aid from the garrison of 30 men-at-arms and 500 foot with the 
added stipulation that the leader of the foray had to be the warden of the town at one 
time and the constable of the castle at another; ' in short one of them must remain 
within the garrison. In the same year further evidence of the intention of conducting 
6 CDS, ii, no. 13 2 1. 
Ibid, no. 1022. 
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offensive operations comes in the form of a memorandum issued to those in command 
at Roxburgh, Jedbugh and Berwick with regard to making forays against the Scots. 8 
These clearly defined and formal instructions leave no doubt that garrisons vvere 
intended to operate in the field during the early years of the war and reveal just whN- 
Edward 11 was so furious in 1322. 
So far the evidence assembled reveals that garrisons were expected to operate 
aggressively whenever a suitable opportunity arose. The question to address now is the 
extent to which these expectations and orders were carried out in practice. To achieve 
this it is first necessary to recognise that forays were not solely the province of the 
orders of the king or his lieutenant but could be detennined by the initiative of the 
constable himself It was ultimately the responsibility of the constable to ensure the 
aggressive role of his garrison was perfonned when the opportunity arose. 
The first glimpse of garrisons operating in the field is in the survival of several 
letters chiefly concerning the constable of Roxburgh, Robert Hastang. In 1298 he 
informed the king of his intention to attack a Scottish force when it returned to the 
Scottish border and in 1301 he was involved in the arrangements for a foray against 
robbers in the woods around Roxburgh which was to involve the Jedburgh garrison 
and troops under Alexander Balliol and Hugh de Audley. 
9 It was these same men 
along with Walter de Huntercombe who arranged a meeting in September 1300 to plan 
how best to secure the March although nothing could be concluded as only Audley and 
the Hastang brothers turned up; 10 in this case the 'securing of the march' must surely 
have involved provisions for co-ordinated aggressive action. Robert 
Hastang was 
involved in attacks on the Scots in 1298, seven horses being lost when 
Hastang and his 
garrison were 'making sallies' against the Scots, the wording clear that 
the garrison 
8 Ibid, no. 999. 
9 Ibid, nos. 1221,1226,1227. 
10 Stevenson, il, pp. 417-8. 
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made multiple attacks. " Detailed arrangements were made in December 1298 for a co- 
ordinated foray involving a combined force which, amongst others. Included troops 
from the garrisons of Jedburgh, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Berwick and Norham. John 
Kingston, constable of Edinburgh, was to decide when these forces should assemble at 
Edinburgh to undertake a foray to aid Stirling which they would mount 'all together. '12 
Robert Tilliol, constable of Lochmaben, requested one hundred armed horse under a 
good commander so he and his garrison could move against the Scots infesting the 
surrounding countryside in September 1301, the lack of troops 'to ride upon' the Scots 
leading to the area rising up against the English. In a separate letter Tilliol declares his 
garrison have no fear of these Scots and relates that the knight William de Henz, 'one 
of our companions' and by implication a member of the garrison, was taken by the 
Scots during a sally by the garrison. 13 Kingston also requested reinforcements to 
enable him to make a raid, his garrison at Edinburgh being insufficient for the purpose; 
in response the king ordered Simon Fraser to be ready to support him With 20 barded 
horses. 14 
Here then in the early years of the war garrisons can be seen engaged in and 
planning aggressive activities many of which were strategically defensive in nature. In 
direct contrast to Edward 11's criticism of inactive garrisons in 1322 there were two 
occasions on which constables were so determined to mount forays that they requested 
reinforcements to facilitate this. 15 The freedom of the individual constable to initiate 
forays is also evident in these accounts; Tilliol detennined to put down the local 
country and the foray Kingston needed reinforcements for being explicitly described as 
a raid he wished to make. Constables would have been under the same remit that was 
11 CDS, ii, no. 1007. 
12 Stevenson, ii, pp. 339-41. 
13 Jbg pp. 431-3. 
14 CDS' ii, no. 1034. 
15 The aggressive activities of Kingston and Hastang suggest this was not mere posturing on 
their part. 
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given to Patrick Dunbar in 1298 when he was appointed captain of the forces and 
castles in the east march, one that instructed him to undertake forays when he and the 
officers under his command saw fit opportunity. 16 Such aggressive operations can be 
seen to encompass a wide spectrum of activities undertaken by garrisons ranging from 
local, tactical actions in defence of their castle, to long-range forays of strategic 
importance. It is to this various range of activities that attention needs to be focussed. 
At the lowest end of the spectrum of aggressive activity by a garrison was the 
mounting of sorties against an enemy that was attacking their castle, in effect a 
counter-attack to preserve the integrity of the castle. The sally from Lochmaben in 
which Heriz was captured is a prime example of this. Another was the opportunistic 
foray of the constable Robert Manners against the Scottish watch that was encamped 
before Norham in 1327, Manners exploiting the flooded river which separated the 
watch from the main Scottish force. 17 The Scalacronica details several occasions on 
which Thomas Gray's garrison of Norham executed the defence of their castle in the 
field: when William Marmion, complete with his gilded war helm, sallied forth the 
garrison mounted a foray to support him putting the Scottish force arrayed before 
Norham. to flight and cutting down those they caught in a pursuit over several miles; a 
Scottish attempt to seize cattle from the vicinity of Norham resulted in a foray by part 
of the garrison and then a ftu-ther attack by Gray which drove the Scots across the 
Tweed with pursuit only prevented as the garrison was not mounted; an attempt to 
ambush Gray when he was in charge of Cupar castle ended with Gray getting 
back into 
the castle where 'he found his men sallying forth' in support, an action which would 
again have resulted in putting the Scots to flight. That Norhmn was considered 
to be 
the most perilous place in the country and it was to here that 
Marmion went to prove 
16 CDS) ii, no. 1025. 
17 Scalacronica, P. 82; P. Traquair, Freedom's Swordý Scotland's 
Wars of Independence (London, 
1998), p. 247. 
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his valour demonstrates that it was routine f or the garrison to defend the castle in the 
field; he would have won little renown if the garrison permanently remained behind its 
walls. 18 These brief counter-attacks, limited in scope and distance but of tremendous 
importance, were the tactically offensive operations which garrisons would have 
engaged in most frequently of all. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum were much more ambitious and audacious 
operations which could have significant strategic implications the most spectacular of 
which was that undertaken by John Stirling, constable of Edinburgh, in May 1336. 
Receiving intelligence that Cupar castle was besieged by the Scots Stirling took 40 
men-at-arms and 80 archers from his garrison at Edinburgh and secretly crossed the 
Forth in 32 boats. Setting fire to two villages - to make his force seem larger - Stirling 
and his men descended on the Scots whilst the garrison of Cupar also sallied out 
against the besiegers; panicked and believing the English army had arrived the Scots 
fled leaving behind their siege engines, anns and stores. Having pursued the Scots and 
killed those they could catch Stirling and his force returned to Cupar where they seized 
the abandoned baggage and burnt the siege engines. Stirling's men then returned to 
Edinburgh, the whole escapade taking only four days. 19 This raid was astonishingly 
successful achieving the double victory of relieving Cupar castle and destroying 
precious Scottish siege engines. 
Comparable to this are the aggyessive actions of Robert Urnftaville whilst 
constable of Roxburgh in the late 1390s and early 1400s. His most famous exploit took 
place in 1399 when a Scottish force raided across the border destroying 
Wark castle 
and harassing Northumberland, a raid timed to exploit the distraction of the ongoing 
parliament that was to officially crown Henry IV. Acting on 
his own initiative 
18 Scalacronica, pp. 48-50,61-4. 
19 Lanercost, pp. 296-7; CDS, iii, p. 354. 
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Umfraville moved with his garrison against the Scots and routed them at Fulhope-law 
in Coquetdale, destroying the enemy and taking many prisoners. To recognise 
Umfraville's decisive action Henry IV invested him as a Knight of the Garter. The next 
year, 1400, Umfraville again led his garrison against a major Scottish incursion, this 
time routing them at Rede-swire where important prisoners again fell into his hands. 
On two separate occasions Urnfraville therefore actively sought out, took on and 
defeated Scottish raiding forces with his garrison; this is a classic example of a 
garrison acting aggressively to secure the surrounding area. 
These engagements demonstrate that although a garrison could not halt a 
Scottish army it could oppose an element of an army or a strong Scottish raiding force. 
In June 1340 a Scottish force invaded across the border but the men of the March 
failed to oppose it and it was a combined force from the garrisons of Roxburgh, Wark 
and Norham that eventually fell on the Scots as they returned to the border loaded with 
21 booty, the English force taking 80 prisoners. In the late 1340s William Douglas and 
his men entered Ettrick forest in the vicinity of Roxburgh where John Coupland was 
constable. Coupland gathered men from his garrison - 'a very large armed band' - and 
moved into the area to reclaim Teviotdale to English allegiance however Douglas' men 
proved stronger and put Coupland's band to flight. 22 A Scottish force under Alexander 
Ramsay based itself 'underground' at Hawthorriden in c. 13 38 from where it raided 
seizing fodder and prisoners. To end this torment the 'garrisons of the English march',, 
complemented by reinforcements, 'secretly gathered' and surprised the Scots in open 
country. A feigned Scottish retreat followed by a counter-attack won the day with 
20HOCIgSon, part ii, ii, PP. 48-49; Northumberland Families, 2 vols. (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 
1968,1970), 
i, p. 214. Henry IV no doubt gained popular mileage out of rewarding Urnfraville with this 
honour, an 
astute political ploy at the start of Henry's reign. Urnfraville was also 
keeper of Harbottle and may well 
have used troops from this garrison in conjunction with those from Roxburgh. 
21 King, 'War and Landed Society', p. 92. 
22 Wyntoun, v, p. 186; Bower claims Coupland was jealous of Douglas' success, 
Boiver, vii, p. 27 1. 
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many English troops being captured including Robert Manners, the English leader. -- -, A 
more successful note was struck by a chance encounter in 1335. Returning from a 
plundering expedition in Scotland a company drawn from English gamsons - the 
Roxburgh garrison is specifically mentioned - encountered a Scottish band that was 
escorting the Count of Namur back to the border; in the ensuing fight William Douglas 
was forced to flee and the earl of Moray was captured. 24 
This chance encounter adds another level to the spectrum of aggressive 
activities undertaken by garrisons; a foray for plunder and booty. The garrison force 
was returning from Scotland where it 'had seized booty' in a 'plundering expedition". 2 -5 
In 1337/38 a section of the Edinburgh garrison drove a large number of beats away 
. r_ - from Calder Muir while the foray in which the constable, John Stirling, was captured is 
described as one in which he and his garrison were aiming to take 'some booty. 26 A 
raid along the Firth of Forth by the captain of Berwick in 1388 had as its aim the 
making of profit from such booty. 27 In 1298 John Kingston ordered his garrison to 
secure all the beasts in the locality of Edinburgh . 
28 One of the charges alleged against 
Andrew Harclay in 1319 was that on receiving the order to muster the county array to 
make a sortie he had sent messengers to tell the local men not to come as he would 
soon be in charge himself The result of this was that news of the intended foray spread 
to those around Hermitage, the target of the attack, and consequently they removed 
29 
their goods in anticipation. Such plundering raids served the 
dual purpose of 
23 Bower, vii, p. 47. Exactly which garrisons were involved 
is unfortunately impossible to deduce. 
24 Bower, vii, p. 115; Lanercost, p. 293. 25 Ibid. 
26 Bower, vii, p. 133; Lanercost, p. 308. Though it was also a sortie 
to defend the besieged castle. 
27 A. Goodman, 'The Defence of Northumberland: A Preliminary 
Survey', Armies, Chivaln, and 
kVarlare in Medieval Britain and France, ed. M. Strickland 
(Stamford, 1998), p. 169. 
28S 
tevenson 
, 
ii, p. 304. 29 CDS, iii, no. 675. 
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depriving the enemy and profiting the garrison and appear to be a frequent aCtIN,, ItN- of 
garrisons situated in hostile territory. 
Rather than seeking profit the starving garrison of Bemick undertook a 
desperate raid for victuals on St. Valentine's Day, 1316. Prisoners and cattle were 
taken in a foray that extended to within two leagues of Melrose Abbey but disaster 
struck on their return when they were attacked at a ford by the Scots losing all the 
supplies, most of their horses and more significantly 20 men-at-arms and 60 foot. The 
raid had been launched against the orders of the warden and the weakened garrison 
stood in severe peril. " It was to avoid just such a situation that provisions were made 
regarding the mounting of forays in orders and indentures; a defeated sortie could 
mean potential disaster for the castle in which the attacking force was based. The 
danger Edinburgh was in following John Stirling's capture has already been 
described' while Norham. was endangered in 1355 when Thomas Gray was captured 
along with men of his garrison when they stood and fought against a Scottish ambush 
sprung by William Douglas after Gray and his men had been drawn away from their 
castle by William de Ramsay's band who had plundered the town of Norham. 12 This 
ruse by the Scots has unmistakable echoes of those conducted against local Scottish 
castles between 1306 and 1312 which themselves underscore the fact that garrisons 
were apt to act aggressively if the chance arose and take the field against their enemy. 
Being lured into a trap was a danger garrisons acting aggressively always faced 
but the 
numerous incidents of them mounting such actlons Illustrates it 
did not curb theIr 
willingness to act aggressively. 
30 CDS5 iii, no. 477. The term 'looting' appears somewhat misplaced considering 
the pnvat, ons of the 
;, amson, Bruce, pp. 566-70. 
See 
. 232. 
I 
Bowper, vii, p. 279; Wyntoun, vi, p. 206. 
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Indeed the capture of constables is an indicator in itself of the extent to which 
garrisons operated in the field. As noted John Stirling and Thomas Gray Nvere both 
taken whilst engaged in forays while Robert Hastang was captured near Roxburgh 
castle in 1301 and John Felton, when constable of AInwick, was taken prisoner in 
1317 . 
33 Another indicator are the frequent payments for restoration of horses killed in 
the king's service that were made to garrison soldiers and which are often included 
among payments of wages to the garrison. The payroll for 1311/12 is an excellent 
example. In Roxburgh alone eight horses were lost in service, one of which was a 
warhorse valued at E20, and the garrison of Linlithgow lost eleven horses in the king's 
service valued altogether at a substantial total of f99.13s. 4d. which included a 
warhorse worth E20 and two of LIO. The Edinburgh garrison lost the extraordinary 
total of seventeen horses including one valued at E20 and another of exceptional 
quality worth E40 . 
34 The numbers lost and the fact that quality warhorses were among 
these clearly indicates that these losses were the result of action beyond the walls of 
the castle. Surviving pay accounts are littered with similar restoration payments and 
are proof that garrisons were regularly engaged in aggressive operations. 
The most emphatic evidence that garrisons widely operated in the field comes 
from the number of mounted soldiers stationed within the garrisons. To be effective 
beyond their walls garrison soldiers needed to have mobility (i. e. to be mounted); 
foot- 
soldiers could operate effectively within sight of the castle walls 
but horses were 
35 
needed for anything more. The sizeable numbers of mounted soldiers retained within 
garrisons has already been illustrated. Knights, men-at-arms and sergeants 
each 
possessed more than one horse and these traditional mounted soldiers 
were 
complemented in garrisons first by the emergence of the 
hobelar and then, from the 
31 Watson, Under the Hxnmer, p. 13 9; Moor, Knights of Edward 
I, iiý p. 8. 
34 CDSJ iii, app. vii, pp. 407-8,410,412. 
35 As Thomas Gray and his soldiers found out when defending Norham, see above. 
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1330s, by the mounted archer. In 1311/12 the Roxburgh garrison could muster 
approximately 76 mounted soldiers and Linlithgow up to 113; in 1322, at its peak, 
Barnburgh could put into the field 107, Warkworth 101 and Dunstanburgh 95. John 
Stirling's garrison at Edinburgh in 1335/36 contained 71 'hobelars and archers' as well 
as several knights and a large number of men-at-arms; these archers would have been 
mounted archers and as such were the highly mobile troops that enabled Stirling to 
undertake his audacious foray. Large numbers of mounted soldiers were not present 
merely to defend the walls of their castle, a task that could and in all likelihood was 
routinely accomplished on foot as Thomas Gray's defence of Norham illustrates, but 
were there in a primarily aggressive capacity. A multitude of mounted soldiers was an 
extra cost and burden in terms of expense and fodder but it was deemed necessary to 
ensure garrisons possessed a powerful aggressive capability. The only reason large 
numbers of hobelars and mounted archers were a permanent component of garrisons 
was because they allowed garrisons to effectively undertake field operatIons. 
It is also incorrect to assume that foot-soldlers held back these mounted troops 
as many forays were conducted by a section of the garrison rather than its entiretv. 
This was a matter of security for the castle as well as to ensure mobility. 
John 
Stirling's ill-fated foray that ended with his capture consisted of two or three 
knights 
and about 20 men-at-arms, an indication that only a small component of 
the garrison 
36 
was involved and none of the mounted archers. Occasionally almost 
the entire 
garrison was involved in an operation well beyond the castle; 
John Stirling's audacious 
Cupar sortie involving 40 men-at-arms and 80 archerS37 while 
in 13, Y) the entire 
garrisons of Warkworth and Dunstanburgh were called into action 
at Byland. 38 In the 
36 Lanercost, p. 312; Bower's claim that Stirling had 500 men 
fighting for him in this action is obviousk 
wholly erroneous, Bower, vii, p. 139. 37 CDS, iii, p. 354. 38 BL Stowe Mss 553, fos. 56r-57r. 
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early years of the century the preponderance of foot-soldiers was dealt with bv the 
mobile elements of several garrisons operating in conjunction with one another as seen 
in the planning of the 1298 foray to relieve Stirling. Garrisons were therefore never 
hindered in their mobility by the presence of foot-soldiers within their ranks if a fora, v 
called for rapid movement. 
Dedicated strike forces also co-existed within the garrisoning network. Berwick 
was used in early 1306 as a base from which Aymer de Valence launched mounted 
expeditions and in 1299 several officers and their men assembled at Carlisle to await a 
foray from that town. The best example of a permanent fast-moving strike force is that 
commanded. by William Latimer which was based in the town of Roxburgh for several 
years and which numbered 38 men-at-arms in 1301.39 In autumn 1302 this force, now 
of 20 men-at-arms, is specifically described as being 'appointed to ride when necessary 
10--- from Roxburgh in divers parts of Scotland'. At the same time John Segrave agreed to 
make forays from Berwick 'when necessary' with a troop of 30 men-at-arms . 
40 Also in 
autumn 1302 a force of 71 men-at-arms which was to make mounted expeditions was 
based in the castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben under John de St. John. 
" Andrew 
Harclay's force based in Carlisle lost horses in engagements on Stainmoor and at 
Penresax in 1314 and suffered further losses in forays undertaken between June and 
42 ile strike forces such as these were based in towns held by October 1315 . 
Highly mobi 
the English due to the greater space and resources that could sustain them there and 
complemented the mobile elements of the castle garrisons in facilitating 
fast-moving 
field operations. 
39 E 10 1/9/16. 
40 CDS, ii, nos. 1777,1081,1321. 
41 Ibid, no. 1324; E101/10/5. 
42 CDS, iii, no. 516. 
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That co-operation and communication existed between gamsons alloNved them 
to formulate and undertake field operations in concert and consequently to attempt 
more ambitious operations. 43 The letters of Hastang and Audley detailing preparations 
for forays to be undertaken between several garrisons have already been mentioned. 
The foray of December 1298 to aid Stirling was to consist of the following number of 
soldiers: Simon Fraser, 20 mounted men; Alexander Balliol, 10; Walter de 
Huntercombe, in charge of Northumberland, 30; earl Patrick, 10, the Jedburgh 
garrison, 10; Roxburgh garrison, 40; Berwick town, 30; Edinburgh garrison, 330 'at the 
44 least'; Norharn garrison, 20 . Here then five separate garrisons were to provide the 
bulk of the force for one large-scale co-ordinated foray of real strategic significance 
and the commander who was to decide on the gathering of these forces was the 
constable of Edinburgh, John Kingston, with Edinburgh itself selected as the place of 
muster. It was the Roxburgh and Jedburgh garrisons that made up part of the force that 
moved against robbers in 1301 and chiefly the combination of the Wark and Norham 
garrisons that defeated the returning Scottish raiding force in 1340. Edward 11's 
reprimand of 1322 explicitly commands the guilty garrisons to send out spies and to do 
some exploit 'in concert with other garrisons. ' 45 
Another forrn of co-operation can be seen in garrisons coming to the aid of one 
another. As the 1298 foray was to relieve pressure on Stirling castle so the main 
purpose of John Stirling's foray in 1336 was the relief of Cupar castle. 
After the Siege 
of Alnwick had been lifted in 1327 and the Scots had moved on against 
Warkworth 
and Norharn, Henry Percy tried to draw the Scots away by launching a counter-rald 
into Teviotdale. In 1315 on three occasions Roger Damory 
led a detachment from 
43 Strickland's conclusion that the northern castles 
formed no cohesive network in the twelfth century 
ontained units, is confined to those periods 
when a major 
and operated as largely independent, self-c 
Scottish army was operating in the area thus inhibiting communication, 
'Securing the North', P. 21 2- 
44 81evenson, ii, p. 341; Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 
76. 
45 CDS, ii, nos. 1226,1227; CDS, iii, no. 783. 
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Knaresborough to assist forces further in the north. 46 Here then garrisons Nvere 
operating effectively as a network, helping each other when possible and undertaking 
field operations together. The proximity of certain castles facilitated this co-operation 
as did the individual relationships of constables - in terms of being related to or 
knowing one another - as did the appointment of a lieutenant of Scotland in overall 
control of two or more castles and the distribution of royal forces in several 
fortifications like those spread throughout 19 different fortifications under Arundel in 
1317. Even when hard-pressed under the strain of warfare garrisons were able to co- 
operate with one another in the form of planning and mounting offensive operations 
together or coming to the aid of each other. This capacity for co-operation enhanced 
the aggressive capabilities of garrisons allowing for more ambitious and far-reaching 
operations in the field. 
In fact garrisons were no strangers to working in conjunction with field forces 
as well; the arrival of an English army in their vicinity did not automatically relegate 
them into a passive and redundant role. 47 In reality garrisons were frequently called 
upon as pools of manpower from which to draw extra soldiers for specific operations. 
Approximately 93 men-at-arms, five hobelars, three crossbowmen and 1,400 archers 
were drawn from the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Lochmaben for 
Edward I's campaign of 1300 and the army that mustered in July of the following year 
included a complement of 272 garrison soldiers comprising of I 10 from the garrison 
of Berwick; 100 archers and 32 hobelars from Roxburgh and Jedburgh; 20 archers 
48 
trom Edinburgh. Again in 1303 41 soldiers from the Berwick garrison were ordered 
46 Traquair, Freedom's Sword, p. 247; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 2 10. 
47 It was not just in moments of crisis that they contributed to field-armies, R. A. 
Brown, English Castles 
3 rd edition, London, 1976), p. 199. 
8 CDS, ii, no. 1229; Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. 107,119. 
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by the king to be at Roxburgh in May on the day appointed for the levies to muster 
there for the expedition of that year. " 
The most detailed evidence of garrisons undertaking this kind of activity comes 
in the Wardrobe Book of Henry de Abingdon for 13034. Interestingly there are two 
sections containing payments for garrisons; one is the normal set of financial accounts 
for garrisons staying within their castles but the other is contained within the section 
detailing payments for the retinues which constituted the army that served in Scotland 
during the spring and summer of 1304. It can be seen that during this period a total of 
266 garrison soldiers served as part of the army being drawn from the gamsons of 
Berwick, Linlithgow, Kirkintilloch, Edinburgh, Jedburgh, Roxburgh and Lochmaben. 
The primary objective of this campaign was the siege of Stirling castle which lasted 
from late April until July and although there is variation among the dates for which 
components of the various garrisons were serving with the army all but two fall 
between May and July, the two exceptions extending until August. The numbers drawn 
-C-- - from individual garrisons range from a mere four crossbowmen from Jedburgh to a 
substantial force of 94 foot-soldiers from Linlithgow. The duration of service vanes 
from just seven days for the 34 archers of Edinburgh up to a period of slightly over 
three months, 10 May until 15 August, for the forces from Linlithgow while 24 
crossbowmen and their vintenar from the Berwick garrison remained with the army 
50 
from I May until 21 August . 
The scale and complexity of the involvement of garrisons serving alongside the 
army is revealed in these accounts for the payment of wages. The large garrisons of 
Berwick and Linlithgow provided significant numbers of troops for the duration of the 
campaign whilst other garrisons providedjust as important albeit smaller numbers. 
The 
49 CDSý ii, no. 1356. 
50 BL Add Mss 8835, fo. 90; CDS, ii, no. 1599, refers to these garrison forces extremely briefly although 
it adds Dumfries and rather unhelpfully 'others' also supplied troops. 
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dates during which components of garrisons served with the army also varied from 
garrison to garrison. This was the basis of the orgamsation by which significant 
numbers of garrison soldiers served alongside the army in the field, a role for which 
they were effectively classed and received wages as another component of the anny 
despite their identity as garrisons. At the end of their period of anny service they 
returned to their original garrisons. Although 1304 was a time of English dominance 
which allowed garrisons to be moved with more freedom this same set-up must have 
operated for the components of garrisons serving in the preceding years. Indeed NNinter 
was a notoriously dangerous time for garrisons yet the Berwick garrison provided three 
constables and 120 archers that remained with the remnants of the army from 23 
December until 12 January. The separate section in the accounts for garrison forces 
serving in the field as part of the army proves that such activity was not an unusual 
occurrence and arrangements for special payment for this were already in place. 
Service as a part of an army could therefore either involve numbers in their 
hundreds drawn from a range of garrisons or alternatively a smaller number ftom 
perhaps one or two garrisons. Only chance survivals of records and a piecing together 
of these can reveal the extent of these operations. During 1300 there were 57 men-at- 
arms assigned to stay in the garrison of Roxburgh but on 6 July 39 of these left to join 
the king's army and on the same day ten of the 40 crossbowmen and 60 of the 160 
archers also departed to join up with the army. On 4 July, of the 21 men-at-arms within 
Jedburgh, 12 left to meet up with the army. Similarly eight constables with 900 archers 
under their command left the Berwick garrison on 23 July to go to the 
king's army. 51 
This considerable movement of men from garrisons to the army in 
July 1300 indicates 
just some of the components that made up the large garrison 
force mentioned above 
51 Lib. Quot. pp. 8-9,148. 
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that was engaged in the campaign of that year; once again the variance in dates and 
numbers is evident although the inclusion of these men amongst the norrnal Varrison 
accounts indicates that improvements in allotting the pay of such men had taken place 
by 1304, possibly as early as 1301 as their inclusion in the army payroll of that Year 
suggests. 
This pattern of making use of garrisons as a pool of manpower to support a 
field-army is evident in the first quarter of the period but has changed towards its 
close. At the English siege of Berwick in October 1319 there were 157 troops from 
Barriard castle and 24 hobelars from Norham present52 while the desperate battle at 
Byland in 1322 saw 215 garrison troops involved. 53 In 1385 Henry Percy, the warden 
of Berwick,, and the joint constables of Roxburgh, Thomas Swinburne and Richard 
Tempest, were ordered to attend the king for twenty-nine days whilst the latter 
personally led an anny into Scotland. Percy was to provide 100 men-at-arms and 200 
archers and the constables of Roxburgh 40 men-at-arms and 80 archers however in 
both cases these men were to be 'beyond their garrison', in other words in addition to 
54 rom which to draw extra their garrisons. Here gaffisons are not acting as reserves f 
men; the garrison remains in place whilst extra troops have to be raised by the 
constables from outside of the garrison to complement the field-army. Although the 
Roxburgh garrison was well-manned Richard 11 was keen it should stay that way and 
his specific order that both it and Berwick should not contribute men signifies that the 
retention of the castle was of overhding importance. 
It is tempting to interpret this specification that the garrison should not 
be used 
as part of an argument that claims garrisons lost their aggressive character 
towards the 
end of the fourteenth century. The order of 1385 and the developing entanelement 
of 
52 CDS, iii, no. 668. 53 BL Stowe Mss 553, f6s. 57v-58r. 
54 CDS, iv, no. 340. 
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political repercussions for the loss of castles are easily linked together to suggest that 
constables were unwilling to run the risks of off ensive action, risks that could involve 
the loss of their castle. 55 In 1385 even the king appears more concerned with the safety 
of Roxburgh than gaining a ready and experienced body of troops for his army. Yet 
this is to ignore certain facts. In the later fourteenth century the only major fortress in 
English hands apart from Berwick was Roxburgh hence Richard H's concern for its 
safeguard. In these circumstances, and with few garrisons in existence, there vvas little 
reason for the garrison of either Roxburgh or Berwick to go on the offensive as part of 
the army. However they did engage in offensive operations themselves as the raid from 
Berwick in 1388 and Urnfraville's forays from Roxburgh demonstrate. Clearly these 
garrisons never lost their aggressive spirit or role. 
One intriguing question remains concerning the field operations of garrisons, 
did they participate in any of the battles of the Anglo-Scottish wars? There is almost 
no direct evidence for this but in light of the regularity with which garrisons acted as a 
component of an army or field-force it would seem extremely likely. One of the few 
engagements for which there is definite proof is that of Humbleton in 1402 where it 
has been noted that amongst those present at the battle were the lieutenant of Roxburgh 
and the constable of Dunstanburgh, the chance mention of their names implicit in 
placing sections of both garrisons at the battle. 56 The loss of two warhorses by John 
Kingston in the engagement at Methven in 1306 almost certainly places elements of 
the Edinburgh garrison there . 
57 Frequently it is only through guesswork, probability 
and ambiguous statements that further participation in battles can be looked for. 
Richard de Waldegrave, constable of Stirling, was certainly killed during the battle of 
55 See pp. 234-6. 
56 AJ. Macdonald, Border Bloodshed Scotland, England and France at War, 1369-1403 (East Linton, 
2000), p. 155. 
57 CDSý v, no. 472(t). 
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Stirling Bridge In 1298 and a letter describing the aftermath in which the %ýTiter 
claimed that he and other Englishmen attempting to escape from the rout rushed into 
Stirling castle and were thus able to keep it from falling to the Scots clearly infers that 
some if not all of the garrison had been engaged and either killed or wounded in the 
battle. 58 Bannockburn raises a similar probability of the Stirling garrison playing a part 
in a battle which was fought immediately before them although there is no evidence 
with which to support this, any such argument relying on the precedent of hard-pressed 
garrisons sallying out to aid a relieving force as the Cupar garrison ventured out to aid 
John Stirling's men. 
However there is a strong possibility that elements of the Berwick garrison 
were involved at Bannockburn. Edward U's desperate need for foot-soldiers occurred 
whilst in Northumberland and it is unlikely that the significant number of foot-soldiers 
in Berwick went unnoticed. On 17 August there was a substantial reinforcement of the 
Berwick garrison when a royal household force of 21 knights, 85 esquires and fifteen 
sergeants-at-arms were ordered there by the king, 59 an emergency measure which 
indicates Berwick may also have contributed troops of this stature to the army that 
fought at Bannockburn. In light of this circumstantial evidence and the situation 
immediately prior to Bannockburn it would be surprising if significant numbers of 
troops from the Berwick garrison were not a component of the army that fought at 
Bannockburn. That the constable of Bamburgh was taken prisoner at Bannockburn 
suggests elements from other Northumberland garrisons may also have been present. 
60 
58 Stevenson, ii, p. 232. Barrow relates that Waldegrave along with most of his garrison was slain in the 
battle, Robert Bruce, p. 13 0, n. 3. 
59 E159/101, mm. 156-7. There is the possibility that the call for reinforcements 
for Berwick vas to 
ensure it was in effect over-manned so that there was no possibility of 
losing it as it would surely be the 
next objective of the Scots. However the urgent tone of the 
demands for foot-soldiers and the 
extraordinary reinforcement of knights and esquires being almost all 
from the king's household suggests 
a more desperate situation. 
60 Ancient Petitions, pp. 61-2. 
" 60 
Along with Humbleton the only other battle at which It Is certaln -gamisons 
were present is that at Byland which took place on 14 October I -ý '22. On that date 
Ralph Neville, in charge of Warkworth, took his whole garrison of 40 men-at-arms and 
80 hobelars to the 'fight' at Byland; the next day he is recorded as hax-Ing 80 hobelars 
but only 34 men-at-arms. Similarly the constable of Dunstanburgh, Roger Madult, took 
his entire garrison of 18 men-at-arms and 77 hobelars to Byland from which he left 
61 with all his men-at-arms but only 64 hobelars. In this case not on], -,, Is 
there 
documentary evidence that these two garrisons participated in the battle but also proof 
that they suffered casualties in the engagement. Their involvement at Byland was due 
to the desperate situation caused by the unexpected arrival of a Scottish army \vhich 
caught out Edward 11"s d'sorganised force that was movIng south. Suddenly aware of 
the danger Edward quickly ordered these nearby garrisons to come and supplement his 
beleaguered force. He also looked towards Carlisle for help, ordering Harc)ay to 
muster the necessary troops. 62 The ready pool of seasoned troops provided by garrison 
soldiers led to their deployment in this desperate battle and it is likely the immediate 
readiness of such a pool led to their use in more engagements than the surviving 
records reveal. 
Clearly there was a wide spectrum of aggressive activities that garrisons 
undertook throughout this period ranging from local counter-attacks to defend against 
an immediate attack on their castle to ambitious forays that could have strategic 
implications as well as participation In major set-plece battles. The evidence 
for the 
regularity of these actions in the field comes from the circumstantial details of 
horses 
lost and constables captured as well as being retrieved from financial accounts and the 
description of individual actions in chronicles. Just as important is that 
factors which 
6' BL Stowe Mss 553, fos. 57v-58v. Seven of Ralph Neville's men-at-arms were knights. 
62 Bnice, p. 684., n. 353. 
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could be seen to deny garrisons their offensive capability have been discounted; they 
did operate together, co-ordinating their actions, mounting forays as a combined force, 
while they were also numerous and mobile enough to strike effectively at the enemy. 
By the start of the 1320s garrisons had been honed into fast-moving strike forces. 
Whether acting in concert or on own their own garrisons could use their aggressive 
capabilities to accomplish tasks of tactical and strategic importance. Nor did they lose 
their aggressive role when an English field-army was operating in their theatre rather 
they acted as a key source of support and reinforcement, complementing it by sections 
becoming involved in the operations of the army in Scotland and effectively operating 
as a temporary field-force. 
This is not to deny the over-riding importance of field-forces which remained 
the principal mechanism of both offensive and defensive warfare. Indeed several of the 
notable forays by garrisons took place when an army was in the immediate vicinity, for 
example the Edinburgh garrison's foray to Cupar, which suggests that there was a 
greater freedom to act aggressively when field-forces were in the region. Garrisons 
were always an interrelated component of a military system of which the host or field- 
army was the main factor. This is the key to understanding the field role of garrisons 
when operating alone; the need to recognise their limitations. They were never able to 
halt a Scottish army or major raiding force, were unable to lift a siege themselves and 
land right up to the walls of the castle itself could be plundered and destroyed by the 
Scots. Yet garrisons were not expected to be able to oppose these kinds of threats. 
There is no contemporary criticism directed at constables who failed to act against 
forces much larger than their own. Garrisons had a wide variety of aggressive roles to 
fulfil but these came within a clearly defined spectrum which constables were careful 
not to overstep as to do so could be fatal not only to the garrison 
but also the castle. 
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There was a fine balance to be struck in time of close warfare between ensuring the 
safety of the castle and undertaking attacks; it was more valuable for a constable to 
ensure the preservation of his garrison for aggressive actions after a Scottish army had 
passed rather than to throw it helplessly into its path. 
The true importance of Edward U's letter of 1322 is not his immediate 
condemnation of the garrisons but the implicit reason for his surprise and severity-, that 
garrisons did engage in aggressive actions as a matter of course. This letter is NNTItten 
after several of the most severe years of war for the English yet its wording lea-ves no 
question that garrisons fulfilled their various field duties beyond their castle walls 
throughout these violent years. Rather than illustrating the aggressive impotency of 
garrisons the letter portrays the normality and frequency of such operations. Edward's 
letter is remarkable for its novelty; throughout the war garrisons remained actively 
engaged in the variety of aggressive operations that they were expected to fulfil by 
operating in the field on a regular basis. 
26 3' 
INTELLIGENCE CONIW. MCATION, q 
In August 1299 Robert Hastang, constable of Roxburgh, sent a letter to Edward 1. A 
reading of this leaves no doubt that it is a detailed intelligence report concerning a 
high-level meeting of Scottish leaders and their ensuing activities. ' The degree of 
information conveyed is extremely wide-ranging. Names, places, dates, numbers, 
arrangements, intentions; they are all here. As an intelligence report on the Scottish 
commanders and their activities - both political and military - it is extremely detailed 
and comprehensive. Having written all this information in his letter Hastang 
immediately sent it to the king where it would have proved indispensable in updating 
the English commanders on their enemy. 
Hastang's letter is an exceptional example of the intelligence that a constable 
could obtain when resident in his front-line fortress, especially those located in 
Scotland. As with field operations this was a role expected of a constable, an integral 
part of his duties both in time of war and truce, an obligation to be aware of activities 
in his immediate vicinity and to convey these to the appropriate authority. Indeed it 
was such an accepted function that it is hardly ever referred to in contemporary 
documents and is only mentioned at critical times or if there was a complete failure to 
provide any intelligence. Edward H, on hearing that Norham castle was besieged in 
1322, wrote to the constable Thomas Gray 'praying' him to send reports of the Scots 
2 
from day to day' and 'from time to time. ' Gray must have responded by sending 
reports of Scottish activity in Northumberland as in a letter sent several days later the 
king refers to the 'sure intelligence' he has received from Gray. This letter is Edward's 
1 CDS, ii, no. 1290. 
2 CDS, iii, no. 777. 
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severe rebuke to the constables of Bamburgh, Warkworth, Dunstanburgh and Alnwick, 
not only does he demand they undertake an attack on the Scottish force but he declares 
his disbelief that they have no proper scouts or 'espial' operating from their garrisons 
and to remedy this by acting in concert to send out 'spies. ' Even despite these 
shortcomings Edward is sure the constables are still aware the Scots are infesting the 
area, as each constable 'well knows. i, 3 In 1301,, with a Scottish force on the move, 
Edward I issued instructions to the sheriff and constable of Roxburgh, the constable of 
Jedburgh, Alexander Balliol and Hugh de Audley to send out scouts to watch for the 
Scots and each warn. the other and the country of the movement of this enem), force. ' 
The expected frequency of such intelligence is hinted at in a letter of Alexander Balliol 
to the king when he writes that Edward should 'not take it amiss' that he has not given 
him news more quickly, a sentiment echoed by a letter of 1300 that refers to Edward 
5 being 'much surprised' that a constable has not provided him with intelligence. The 
rarity of these direct references to intelligence gathering and the ready rebuke when it 
was not seen as be being done demonstrates that it was perceived as a routine activity 
of a constable and also an essential one that was expected to be ongoing With prompt 
and frequent dissemination to the king and his commanders. 
This rarity makes it easy to overlook such an important duty but it also 
illustrates the lack of direction a constable received concerning the need to provide 
intelligence. There were no specific standing orders on the gathering of intelligence 
and unlike clauses in indentures for making forays there was no commensurate 
provision for intelligence activities. 
6 It was down to the individual constable to use his 
own initiative in pursuit of what could prove to be infonnation of the 
highest 
3 Ibid, no. 783. 
4 CDS, ii, no. 1230. 
CDS, v, no. 257; Stevenson, ii, p. 417. 
6 See the file of indentures for the keeping of castles in late 1302 where 
both forays and building works 
are specifically referred to but not a word on intelligence, 
CDS, ii, no. 1321. 
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importance and he could employ any means he saw fit to achieve this. Essentialk- there 
were three methods of actively obtaining intelligence; spies, scouts and Informers. 
Unfortunately these terms are not clear cut, ambiguity existing in the exact means 
referred to,, the words for a spy and scout being used Interchangeably ýNhjje some terms 
used could alternatively mean a spy, scout, messenger or herald. This complication is 
compounded by a lack of evidence concerning true spies due to the pre-requisite 
secrecy such men operated under. 7 Faced by this dilemma of terminology it is to the 
nature of the information gathered that attention must be turned in order to determine 
the means by which it was obtained. 
Robert Hastang's letter is so detailed it must have been the product of someone 
inside the Scottish camp. Only a person present among the Scottish forces at the 
meeting would know the in-depth intricacies of the disagreement. Indeed Hastang 
actually refers to it being his 4spy's account' and it is reasonable to believe that in this 
case the 'spy' was of the type understood by the modem definition of the term; a 
person accepted by the enemy as one of their own yet working for the other side. By 
the detailed nature of the intelligence he supplied John Kingston employed such spies 
r__ - from. his base at Edinburgh. In 1300 he tells of a Scottish parliament at Rutherglen that 
took place on 10 May in which again there was a dispute and during which Ingram de 
Urnfraville was elected as one of the guardians in place of the earl of Carrick. 
Although the contents of a letter sent in the following year by Alexander Balliol are 
inconclusive in detennining whether actual spies were being used he does write that he 
'still has his spies among them' the phrasing of which certainly suggests spies in the 
modem sense of the term, a likelihood increased by Balliol being a 
Scot and 
7 For a fuller discussion of spying see J. R. AJban and C. T. Allmand, 'Spies and 
Spying in the Fourteenth 
Century', War, Literature andPolitics in the Late Middle Ages, ed. C. T. Allmand (Liverpool, 
1976), for 
a general discussion of English medieval intelligence see M. Prestwich, 
Armies mid Waifiire, pp. 211-8. 
8 CDS, v, no. 220. 
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consequently having little difficulty in finding Scots who could blend in vvith the 
enemy without suspicion. 9 It is reasonable to assume that when the intelligence 
provided is highly detailed or contains information on Scottish politics or future 
intentions then a spy in the covert sense has been employed by the constable. 
Documentary evidence for spies is almost completely non-existent but there were 
many such men employed by the English - and by the Scottish - in the wars and 
constables of castles would certainly have been at the forefront as employers of these 
men. 10 
A significant amount of intelligence undoubtedly emanated from covert spies 
but in assessing the surviving evidence it becomes exceptionally difficult to separate 
their reports from those obtained by informers and rumour. When John Kingston 
reported that prominent Scots including the earl of Buchan and Bishop of St. Andrew's 
had crossed the Forth to Glasgow and were then intending to go towards the borders 
Kingston refers to this last intention with the phrase 'as is reported among them and 
their people who are in the forest. ' Again, when relating his suspicions of Simon 
Fraser, Kingston states 'it was reported' that there was a treaty between a Scottish 
force and Fraser; the additional comment that they ate and drank and were on the best 
of terms fitting well as a colourful anecdote of popular rumour. 
11 In this case doubts 
over Fraser's loyalty were accurate illustrating that in the murky world of 
Scottish 
allegiances it was just as important to keep a careful eye on your supposed allies as 
well as your enemies. The intention of the Scots to collect a 
large force with which to 
approach the marches in 1301 was reported by the keeper of 
Lochmaben, Robert 
Tilliol,, using the phrase 'as we understand, ' the clear 
implication being that this 
9 Aid, no. 257. 
10 Chronicles such as The Bruce abound with dramatic incidents of spying, 
'Spies and Spying in the 
Fourteenth Century', p. 74. 
" Stevenson, ii, pp. 301-3. 
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important news originated either from a rumour or an informer. 12 Intelligence gathered 
via rumour or informers could easily blend with that from spies and on many occasions 
a combination of all three would go into building up the intelligence picture. The 
nature and detail of the contents and the phrasing of the constable can be used as an 
approximate guide but no more than that. 
It is usually easier to differentiate intelligence gathered by these methods from 
that obtained by scouts although such men are still referred to as spies in many 
contemporary documents. Reports from scouts provided the bulk of information that 
constables received regarding the immediate area of their castle and the surrounding 
country. In the autumn of 1301 Robert Hastang had 'spies' watching for the return of a 
Scottish force to the border that had conducted a raid into northern England; although 
Hastang called these men 'spies' the nature of their task, waiting and watching in the 
countryside, makes it clear they were in fact scouts. Simultaneously Alexander Balliol 
claimed he would know two days in advance of this force issuing from Galloway - as 
with Hastang he would have had scouts out watching and waiting - and Edward I 
instructed Balliol, Audley and the constables of Roxburgh and Jedburgh to send out 
scouts to keep watch and give warning; 13 indeed Edward 11 specifically castigated the 
northern garrisons in 1322 for apparently having no scouts readily available. 
" In 
September 1301 the keeper of Lochamben reported that John de Soules and the earl of 
Buchan were at Loudon and Simon Fraser at Stanhouses, stating that 
he knew this 
infonnation 'for certain. ' 15 This is good solid intelligence of the type obtained 
by 
scouts. In fact scouts could gather a range of intelligence on their 
travels which 
alongside the location, disposition and movement of 
Scottish forces could include the 
12 Ibid, p. 433. 
13 CDS3 ii, no. 1230. 
14 CDSý iii, no. 783. 
15 stevenson, i i, P. 431. 
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sounding out of Scottish intentions, listening for local rumour and perhaps even 
speaking to informers. Thus Hastang's scouts sent to watch for the return of Soules, 
force were also to ascertain the condition of the Scottish troops and their immediate 
plans. 16 However the main role of scouts remained the task of quietly observin2 enemY 
movements and activities; the men who shadowed a Scottish force as it moved to 
Dalswinton and reported that it was heading towards Nithsdale and Gallo%vav ývere 
undoubtedly scouts operating out of Lochamben. 17 Further proof that all garrisons 
were expected to possess scouts is implicit in the orders for garrisons to co-operate in 
gathering information, a task clearly requiring scouts and presupposing that every 
garrison could provide such men. The great majority of intelligence a constable 
received and duly reported came from scouts, a much more regular and reliable 
method than the use of spies, informers or rumour. 
Scouts needed to move swiftly and unobserved through the countryside to 
within sight of the enemy and consequently lightly armed men riding uncovered horses 
were employed in this role. The type of soldier ideally suited for this role was the 
hobelar. 18 A fine example of how such men operated comes from late July 1299. 
Robert Clifford, constable of Lochamben and warden of Annandale, refers to an Irish 
hobelar called Richard le Bret whom Clifford has retained to spy the 'passings and 
haunts' of the enemy 'by night and day' and who had been constantly engaged in this 
duty for six weeks and three days. This is exactly the type of soldier that performed the 
role of a scout for constables. 
The example of le Bret also illustrates the problematic nature of the 
relationship between scouts and garrisons. Clifford's purpose in writing of le Bret is to 
request payment for the latter in both money and victuals so he does not depart for 
16jbid5 p. 434. 
17jbid, p. 432. 
C. f J. E. Morris, 'Mounted Infantry in Medieval Warfare, ' TRHS, 3 rd Series, viii, (1914). 
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want of sustenance. 19 This places le Bret apart from the regular garrison troops and 
those retained by Clifford as warden and more importantly demonstrates he was not in 
receipt of the regular wages and victuals as they were. The image of le Bret as a 
solitary entity operating apart from the regular troops is clear. As such he %, vas not 
formally classed as a member of the regular garrison. This sense of a separation of 
intelligence specialists from other troops is also evident in the financial account for 
Stirling submitted retrospectively by the constable, John Sampson, for the year 1299. 
Included amongst his expenses was the payment of 9d. to 'divers spies); 20 these were 
more likely to have been scouts rather than covert spies but the important feature to 
note is that these men are paid separately under a specific heading that acknowledges 
their special task of intelligence gathering. As such they are singled out as a group 
apart from the rest of the garrison. 
This creates the impression that scouts and spies had little if any official 
attachment to a garrison even though employed by the constable. Spies certainly 
operated outside the remit of garrisons as secrecy was essential to keep their identity 
hidden and their effectiveness unimpaired. The responsibility for them rested solely 
with the constable; Edward I told Alexander Balliol that if he had provided spies then 
they should remain under his own control. 
21 Informers were no doubt treated in a 
similarly removed manner and the example of le Bret and the separate payments in 
Sampson's accounts indicate that some scouts were also treated with a similar sense of 
separation. 
However there is clear evidence that scouts were regularly classed as a 
formal 
component of garrisons. Their presence is revealed in the garrison rolls 
for 1300-5 by 
19 CDS, ii, no. 1084. 
20 Aid, no. 1949. In this case there is no confusion that 
'spies' could refer to messengers as the latter are 
mentioned separately. 
21 CDS, v, no. 257. As discussed previously these men employed 
by Balliol were almost certainlý- covert 
spies. 
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the striking appearance of either just one or a handful of men with uncoi,,, ered horses. 
In such small numbers there was no effective military role they could possibly fulfil 
except for scouting and carrying messages. The most outstanding examples of this 
occur in the financial accounts for 1304/5. In the garrison of Kirkintilloch there was a 
total of 101 men but only one of these, Richard Meynel, was classed a soldier %vith an 
uncovered horse; in Linlithgow there were only four men with uncovered horses, 
specifically termed as hobelars, out of a garrison numbering over 120 while in the 
previous months when the garrison had totalled over 140 there had been only seven 
hobelars; Edinburgh contained six hobelars amongst a garrison of over 70. In late 1304 
the Roxburgh garrison contained eight hobelars out of a total strength of 1151 
Linlithgow numbered over 100 men in 1304 but of these orfly four were hobelars and 
most striking of all out of the 221 men garrisoning Lochmaben and Dumffies in 1-303 
there were just three hobelars . 
22 Although minimal as a proportion of the total gamson 
these men with uncovered horses were purposefully retained throughout a whole range 
of garrisons. Their presence was without doubt to undertake scouting missions and 
carry messages; in such small numbers they were unable to provide any other role and 
as lightly armed horsemen were ideally suited the role. Indeed in 1311 le Bret can 
again be glimpsed, tMs time acting not as a scout but receiving 2s. for taking privy seal 
letters to the constables of Dumfries, Caerlaverock and Buittle. 
23 In contrast to le Bret 
the majonty of these scouts are classed as an integral component of the garrison, 
appearing on the muster rolls and accounts and receiving their pay and victuals With 
the rest of the garrison. That it was not deemed necessary to specify these men as 
scouts on muster and payrolls indicates that it was general practice to 
have men with 
22 E101/12/18; E101/10/6; CDS, ii, no. 1417. The trend of retairung increasing numbers of 
hobelars in 
garrisons throughout the first quarter of the century obscures the minimal numbers of 
these early years 
which singles them out as scouts however in later years they would still 
be employed in this role when 
necessary. 
23 CDS, v, no. 562. 
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uncovered horses retained within garrisons to routinely perform the important role of 
scouts. 
That hobelars were also ideally suited to carrying messages meant that they 
were not only instrumental in obtaining Intelligence but were -vital for its quick 
dissemination to other garrisons and commanders. This was a two way process. 
Garrisons would only have intelligence on their own immediate vicinity and without a 
flow of information back and forth would be lacking in the appreciation of the larger 
strategic picture, an essential image to possess in the midst of war. The difficulties of 
sending news and of receiving it were particularly pronounced when a castle was under 
siege yet this was a time when up to date intelligence was at a premium. When 
Berwick castle was closely besieged in the late 1290s and victuals began to run out a 
soldier of the garrison swam the Tweed with letters requesting assistance in his shoes 
and upon reaching Norham he returned via the Tweed with promises of a speedy 
relief 24 In 1299 when the castle of Stirling was hard pressed by siege the constable, 
John Sampson, spent 12s. on messengers whom he sent to the king in England, one of 
these losing his horse in the process of delivering 'news of the castle and the 
country. 525 As mentioned Thomas Gray, besieged in Norham in 1322, was instructed 
by Edward 11 to send regular reports of the actiVities of the Scottish force. This letter 
was itself prompted by intelligence which the king had previously received, Edward 
stating that he 'hears' Norham is under siege, infonnation no doubt contained within 
another report from forces, quite likely garrisons, in Northumberland. The two-way 
process of intelligence being sent and received is also evident in this letter; Edward 
informing Gray that he is presently at Newcastle collecting together his forces. 
26 The 
" Stevenson, ii, pp. 228-9. 
25 CDS, ii, no. 1949. 
26 CDSý iii, no. 777. There must have been a limit to the information sent to constables 
during incessant 
warfare due to the danger of the messenger and his letter 
being intercepted by the Scots. 
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loss of his horse that befell Sampson's messenger was a common danger as was the 
loss of a messenger himself and this was recognised by constables multiplying the 
number of messengers when important intelligence was to be conveyedl Alexander 
Balliol promised to send two or three messengers when he had news of the Scots 
issuing from Galloway. 27 
Communication between constables of castles situated in the same region Nvas a 
frequent occurrence and this task also fell to messengers sent out from the garrisons. 
Dý 
Robert Hastang sent letters via messenger to the constables of Jedburgh and Selkirk as 
well as to the keeper of Selkirk forest and Walter de Huntercombe. There is also 
evidence of a regular exchange of letters between John Kingston and Simon Fraser. -)8 
In terms of communication the most numerous recorded examples are the messengers 
sent by the king to the constables. The account books of the wardrobe contain many 
references to the payment of messengers who travelled to castles in the king's service 
with those of John Droxford which cover 1305-6 including a messenger sent to the 
constable of Ayr and another to the constable of Roxburgh. Edward I also sent several 
messengers to a number of castles including Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow, 
Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Selkirk, informing them of the vital news of John Comyn's 
death and the rebellion of Robert Bruce, ordering the constables to fortify their castles 
and providing instructions to ensure their safekeeping. 
29 Channels of communication 
consequently existed between outlying castles and between these and the higher 
commander and which were regularly in use. 
30 The one hindrance was the speed at 
which a message could be conveyed; the fast relay of intelligence over a substantial 
27 CDS) ii, no. 1230. 21 Stevenson, ii, pp. 303,434. 
29 CDS, v, nos. 472,492. 
" It was these channels that allowed garrisons to operate in co-operation with one another. 
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distance was a problem constables could not overcome and no doubt frequently 
rendered important intelligence redundant and outdated by the time it was received. 31 
One way to circumvent this was for the constable to act on his own initiative 
and exploit the intelligence by the aggressive use of his own garrison. As discussed 
previously this was only possible if the situation favoured the garrison and it could 
achieve a broad spectrum of results ranging from the tactical to the strategic. The 
necessity for a garrison to appreciate the opposition it would face in an aggressive 
action makes it clear that before any such engagement was decided upon the constable 
had gathered comprehensive local intelligence on the eneMy. 32 john Stirling's 
audacious relief of Cupar by his Edinburgh garrison would have been planned and 
decided upon by making use of the latest local intelligence which would have shown 
the operation was within the capability of the garrison; there was probably little time 
for the information to be passed on so that more forces could be involved. Individual 
aggressive actions of garrisons would be firmly based on local intelligence in an 
attempt to ensure tactical success. 
Equally important was the sharing of intelligence between two or more parties 
to enable more ambitious operations. The detailed preparations for the combined 
garrison force that was to aid Stirling in December 1298 included a preliminary 
gathering of intelligence. The constables of Roxburgh and Edinburgh, the keeper and 
sheriff of Berwick,, Walter de Huntercombe and Simon Fraser were each to 'spy out 
and cause to be spied out all the news possible about the enemies and their plan' and 
having done this they were to make known to the constable of Edinburgh, John 
Kingston, what each had been able 'to spy out or ascertain. ' Kingston would then plan 
31 There was no posting system of fresh horses to aid messengers from Scotland or northern England 
heading south, the first system being set up in 1372 running between Dover and London, 'Spies and 
Spying in the Fourteenth Century', p. 85. 
. 32 "Intelligence was important in the formulation of strategy; it was also important in achieving tactical 
success, " Prestwich, Annies and Warfare, p. 215. 
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the subsequent foray according to this pooling of intelligence. " in September 1-301 
Robert Hastang, constable of Roxburgh, planned a meeting with several local 
commanders including his brother Richard, constable of Jedburgh, a meeting at which 
Hastang's spies would attend having observed the return of John de Soules force, their 
latest intelligence being immediately used by the commanders to plan their attack. 34 
This transmission of intelligence also flowed between garrisons and field-forces. 
Shortly before the ill-fated battle of Roslin in 1303 two men rode by night from the 
English force encamped there to the garrison at Linlithgow to seek news of the nearby 
Scottish army and then returned to report this information to their commander. Ralph 
de Manton. 35 Immediately prior to Bannockburn, upon the arrival of the English army 
near Stirling, the constable of the besieged castle, Philip Moubray, rode out to meet the 
English commanders advising them that Bruce and his army were in the woods and 
that 'pots' had been dug on the old Roman road in the forest. 36 
in fact there is an important difference between the gathering of intelligence 
described so far and the cases of Roslin and Bannockburn. The previous examples 
have described an aggressive, intrusive form of intelligence gathering, actively seeking 
information by sending out scouts and spies and by employing informers. Roslin and 
Bannockburn delineate another method by which garrisons could provide important 
intelligence, a more passive and subtle process. The information relayed emanated 
from the mere presence of the castle and its garrison in a sensitive area, intelligence 
coming from those based within the castle itself complemented by their local 
knowledge. At the most basic level a constable and his garrison would have extensive 
knowledge of their immediate vicinity which could prove tactically Invaluable should 
13 SteVenSoll' ii, pp. 339-41. 
34 Jbid5 pp. 433-5. 
35 CDS' v, no. 472. 
" Bruce, pp. 430-3; Traqualr, Freedom's Sword, pp. 185-6. 
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an enemy or English force be operating in that area, particularly so if a clash between 
the two was imminent. There is no better example of this than an event prior to 
Bannockburn. The English army had reached Northumberland before Edward 11 was 
made aware of the arrangement agreed for the surrender of Stirling castle. This Nvas 
related to him by the constable, Philip Moubray, in person on 26/27 Ma-v 1314 at 
Newminster. Instantly, on 27 May, orders went out for large quotas of infantnY as the 
army was now marching for the relief of Stirling castle where Moubray had described 
the land around the castle as being 'strong' and 'marshy' and consequently 
inaccessible to cavalry. 37 Although in this case the constable's forewarning proved to 
be in vain the incident perfectly illustrates how critical the local knowledge of a 
constable and his garrison could be in terms of tactical planning. 
Another intelligence role cast in this passive mode was the ability of several 
castles to monitor the movement of a hostile force that was in their vicinity. An 
excellent example of this occurred in September 1301 with a number of letters already 
quoted being from this month and recounting the activity of a Scottish force under the 
command of John de Soules and Ingram de Urnfraville. On 10 September, from 
Lochmaben, Robert de Tilliol informed the king that on Thursday his castle had been 
attacked by this Scottish force that he believed consisted of four bannerets, twelve 
score men-at-arms and approximately 7000 foot; they had burnt the town, attacked the 
peel and lodged at Annan where they had burnt and pillaged the surrounding country. 
The following day the Scots attacked again and Tilliol claimed the garrison managed 
to inflict significant casualties. He reported that the Scots then left, moving to 
Dalswinton and then towards Galloway and Nithsdale where they intended to collect a 
greater force and approach the English march. Three days later Robert Hastang, at 
37 Bruce, p. 402, n. 8 10. 
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Roxburgh, informed the king he had sent scouts to watch for the return of this force 
and stated his intention to attack it. Tilliol's letter must have reached Edward I quickly 
as Hastang refers to the king's letter which had reached him 'this day' (1 -1 3ý') but which 
had arrived only after he had sent out his scouts, the letter instructing him to watch for 
the return of the Scots and almost certainly written based on the intelligence related in 
Tilliol's letter. On 21 September, from Selkirk castle, Alexander Balliol vkTote that he 
has heard from the king's letters that Soules and a great company of Scots had gone 
towards Galloway. Balliol here informs the king his spies are among these Scots and 
he will provide information on them. Finally, on 30 September, come the instructions 
from the king for the constables to send out scouts to warn each other and the country 
of the Scots approach and the reply of the constables that they would know in advance 
38 
when the force came out of Galloway. 
The route of this powerful Scottish force could therefore be followed by 
Edward I and his commanders by means of the regular intelligence reports coming 
from the front-line castles it passed. In this case scouts were also used to actively 
gather intelligence but there still remained a largely passive element of news generated W-- 
by those observing from the walls of the castles. Another interesting aspect of this 
particular episode is that there is little if any sharing of intelligence between constables 
and that this was not the correct procedure is evident in Edward's later order that the 
castles should ensure they warned each other as well as the country. These letters 
vividly illustrate how castle garnsons could monitor the progress of a hostile Scottish 
force that was operating in their midst and would have been a regular feature of the 
period. 
" CDS, ii, nos. 1220,1221,1230; CDS, v, no. 257; Stevenson, ii, pp. 432-5. 
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The presence of garrisons in regional localities also enabled them to obtain 
intelligence on the local political climate. It was this type of important information that 
was contained within a comprehensive letter sent in 1307 from the Forfar garrison, a 
report most probablywritten by the constable himself It details the increasing support 
for Bruce in the region and the efforts of false preachers in propagating this together 
with the advice that men-at-arms must be sent to areas loyal to the king, particularly 
Ross, otherwise Scots will join Bruce due to the lack of protection. 39 The accuracy of 
this intelligence was without doubt; it was sent in May 1307 and on Christmas night 
1308 the castle was stormed by the Scots and the garrison killed. That the assault came 
from local foresters demonstrates just how perceptive this intelligence was about the 
regional population. Similarly in 1301 Tilliol reported that those in the country around 
Lochmaben were rising up due to the lack of English soldiers to ride against the Scots; 
his ominous warning seems to have provoked no immediate response as in a second 
letter Tilliol repeated it and warned that now the Scots who had come into the king's 
peace were going over to the enemy again. 40 
Yet despite their abilities in intelligence gathering there was one area where 
garrisons repeatedly suffered a catastrophic failure; they were never able to be 
forewarned of an assault on their own castles. Although aware of the growing hostility 
around them the garrison of Forfar was unprepared for the actual assault when it came 
and this was true for all the castles stormed by the Scots. Indeed only on one occasion 
was a garrison warned of an imminent attack; when the Scots suddenly assaulted 
Norham. in 1327 on the night of Edward III's coronation they were bloodily repulsed 
by the garrison with this conspicuous success being achieved as the constable, Robert 
39 CDS, ii, no. 1926. That the report came from the garrison of Forfar castle is based on its content and 
the fact that at this time the garrison was mainly composed of Englishmen amid an increasingly hostile 
Scottish population. The request for men-at-arms and the addressee being a 'high official' illustrate the 
writer held an important position which indicates he was constable of the castle, Bnice, pp. 334-5. 
40 Stevenson, ii, pp. 431,433, 
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Manners, had been forewarned of the assault by a certaln Scot wIthin the gamson .41 
night attack on Berwick castle in 1312 was only foiled by chance when the garrison 
was alerted by a barking dog. 42 These incidents are the exceptions that prove the rule, 
demonstrating how effective an advanced warning could be in defending against 
Scottish assaults, a form of attack that ultimately relied on the element of surprise to 
ensure its success. Admittedly these were intelligence failures of the great magnitude 
but they also serve to demonstrate the limitations of garrisons in gathering intelligence. 
There was no sophisticated, all-pervasive intelligence network in place that could 
detect every move and plan of the Scots. Except for the use of a covert spy garrisons 
picked up on obvious local events such as the unconcealed movements of a body of 
troops and the local political mood. However a plan to consciously keep them devoid 
of information, if such a pre-requisite proved necessary, could be regularly achieved as 
the assaults on castles testify. 
When constables did provide intelligence the news itself was not necessan 
the only information they were to include in their report. Whilst besieged in Norham 
Thomas Gray was also instructed to include his own counsel on how to act in relation 
to the activity of the Scottish besieging force. 43 In 1298, when sending their individual 
intelligence reports to John Kingston in preparation for the foray to aid StIrling, the 
constables and commanders were to include their own council based on the 
information they were in possession of and the foray was to be ultimately planned 
according to their advice. 44 Constables were therefore required to analyse and assess 
their intelligence and include their advice on how best to proceed within 
their 
intelligence report. Similarly constables were able to make requests 
to reme& 
41 Lanercost, p. 256. 
42 Ibidl p. 20 1. 
43 CDSý iii, no. 777. 
44 Stevenson, ii, P. 340. 
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situations they deemed potentially dangerous; in 1299 John Kingston asked that the 
victualling of Stirling be seen to having become aware of its perilous state while the 
requests of Tilliol to provide extra men-at-arms for the area around Lochmaben have 
already been mentioned. Naturally, as commanders on the spot, the tone of the 
language employed by these men could become quite stringent as in 1300 when Hugh 
de Audley wrote 'for God's sake employ some counsel so the sheriffdom of Peebles is 
better defended. -)45 Audley was writing in reply to a letter that expressed surpnse that 
he had given 'no intelligence of what we have done, or of what we expect should be 
done,, ' a statement that proves unequivocally constables were to assess their 
intelligence and present their conclusions within their report. 
This statement also leads into another aspect of information that was classed as 
intelligence and was vital to send in reports; namely 'intelligence of what we have 
done. ' Just as important as what the enemy was doing was news of what the garrison 
was actually doing. The letters of Kingston and Hastang detailing meetings, attempts 
to co-ordinate their activities and preparations for forays were all essential in keeping 
the higher command aware of what was going on. Although the brief mention of a 
planned muster of several commanders on the border due to a Scottish threat appears 
as an afterthought in a report of Alexander Balliol it was in fact essential information 
in keeping those in overall charge up to date. A detailed report to the king in the 1340s, 
almost certainly from William de Felton, constable of Roxburgh, contains what would 
have been vital intelligence relating a serious engagement between English and 
Scottish forces. The location of the battle is described together with which English 
forces were present and an approximation of Scottish casualties. The simultaneous 
repulse of a Scottish attack on the town of Roxburgh is reported as is the death or 
45 Jbjd7 pp. 304,418; CDS, v, no. 256. Audley was keeper of Selkirk forest and thus held a similar 
position to that of a constable. 
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capture of three brothers who had repeatedly plagued the castle. In this particular case 
Felton emphasises his own role in the engagement whereas separate accounts 
apportion the weight of credit elsewhere; Murimuth's Chronicle attributing victory to 
the men of the March who were not in the Crown's pay and the Scalacronica 
unsurprisingly highlighting the role of Thomas Gray. 46 It is to be, expected that such 
reports were coloured by the writer's bias and need for personal enhancement in a 
climate where prestige was paramount but the main substance of the report still 
remained correct. In a period when communication was delayed by distance and 
garrisons frequently acted on their own initiative news of what the garrisons were 
doing themselves was just as vital a form of intelligence as that of enemy activity. 47 
Contemporaries, especially chroniclers, make little mention of intelligence 
being present in warfare, both in terms of field-forces and garrisons. However it is 
interesting that the encounter between plundering garrison forces and a Scottish force 
in 1335 is singled out as a matter of chance, Bower explicitly stating that the English 
force was returning unexpectedly and encountered the Scottish troops who had 
escorted the count of Namur back to the border . 
48The 
element of chance is clear in this 
account. It is worth comparing this with Wyntoun's description of English garrison 
forces moving against Alexander Ramsey's men who were encamped around 
Hawthomden in the 1340s. He writes that the English constables 'herd say' of the 
4 
whereabouts of Ramsey" s men; 9 although this may again suggest an element of 
chance in reality the co-ordinated effort of several English garrisons in planrung and 
undertaking a deliberate attack on this encampment would not have taken place 
I CDS, v, no, 809; King, 'War, Politics and Landed Society', P'. 92. 
47 A good example being a letter of 1297 sent to the king relating 
how the constable of Stirling had been 
killed and that the writer had installed a new constable with a number of good troops 
to keep the castle, 
Stevenson, ii, pp. 232-3. 
48 Bower, vii, p. 115. 
49" Ae castellwartis on the Marche herd say /Hou, in thar land lywd were ihai, 
' WI-nioun, .,, pý 14 8 
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without considerable intelligence having been sought and assessed beforehand. Spies, 
informers and rumour may have played their part and scouts would certainly hax, e been 
used. That this whole painstaking process is dismissed in the two simple words of the 
chronicler illustrates just how easily the intelligence activity of garrisons can be 
overlooked. The English were obviously well-informed and in possession of accurate 
intelligence as they took the trouble and risk of assembling their forces and taking on 
Ramsey's men. The outcome is also revealing; a bloody encounter and an English 
defeat. Intelligence could only win part of the battle. 
Castles and their garrisons were clearly at the forefront of intelligence 
gathering in the Anglo-Scottish wars. Although their effectiveness in this area was to 
an extent dictated by the lengths each constable was prepared to go to castles and 
garrisons, by their very nature of being a permanent base in front-line territory, were 
particularly sensitive to the latest developments and would be among the first to obtain 
important intelligence. It was then down to the constable to build on this by the use of 
scouts, informers and spies. Front-line castles provided windows onto Scottish activity 
which were invaluable for the English prosecution of the war. When Lanercost refers 
to the handing over to the English of four castles that were 'overlooking the fTontler of 
the realm' the emphasis on sight is extremely apt; one reason the English wanted these 
castles was to obtain a view of what was taking place in these sensitive areas . 
50 They 
acted as listening posts, as early warning centres to counter Scottish attacks and raids. 
Adequate warning could be instrumental in combating Scottish movements; in the 
summer of 1298 John Kingston complained that despite having told Simon Fraser to 
give advance warning of a Scottish advance he had failed to do so, an omission that 
50 The four castles were Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Edinburgh, Lanercost, p. 125. 
1) 28- 
meant the regional garrisons were unable to remove this threat themselves, one that 
they would have been capable of opposing if given the appropriate waming. 51 
A constable was expected to absorb intelligence from this natural exposure to 
inforniation and also to actively seek it out. Written in 1298 the phrase 'to spý, out and 
caused to be spied out' is particularly accurate in its sense of a proactive and intrusive 
gathering of intelligence. 52 Scouts were the chief exponents of intelligence gathering 
and were members of the regular garrison whereas spies and informers operated 
independent of the garrison. Intelligence was to be sent quickly to the higher command 
but also to be shared between garrisons while reports were also to contain the 
assessment and advice of the constables who had accumulated the information. 
Frequent updates of the garrisons' own activities were also essential items of 
intelligence that needed to be sent to commanders. Constables were well aware of their 
responsibility regarding intelligence and were regularly involved in this duty, those 
that failed Edward 11 were left in no doubt as to the seriousness of their neglect. Indeed 
every member of a garrison - whether a knight, an archer or a carpenter - would be 
extremely sensitive to any intelligence; in their exposed positions one day it might just 
save their lives. 
51 Stevenson, ii, pp. 302-3. 
52 Jbid, p. 340. 
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9. 
GARRISONS, CASTLES AND THE 
ANGLO-SCOTTISH WARS 
This thesis began with the premise that before the operational activities of wartime 
garrisons could be discussed the nature of the garrisons themselves had to be 
understood. Their nature was addressed in the first five chapters and this revealed a 
number of key characteristics. The sheer size of garrisons meant that thelor I i continued 
maintenance consumed vast amounts of money and victuals, two of the most scarce 
and precious commodities of the period. To provide these the bureaucratic machinery 
of medieval England had to be utilised to such an extent that dedicated supply bases 
were established together with a garrison paymaster. During the first quarter of the 
century in particular the unprecedented demands of these garrisons almost stretched 
the state's resources to breaking point with garrisons near desertion on several 
occasions yet despite this the provision of money and victuals never actually ceased 
irrecoverably; the retention of the Berwick garrison through the apocalyptic famine of 
1315/16 is a tribute to the innate strength of the English state. 
The maintenance of large garrisons in Scotland was therefore underpinned by 
the resources of the developing English state which provided the basics without which 
the garrisons could not exist, a fact which signals the critical role they were seen to 
occupy. However this constant strain also made garrisons a vehicle of development 
with the desire to streamline the continual burden of their maintenance leading to the 
widespread use of indentures by mid-century. These were first in use for garrisons in 
the last years of the thirteenth-century and intennittently under Edward 11, earl), 
contracts extending over a short period of time, in particular covering the winter period 
when no army or campaign was normally in existence. Indentures 
drastically cut down 
2) 85 
the work of the bureaucracy placing the responsibility of the tedious day-to-*- 
minutiae of running a garrison on the constable. So successfW was this system that it 
became routine for the establishment and maintenance of garrisons and its success no 
doubt significantly contributed to the adoption of indentures for military recruitment in 
general in the fourteenth century. 
As they led the way in the use of indentures so gamsons were also at the 
forefront of military developments in the period with both the hobelar and the mounted 
archer appearing within them at a very early date in relation to their foundation as 
troop types. It is evident that garrisons were no mere backwater but were at the cutting 
edge of military development, taking on the changing military trends as they happened 
and evolving with the times, providing evidence that garrisons were an active military 
force not passive, static defenders shut behind their walls, a fact conclusively 
demonstrated by their general evolution in the period towards increased mobility 
resulting in garrisons containing totally mobile forces. 
Although dependent on the resources of the state for their survival the daily life 
of garrison troops was maintained by a host of semi-combatants who were skilled in 
tasks necessary for everyday survival and who were present in such numbers that they 
could double the overall size of the garrison. Their presence is all too easy to overlook 
but they were essential to the survival of garrisons and lend an element of self- 
sufficiency to garrisons; so long as the raw materials and ingredients were available 
they could provide for themselves. In contemporary terms these skilled personnel 
combined with the number of troops meant that garrisons resembled something 
approaching a medium sized settlement with its own particular way of life. Placed in 
this context it is clear that the creation and maintenance of a large garrison was an 
enormous undertaking that went much deeper than just statiorung troops in a castle. 
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All of these aspects distinguish exactly what comprised a garrison and illustrate 
their complex nature. However, with these essential supporting elements in place, a 
garrison's operational effectiveness was solely dependent on the military personnel 
retained within it. The commanders varied over time, their experience, abilities and 
status fluctuating in sympathy with the prevalent state of the war and domestic politics 
while the frequent appearance of commanders of national standing emphasises the 
importance of the garrisons. Yet it is with regard to the backbone of the garrisons, the 
men-at-arms, that a most important discovery has been made. This is the remarkable 
consistency with which the same men remained in garrison service whether in the 
same garrison or moving between them. Even when garrisons in Scotland were in their 
infancy men-at-arms saw them as an oppoftunity for regular, semi-permanent paid 
service, lasting so long as the garrisons remained in existence. In effect garrisoning 
became a career for these men and in consequence it is not an exaggeration to see them 
as professional garrison soldiers. Such consistency in service is clear between 1300 
and 1311/12 and a similar element is strongly indicated in both mid-century and within 
Roxburgh in the 1380s; men-at-arms undertaking long-term service remained at the 
core of these garrisons throughout the period. A more transient, short-term level of 
service co-existed around this yet even this commonly still amounted to at least several 
months of service. There is too little evidence to comment on the patterns of service of 
those troops below men-at-arms in status but familial relationships and, in the earlier 
period, the movement of men between troop types suggests that 
long-term service was 
a feature that extended throughout garrisoning. However it is the semi-permanent core 
of men-at-arms at the heart of garrison service that must 
be emphasised. 
in understanding the elements that went into making a garrison It Is quIte clear 
that garrisons were seen by contemporaries as being of critical importance in 
the war 
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against Scotland. The great cost and burden that they inflicted on the state was deemed 
worth the effort and resources expended on them. In this sense gamsons were most 
definitely a national undertaking in that they consumed money and victuals from 
throughout the country and, as the protections from the 1380s demonstrate, they were 
also a national undertaking in terms of the regions from which their troops originated, 
a feature that must be true for the whole period considering the large numbers serving 
in the first half of the century. The rapidity with which garrisons were cut-back when 
the opportunity arose sharply illustrates the great strain they placed on the country, the 
extreme difficulty for the medieval state in keeping garrisons heavily manned on a 
semi-permanent base cannot be overstated. That the Crown was determined to 
maintain these large and burdensome wartime garrisons clearly illustrates that they 
believed them to be absolutely essential in prosecuting the war. 
Yet despite the enormous resources and faith invested in them by the Crown 
the English garrisons in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century may at first 
appear to fallen some way short of repaying this faith. The greatest condemnation is 
that, in the aftennath of Bannockburn,, they were incapable of preventing the ravaging 
of northern England, failing even to protect their own demesne lands. Equally 
damaging is the refrain that they were wholly ineffective against strong Scottish 
raiding forces or field-armies, meekly allowing such bodies of men free passage while 
remaining behind the relative safety of their own fortifications. The powerful garrisons 
installed in Scotland do not escape damning criticism; they can be seen as lacking in 
the most fundamental role of a garrison, that of holding their castle in the face of an 
enemy attack, great swathes of them falling between 1311 and 1314 and in mid- 
century with the method by which the former were mostly taken, surprise assault, 
adding a criticism all of its own. There is an unmistakable sense that these castles 
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should not have fallen, that they should have held out. ' In short garrisons neither led to 
the conquest and occupation of Scotland nor proved effective In defending northern 
England against devastating raids. The two main periods during which English 
garrisons were based in Scotland both ended with a gradual loss of the occupied castles 
and ultimately battles of considerable significance, namely Bannockburn and Neville's 
Cross. In this respect garrisons appear to have contributed little to the war effort. 
To establish the validity of these criticisms they need to be considered in 
relation to the nature of the garrison. In doing so it is evident that there was a 
potentially fatal weakness inherent in a garrison in that it was ultimately dependent on 
outside help for its basic survival in terins of money and victuals and, if needed, 
reinforcements. A garrison had to strike a fine balance between being manned by 
sufficient numbers but not so many as would prove difficult to keep adequately 
victualled. Considerations of victuaHing limited the size of garnsons yet an 
undermanned garrison was operationally ineffective and in danger of losing its castle. 
It is notable that issues of manning, in ten-ns of reinforcements, and of victuals are two 
of the three areas Barbour picks out as being essential for holding a castle and 
consequently potential weaknesses. Barbour also specifies that the prospect of relief 
must be real, another requirement that came from outside of the garrison itself These 
essentials were not the responsibility of either the constable or his garrison but 
belonged to higher ranking commanders and bureaucrats. Garrisons could not survive 
in isolation and it is no coincidence that it was in periods when England was 
strategically on the defensive and garrisons were left bereft of constant outside support 
for prolonged periods that they fell to the SCOtS. 2 By understanding that garrisons were 
not isolated entities expected to survive without support but were part of a larger 
1 The most concise summary of these criticisms is in Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 209-11. 
2 'Without adequate supplies even the strongest and most heavily manned castle must fall' (my italics), 
Brown, English Castles, p. 190. 
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system which was crucial to the underpinning of their existence the criticism of the 
loss of castles is set into context and can be seen as a failing of the system that 
supported them rather than an inadequacy inherent within the garrisons themselves. 
The point that must be borne in mind is that garrisons, as with any military 
force, had their limitations. Pinned behind their walls they required support, they could 
not survive indefinitely in isolation. Such realistic limitations have also been forgotten 
when garrisons are criticised for failing to intercept Scottish field-armies or to oppose 
strong Scottish raiding forces; garrisons, whether operating alone or in concert with 
one another, were not expected to halt such powerful enemy forces and to state 
otherwise is to misunderstand their role. The much quoted letter of Edward 11 used to 
criticise the northern garrisons actually specifies the type of enemy forces garrisons 
were expected to deal with, namely those which were not overly substantial in number 
and which were unsupported, isolated and in a known locality. Against such forces 
there are numerous examples of garrisons making sorties and it is evident that 
constables were free to take aggressive action whenever they believed a suitable 
opportunity presented itself The available evidence indicates that they undertook 
forays much more frequently than has been previously realised to the extent that they 
were regular operations routinely carried out by garrisons. As the Scalacronica 
indicates gaffisons even preferred to undertake the defence of their castle in a tactically 
offensive manner rather than from behind the walls. Garrisons conducted a whole 
spectnnn of tactical and strategic operations in the field ranging from the defence of 
their castle to ambitious long-range forays. The letter also makes it plain that garnsons 
were expected to co-operate and work together. AdditIonal evIdence strongly supports 
this; the regular communication by letter between garrisons, the meetings between 
constables and co-ordinated forays all provide evidence of extensive co-operation. 
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That men-at-arms circulated between garrisons and formed an identifiable common 
community reinforces this sense of widespread co-operation. 
The belief that garrisons did not regularly work in co-operation with one 
another centres on the argument that castles were not conceived as forming part of an 
interconnecting network when they were originally built and that only in such a 
deliberately constructed system was it possible for garrisons to support one another. 
There was certainly no overall master-plan allowing for mutual support in Scotland 
and northern England. However there is no doubt that English garrisons, particularly 
those in Scotland, did effectively operate as a network. The great concentration of 
castles in Lothian, including Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Jedburgh and Roxburgh, meant 
that they were in close proximity with the latter two particularly near one another 
while Linlithgow and Edinburgh were virtually neighbouring garrisons and the peel at 
Livingston allowed overland transit of goods to Stirling. In the west the garrisons of 
Lochmaben and Dumfries were routinely classed as one. Situated near the coast many 
of these castles were supplied by sea as Edward I had ensured his great network of new 
fortresses in Wales could be. The garrisons south of the Forth were therefore not 
isolated and could quite easily operate as a cohesive network as too could those 
concentrated in Northumberland when northern England became the front-line. 
There was also extensive co-operation between garrisons and English field- 
forces. It is evident that garrisons were expected to play an active role in support of 
any campaign in their region or indeed beyond it. The level of involvement vaned 
between a small proportion of the garrison being called to almost the entire garrison; 
whichever, it is clear that garrisons had an important role to play in conjunction wIth 
3 Brown, English Castles, pp. 216-7; Strickland, 'Securing the North', pp. 2 10-11; Prestwich, Armies 
aW Warfare, pp. 206-9; J. H. Beeler, 'Castles and Strategy in Norman and Early 
Angevin England', 
Speculum, xxxi (1956), pp, 581-601; C. W. Hollister, The Militaty Organisation of Nonnan 
Erigland 
(Oxford, 1965), pp. 161-6. 
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field-forces and one which could be defensive as well as offensive as the participation 
of the northern garrisons at Byland in 1322 illustrates. The strength of the link between 
garrisons and field-forces can be seen in the practice of garrisons being bolstered by 
the intake of troops from these forces during the winter period and their departure with 
the return of the campaigning season, a practice that both kept field-forces in being and 
c! flr n sue gthened garrisons during the period when they were most vulnerable to attack. 
Indeed it is misleading to view the personnel of garrisons and field-armies as two 
wholly distinct groups; many garrison troops may well have started out serving in a 
field-army and garrisons operating outside their walls can arguably be seen as a field- 
force. 4 By breaking this artificial distinction the heavy involvement of garrisons with 
field-forces can be seen to be a natural and expected interplay between the two. 
It is within this connection between garrisons and field-forces that the key to 
understanding the apparent defensive inability of garrisons against substantial enemy 
forces can be found. Following on from the pioneering and incisive analysis of 
crusading warfare by R. C. Smail several recent works on the strategy of defence have 
highlighted that it was a combination of garrisons with a powerful relieving field-force 
which provided a true and effective defence. 
5 Contemporary commanders knew the 
limitations of what a garrison could openly oppose and it was the field-army which 
was the primary instrument of defence, an argument borne out by the 
decisive defeat 
inflicted on the Scots at Neville's Cross. This does not mean that garrisons were 
obsolete; they could still harry sections of the enemy force, attack its rear, cut supply 
lines and, if besieged, hold out and effectively pin down the enemy. 
Yet theirs was a 
subsidiary role and an effective defence ultimately 
depended on the quick raising of a 
4 Morillo, Anglo-Norman Warfare, p. 94. 
5 R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfle, 1097-1193 (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 
204-15-, 1 France, 
Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300 (London, 1999), pp. 
95,97,1022, Monllo, 
Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, pp. 94-7,105; Strickland, 
'Securing the North', passim. 
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powerful relieving field-force without which garrisons could only remain behind their 
walls and hope to retain their castles; defensive strategies may have been based on 
castleS6 - and by implication garrisons - but they were only based on them not 
ultimately reliant on them. It was the lack of such relieving forces during 1311-14 and 
in the late 1330s and early 1340s which greatly contributed to the loss of castles and 
unopposed Scottish raids, periods which coincided with the Scottish war becoming a 
secondary consideration for both Edward 11 and Edward 111. The situation was 
exacerbated by the peculiar type of warfare the Scots waged in northern England in 
which their aim was not the traditional one of annexing territory but of raiding and 
extorting ackmail thus bypassing one of the key characteristics of the castle, that of 
holding land. It was in response to this warfare that wardens were appointed with 
mobile forces between 1315 and 1319, a large proportion of their mounted troops 
being based in the front-line northern castles and the rest remaining with the warden as 
a relieving field-force ready to move to any trouble-spots. This was a sophisticated if 
costly answer to the problems of defence and proves that it was the combination of 
mobile garrisons and a field-force which provided the only effective means of defence, 
one that was to be executed in a tactically offensive manner as the increasingly mobile 
garrisons of the early 1320s and 1330s demonstrate. 
All the evidence so far points to garrisons, and by association their castles, 
being at their most ineffective when forced into a prolonged defensive. Yet With the 
traditional assumption being that they were primarily defensive in nature their obvious 
limitations in this area questions whether this really was their primary role. Indeed the 
inescapable argument running through all the evidence is that these garrisons were 
actually intended to primarily be aggressive forces operating in the field. 
They were 
' Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 206. 
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not meant to be confined within their walls defending the castle from attack. this may 
have been their most basic role but it was not their ralSon d'itre. Such a desperate 
situation was an emergency measure, an unnatural state for a garrison to find itself in 
rather than a natural one. 7 Troops pinned behind their walls were at best a neutralized 
force and at worst in a potential death-trap. 8 For a garrison to find itself under siege or 
assault was an accepted eventuality in time of war but it was not expected that this 
would last over an extended period of time with no help forthcoming. Based in hostile 
territory, unsupported and forced into a prolonged defensive it was only a matter of 
time until a castle fell. In such a situation a garrison was in its most vulnerable state. 
The lack of censure to constables who lost their castles in such circumstances makes it 
clear that they were not expected to be capable of holding out indefinitely. 
The reality is that English garrisons in this period were intended to be primarily 
aggressive forces with castles as their base of operations rather then being bodies of 
troops installed in castles primarily to protect the latter from attack. They were not 
static, defensive forces, undertaking the odd offensive operation when the opportmity 
arose; garrisons were active forces, expected to operate aggressively beyond the 
confines of their castle walls in both offensive and defensive operations. This is the 
reason why garrisons remained at the forefront of military trends and why they 
continued developing towards becoming totally mobile forces. The experienced and 
long-serving troops of a garrison were also surely too scarce a commodity to be wasted 
solely for the purpose of defending the castle walls, being among the most seasoned 
semi-permanent soldiers the English realm possessed. The natural area of operations 
7 Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, p. 95. 
8 Ibid, p. 96. As demonstrated most notably by the number of 
leading Scots captured within Dunbar 
castle in 1296 and the prominent English prisoners, 
including the earl of Hereford, taken in Bothwell 
castle when seeking refuge after Bannockburn. 
9 As do the indentures which stipulate a constable could surrender his castle if relief 
had not arri'ved 
within an agreed period. 
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for a garrison was in the field either acting alone or in concert '"ith other garrisons or 
field-armies, functioning in a strategically offensive manner or, if on the defensiý e, in 
a tactically offensive manner. It was for these aggressive capabilities that so much 
money and effort was expended in maintaining them and it was when operating in 
conjunction with a field-force that garrisons really proved their effectiveness. It was 
the failure of the Crown to support them With regular field-forces that blunted their 
aggressive ability and forced them into a prolonged defensive leaving them isolated 
and confined within the prison of their own walls With the inevitable loss of their 
castles ultimately following this transition that placed garrisons in their most 
vulnerable state. 
That acting aggressively was the predominant characteristic of these garrisons 
is reflected in the difference between the size of garrisons in Scotland and 
subsequently those on the front-line in northern England in the first half of the century. 
In overall terms those in Scotland were more heavily manned and the periods in which 
the numbers of those serving in garrisons peaks occurs during the occupation of the 
Scottish castles. Contrastingly when the northern castles of England became the front- 
line in the years immediately following Bannockburn their garrisons were on average 
of a much smaller scale. So minimal were the northern garrisons maintained by the 
Crown immediately after Bannockburn that a recent historian of the period has 
described this as unpardonable neglect on the part of Edward 11, an argument 
supported by Edward 11 not using his right of rendability to take important northern 
castles into the hands of the Crown. 
10. However defeat at Bannockburn coupled with 
the wholesale loss of Scottish castles had decisively turned the war 
for England into a 
desperate defensive one; the aim now was not to aggressively pursue the conquest and 
McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, pp. 143-4, The prorynnent pfivate northern castles that 
dd come under 
Crown authofity did so accidentally due to minorities and were accepted reluctantly 
as demon --. -, t rated by 
the quick return of AInwick to Henry Percy though 
he was still not of age. 
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subjugation of Scotland but to hold on to the north of England. This could simply be 
achieved by retaining the northern castles in English hands. Large garrisons were not 
necessary for the effective defence of a castle from attack with relatively small 
numbers able to hold off much greater forces throughout the medieval period and NNIth 
the war now being fought in England the Scots were denied the advantage of home 
territory which had been so important in the taking of Scottish castles. " That the 
largest and most powerful garrisons are to be found in Scotland during the vigorous 
English prosecution of the war there reflects the fact that these garrisons were 
essentially aggressive forces routinely operating in the field, intended to function as 
they had done in Anglo-Norman times as cornerstones of conquest and occupation. 12 
However the most conclusive evidence that these garrisons were primarily 
aggressive is their development into totally mobile forces. A central argument against 
the ability of garrisons in the field is their perceived lack of mobility and with regard to 
the early years of the century this is to an extent true. The large number of foot-soldiers 
meant that the full power of the garrison could not necessarily be brought to bear in 
forays and the mobile men-at-arms of the garrisons were therefore supplemented by 
dedicated mounted strike forces such as that based in Roxburgh town under William 
Latimer. This all changed after Bannockburn as first hobelars and then mounted 
archers were retained instead of foot-soldiers which consequently transformed entire 
garrisons into becoming fast-moving strike forces. Particularly telling is the large 
number of mounted archers present in the garrisons of both mid-century and towards 
the end of the period; if these garrisons were intended to be defensive then foot- 
soldiers would have easily sufficed but instead the Crown took on the expense and 
difficulty of maintaining mounted troops because only they could provide the 
field 
" Strickland, 'Securing the North', p. 216; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 206, Brown, 
ý, -jjgljsh 
Castles, p. 185. 
12 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 206. 
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capability that the Crown wanted these garrisons to exercise. The maintenance of fully 
mounted garrisons was for no other purpose than to enable them to operate in the field. 
One of the main reasons garrisons are presumed to be prlmarily passive 
defensive entities is due to their intimate association with that great symbol of the 
Middle Ages, the castle. Defence was an intrinsic consideration of the castle bwlder 
and even today their monolithic remains retain a sense of the impregnable xvith any 
onlooker immediately questioning how such a building could ever be taken. The vast 
majority of military architecture that featured on the castle building was defensive and 
this predominant feeling encompasses all connected with the castle including their 
garrisons. Yet this emphasis on impregnable solid defence was inherent in the very 
nature of the castle and to appreciate the role of the castle in warfare it is necessary to 
concentrate on its purpose rather than its structure. 
The conclusions reached concerning the role and activities of garrisons 
therefore provide important insights into the role of the castle in warfare. It has already 
been stated that castles were meant to keep garrisons in relative security functioning as 
a heavily defended forward base rather than garrisons merely being present to just 
defend the castle building and it follows that the housing of aggressive garrisons was 
one of the main roles of a castle,, a fact which immediately lends an emphatic 
aggressive aspect to the castle itself This should not be a surprise as castles were 
originally an instrument of aggression, key weapons in the process of conquest under 
the Anglo-Normans, used to secure newly won territory and acting as a base from 
which further inroads could be made. One of the greatest examples is that of Chdteau- 
Gaillard,, the foremost castle of its age, for which a penetrating recent revision of its 
role has concluded that it was not built to defend the route to Rouen but as a 
forward 
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base from which Richard I could recover the Vexin. 13 Similarly the great castles 
constructed by Edward I in Wales were built on such a capacious scale as they were 
intended to house field-forces operating in the region while the extensive network of 
castle garrisons retained in Normandy in the early fifteenth century saw them 
frequently used as field-forces and the attachment of permanent field companies to a 
number of garrisons following the reforms of 1434 illustrates that field operations were 
synonymous with these garrisons. It is also telling that the garrisons of castles closer to 
the French border were more mobile in their composition thus exploiting their 
aggressive potential. Clearly castles formed the basis of sophisticated systems of 
offence as well as of aggressive defence. The use of major castles as forward bases for 
conquest and occupation again explains why the greatest garrisons of the period were 
in the Scottish castles from which the conquest and subjugation of Scotland was 
attempted, a war fulfilling the true purpose of the castle as an active front-line 
instrument of war. 
14 
Rather than being deliberate defensive networks many castles were initially 
conceived as instruments of offence and it is this offensive aspect, both strategically 
and tactically, which has recently been emphasised by several historians. In analysing 
the defensive role of the castles of northern England in the twelfth century Matthew 
Strickland relates their very definite limitations in this area to the fact that they were 
indeed initially instnnnents of offence. 15 John France has definitively stated that it is a 
mistake to see the castle as simply a defensive structure; that it was a secure base from 
13 An offensive system which also linked in with the new naval base of Portsmouth, I Gillingham, 
Richard I (Yale, 2002 edition), pp. 301-5; see also idem, 'Richard 1, Galley-Warfare and Portsmouth: 
The beginnings of a Royal Navy', Thirteenth Century England TY, ed. M. Prestwich, R. H. Britnell, R. 
Frame (Woodbridge, 1997). Again, despite its impregnable look, Chdteau-Gail lard was primarily 
aggressive with its defensive attributes inherent. 
14 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 215; A. Curry, 'English Armies in the Fifteenth Century', Arms, Armies 
and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, eds. A. Curry, M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 
5 21, 
62-4. 
15 Strickland, 'Securing the North', pp. 214-20. 
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which to launch attacks, especially if the garrison contained mounted troops, and he 
identifies that the real strength of the castle lay in the garrison based within It. 
16 
Similarly Stephen Morillo has recognised that defending the castle walls was an 
emergency measure for a garrison, that for garrisons offensive operations were more 
important than defensive ones and that it was only heavily manned garrisons which 
were capable of executing such aggressive operations. 17 Allen Brown was at pains to 
stress that castles were offensive as well as defensive and that the former could well be 
argued to be their primary role with their real military value being found in their 
function as a base and consequently he emphasised the importance and preponderance 
of mounted troops within garrisons. " As these statements make clear the full 
aggressive potential of the castle could only be realised by the garrison based within it 
and only by maintaining a powerful garrison equipped to perform the role of a strike 
force was the English Crown able to transform the front-line Scottish castles they 
occupied into true instruments of war. 19 It was for this reason that questions of 
garrisoning and victualling have been seen to dominate those of architecture during the r.;, -, 
reign of Edward 11 as these were the ones that mattered in a state of incessant warfare 
when castles were very much in the front-line. 20 
However there was a duality of role in the castle acting as a forward base for 
not only did it function as a base for the garrison but also as a supporting base for 
field-forces which were operating in the area. Castles acted as storehouses of victuals 
for these field-forces as well as providing them with local intelligence and, if needed, 
16 France, Western Warfare, pp. 78,104. 
17 Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, pp. 74-5,95-6. 
18 Brown, English Castles, pp. 172,198-9. 
'9 It is Smail who aptly describes castles as offensive weapons, Crusading Warfare, p. 215. 
20 Prestwich, 'Castles in the Reign of Edward H', p. 176. The argument that the reign of Edward H was a 
depressing one for the castle in which its military importance declined is more concerned with domestic 
conflict rather than the Scottish war in which castles clearly retained the same critical militar-N 
importance they had always possessed. 
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acting as a refuge of relative security. Exactly how critical castles were to field-forces 
is starkly demonstrated by the campaign of 1314. The absence of any English 
campaign after 1311 allowed Bruce to seize and destroy innumerable fortifications in 
Scotland held by the English with Linlithgow being the first significant loss in Lothian 
falling in late 1313. These losses were due to the breakdown of the svstem which 
required the presence or real threat of a relieving army. At this time Edward 11 
announced a muster for a campaign in the following summer. The response of Bruce 
was to immediately try and take the first-rate castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh and 
Stirling. This was not primarily motivated by a fear that the English army Nvould 
strengthen and consolidate these garrisons and castles but through a realisation of what 
such a substantial army could potentially accomplish basing itself on these castles. The 
enormous support they could provide to the army would make a powerftd English 
campaign in Scotland a dangerous reality. It was vital for the Scots to deny them to the 
English. This was why the seizure of these castles suddenly became so urgent that the 
desperate method of assault was turned to in an attempt to accelerate the process of 
their capture. By taking these major castles the English campaign could be irreparably 
damaged before it had even begun, these castles providing an invaluable advantage for 
a campaign in hostile territory. 
A key feature of the Scottish policy of destroying castles was to ensure there 
were no bases that could provide the necessary support for further Eng] ish 
campaigns. 21 Without the possession of castles in Scotland there could be no hope of 
English success as Witnessed by the hopeless floundering of the 1322 campaign when 
the Scottish strategy of retreat and scorched earth forced the English army to turn back 
due to a lack of supplies and no strategic direction, two of the essential commodities 
2' Their destruction also denied the English the ability to 'lord it over the land' (Lanercost, p. 204) as 
well as denying them places of safety from the Scots, C. J. Rogers, 
War Chiel and Sharp (Woodbridge, 
2000), p. 61 n. 86. 
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castles gave to an invading field-army. It was no coincidence that this hopeless 
campaign took place when the English did not hold any castles In Scotland. Castles 
effectively acted as a strong bridgehead for campaigns and for control, the keystones 
of conquest, and it was for this reason that the earliest campaigns of Edward III in 
Scotland had as one of their central aims the capture, rebuilding and garrisoning of the 
major Scottish castles without which no attempt at the conquest and control of 
Scotland was possible, the same castles which Edward I had been quick to seize when 
war broke out in the 1290s and from which he had attempted to subjugate Scotland. 
In 1314 and 1322 the issue of the castle providing essential support for a field- 
force comes to the fore, one which was dependent on the castle itself rather than the 
garrison and it is on this basis that Morillo has argued that it is possible to distinguish 
the role of the castle from that of its garrison. He suggests that such support is an 
integral aspect of the castle building irrespective of the garrison while he also 
conjectures that a garrison operating outside of its castle walls should be judged as a 
field-force 
. 
22 However such a distinction is artificial as it is not possible to separate the 
castle from the garrison, the building from the troops. Each was integral to the other. 
The garrison was always active whether in the field, gathering intelligence or 
maintaining the castle defences. When a field-force was present the garrison acted in 
co-operation with it along with the castle providing it with support. Nor can garrisons 
operating outside of their walls be totally classed as field-forces as they were first and 
foremost garrison forces and at the end of operations returned to their castles. The 
installation of large garrisons in the major Scottish castles was to allow these garrisons 
to control the surrounding area and to maintain an unceasing and aggressive war 
from 
them which arose from their ability to undertake determined and sustained attacks 
thus 
22 Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, p. 94. 
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allowing constant pressure to be exerted. 23 Such activities merged completelý N%ith the 
function of the castle as a supporting base. The aggressive role of the castle 
encompassed both those of support and the activities of garrisons and any distinction 
between the two is only possible in a purely academic sense; to contemporaries the 
military value of the castle would have been seamless. 
Having analysed exactly what a garrison was in this period it has become 
possible to fully understand their operational roles and capabilities and this in turn has 
enabled the role of the castle in warfare to be addressed in a new light. In both cases 
the overriding conclusion is that in this period they were primarily aggressive entities 
intended to project power beyond the walls. Garrisons and castles were also 
inextricable components of a sophisticated military system with an administration of 
supply and reinforcement at its core which was critical to their survival as was co- 
operation with field-forces; they were not meant to operate in isolation or to defend 
themselves and the surrounding area for extended periods of time without support. The 
perceived failures of garrisons and castles in the warfare of this period was down to a 
breakdown in this system and the prolonged penods in which they were left vulnerable 
in an unnatural state of almost permanent defence. 24 These failures were not down to 
some intrinsic fault within garrisons and castles themselves and it follows that there 
was no decline in the military importance of the castle in the Anglo-Scottish wars of 
the fourteenth century. 
Castles were most effective when engaged in aggressive warfare beyond their 
castle walls and to reach their ftill potential in this they had to 
be heavily manned and 
ideally comprise of a totally mounted force. It was the presence of such a garrison 
that 
23 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 209,213. 
24 The breakdown of such a system is also indicated by the many small 
fortifications built in 
Northumberland which are indicative of a fragmentation of governmental power and control, 
Sumption, 
Trial by Fire, p. 3 85. 
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realised the full potential of the castle as such a potent instrument of war and it was in 
this active and aggressive manner that the English Crown attempted to use the 
garrisons it retained during the Anglo-Scottish wars of the period. The advent of the 
hobelar and then the mounted archer actually increased this potential as the century 
progressed. In contrast it was when forced into bouts of prolonged and increasingly 
isolated defence that castles and garrisons were at their most vulnerable and 
ineffective, the weakness of their reliance on an external system of support coming to 
the fore. It is only from a detailed study of garrisons as opposed to castles that the 
primacy of active field operations over defending the walls emerges, the predominance 
of the latter in terms of historiography due to the architecturally based studies of 
castles that have held sway for so long. 
In recognising the capabilities and limitations of garrisons and castles it is 
essential to appreciate that they operated as part of a much more complex system, one 
that encompassed the entire military establishment of medieval England. As medieval 
warfare itself has recently been reclaimed as being capable of displaying sophisticated 
strategy and tactics so garrisons and castles should be accepted as being integral 
components of such highly developed methods of warfare in which they were both part 
of the system that made this warfare possible as well as being dependent on the system 
for their own survival and effectiveness. Only by completely understanding the 
structure and nature of English garrisons of this period does such a sophisticated and 
involved relationship become evident. It is also clear that it is only by embracing a 
more wide-ranging study of the castle than just its actual design and construction can 
the true role of the castle in medieval warfare begin to be truly understood. 
3 03 
The role of the castle in terms of occupation and conquest may be long 
recognised but it has never been addressed in detail. 25 Indeed very little attempt has 
been made to explain exactly how contemporaries went about harnessing and utilisi'ng 
the castle as an effective instrument of war and the aim of this thesis has been to 
explain how the English Crown attempted to do so during the Anglo-Scottish wars of 
the fourteenth century. In doing so it has reinforced the argument that it is the 
aggressive role of the castle, combined with its defensive strength, which explains its 
military importance . 
26 The ultimate power of this defensive strength has long been 
recognised as an inherent and integral feature of the castle building itself, as this thesis 
has shown the real extent of its aggressive role resided in the potential invested within 
its garrison of operating beyond the castle walls. In this period the English Crown 
clearly saw the castle functioning as the potent aggressive weapon of war in which its 
very origins lay. 
15 Strickland, 'Securing the North', p. 220. 
26 Brown, English Castles, p. 199. 
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